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The history of the U.S. is inseparable from its practices of imprisonment.  The 
centrality of incarceration is evident in books, films, and performances situated in 
tension between imaginative and historical discourses:  William Faulkner’s novels 
Sanctuary (1931), Light in August (1932), and Go Down, Moses (1942); Eldridge 
Cleaver’s Soul on Ice (1968) and Norman Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song (1979); 
Tony Kaye’s American History X (1998), Norman Jewison’s The Hurricane (1999), 
and Liz Garbus, Wilbert Rideau, and John Stack’s The Farm:  Angola, USA (1998); 
Ken Webster’s Jury Duty (1999) and a 1999 protest, “Live from Death Row.”  These 
representations of imprisonment provide the means to identify a carceral identity, as 
imprisonment has become a matter of cultural difference similar to other indices such 
as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.  Raced practices of imprisonment have 
contributed to the equation of black masculinity with criminality in the cultural 
imagination, a practice resisted in texts that evoke a plural, social identity.  Faulkner’s 
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fiction demonstrates a shift in responsibility for criminality between 1931 and 1942, 
from the individual to the social, and challenges the degree to which lynching 
informed Southern execution practices.  Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song
bracket a transformation in the carceral identity from raced and politicized to an 
ahistorical, race-less phenomenon, a change apparent in the transcripts of the 
American Correctional Association as well.  The wholesale expansion of 
imprisonment in the U.S. in the last quarter of the twentieth century figures 
prominently for films set in prison, and the films make claims to the real in a manner 
that affects actual prisoners.  The concluding performances challenge the isolation of 
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Imprisonment and the Cultural Imagination
[T]he weight of past narratives and characterizations of the prisoner 
work as social forces in shaping the depiction and motives of the 
prisoner of the present and hence force the issues of race and gender.  
Because the public has a memory of the discourses concernig 
prisoners, however ephemeral, all new constructions of the prisoner 
begin with past characterizations as a base.
—John M. Sloop, The Cultural Prison
The study of incarceration as it is represented and practiced in the twentieth 
century United States gained clarity for me the summer of 2001, when a particular
incident illustrated how the imagination of prisons overwrites their actuality.  On a 
Sunday afternoon, I took a break from working on an early draft of this project and 
scrolled through the channels of Time Warner Cable.  Turner Network Television 
(TNT) featured The Shawshank Redemption (1994), a well-known Academy Award 
Best Picture nominee in which Tim Robbins and Morgan Freeman play long-term 
convicts whose friendship redeems both of them.  At the same time, The Discovery 
Channel screened the documentary “Maximum Security Prisons”—or rather it was 
scheduled, but there seemed to be some problem with the cable signal, and Discovery 
displayed only a blank monitor.  That blankness contrasted sharply with The 
Shawshank Redemption, where actors played convicts on screen, the characters sitting 
in a theater watching a Rita Hayworth film.  When Andy Dufresne (Robbins) leaves 
the theater, he is attacked, brutally beaten, and presumably raped by a group referred 
to as “The Sisters.”  On the Discovery Channel, “Maximum Security Prisons” ended 
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and “Supermax” began its account of a high security facility, but the signal remained 
blocked and the screen dark.  Back on TNT, in The Shawshank Redemption, Andy 
tries to get funding from the warden to buy new books for the prison library. 
Too much could be made of whatever technological glitch made “Maximum 
Security Prisons” unwatchable that afternoon—though Martin Luther King III cites a 
similar experience he had earlier the same year, one he recounts in his keynote 
address at a national conference of prison administrators (ACA 2001 2).  Discovery’s 
programis even one of the two shows he mentions.  There is a crucial lesson in the
blank screen of “Maximum Security Prisons” as adocumentarycontrasted with the 
glossy and familiar look and characters of Frank Darabont’s film, with its coherent, 
humanist narrative, in which a white man imprisoned for a crime for which he was 
innocent learns about compassion from a black man who was guilty.1  The 
documentary would not have provided access to some unmediated “real,” given that 
it, like The Shawshank Redemption, would feature the efforts of producers funding 
the venture, a director choosing and structuring scenes, editors building narrative 
continuity, and the rest of the production crew that make film and video such 
collaborative work.  
However, there are critical differences between depictions by actors and by 
prisoners, fictional narratives and documentary, realistic and really “real.”  Certainly 
there are challenges to authenticity and the problems of the “real” posed by post-
structuralism2—or, for that matter, raised in the British reality television series “The 
Experiment,” reported by BBC News as a twenty-first century redux of the infamous 
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1971 Stanford Prison Experiment, featuring aspiring actors playing real people in 
order to be on television and thereafter become “real” actors.  Nevertheless, a crucial 
gap remains between Freeman playing Red and Supermax prison inmate Kenny 
Collins, who speaks in the prison protest “Live from Death Row” described in the 
conclusion of this dissertation.  The difference I highlight between the popular 
Hollywood film and unseen documentary illustrates one of the central tenets of this 
project, that actual prisons have a constructed invisibility in sharp contrast with their 
surfeit of representation in books, films, television, and other media.  These screens 
of the imagination offer the projections of what is hoped and feared to be true of 
prisons, places that are by definition difficult to access—except for black men, who 
enter far too easily.    
The ease of switching channels between the documentary and the film also 
highlights the seemingly narrow gap between actuality and its imaginatio .  There is a 
simultaneous mutual causality and disjuncture between the historical record and the 
cultural imagination, a difference that is particularly stark for prisons as they are 
endured by those within and imagined by those without.  It costs U.S. taxpayers over 
$35 billion each year to keep two million people in prison and jail, over 40% of 
whom are black; another 4.7 million people are on parole, probation, or held in an 
alternate facility (Schlosser 54; U.S. Department of Justice“Prison and Jail Inmates at 
Midyear 2002” and “Probation and Parole”).  There is a largely unremarked tension 
between that set ofsocial and institutional practices and the hundreds upon hundreds 
4
of recent descriptions of imprisonment varying in media, genre, popularity, and stakes
in the real.
These depictions make for a various literary record.  The depictions of 
incarceration take many forms and become a part of history in a manner different 
from but related to other aspects of the historical record, including but not limited to 
patterns of U.S. prison policy and practice that have varied considerably over time.  
The sheer difficulty of engaging those methodol gical problems, coupled with the 
fact that imprisonment is so visible as to not be seen, necessitates this Prologue’s 
somewhat impressionistic scope as a preface to Chapter One, which functions as a 
more proper introduction.  That chapter stablishes the historical and theoretical 
frameworks for the subsequent analyses of representations of criminality and 
imprisonment.  Chapters Two through Five examinethree novels, two books situated 
between biography and fiction, three films, and two performances:  William 
Faulkner’s novels Sanctuary (1931), Light in August (1932), and Go Down, Moses
(1942); Eldridge Cleaver’sSoul on Ice (1968) and Norman Mailer’s The 
Executioner’s Song (1979); Tony Kaye’s American History X (1998), Norman 
Jewison’s The Hurricane (1999), and Liz Garbus, Wilbert Rideau, and John Stack’s 
The Farm:  Angola, USA (1998); Ken Webster’s Jury Duty (1999) and a 1999 protest, 
“Live from Death Row,” where actual prisoners speak via speaker phone with an 
assembled audience.
As the last of these demonstrates, for those not themselves confined, 
imprisonment is closed off from visibility, creating a space for imagined interiors, 
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whether projected on screen or cast on the page, which purport to unveil the mystery.  
However, that unveiling often merely capitulates to the contradictory fantasies of 
audiences who conceive of prisons as forces of order, places of r habilitation, torture 
chambers of psychic, physical, and sexual violence, consolidations of uniformly 
violent, dangerous, and most often black criminals, or all of these at once.  Those 
fantasies, particularly in the absence of lived experience, prove formative for widely 
held assumptions regarding actual incarceration.  Various critics of popular culture 
such as Henry Giroux, Ed Guerro, and bell hooks argue that fictions shape public 
perception, but producers and audiences also speak to that matter themselves.  For 
example, an April 2002 advertisement in Premiere Magazine for the Suncoast film 
retail company features a store manager’s pitch for the company’s products with this 
endorsement of The Shawshank Redemption:  “They do a great job of capturing how 
it must feel to be behind bars and then be free again” (25).3
Again, prisons by definition are enclosed spaces, and those not themselves 
incarcerated imagine those interiors, look to popular and provocative projections to 
see “how it must feel to be behind bars.”  This dissertation explores that must, that 
subjunctive, that imagination of actuality.  I am not claiming an unmediated real, 
telling what prison is really like for those inside, how it really feels to be 
incarcerated.  As Statesville Prison, Illinois inmate Simon “Sam” Guitierrez writes, 
“Prison life is really nothing like what the press, television, and movies suggest” 
(Morris “Contemporary” 203).  The fascination with imprisonment emerges in the 
gap between historical ctuality and its imagining, between the tremendous numbers 
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of actual prisoners and their near invisibility in public discourse, the representations
of imprisonment and a lack of a corresponding critique.  This dissertation looks to 
texts that traverse that gulf in examining a specific set of representations of 
incarceration, works that make some claim to the real even as they are held in tension 
between imagination and history. 
William Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses begins with the chase for an escaped 
slave and ends four generations later with a black man imprisoned and executed in 
Chicago, his body returned to his native Jefferson, Mississippi.  Faulkner suggests 
that the character’s criminality is part of a pattern of racial inequity perpetuated 
through the genealogical span of a novel beginning with southern slavery and 
progressing through Jim Crow to 1940.  Furthermore, he locates the social 
responsibility for the return of Butch Beauchamp with the entire town in general and 
the white male business community in particular.  Eldridge Cleaver in Soul on Ice
operates in various registers, sometimes, like Norman Mailer, observing himself 
watching the time of his time, commenting on contemporary events and popular 
culture, though with a prison cell view in his case.  Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song
even more fully narrates the history of its present, excerpting news clippings, 
interviews, and other ephemera that provide a texture of historical actuality to the 
narrative of Gary Gilmore’s crimes, trial, and execution.  Mailer d monstrates the 
role narration plays in telling history as hedocuments the media circus surrounding 
Gilmore’s case involving lawyers playing the part of reporters, reporters shaping 
popular opinion, and movie producers contributing to the outcome of events.  The 
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three films surveyed—American History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm—all 
variously situate themselves in the real of history, whether citing statistics of 
incarceration, using documentary style or occasional news footage, or being a full-
fledged documentary, as the last is.  The dramatic performance Jury Duty pitches 
itself as being based on a true story, and the activist protest “Live from Death Row” is 
only in its analysis understood as a performance rather than an event.  Despite their 
differences of genre and media, these are all representations of criminality and 
imprisonment shaped by imagination, and they are all invested in operating in 
historical terms, drawing relationships between imagined situations and actual 
circumstances.  
The degree to which these books, films, and performances implicate 
themselves in their respective histories complicates the approach of historical 
contextualization that has been the dominant trend in U.S. literary criticism over the 
past two decades.  Such historicism incorporatesstrategies of textual juxtaposition 
and analysis, drawing connections between diverse textualities.  Critics relatefiction,
documentary, ephemera, and historiography, incorporating these markers of meaning
as a way of making sense of history, literary and otherwise.  The presumption of that 
methodology is that history can be understood as a social unconscious, its direct 
access unavailable after the fact, and mediated through its textualization.4 However, 
the works surveyed in this dissertation make a deliberate effort to engage their 
immediate history, already incorporating matters of the historical record into 
themselves, whether a “true live novel” including contemporary newspaper accounts 
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in The Executioner’s Song, a feature film integrating documentary footage in The 
Hurricane, or a performance situated in actuality as in “Live from Death Row.”
Nevertheless, the same strategies of historically nuanced analysis also level some of 
the differences among fiction and non-fiction, television, film, newspapers, and other 
media charting the scope of a shared reality.  Those methodsprovide the basis for the 
traces and erasures of identification, the operation of fear and desire, projections of
human agency.  Media representations with claims to the real play an important part 
in defining the shape of what might be understood as the cultural imagination, the 
pages and screens of thought and belief in which people recognize themselves and 
others.5 Reading the cultural imagination as symptomatic of a social unconscious
guides this dissertation’s examination of the representation of imprisonment in 
twentieth century U.S. literature.  
Just as these books, films, and performances are complicated by their 
trafficking back and forth between imagination and history, the documents by which 
their historical contexts might be understood are themselves informed by imaginative 
discourse.  For example, the American Prison Association president in 1929, George 
C. Erksine, declares in his keynote address, “Probably never in r cent times has the 
attention of the public been centered on crime and criminals as it is to-day.  The head-
lines of the morning paper, the table of contents of the current magazines, a casual 
glance at the shelves of any book store, the growing list of federal, state and 
municipal crime commissions, all bear witness to this modern trend” (2).  A very 
similar claim made over four decades prior by a member of the same organization 
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fractures the exceptionality of Erksine’s “never before.”  The speaker Hamilton 
Mabie asserts in “The Press and Crime” a nearly identical point—though he 
differentiates between “the noblest literature” and popular journalism pandering to 
“ignoble taste” (NPA 1886 146-47).  Both Mabie and Erksine respond to the need for 
administrators of actual prisons to account for and situate themselves with respect to 
the record of crime and punishment as it has been popularly describedin a variety of 
registers.  The earlier speaker implies the tension between the literary and the 
popular, and even highlights the relationships between imagination (noble literature, 
current magazines, and shelves of any bookstore) and history (speeches of prison 
officials, headlines of the morning paper, and reports of crime commissions).  Both of 
these matters of differentiation and distinction guide this dissertation’s analysis of 
imprisonment in books, films, and performances of thetwentieth century U.S.  
More significantly, the point thatvarious representations of imprisonment 
shape the discourse of thes  prison officials implies something else:  the distinction 
between text and context cannot be sustained.6 Over four decadesprior to Erksine’s 
comment on the “modern trends” of contemporary popular culture in 1929, Mabie 
was offering a similar account. Forty-five years later, in 1974, two of the nine papers
on psychological treatment of prisonerspresented at the American Correctional 
Association (ACA) conference respond directly to Stanley Kubrick’s representation 
of rehabilitation in A Clockwork Orange (1971).  Twenty-four years after that, ACA 
President Reginald A. Wilkinson offers this anecdote:
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I wrote a letter to the HBO producers of the dramatic series entitled:  “Oz.”  I 
explained that the stereotyping and misrepresentations of the corrections 
profession in their drama is unacceptable.  Of course, the response that I 
received was that the show was designed to “entertain” and was not meant to 
depict reality.  It is precisely these nonreality [sic] depictions that perpetuate 
the fallacies about our craft.  The characterization of corrections on the silver 
screen and in the mass media serves as a constant reminder that we must be 
ever vigilant in heralding the positive aspects of our profession.
(ACA 1998 85)
The pervasiveness of the cultural imaginat on means researchers and administrators 
must contend with its depictions.7
The swirl of textualities circulating in culture and history traffic in various 
registers of truth-value, including “realistic”  novels and films, newspapers, and 
television programming ranging from wholesale fiction to reality TV to the news.  
Imprisonment in the cultural imagination shapes how actual prison administrators 
discuss it.  Furthermore, Julian V. Roberts and Loretta J. Stalans draw upon 
criminological research and Gallup and other polls to demonstrate how public support 
for “tough on crime” politicians is often misrepresented, orchestrated, or the result of 
widely held misconceptions regarding crime, punishment, and racial stereotypes.  
They emphasize how the media plays the role of “crucial intermediary between 
politicians and public” (31-32).  However, they focus exclusively on news accounts 
and do not recognize what Wilkinson does, that “silver screen” and “mass media” 
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both shape belief; texts that traffic between history and fiction such as those surveyed 
in this dissertation inform public opinion.8  Such opinion contributes to the shape of 
another body of documents, the statistics of incarceration, as this dissertation suggests 
that those numbers too have been influenced by depictions of imprisonment in the
cultural imagination.
Mabie’s and Erksine’s claims of the pervasiveness of images of crime and 
punishment in 1886 and 1929 remain accurate at the turn of the twentieth century, 
when there is an unexamined presenc  of prisons in texts popular and literary.  That 
prevalence is easily surveyed, and while a complete list of explicit references to the 
carceral in popular culture would prove impossible, a few high profile examples from 
the years during which I undertook this dissertation include the following:  Don 
Delillo’s Underworld (1997) briefly chronicles a juvenile detention facility, and
Alexander Parson’s first novel Leaving Disneyland (2001) opens in Tyburn 
Penitentiary, a fictional riff on London’s infamous hanging tree.  The 2001 video for 
DMX’s “Who We Be,” one of many rap videos set in a prison, features a cascade of 
politically laden rhymes appearing like headlines, super-imposed over a black man 
behind bars.  A heavy metal band, Godsmack, sets a 2000 video in a prison riot. 
Denzel Washington plays a wrongly convicted boxer serving time in a film based on 
a true story in The Hurricane, which, along with American History X and The Farm,
draws attention to the number of black men behind bars.  Robert Redford appears as a
court-martialed general leading a prison revolt in The Last Castle (2001), a 
counterpoint to his role as the muckraking warden disguised as prisoner inBrubaker
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(1980).  That film also features Freeman, who plays Red in The Shawshank 
Redemption, and an earlier Redford film, Up Close & Personal (1996), has yet 
another prison riot as its pivotal episode. Oz (1997-2003), a television drama set in a 
prison, was HBO’s debut regular series, and while the ACA president castigates it for 
its inaccuracy, it remains one of the few programs not geared primarily for a black 
audience to feature prominently many black actors in its cast, reproducing the over-
representation of black men in actual prisons.  
As of the end of 2003, there were at least 251 U.S. films featuring men in 
prison and 87 focusing on women in prison,9 another testament to the carceral as a 
site of recurrent fascination.  These productions merit remark from prison officials, 
and Brubaker and Oz are singled out at ACA conferences for comment and critique 
(1980 6; 1992 3; 1998 85).  Prisons are an eponymous part of how contemporary 
United States culture imagines itself, but this list also highlights the emphasis on 
blackness and masculinity that colors and genders incarceration—and consequently, 
criminality.  Prisons and criminals in popular fiction offer a problematic population of 
characters wherein black masculinity and criminality are mutually constituting 
systems of signification, a vexed connection that guides the selection of the texts of 
this dissertation.10
Not only popular fiction but also popular journalism has represented the 
related matters of incarceration and race.  The 2000 presidential election made then 
Governor of Texas George W. Bush’s record of overseeing 152 executions a matter
of national discussion, a debate that replayed questions of the racial equity of capital 
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punishment.  Those sameinquiries had almost three decades before prompted the 
Supreme Court to formalize in Furman v. Georgia (1972) what had been an informal 
moratorium on executions since 1967.  In addition, in 1998, 2000, and 2001, The
Atlantic Monthly, Newsweek, and Time, respectively, offered cover articles addressing 
the increasing number of prisons built each year, the privatization of prisons, the 
disproportionatestatistics of black men serving time, and the negative ways in which 
incarceration affects communities.  The cover image of a black man for each of these 
issues foregrounds the racial disparity in U.S. prisons.  The popular imagining of 
prisons and prisoners, including the raced casting of criminals, both affects and is 
affected by their representation in news media.11  Two instances exemplify the 
complex back-and-forth dialogue between actuality and imagination.  George H. W.
Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign famously deployed the image of Willie Horton 
and thereby drew on the long-standing myth of the violent black rapist in order to 
attack Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis’ record on crime.  Five years later, the 
commissioner of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections claims, “The Willie 
Horton phenomenon has affected just about every correctional system in this country” 
(ACA 1993 76).  Imagined fears contribute to actual incarceration.  
In the other direction, from raced state violence to its imagination, the grainy 
film record of the 1992 beating of Rodney King by a gang of police officers so 
permeated the mediascape of the 1990s that it has at least two citations in film:  
Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days (1995), in which LAPD officers surround and 
assault a character played by Angela Basset, and the Wachowski brothers’ The Matrix
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(1999), in which Lawrence Fishburne’s Morpheus is similarly abused.  Such interplay 
between news and imagination makes it difficult for audiences to determine from just 
where their preconceptions emerge, what competing frames of reference of dubious 
facticity and even less determinate meaning produce the set of shifting assumptions 
and social discourses that are culture.  Historically nuanced textual analysis becomes
a strategy oftracing trendsin a social unconscious, the cultural imagination, and 
suggesting their significance.
Imprisonment was not imagined but lived for over two million people as of 
the close of 2003. Furthermore, among those in federal and state prisons and county 
jails, black men are over-represented by a factor of more than seven in comparison to 
white men, Hispanic men by a factor of almost three.12  That over-representation of 
black men in prison presents a reversal of their under-representation as both writing 
and written subjects, the sort of disproportion that literary scholars have in general 
sought to redress in the past quarter century.U.S. literary study since the early 1980s 
has emphasized progressively more nuanced politicality and historicity, wherein the 
difficulties and fecundities of cultural diversity should reflect in organizations of 
“literature” as both a field of study and a set of texts to mirror lived experience.  
Prison as a metaphor is pervasive; however, the scarcity of real and imagined prisons
in critical discourse belies theprofusion of the incarceration of raced and classed 
populations in the U.S.  The under-r presentation of prisoners is not merely a 
phenomenon of literary history, but a matter of national significance—particularly 
given the anti-democratic erasures that took place in the national election of 2000,
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where the construction and deployment of a carceral identity—the criminalized 
person subject to imprisonment—helped shift the outcome of the presidency.
The purging of voter rolls during the highly contested 2000 U.S. presidential 
election in the state of Florida illustrates the tense interplay of black and carceral 
identities.  Florida was one of 13 states that at the time prohibited former offenders 
from voting unless granted particular clemency, even after their sentences were 
completed.  The names of thousands of men and women were on waiting lists to have 
their rights reinstated, and the delay at the office of G vernor Jeb Bush, George W. 
Bush’s brother, was two to three years.  At the time, black men and women 
outnumbered white by 3.3 in Florida prisons.  Over 30% of the black men in Florida 
could not vote because of previous convictions, and black voters in the state voted for 
Democratic candidates typically nine to one.  Therefore, a tremendous number of 
potential voters, many of them black men, already were removed from the democratic 
process due to state law and bureaucracy.  
In addition to the people already on record as ineligible to vote due to a pri r 
conviction, a list of 57,746 names of “probable felons” was assembled and distributed 
to the county voter registration boards in order to facilitate their removal from the 
catalogue of eligible voters.  The list was compiled at great expense by the private 
company Database Technologies under the direction of the Governor’s office—
specifically, by Katherine Harris, who served both as Florida’s Secretary of State and 
co-chair of Bush’s presidential campaign in the state, and was thereafter elected as a 
Republican to the U.S. House of Reprsentatives in 2002.  The list featured 10 times 
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the number of names generated in earlier efforts and was later determined to be 
riddled with mistakes.  It drew from state-provided information, including names, 
dates of birth and conviction, and race.  However, subsequent examination by the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has demonstrated that Database Technologies, 
under direction from Harris’ office, categorized the 57,746 people as “probable 
felons” through gross extrapolation of the data, leading to thousands of errors, such as 
close but not precise matches of names and dates to the information provided, as well 
as outright mistakes, such as a woman being mistaken for her sister, an ex-offender, 
and a man barred from voting in 2000 for a conviction in 2007.13
The voting controversy has four crucial components related to this 
dissertation.  These include the over-representation of black men among Florida 
prisoners and those formerly convicted, the state law barring former offenders from 
voting, the inefficient and grossly inaccurate composition of the list, and the matter of 
partisan intent on the part of the office of Florida’s Secretary of State and its mutually 
exclusive interests in an impartial election process and  profound Republican
investment as embodied in Harris.  The first of those factors demonstrates the degree 
to which questions of criminality are informed by other matters of identity such as 
race and masculinity.  The second and third factors together illustrate that criminality 
is an identity historically subject to categorization, description, and definition to the 
extent that it transforms “persons” to “felons” whose very delinquency follows and 
defines them even after their sentence has been served.  The practice of surveillance 
effectively produced criminals in the absence of any actual crime or injured party 
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prior to the assignment of their “probable felon” status, which itself constituted its 
own injury in the loss of voting rights.  The list and its use illustrate Michel 
Foucault’s claim in Discipline and Punish (1979) that “prison, and no doubt 
punishment in general, is not intended to eliminate offences, but rather distinguish 
them, to distribute them, to use them; that it is not so much that they render docile 
those who are liable to transgress the law, but that they tend to assimilate the 
transgression of the laws in a general tactics of subjection” (272).  The “probable 
felon” list produced criminality where there often was none, a distinction that in this 
case served an overall strategy of anti-democratic control.14
The fourth matter, that of intent, is thus raised.  A common criticism leveled 
against Foucault, that he mistakenly equates intent with effect, seems similarly 
applicable in this situation with regard to whether Florida’s specific effort in this 
instance was intentionally racist.  However, the Voter Rights Act (1965) is explicit on 
the matter that intent and effect need not be coincident to determine that voters have 
lost their constitutional right to vote.  In the executive summary of the findings of the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ investigation of the 2000 election in Florida, the 
Commission determined, “The VRA does not require intent to discriminate. Neither 
does it require proof of a conspiracy. Violations of the VRA can be established by 
evidence that the action or inaction of responsible officials and other evidence 
constitute a ‘totality of the circumstances’ that denied citizens their right to vote.”  
That “totality” includes “voting procedures and voting technologies and […] the laws, 
the procedures, and the decisions that produced those results, viewed in the context of 
18
social and historical factors.”  The Voter Rights Act provides powerful leverage to the 
analysis of the historical practices of incarceration identified in this dissertation:  the 
question of racist intent is not the point in the over- epresentation of black men in 
prison.  The effect is the key, as is made clear in the American Correctional 
Association’s official endorsement in 2001 of the “restoration of voting rights” to 
former felons after the completion of a sentence, citing that “disenfranchisement 
disproportionately affects segments of the population” and fulfills no corrective 
purpose (2001 97).  Still, as of 2004, 48 states prevent inmates from voting, and 13 
bar any former convict from the electoral process.  Furthermore, the lack of voting 
rights for both those imprisoned and former offenders—and in the 2000 presidential 
election the accounting and disenfranchisement of “probable felons”—demonstrates 
that the carceral identity is a historical actuality with extensive political ramifications, 
a matter drawn all the more clearly in a national election determined by 537 votes.15
The stakes are high in the critique of the representations of imprisonment, the 
connections between imagination and actuality and those in and out of prisons, 
especially because of the dangerous equationof black masculinity and criminality.  
There is jurisprudential law, easily understood as historically contingent— he 
contradictions and revisions between the separate but equal ofPlessy v. Ferguson
(1896) and its overturning inBrown v. the Board of Education (1954), for example—
and then there is natural law, seemingly axiomatic and universal.16  The problem is, 
the difference between the two does not fade only in deconstruction, a rhetoric of 
reversal.  Repeatedly and uncritically participating in fictions governed by the 
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inexorable logic of verisimilitude produces ipso facto the black super-masculine 
menial, who becomes the criminal.  The cultural imagination shapes the real.  
The over-representation of black men in prison equally serves opposite 
arguments.  First, structural inequalities in education, employment, and social 
services have perpetuated the disenfranchisement of black men even as the criminal 
justice system inequitably punishes them; second, black men are “naturally” more 
likely to commit crimes.  Of course, endorsing the latter of these is unequivocally 
racist and ignores the raced injustice throughout U.S. history, and only those unafraid 
of their racism will espouse it.  However, the repeated projections on page and screen 
cast shadows which color criminality and precipitate sedimentary layers of cultural 
expectation, the relentless logic by which an imagined symbolic of realism overwrites 
the real.17  While the terms imaginary, symbolic, and real invoked here carry with 
them Lacanian associations, their meanings are not bound there.  While it is only a 
happy accident of history that Lionel Trilling’s essay “Reality in America” is printed 
in The Liberal Imagination (1950), the Imagination’s containment of “Reality” at 
least suggests that imagining the real is a critical imperative beyond psychoanalysis.  
Antonio Gramsci makes this point in his description of the optative utopia of 
“concrete fantasy,” a counter-hegemonic strategy of alienated groups (Prison 
Notebooks 126).  However, layered representation can participate in social control as 
well as resistance.
The opening personal vignette of this Prologue contrasts the visibility of the 
fictional prison of The Shawshank Redemption with an unseeable documentary of a 
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Supermax facility.  That overwriting of actual, material circumstances of 
imprisonment with their imagination is not simply an occasional accident,a linguistic 
sleight-of-sign, or a semiotic concealment, but a matter of material subalternity.  For 
those not themselves contained within them as inmates, visitors, or staff, prisons quite 
literally are obscured from sight.  The prison occupying a copper mine 100 feet 
underground in Newgate, Connecticut may have ceased operation in 1828,18 but 
prisons continue to demonstrate a third world buried beneath the first.  That vertical 
diaspora is best illustrated in Angola Penitentiary in Louisiana, chronicled in The 
Farm, the name “Angola” enduring from the plantation where the prison now stands, 
a plantation that took its name and its slaves from Africa,19 a prison where primarily 
black prisoners now work the fields, and where writ lawyers cannot find redress.  
Black men and women were incarcerated disproportionatelyduring the Revolutionary 
period at the country’s first prison on Walnut Street and at Parchman Farm during 
Reconstruction, a raced incarceration that continues in prisons today.  Certainly, 
resisting those practices requires the work of activists and lawyers.  Challenging the 
calculus equating blackness and criminality in the cultural imagination and 
developing strategies of resistance also demands the participation of historians and 
cultural critics.  
My personal hope and scholarly dedication is that constructing a clearer sense 
of the carceral identity in the cultural imaginationand its tension with the historical 
record can create the possibility for that machine of signification and the expectations 
it produces to be recognized, re-appraised, and reorganized. Gaining a clearer sense 
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of the historical processes of representation and expectation may helpunbalance the 
tacit equation of criminality and black masculinity—because the black man accused 
of murder, sex crime, or assault maintains a mythic force in the U.S.  Euphemistic 
courts of public opinion try cases in ways similar to conventional jurisprudence.  
They share the characteristic of situations of undecidability that nonetheless demand 
decisions.  Courts both literal and figurative reach conclusions that in effect 
simultaneously record and invent history, retroactively determining what has already 
happened.  Legal courts do so with the attendant material consequences of 
exoneration, fine, or imprisonment.  However, such actual trials mandate the presence 
of the accused; there is no comparable imperative ofhabeas corpus in courts of 
public opinion. Popular conceptions of blackness and crime can take place in the 
absence of either one.  The layered representation of the cultural imagination has 
effects less immediately tangible but nonetheless pervasive, as the equation of black 
masculinity and criminality is balanced through the fulfillment of the desire to see 
black men in prison.
A final reason to trace the development of the representation of imprisonment 
in the cultural imagination is to substantiate H. Bruce Franklin’s declaration in his
2000 MLA presentation:  “Just as we now assume that one cannot i telligently teach 
nineteenth-century American literature without recognizing slavery as context, one 
cannot responsibly teach contemporary American literature without recognizing the 
American prison system as context.”  Franklin’s call here echoes the emphasis on 
incarceration patterns made in Mary Helen Washington’s presidential address at the 
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1996 American Studies Association meeting and Angela Davis’ jeremiad there two 
years later.20  In drawing attention to the historical context of imprisonment, Franklin 
relies on the tacit relationship of historical and literary study to assert the as yet 
insufficiently addressed significance of incarceration in the contemporary U.S., as 
well as in the literary history of that nation.  In pairing slavery and imprisonment, he 
implies both their related practice and equal importance in constructions and revisions 
of the nation and its literature.  The rhetorical gambit is powerful—my interest is in 
demonstrating the degree to which it is accurate.
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CHAPTER ONE
Imprisonment in U.S. History and Literary Studies
[N]ot courthouses nor even churches but jails were the true records of 
a county’s, a community’s history, since not only the cryptic forgotten 
initials and words and even phrases cries of defiance and indictment 
scratched into the walls but the very walls themselves held […] the 
agonies and shames and griefs.
—William Faulkner, Intruder in the Dust
This dissertation organizes its study of the representation of criminality and 
imprisonment from 1931 to 1999 through a set of texts that emphasize the tensions 
between imagination and history.  While Faulkner’s Sanctuary, Light in August, and 
Go Down, Moses all focus on crime and punishment,the last in particular 
reconstructs the raced past of the Old and New South.  Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and 
Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song both blend biography and historiography in v ewing
national history through the lens of a prisoner.  Three films, American History X, The 
Hurricane, and the documentary The Farm, all variously leverage the cachet of the 
real, as do two performances of 1999, the drama Jury Duty based on an actual trial, 
and the protest against the death penalty “Live from Death Row.”  These books, 
films, and performances are first and foremost addressed as a part of a historical 
record, telling a type of truth in their various adherences to frameworks of fiction and 
non-fiction.  Faulkner’s wholly imagined narratives nevertheless relate a history of 
Southern racism from slavery to imprisonment.21 Soul on Ice operates variously as 
autobiography, cultural myth, social critique, and literary criticism, while Mailer’s 
novel incorporates contemporaneous records such as newspaper and interview 
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accounts of events into its narrative.  American History X regularly appeals to tactics 
of realism and has its characters spout incarceration statistics to substantiate its truth 
value, while The Hurricane draws from actual events and features some documentary 
footage—and The Farm is entirely a documentary.  Jury Duty has the distinction of 
being based on a true story, and the activist demonstration “Live from Death Row” is 
a demonstration, a historical event only addressed as a performance.  
I situate their representations of imprisonment with respect to two other means 
of knowing past prison practice and policy:  first, in the anonymous exactitude of 
statistics as accounted by historians, sociologists, and the U.S. Department of Justice; 
and second, in registers ranging from praise to polemic to declarations of policy and 
academic research as presented in the annual proceedings of the American 
Correctional Association, formerly the National and then the American Prison 
Association.22  These representations are given greater texture by drawing upon U.S. 
prison historiography and sociology to demonstrate that prison history is central to 
national history.23  The effort in each chapter is to offer theoretically inflected 
explorations of the mutual informative relationships of actual imprisonment and its 
representation in these works of literature, film, and performance, wherein the 
depictions of prisons and prisoners are held in tension between imagination and 
history.  The historical expanse of the study and the many genres and media 
demonstrate the degree to which incarceration, a concealed practice, proliferates in 
language and images, saturating the history and culture of the twentieth century 
United States.  That variety also demands a range of critical approaches sensitive to 
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the ways in which different sorts of works operate and attendant to the historical 
contexts from which they are inseparable.  Texts that are literary, bureaucratic, 
theoretical, documentary, and ephemeral function differently, but bringing them 
together is necessary to both demonstrate and interrogate the unacknowledged 
pervasiveness of imprisonment in the cultural imagination and historical actuality—
and how each has affected the other.
I draw on multiple strategies of investigation, including close analysis of the 
works themselves sensitive to their various media of writing, film, and performance, 
the historical and cultural moments of their production and original reception, and the 
texts’ implication in individual and collective psychoanalytic models.  That 
combination of efforts conducts the three-part argument of this dissertation’s 
proposition that the history (literary and otherwise) of the U.S. is indivisible from that 
of its prisons.  First, imprisonment is a condition of human experience alongside race, 
class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and other indices of cultural difference.  Second, 
the history of raced incarceration in the U.S. largely equates black masculinity with 
criminality in the cultural imagination, in effect if not in intent a strategy of racial 
containment, which many of these texts render visible and often contest.  Third, they 
generally offer a tactic of resistance in an expanded model of personal identity, a 
social subjectivity emphasizing an engagement with history and a collective sense of 
the self in that history at odds with the American ideal of autonomous individualism.  
The carceral identity in the cultural imagination is informed by race, gender, and 
class; historically, it has been a place of struggle between forces that would isolate the 
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prisoner and the efforts to demonstrate the social and historical contingencies of 
imprisonment.  
The mutually informative tension between cultural imagination and national 
history demands a variety of critical approaches.  The confluence of the personal, 
cultural, and historical in the constructions of character in these works invites 
historically and at times psychoanalytically nuanced approaches to social and 
individual subjects, to the operation of power, to shared fears and desires.  The texts 
that are widely or highly regarded (or both) at prticular historical moments can be 
understood as meeting some need, fulfilling some lack or expectation in their 
representations.  This dissertation therefore makes occasional use of psychoanalytic 
terms to describe how these books, films, and performances function, the ways they 
operate in helping shape the cultural imagination.  Incorporating such an 
interpretative framework at times less fulfills an ahistorical theoretical imperative 
than responds to the degree to which the texts surveyed themselves regularly 
implicate individual and social accounts, challenge the distinctions between the 
personal and cultural past, and between imagination and history—what might be 
remembered, known, believed, and recorded.  
The works surveyed occupy not a middle ground between historical and 
imaginative, but traffic back and forth between fields of discourse:  Go Down, Moses
reconstructs the history of the New South, Soul on Ice fuses personal and cultural 
history with myth critique and revision, The Executioner’s Song claims to be a “true 
life novel” in its subtitle, and American History X employs a code of realism 
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prompting some viewers to question whether it is based on actual events, which The 
Hurricane and Jury Duty actually are.  The Farm and “Live from Death Row” are 
non-fiction, a documentary and an activist demonstration, but each is shaped by and 
contends with social expectations in part informed by the layered representations of 
the cultural imagination.  The analysis conducted, then, tracks among various 
discursive registers of theoretically nuanced and historicized readings to demonstrate 
how works making a claim to the real tell their own sort of “truth.”
Attention to situating such claims to the real unites the application of various 
theoretical approaches, whether historicizing, psychoanalyzing, or emphasizing 
differences in the performances and limits of cultural identity.  This dissertation 
makes use of vocabularies and methods(most explicitly those of Freud, Lacan, and 
Deleuze and Guattari, and more implicit y, Foucault, Jameson, and de Certeau) in 
order to clarify aspects of texts that might otherwise escape notice.  These include: 
the social unconscious of Faulkner’s imagined Jefferson, Mississippi; the 
misrecognition of blackness as criminality, the “Negro” crimes and sentences of Light 
in August, Soul on Ice, Hurricane, The Farm, and “Live from Death Row”; the social 
accountability for crime and punishment in Go Down, Moses, Soul on Ice, The 
Executioner’s Song, and virtually all of the films and performances; schizophrenia as 
described in Soul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song, and The Hurricane; and the 
resistance to individual autonomy and support of social identity in many of the texts.  
However, this dissertation also works to guard gainst the seduction of those
theoretical discourse.  In the effort to better illuminate cultural functions of carceral 
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practice as it is projected on page, screen, and stage, such application can shine so 
brightly as to obscure the representations themselves.  At one extrem , criticism 
wholly in one vein or another can inadvertently treat the theoretical discourse as a 
closed symbolic order, the self-substantiating name of the father.  At the other, 
working with a variety of models can lead to muddied or specious application or 
appropriation, poaching and name checking.  To avoid these pitfalls, I have 
foregrounded accounts of the texts themselves, incorporating terms and approaches 
that clarify rather than cloud how imprisonment and the identity of the prisoner 
function in different ways over time.  I balance theoretical reading with an account of 
the diverse interests producing and receiving books, films, and performances with 
varying levels of disinterest, dismay, and desire—to bring together the mechanics of 
production with the various audiences of theorists, critics, and general readers and 
viewers.
Furthermore, the effort here is to apply various theoretical vocabularies 
bridged by shared participation not only in the topic of imprisonment, but through the 
historicist imperative to relate these texts to the contexts from which they are 
inseparable.  Indeed, I hope to have demonstrated that any particular lens of this or 
that theory attentive to what these books, films, and performances do—what they 
produce—is always implicated in history and its narration.  The history of now is at 
once the product of what has already happened, and the process of a cultural 
imagination recreating that past in its own terms, thereby laying a blueprint for future 
images and imaginings.  The historical and material overwriting of prisoners in the 
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United States has limited dramatically their ability to participate in that process.  The 
right of habeas corpus in the court of public opinion is not one constitutionally 
upheld, and the reiterative projections of carceral experience create the basis for 
documentary and other aspects of the historical record to reinforce mainstream 
imaginations of imprisonment.  Scholars must therefore make a greater effort to 
return prisoners to history, to recognize the changes through time of a carceral 
identity, a demarcation of human experience that carries tremendous cultural force.
Like this dissertation as a whole, this chapter situates these texts with respect 
to their contemporaneous history, their initial reception from 1931 to 1942, from 1968 
to 1979, and at the close of twentieth century.  First, I argue for the centrality of 
imprisonment to understanding U.S. history, literary and otherwise, and demonstrate 
that the texts surveyed in this dissertation ctribute to that project.  Next, I point out 
how the representation of incarceration largely has been overlooked until recently in 
U.S. literary studies.24  Last, I substantiate how a combination of ways of reading is 
necessary for the diverse set of texts surveyed, and offer a chapter by chapter sense of 
how the related arguments develop.  The overall purpose of this dissertation is 
threefold:  to call attention to the importance of prisons and prisoners to conceptions 
of the U.S., its literature, and its history; to argue that raced practices of imprisonment 
have contributed to a difficult equation of black masculinity with criminality; and to 
suggest that a richer account of that history as it has been recorded and imagined can 
contribute to its reconstruction.  The “real” of history is fleetingly experienced, and 
only lastingly available in its textual narration.  The stories that tell that history are 
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inflected by the circumstances of their own production.  Or as Rage Against the 
Machine frontman Zack de la Rocha describes such historical narrativization in the 
song “Testify” (1999), “Who controls the past now/ Controls the future/ Who controls 
the present now/ Controls the past.”25  This dissertation renders a history of 
imprisonment as it has been both practiced and imagined not in an effort to control 
either past or present, but in the attempt to tell a particular history in order to 
contribute to the imagination of a different future.
In the opening epigraph of this chapter, a provocative passage from Intruder 
in the Dust (1948), William Faulkner imagines the history of Yoknapatawpha County 
scratched into the walls of its jail in a nearly illegible graffiti of identities and 
indictments—a linguistic reversal, as the accusations are offered by those themselv s 
convicted and imprisoned.  The novel itself is not among the author’s most heralded, 
and even his avid readers may be unfamiliar with its narrative.  However, one of its 
characters is very familiar, Lucas Beauchamp, a name recognized from Go Down, 
Moses, where he plays alternately trickster and tragic hero, a black sharecropper who 
repudiates the wealth but not the pride of his white McCaslin grandfather.  In Intruder 
in the Dust (1948), Beauchamp spends almost the entire novel in jail, anticipating his 
lynching by the family of a white man he is said to have killed, until he convinces the 
nephew of the County Attorney to undertake the role of detective, exhuming the 
corpse of the murdered man to prove his innocence.  Readers see in Beauchamp a 
black man awaiting execution by mob or jury, a figure with a lineage extending back 
in history and fiction to Nat Turner and William Wells Brown’s George Greenof
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Clotel (1853); coincidentally, Nat and George are also the names of Lucas’ daughter 
and her husband in Go Down, Moses.  Turner’s actual and Green’s fictional death 
sentences are pronounced in response to slave rebellion, while the threat of lynching 
for a murder he did not commit hangs over Beauchamp.  Various characters remark 
that Beauchamp is actually punished for his pride—conveyed from his white 
progenitor—and accompanying repeated refusal to “be a nigger” (296, 299, 327).  In 
the eyes of Jefferson, sitting behind bars is the first time Lucas looks like a black 
man.
The past imagined in the walls of the jail in Intruder in the Dust is not written 
in the novel, and readers must turn to G Down, Moses for a richer sense of how 
crime and punishment shape cultural history—to read, in effect, the “agonies and 
shames and griefs” in the prison walls.  That writing on the wall gestured towards in 
Intruder in the Dust is actually recorded in the well-known ledger section of “The 
Bear” in the earlier novel, though the “cryptic forgotten initials and words and even 
phrases” there conduct a record of slavery rathe t an imprisonment.  In Faulkner’s 
fictional nineteenth and twentieth century South, there is not necessarily much 
difference among various practices of raced social control.  The opening episode of 
Go Down, Moses is a vignette featuring Beauchamp’s father, a slave, whereas the 
next section depicts the Jim Crow Mississippi of an elderly Lucas.  Lucas asks if he 
will be plowing the crops of Parchman Farm, a prison, instead of his tenant farm, and 
the sense is that there would be little difference.  Unlike other Yoknapatawpha 
landmarks, Parchman Farm is a matter of historical fact, and David Oshinsky 
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demonstrates that Antebellum strategies of racial containment were perpetuated in 
such prisons in “Worse Than Slavery”:  Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow
Justice (1997).  The degree to which Southern racism informed incarceration in the 
years following Reconstruction is apparent in the claims of prison officials of the 
time.  A South Carolina chair of a prison’s board of directors in 1888 declared that 
prisons in the state exist to house freed slaves, claiming that 95% of prisoners are 
black (NPA 70); the same year, an Alabama prison administrator blamed a 250%
greater mortality rate among black prisoners on their weak constitution (NPA 84).  
However, prison history in the U.S. cannot be collapsed to the injustices of Jim 
Crow—when black men were imprisoned for hazily defined and variously enforced 
crimes such as mischief, prison administrations stood to make small fortunes leasing 
black and white convicts as contract labor, and conditions proved so inhumane that 
five to ten years effectively mandated a life sentence.  The history of incarceration 
extends both before and after that period.
Prison history as national history
Walnut Street Jail was established in Philadelphia in 1776 and became the 
nation’s first prison in 1790.  Walnut Street represented a fundamental change in 
punishment, a shift from the bodily abuse of stocks, whipping, and execution to 
confinement and discipline.  The most prominent proponent of such a system was the 
ardent abolitionist and the nation’s pre-eminent medical doctor Benjamin Rush, who 
signed the Declaration of Independence alongside Benjamin Franklin and presented a 
proposal for a penitentiary model in the latter’s living room in 1787.26  That plan 
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emphasized reform, prevention, and deterrence through “bodily pain, labour, 
watchfulness, solitude, and silence.”27  Rush’s description, informed by 
Enlightenment ideals of justice and Protestant imperatives of discipline and work, 
was endorsed by Thomas Jefferson, who made further revisions, including offering 
changes to the criminal code as well as architectural drawings.  The jail, which held 
prisoners until their sentencing or for very brief durations, became the prison, where 
confinement was the punishment.  Many of those confined at Walnut Street were 
African Americans, over- epresented by a factor of more than seven when compared 
to whites, and primarily serving sentences for property crimes such as theft.  The 
rapid expansion of incarceration led to overcrowding at Walnut Street, and 
Pennsylvania’s Eastern State Penitentiary at Cherry Hill was built to replace it in 
1829.  It was the largest building in the U.S. at the time.  Prisoners in the 
Pennsylvania model of isolation almost never left their cells, laboring, sleeping, and 
eating in close to absolute isolation for the duration of their sentences.  An alternate 
model of congregate imprisonment developed at Auburn Penitentiary in New York, 
built in 1819, where prisoners slept in separate cells but worked together in silence 
enforced by frequent whipping.  Out of favor as a punishment p r se, whipping 
remained accepted as a means of discipline within prisons.  The Auburn model 
typically proved more profitable than the Pennsylvania system, and debates over the 
relative merits of the two resulted in a battle of pamphlets whose rhetorical volume 
approached that of contemporary arguments for and against slavery.28
34
Both models maintained at least the idea of rehabilitation of the individual as 
a component of Jacksonian democracy, and their construction and practices 
proliferated throughout the U.S., attracting international attention and emulation.  
Alexis de Tocqueville’s journey through the U.S. in 1831, which led to his 
Democracy in America (1835), was originally purposed to inspect the prison system 
in order to provide a model for the French government.  However, with attention 
shifting away from reform in the 1850s, and prison populations increasingly holding 
African Americans and new immigrants, less money was set aside for construction 
and maintenance.  Ballooning numbers made the isolation and silence of the 
Pennsylvania and Auburn models no longer tenable due to overcrowding and 
insufficient staff, negative factors compounded by the lack of sanitation and health 
services, as well as harsh labor conditions.  Even any intention of reform faded in the 
subsequent decades, until the deplorable conditions surveyed by an examining 
committee and the urgency to organize and professionalize carc ral policy led to the 
formation of the National Prison Association in 1870.  Rutherford B. Hayes, the U.S. 
president from 1877 to 1881, was the organization’s first president in 1870 and 
thereafter from 1883 until 1892, a tenure twice as long as any other head of the 
Association.  Aspects of a proto-Progressive platform can be read in his keynote 
address at the NPA congress in 1888, which links criminality and its attendant 
imprisonment not to deficient character but to socio-ec nomic factors such as 
unemployment.  A reverend speaking after Hayes cites a warden’s view that one-third 
of prisoners don’t belong in prison, one-third should be there forever, and one-third 
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should have in and out privileges—and another participant would offer these 
proportions nearly verbatim in 1968.29
However, all the prisoners were there, and the renamed American Prison 
Association renewed its commitment to reforming prisoners in 1930 without more 
substantively addressing the consistently deleterious conditions of the nation’s 
prisons.  What approaches might prove rehabilitative and reduce recidivism remained 
up for debate, and experiments in education conducted by Zebulon Brockway at 
Elmira Reformatory and elsewhere in the 1880s and 1890s gave way to a medical 
model of treatment.  Doctors and administrators advocated psychological 
classification and individualized remedies, but budgets did not provide the resources 
for the implementation of those practices.  There were also growing challenges to the 
labor typically accompanying imprisonment.  Abuses of convict leasing had 
decreased, but even the possibility of humane work came under legal attack by 
organized labor and industrial interests concerned about marketplace competition, 
culminating in the Hayes-Cooper and Ashurst-Sumner Acts of the 1930s, making 
productive occupation for prisoners increasingly rare.  
Even as the APA again changed its name in 1954 to the American 
Correctional Association to emphasize the imperative to reform, it was a gesture 
more conciliatory to aspiration than actuality.  However, the Brown v. the Board of 
Education decision that same year laid the basis for subsequent improvements in 
prison conditions in the 1960s.  National movements organized around the struggle 
for racial equality led to the Civil Rights Act in 1964, which drew from laws written 
36
after 1865 to protect the rights of former slaves, and then served as a constitutional 
basis against discrimination a century later.  By extension, the Civil Rights Act also 
provided for prison reform, as did the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, the 
guarantee of appearance in court to contest incarceration, one of the rights suspended 
by the British government and thus precipitating the Declaration of Independence
Rush signed.  These expanded applications of federal law reversed the “hands off” 
policy which had previously relegated prison oversight entirely to states.  In 1970, 
many jails and prisons—largely in the South—were declared practices of cruel and 
unusual punishment for operating little better than slavery.  In many ways, then, U.S. 
prison history is national history.30
There is more of the story to tell, particularly how rates of incarceration 
(rather than the number of people in prison, which increases along with the overall 
national population if rates remain the same) remained relatively stable historically 
until the mid-1970s.  According to the U.S. Department of Justice, in the 1980s, that 
rate doubled, and in the 1990s doubled again (“Incarceration Rates”).  This 
introduction and to a greater extent the subsequent chapters render that history 
through the twentieth century in finer detail.  A fairly obvious question remains, 
however—what does prison history have to do with U.S. literature?  Certainly there is 
Beauchamp in the Jefferson jail throughout most of Intruder in the Dust, and careful 
historical study of Mississippi imprisonment practices through the first half of the 
twentieth century might demonstrate the degree to which the narrative account does 
or does not match actual incarceration practices of the place and time.  
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However, I am less interested in Lucas Beauchamp than I am in the people of 
Jefferson who want, who need to see him behind bars.  That history of desire and fear 
is much longer and more complex.  It is a matter of cultural expectation that is 
constituted in the tension between imagintion and historical actuality; the real of the 
latter is mediated, accessed through representations and narrations of all shapes and 
sorts.  Books, films, performances, and other forms of discourse emerge from, are 
both inflected by and transform the diverse sets of social practices and participatory 
spectatorship that are culture.  Their historically specific analysis provides a valuable 
instrument by which to gain a sense of the tenor of time and chart its change.  
Furthermore, the texts of this dissertation cue themselves to be read as telling a sort of 
truth, as they traffic back and forth between actual and imagined histories.  They 
thereby play a significant role in defining the scope of the cultural imagination.  That 
fantasy of what is known, remembered, and believed to be real is unavailable directly, 
and is mediated.  The depictions of incarceration are therefore usefully addressed in 
examination sensitive to historical specificity and psychological nuance, an 
examination of the language, images, and practices, the sites and sights where texts 
evoke what audiences want, need, and fear to be true.
The books, films, and performances of this dissertation either foreground or 
vividly repress how race shapes practices and patterns of imprisonment.  W.E.B. 
DuBois’ prescient claim in 1903 that the “problem of the twentieth century is the 
problem of the color line” (1) sees its starkest enactment in U.S. prisons, where 
exactly one hundred years later, at the end of 2003, rates of imprisonment for black 
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men drastically outnumber white.  That over-r presentation in actual numbers both 
emerges from and contributes to the phenomenon of conflating black masculinity and 
criminality.  Henry Louis Gates Jr., in the introduction to his Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Black Man (1997), offers an anecdote of a black male professor 
mistaken for a criminal.  Gates writes, “I don’t know a black man who doesn’t have at 
least one [of these stories] to tell” (xxii).  The novels, memoirs, feature films, 
documentaries, and performances surveyed in this dissertation tell more of these 
stories.  In Light in August, the murder of Joanna Burden prompts the townspeople of 
Jefferson to hope, to know a black man did it (288).  Dale Pierre is a background, 
evoked character in The Executioner’s Song, but he is a black man whose defense 
costs a District Attorney hopeful’s chance at election, because that lawyer had come 
to believe the man was innocent, “convicted by the Jurybecause he was black” (872).  
The arrest of Rubin Carter and John Artis that initiates their imprisonment in The 
Hurricane begins with them pulled over; a police officer tells them that they are 
looking for two black men, and Carter responds, “Any two will do?”  In “Live from 
Death Row,” Jody Lee Miles, a white man, testifies on the raced nature of the death 
penalty from the vantage point of death row.  This misrecognition of blackness as 
criminality serves as a focal point of analysis in this project, turned and returned to 
repeatedly.
Given that emphasis, there is the conspicuous absence of Richard Wright’s 
Native Son (1940).31  On one hand, the story of Bigger Thomas narratively conducts a 
thesis related to that offered in this dissertation.  Wright emphasizes the social and 
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historical conditions that predispose Bigger’s conscious and unconscious violence, as 
well as the white expectation of it, and the racist hysteria surrounding his pursuit. 
Bigger’s prison house reflections include his observation of “a black sprawling prison 
full of tiny black cells in which people lived,” and the socialist lawyer Maxargues in 
court that the frenzy calling for Bigger’s execution demonstrates the “[f]ear and hate 
and guilt” of race and class conflict (334, 357).  In the novel, material limitations and 
how whiteness imagines blackness produce the expectation and fulfillment of raced 
criminality.  On the other hand, the didactic and relentless development of these 
arguments makes their representation of carceral force less nuanced than the 
complexities and contradictions of Go Down, Moses, Soul on Ice, The Hurricane, The 
Farm, and “Live from Death Row,” all of which offer a similarly raced carceral 
trajectory.  Wright has a particular axe to grind:  the history of racism in the U.S. 
produces a set of social and material conditions that determine human possibilities.  
Such determinism governs the novelist’s sense of narrativization as well, and 
Wright in “How ‘Bigger’ was Born” describes his writing process as that of a 
“scientist in a laboratory,” creating circumstances into which he inserted Bigger (xxi).  
The effort to conduct in narrative a scientific Marxism, the analysis of seemingly 
objective conditions, sharply limits human agency.  However, Wright’s account of his 
discursive method leaves open a broader, less mechanistic sense of possibility.  He 
depicts his process of translating into fiction “what he has read, felt, thought, seen, 
and remembered” (vii)—what he again offers as “following the guidance of my own 
hopes and fears, what I had learned and remembered” (xxi).  Wright effectively 
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describes his part in what I refer to as the cultural imagination, what is read, felt, 
thought, seen, and remembered, what he hopes and fears to be true.  The narration of 
an ever-shifting present imagined in this way extends beyond the scope of strict 
determinism.  The method of Native Son’s narrative argument therefore shapes the 
means of analysis in this dissertation, rather than the novel serving as its object.  
Native Son is not overlooked in this dissertation; rather, this dissertation is overseen 
by it.  The specter of “Bigger” Thomas haunts these pages, and unlike the elder 
Hamlet’s ghost, he is less forbidden to speak the language of the prison house and tell 
its secrets than demanding that they be written.
The structural design of this project draws attention to the pervasiveness of 
imprisonment in a variety of twentieth century U.S. texts.  To focus on a single 
medium or genre, or to read synchronically and survey a set of contemporaneous 
texts, or scan diachronically and track through time the writing of a single author such 
as Faulkner, would localize the degree to which the imagined prisons have saturated 
U.S. cultural production.  This dissertation thus broadens its scope and reads at a slant 
in two ways.  First, these five chapters cut across culture and through history to 
demonstrate the proliferation of images of incarceration.  Second, each chapter reads 
its grouped texts not with but against one another, as well as alongside others, 
particularly the history of actual incarceration practices and the discourse of prison 
officials themselves as offered in the transcripts of the annual meetings of the nation’s 
pre-eminent correctional organization.  The three periods bracketed by the texts 
surveyed offer rates of change from 1929 to 1942, 1968 to 1979, and 1980 to 1999.  
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The first period demonstrates how Faulkner’s view of raced crime and punishment 
and the social responsibility for it evolved, when both his fiction and the historical 
record suggest an equation of lynching and execution in the South.  The second charts 
the possibilities of understanding imprisonment as  historical and political
phenomenon in 1968, and the disappearance of that definitional context by 1979; 
between Cleaver and Mailer, there are diminishing possibilities for situating prisoners 
in history.  The third period culminates at the end of the twentieth century, and the 
films and performances of 1998 and 1999 show how the fascination with imaginary 
prisons at the brink of the twenty-first century obscures their concrete actuality, a 
tendency resisted in more marginal productions such as the two performances 
described in the concluding chapter.  
Given the scope and span of this project, each of these chapters could easily 
be a book in its own right.  This does not mean the analysis is superficial or lacks 
rigor.  Instead, my interest is in demonstrating the proliferation of incarceration in the 
cultural imagination and initiating questions, drawing relationships, opening lines of 
inquiry rather than closing them.  The description and analysis is at times offered in 
broad strokes because the picture is very large, but it is drawn in finer detail in these 
three crucial periods of imprisonment in the twentieth century U.S.  The first period, 
the decade between the publications of Sanctuary and Light in August and Go Down, 
Moses, saw the greatest recorded number of executions in the country’s history, 
offering a backdrop to the death sentences concluding each of t ese novels.  In 
particular, Southern execution practices coupled with national statistics so closely 
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resemble lynching as to suggest a substitution effect.  Go Down, Moses charts that 
history of incarceration most fully, describing it as a raced practice and the 
culmination of slavery and Jim Crow.  Furthermore, the speeches and research 
presentations of the American Prison (Correctional in 1954 and thereafter) 
Association from 1929 to 1932 offer a corresponding description of the causes for 
criminality to that offered in Faulkner’s Sanctuary and Light in August.  However, a 
decade later, in 1942, their respective senses of the contributing causes and 
responsibilities for crime and punishment diverge, as Go Down, Moses offers a sense 
of social responsiblity for raced criminality even as APA participants propose further 
individuation of prisoners.  
The second era, between Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song, frames a 
historical period where the revolutionary possibilities of recognizing, affirming, ad 
reaching across cultural differences seem to move from exultant to exhausted, and 
Cleaver’s imagined “we” becomes Mailer’s account of the execution of Gilmore’s 
“I.” 32  In 1968, Cleaver and Mailer were both addressing the threats and possibilities 
of social transformation in the U.S.; the same year, a warden and ACA President 
Preston L. Hancock believed “that we are in one of those convulsive spasms of 
change at the present time” (ACA 1968 13-14).  Cleaver was the most optimistic as to 
what change might bring, Mailer and Hancock far more circumspect.  However, 
much of the social unity effected in resistance in the 1960s was predicated initially on 
the civil rights movement and thereafter organized around the opposition to the 
Vietnam War.  The conclusion of the war thereby undermined the bases of the cross-
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cultural affiliations Cleaver and Mailer both documented in 1968, Cleaver in Soul on 
Ice and Mailer in Armies of the Night and Miami and the Siege of Chicago.  Those 
alliances between white and black, young and established, men and women, included 
resistance to imprisonment practices, and Mailer chronicles the list of demands made 
by the Youth International Party at the Democratic Convention.  The first is an end to 
the Vietnam War, the fourth, a “prison system based on the concept of rehabilitation 
rather than punishment” (Miami 137).  There were some gains for prisoners’ rights to 
self-representation in several Supreme Court cases between 1968 and 1974.  These 
included not only legal representation but more general communication between 
those in and out of prison, the sort of exchange upon which Soul on Ice and The 
Executioner’s Song both depend.33
However, not all cases supported prisoners, and Furman v. Georgia (1972) at 
once suspended capital punishment and provided the criteria by which states could 
again make it constitutional.  The hiatus since 1967 ended with the death of Gilmore 
in 1977.  By 1979 and The Executioner’s Song, the overall tenor of carceral policy 
had shifted.  A few notable ACA speakers addressed the raced nature of 
imprisonment practices the same year that Mailer’s novel reminded readers of a white 
celebrity convict who admitted his guilt and wanted to die.  Rates of imprisonment 
began their exponential increase, while execution rates started a precipitous climb.34
The splinter of social resistance to execution as chronicled in Mailer’s “true 
life novel” is a fragment of the more unified opposition previously organized around 
the war protest.  Broad-based resistance also failed to materi lize for the engagement 
44
following Vietnam, the subsequent police action writ large, the “war on drugs” 
initiated by New York Governor and thereafter Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, 
along with President Richard Nixon.  A wholesale expansion of the carceral system—
beginning in New York and occurring nationwide thereafter—resulted from shifts 
from treatment to incarceration and discretionary to mandatory sentencing.  The 
expansion of criminalization and mandatory minimum sentencing also led to the 
almost fourfold increase in those incarcerated that included black men in 
disproportionate numbers to their overall population.  
The third period of incarceration following those changes is among the 
bleakest of the twentieth century.  Between 1980 and 1999, according to the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the number of incarcerated persons more than tripled when 
adjusted for overall increases in population; the 1.9 million people in jail or prison in 
1999 nearly quadrupled the almost half a million people incarcer ted in 1980.35  Thus 
the three films and two performances at the end of the twentieth century correspond 
to the on-going three-decade experiment in imprisonment as the solution to all 
criminological dilemmas, the result of over two centuries of raced carceral practice, 
producing a system in which black men drastically outnumber white.  Raced 
incarceration patterns prior to the early 1970s, particularly in the South, can be 
attributed to both social and judicial racism, to structural (i.e., economic) inequities 
and irregular arrests and sentencing.  The nationwide expansion of the Rockefeller 
drug laws is the greatest factor in the increase in the prison population in the second 
half of the 1970s, and the targeted arrests of inner city drug offenders in the 1980s 
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and 1990s, coupled with longer mandatory sentences, compounded racial 
disproportions thereafter.36 As Chapters Four and Five demonstrate, by the last 
decade of the twentieth century, prison administrators were well aware that the 
increasing inmate population had little to do with increasing crime, and much more to 
do with racism and political weakness at the national level.
U.S. incarceration has become a matter of national and international critique 
and protest even as prisons continue to be built in record numbers to accommodate 
the ballooning prison population.  For example, California alone constructed between 
1984 and 1998 at a cost of over six billion dollars (Gilmore 171-172).  At the same 
time, the condition of imprisonment in the cultural imagin tion becomes image and 
setting with no strings attached, taking on a perverse polymorphism.  “Prison” 
becomes the exemplar sign that obscures its referent, an excessive visibility that 
conceals actuality, a machine of endless signification wherein the prisons of 
American History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm are at once hell and places of 
transformative salvation.  In the wake of The Shawshank Redemption, the first is 
similarly a space of violent homosexual rape and where one learns to be a better man. 
All four of these films depict black men as unjustly held, yet made better by the 
experience, even as American History X and The Farm cite national and state prison 
statistics regarding black prisoners, though with reverse agendas, as the former does 
so to substantiate white racism.  The two performances of the concluding chapter, 
Jury Duty and “Live from Death Row,” strive with some success to represent 
imprisonment without capitulating to its perverse imaginings.  All of these 
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representations foreground incarceration in a manner that literary and cultural critics 
have largely missed.
Imprisonment and literary study 
Humanities and social sciences scholarship of the past quarter century 
increasingly has organized its inquiry by matters of identity, of gender, race, class, 
and sexuality, differences constituted in and themselves shaping history.  
Increasingly, identity has been addressed not as a stable ontological categorization, 
but a culturally situated struggle among competing groups and enacted by individuals 
through socially coded performances.  A definitional statement made by the 
American Prison Association provides a point of entry into the performative character 
of criminality and its attendant incarceration.  The first of the NPA’s Declaration of 
Principles, established in 1870 with the organization’s founding and revised and 
reaffirmed 60 years later in 1930, lists a set of definitions:  “Crime is a violation of 
duties imposed by law, which inflicts an injury upon others.  Criminals are persons 
convicted of crime by competent courts.  Punishment is suffering inflicted upon the 
criminal for the wrong done by him, with a special view to secure his reformation” 
(1930 249).  That principle is again reaffirmed 60 years later, in 1990.37  Crime, then, 
is an act against written law with its own effect, injury.  A person becomes a criminal, 
however, not in committing the act of the crime, but through being acted upon by the 
court; criminality is subject to determination by the judge or jury.  Criminality is thu
a condition imposed by the court, not coincident with the commission of the crime 
but an effect of the jurisprudential conviction.  
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That can seem a matter of linguistic hair-splitting, until one considers the 
number of laws broken regularly in virtually all social segments of the U.S.:  stock 
market insider trading, exceeding the speed limit, domestic violence, corporate 
negligence, driving while intoxicated, illegal drug use (and the attendant sale), 
whether by right-wing polemicists such as Rush Limbaugh or by the inner city
populations he regularly demonizes, or any number of infractions that are part of the 
texture of everyday life as it is practiced and imagined in culture.  According to the 
APA Declaration, the cynical maxim, “it’s not a crime if you don’t get caught” is 
accurately framed in terms of the condition of criminality, rather than the commission 
of crime.  One is not a criminal for breaking the law, but only through a subsequent 
conviction in court.38
Criminality is thus a matter of interpellation, of being so named.  The term 
immediately invokes Louis Althusser and his claim of subjects as hailed into being.39
His example of the policeman’s call, “you there!” implies both the threat and the 
psychoanalytic guilt presumed in such a naming, and he describes that hailing as the 
entry of the subject into history (169-174).  That singular interpellation as identity 
formation is nicely exemplified with regard to race and gender in such noted 
examples as Frantz Fanon’s “Look, a Negro!” and Judith Butler’s “It’s a girl!” (Black 
Skin 109, 111, 112; Bodies 232).  Like those interpellations,40 the identity of the 
criminal has its presumably straightforward cause, originary and singularly definitive:  
the person is black and not white; the newborn child as these sexual parts and not 
those; the accused is guilty rather than innocent.  However, as with other indices, the 
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facticity of criminality (and the incarceration with which it has become increasing 
commensurate) and its meaning are not always so straigh forward.  The black and 
white of race is particularly vexed, at times denoting a perception of skin color and 
thus far more a psychological and cultural matter than one of biology, in other 
instances signifying ethnicity or ideology.41  In the field of gender, many theorists 
have approached the questions of male “becoming” especially with regard to the 
femininity that has defined it by opposition, work that others have relied on in 
defining how masculinity might operate.42
While incarceration, race, and masculinity provide the topoi of this 
dissertation, I sometimes employ a fairly uncomplicated treatment of the latter two, 
foregrounding the “incarceration” of the dissertation’s subtitle at the expense of the 
other two terms.  As prison studies becomes ore central to historical, literary, and 
cultural studies, then more specifically inflected analyses will appear, more richly 
describing blackness, masculinity, and other identity indices as they are constructed 
and deployed within imprisonment, both actual and imagined.  For example, in the 
gendered spaces of prisons, patriarchy as man-is-dominant engages prisoners in a 
subordinate role to “the man” who keeps them down; male prisoners thereby 
subordinate one another, sometimes in violent rituals of male prison rape, fantasies of 
which outside of prison even exceed its prevalence in prison.  That sexually enacted 
violence has its raced practice as well.43  Nevertheless, this study largely treats 
incarceration as the primary variable in the cultural function of imprisonment, its 
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purpose and practice changing historically.  Future work will incorporate more fully 
other indices of difference alongside the carceral.
The subsequent chapters address criminality as an identity equated to prisoner, 
given that through much of the twentieth century in the U.S.—especially in the past 
30 years—punishment largely has been synonymous with imprisonment.  Formerly 
reserved as punishment for severe crimes of violence and property, imprisonment 
increasingly has become since 1980 the only solution for the problem of all people 
named as criminals.  Such a calculus corresponds to another, that of black masculinity 
with criminality.  It is not only racists or the under-informed who follow that faulty 
transitivity:  if A equals B, and B equals C, then A equals C.  Black men are over-
represented in prison, and those in prison are presumed to be uniformly violent 
criminals, so black men are violent criminals; or, most black men are violent 
criminals and thus fill prisons.  Edgardo Rotman,  prison historian and proponent of 
reform, writes, “In the mid-1950s there was a significant change in the inmate 
populations as a consequence of the large migrations of southern blacks into northern 
and western cities.  Thus many northern prisons came to hold a black majority” (172).  
A scholar sympathetic to the project of prison reform manages to suggest, without 
comment on racism and unemployment, that because black people moved north, 
prisons in the north became largely black.  The character of Butch Beauchamp in Go 
Down, Moses follows this pattern, moving from Jefferson, Mississippi to Chicago, yet 
as Chapter Two argues, Faulkner broadens the responsibility for criminality beyond 
racial determinacy.  Indeed, almost all of the texts surveyed represent and generally 
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engage the virtual equation of black masculinity with violent criminality.  That matter 
is central to Light in August, Go Down, Moses, Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, American 
History X, The Hurricane, The Farm, and “Live from Death Row,” and marginal to 
The Executioner’s Song.44  Criminality and the incarceration largely commensurate 
with it present both a category of human experience and one informed by other 
indices of identity such as masculinity and blackness.  
We can trace the degree to which dentity and the politics of identity as the 
fault lines of cultural history have served as a fundamental organizing principle of 
much humanities scholarship since the late 1970s in the development of The Heath 
Anthology of American Literature.  One of several collections organized to emphasize 
the always already multicultural nature of U.S. literary history, its production offers 
one means to address the attention to cultural difference as well as the relative 
absence of the discussion of incarceration.  The self-professed genealogy offered in 
its preface traces its origins to discussions challenging the national canon in 1968, 
then the 1979 project titled “Reconstructing American Literature,” which led to the 
so-titled 1982 conference at Yale and a text of he same name providing pedagogical 
strategies for reformulating national literature courses (1994 xxxii- i).  Those 
initial discussions were part of the broad-based challenges to monoculturism in 
university humanities study.  In 1968 and 1969, student groups initiated strikes and 
negotiations with administrations from the University of California, Berkeley to the 
City University of New York to argue for broader representation in the university, 
whether through its curricula or its student body.45  The commitment to universities 
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better representing the diversity of cultural experience was and remains particularly 
necessary in studies of the literature and history of the U.S., whose stake is defined 
less in language or region than nation, a nation explicitly founded on the promise, if 
not the fulfillment, of democratic ideals.  The democratic ideal of representativeness 
has proven one of the central imperatives defining U.S. literary history and theory 
from Ralph Waldo Emerson to F.O. Matthiessen to the so-called “New Americanists” 
of the 1980s and 1990s, even if the qualifications of that representation have changed 
dramatically.46  The effort by cross-cultural alliances of academics and activists to 
reconstruct American literature emphasized the enriching d versity of race, class, 
ethnicity, and gender.  From the struggles in Berkeley, New York, and elsewhere in 
1968, to the 1979 project and Yale conference three years later, to the four editions of 
the Heath Anthology and those like it, efforts emphasizing a historically multicultural 
U.S. have made such inflections of difference the most prevalent organizational 
framework in humanities and social science study.47
One of the strategies of literary critics and theorists working in this tradition 
has been to de-center a monocultural perspective through the analyses of both the 
view from the margins and of those marginalized.  This pair of approaches has been 
the effort of many of the participants of this particular strand of literary history, 
whether those contributing to the 1982 summer conference or editing the Heath 
anthology.  For example, Richard Yarborough, the associate general editor of the 
anthology, employs the dual perspective in “The Problem of Violence and Black 
Masculinity in Recent U. S. Historical Cinema:  A Look at Amistad, Rosewood, and 
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Hurricane.”48  Yarborough calls attention to the trend of the Europeanization of black 
masculinity in these films, each of which is a historical drama leveraging the cachet 
of being “based on a true story.”  However, he does not point out that his topical 
selection includes representations of a slave revolt, a lynching massacre, and black 
man unjustly imprisoned, an arc that follows the historical telos of slavery, Jim Crow 
lynching, and the raced incarceration of black men, the history that underwrites this 
dissertation.  Yarborough’s oversight is no pernicious disavowal of a nation’s raced 
carceral history.  Instead, it is a quite literal “seeing over” of the phenomenon49 I 
describe:  pervasive imagery’s concealment of the history of imprisonment and its 
actuality, what the cover of Newsweek in 2000 describes as almost one-twentieth of 
the population and the Department of Justice lists as over two million,50 the 
underclass controlled and concealed in the design Rush promoted more than two 
centuries previously.  
Scholars have already mapped some of the cultural terrain of representations 
of incarceration in examinations and collections of prison writing, the discursive work 
of prisoners themselves.  Bell Gale Chevigny and H. Bruce Franklin in particular 
have addressed prisons’ constructed invisibility by focusing on prisoners’ texts.  In 
Prison Literature in America:  The Victim as Criminal and Artist (1989), Franklin 
argues that the main lines of American literature can be traced from the plantation to 
the penitentiary” (xxxii).  His book offers extended readings of the writing of 
captives, from slave narratives to writing of the mid-1970s.  He shifts from reading 
these works to offering more of the writing itself in his collection Prison Writing in 
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20th-Century America (1998).  That anthology and Chevigny’s Doing Time:  25 Years 
of Prison Writing (1999) both underscore that the wording of the Thirteenth 
Amendment effectively made raced incarceration a de facto extension of slavery (xiii; 
4), but their primary emphases are the self-r presentations of prisoners themselves.  
Prison teachers and activists such as Robert Ellis Gordon and Kathleen O’Shea 
juxtapose prisoners’ stories with their own, writing themselves in the spaces between 
the prison writing they include in, respectively, The Funhouse Mirror:  Reflections on 
Prison (2000) and Women on the Row:  Revelations from Both Sides of the Bars 
(2000).51
Such prison writing and its study—the prisoners, teachers, scholars, and 
activists producing and drawing attention to the writing describing prison from the 
inside, largely in an effort for social justice—are excellent and necessary in their own 
right.  This dissertation takes a different though related tactic and draws attention to 
the sheer pervasiveness of prisoners real and imagined, written and screened from 
both sides of prison walls.  The views from inside and out create dual vantage points 
from which to examine the degree to which carceral culture and those who 
incarcerate mirror one another, as such reflection proves a key trope for the growing 
body of prison writing.  As a poem printed in the prison magazine The Angolite in 
1985 poses the matter:
Go ahead
Lock us up
Lock us all up
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Lock away the ones you see
In the mirror while you’re shaving
Because we’re all just reflections
Of your world
Of the world you think we’ve left behind.52
Like this poet, Chevigny claims that “prison reflects the state of society,” and in his 
forward to Prison Writing, Attica historian Tom Wicker also argues that what 
happens inside the walls “inevitably reflects the society outside” (Chevigny xviii; 
Franklin xii—emphasis added).  As Gordon’s titular “funhouse mirror” suggests, the 
reflection can distort and prove grotesque.    
Such mirroring and the (mis)identification it implies require a closer look.  
While generally the imagination of prisons overwrites their actuality, this dissertation 
also demonstrates that prisoners and the culture that incarcerates sometimes mirror 
one another, sometimes reflect on one another, and fundamentally alter one another.  
For example, Faulkner’s description of the cause of criminality in the early 1930s is 
the same as that offered by contemporary prison officials.  Cleaver offers a prison cell 
view of domestic and international policy of the mid-1960s, and he and Mailer each 
train their critical gaze on the absurdities on both sides of prison walls.  However, the 
depictions back and forth do not only represent history, but participate in its 
development.  Representation offering itself as “real” participates in the texture of 
that reality, changes the course of human events.  For example, Cleaver’s writing in 
1968 made him a key figure in ACA discussions of the early 1970s.  Mailer’s “true 
55
life novel” scrupulously (and sometimes less so) documents the events surrounding 
Gary Gilmore’s incarceration and execution in 1976 and 1977, including how 
television producers, reporters, lawyers, and writers shaped the events they recorded.  
The non-fiction documentaryThe Farm is at once part of the historical record and 
itself critically informed by prior imaginings of prison.  The cultural imagination less 
reflects historical actuality than plays a dynamic role in it.
The analyses conducted in this dissertation demonstrate how historical context 
shaped these texts, but they also show how these texts imagine history and how their 
telling changes, produces that history.  The books, films, and performances surveyed 
move back and forth across prison walls:  Faulkner’s imag nation of them from the 
outside, Cleaver writing out and Mailer writing in; the prison films running the gamut 
from the wholesale fiction of American History X, to being based on the actual 
imprisonment of Rubin Carter in The Hurricane, to a documentary shot largely inside 
Angola Prison in The Farm; and the drama Jury Duty based on a capital trial, with the 
death penalty protest “Live From Death Row” joining inmates and audience in highly 
mediated dialogue.  Balancing the representations from inside and out provides more 
perspectives on how prisons operate in the cultural imagination.
Though many books and films make prisons both marginal and central to their 
narratives and settings,53 there is insufficient analysis focusing specifically on 
representations of imprisonment in the U.S.  The study of prison in writing and film54
has proven generally marginal to the better developed field of law and literature, in 
which prisons scarcely if at all appear.  Little to no mention of prison is made in work 
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such as Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux’s Interpreting Law and Literature
(1988) or Richard Posner’s Law and Literature (1988).55  The decade between the 
latter and its second edition (1998) saw the appearance of at least a dozen other texts 
with “Law” and “Literature” prominent in their titles, including Wai-chee Dimock’s 
Residues of Justice:  Law, Literature, Philosophy (1996), as well as Ann Algeo’s The 
Courtroom as Forum:  Homicide Trials by Dreiser, Wright, Capote, and Mailer 
(1996), Brook Thomas’ American Literary Realism and the Failed Promise of 
Contract (1997), and Jay Watson’s Forensic Fiction: The Lawyer Figure in Faulkner
(1993).  These works sort the differences and dependencies between the two 
discourses of law and literature, twin fields focusing on the use and effects of 
language, and their paired study addresses the literary representation of law as 
agonistic inquiry, the courtroom as stage and place of contest, the function of the 
tropes of jurisprudence in literature, and the application of literary examples and 
methodologies to law.  In addition to these texts that focus primarily on the depictions 
of trials, David Guest offers a critique of U.S. fiction representing execution in 
Sentenced to Death:  The American Novel and Capital Punishment (1997).  However, 
much lies unexamined in the space between trial and execution, and death is not the 
only sentence.  The near absence of a critical enterprise drawing attention to the 
narratives of imprisonment offered in U.S. literature reproduces the largerinvisibility 
of imprisonment for those not themselves in prison.   
That absence of more critical comment on representations of imprisonment in 
part occurs because of the evolution of the term p ison.  The semantic shift from a 
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condition of captivity to a place of punishment reflects the crux of Foucault’s 
argument in Discipline and Punish, in which punishment of the body shifted to 
discipline and individuation.  The legitimacy of the historiographical method of 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish has received significant criticism.56  Though it is 
written as critical theory and a “history of the present” (31), it still does draw 
primarily from eighteenth and nineteenth century prison history—if to illustrate its 
points rather than serve as their basis.  In addition, some subaltern studies, the 
analyses of power’s sedimentation of culture, have been critically informed by 
carceral practice.  For example, it is difficult to conceive of Antonio Gramsci’s rich 
description of hegemony not being shaped by his writing from inside prison walls.  
Dick Hebdige draws heavily from Gramsci in his definitive Subculture (1979), and he 
frames his argument with the prison writing of Jean Genet.  Therefore, some of the 
critical theory formative of historically nuanced cultural study has been shaped by 
actual and imagined incarceration.  Still, theoretically informed analyses of literature 
typically employ the sense of prison as a general sense of confinement, rather than a 
specific material condition.57
The emphasis on the carceral as figurative likely has been informed both by 
Foucault’s emphasis on power for which imprisonment is largely a metaphor, as well 
as Jameson’s use of the term in his critique of formalism in The Prison-House of 
Language (1972), with its titular citation of Wordsworth via Nietzsche.  Jameson and 
Foucault drew titular attention to prisons even as the first in his argument and the 
second in his employment by subsequent critics made imprisonment figurative, a 
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metaphor for the limits of formalism and the operation of power, respectively.  My 
title The Language of the Prison House at once acknowledges the theoretical debt to 
Jameson, among others,58 even as I write his title in reverse, emphasizing not 
language as a prison, but the language and images through whic prisons are 
represented in the cultural imagination.  
Jameson’s and Foucault’s work proved valuable for analyses of cultural 
production attendant to historical conditions, but the shift to prison as an abstraction 
overwrites what is itself a material circumstance, a bait-and-switch of literal and 
figurative that reproduces the gap between actual and imagined prisons.  This 
dissertation certainly relies on Foucault’s work on prisons in addition to his 
formulation of history as a genealogy of discourse, power, and discursive authority, 
as well as on Jameson’s emphasis on historicity and the embedded politicality of 
texts, in The Political Unconscious (1981) and elsewhere.  However, prison as a 
metaphor causes a slippage as academics writing about images of imprisonment as 
punishment end up writing about an existential state.  For example, Martha Duncan’s 
Romantic Outlaws, Beloved Prisons (1996), in examining fiction from Aeschylean 
tragedy and on past Modern Times through the lenses of political science and law, 
flattens or effaces the cultural and historical contingencies of the texts she reads, and 
writes a sense of the popular at the expense of the complexity of historical actuality as 
it might be understood through various records and textualities.  In analyses such as 
these, prison becomes a trope.  
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That troping is not unexpected, as “prison” provides a powerful and 
polymorphous sign.  Race itself is such a state in W.E.B. DuBois’ description of 
whiteness as a “prison-house closed round about us all” (Souls 3), Wright’s account 
of America as “a black sprawling prison full of tiny black cells” (334), and James 
Baldwin’s “sunlit prison of the American dream” (Notes 13).59  Later theorists too 
make the slip, and for Michel de Certeau, “[T]he law is already applied with and on 
bodies, ‘incarcerated’ in physical practices” (148).  Given the power of the metaphor 
and the sheer volume of critical work informed by Discipline and Punish, with its 
problematic methodology of critical theory masked as historiography, it should not 
come entirely as a surprise that imprisonment becomes primarily a metaphor for the 
operation of power.  Nevertheless, the focus in this dissertation remains on prison not 
as a metaphorical state or a feeling of being confined, but as real and im gined places 
of bodily confinement within bars and concrete.  
The distinction is important, given that even the critics of actual prison writing 
make the slippage, the misprision in which some vital thing is lacking, as the structure 
of representation referring to actual lives becomes a sign that wholly replaces any 
referent to a material condition.  At his best, for instance, Ioan Davies in Writers in 
Prison (1990) makes salient points concerning prison writing and the ways in which 
discursive practices counter strategies of domination; at his worst, Davies commits 
ahistorical and solipsistic excesses in claims such as “the metaphoric prison and the 
real prison are ultimately one and the same,” and “Death Row becomes the land that 
we all inhabit” (40, 189).  Chevigny comes close to making the same slip in 
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suggesting, “Though from a certain vantage point we all sit on death row, some of us 
know this better than others” (301).  Something is lost when imprisonment becomes 
primarily a metaphor, either for the circuitry of force in the social or for a bleak 
perception of a psychological or philosophical condition.  There are rhetorically 
powerful reasons for challenging the distinctions between those in and out of prison; 
indeed, the lack of widespread concern regarding imprisonment practices can in part 
be attributed to the lack of identification, of mutual recognition between those 
imprisoned and those not.  However, any such challenge to definitions of criminality 
and practices of imprisonment must be grounded in the specificity of material, 
cultural, and historical conditions, and thereby benefits from tactics of historicity, 
literary study after the historical turn.
That turn to history provides the basis for another exigency of this 
dissertation—the emphasis on cultural representativeness in recent constructions of 
U.S. literary history, in which imprisonment has been largely overlooked.  In the 
1980s and 1990s, the compass for most literary study has been the historical contexts 
for production and reception, and that analysis has treated literary representation as 
symptomatic of social concerns.  That strategy is one of tracking the culturally 
formative discursive relationships between books deemed “literature” and documents 
of the contemporaneous historical record.  Such critics take the position that literary 
history stands for national history and thus should be plural, multicultural, and 
hybrid.60  Given the relationship of literary and national history, it is unfortunate that 
Americanist literary study has not made more central the growing body of U.S. prison 
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historiography, which has become a veritable cottage industry in historical 
scholarship.  Chronicling the stories of prisons has largely been the work of 
historiographers and activists—which is not to say that prison studies have proven 
central to the study of U.S. history, either.  While prominent university presses have 
in the past decade published works of prison history and there is now The Oxford 
History of Prisons (1998), noted historian Eric Foner makes no mention of prisons in 
The New American History (1997), and even Thomas Holt’s summation therein of 
“African-American History” ignores the substantial ways in which incarceration has 
shaped black identity and community since the Civil War.  That absence elides the 
critical prison historiography, which includes the work of Scott Christianson, Jay 
Adam Hirsch, Oshinksy, and William Banks Taylor, all of whom link slavery and 
incarceration.61  Still, the evidence and arguments offered by these historians has 
remained generally marginal to central questions of U.S. history as well as literary 
studies.  
The three dominant strategies of U.S. literary criticism by which to re-
evaluate a cultural history have been to read multicultural history between th  li es of 
canonical U.S. authors, to rewrite the canon to recover other voices, and to challenge 
metacritically the mechanisms of literary canonicity itself.  This dissertation draws 
from each of these methods.  My analysis of Faulkner’s fiction emphasizes the 
multicultural history written in Go Down, Moses, and other chapters draw upon 
marginal or unconventional texts in various genres.  For example, the documentary 
The Farm received sufficient critical acclaim to see it nominated for an Academy 
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Award, but remains obscure in comparison with widely circulating films such as 
American History X and The Hurricane.  The genre, rhetorical imperatives, or both of 
all of the texts surveyed are in contest as well, and what Richard Poirier writes of 
Mailer could be broadened to include many of these texts.  “I would take his 
engagements with language as political rather than simply literary ones:  they are a 
way of discovering how to hold together elements that perhaps by nature would tend 
to destroy one another, both in a political and in a literary structure” (Performing Self
5).  The problematic duality of the political or historical and literary structures of 
Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song, and the documentary The 
Farm make their categorization difficult, as they blur boundaries of fiction, history, 
and myth in their imperative to tell the “truth.”  The prominence of testifying likely 
causes each to emphasize its place in the history of its respective “now,” and these 
shared concerns locate hem not only as imaginative works, but alsoas cultural 
theory, criticism, and history, outside the scope of more conventional imaginative 
fiction, of literature.    
“Literature” is a problematic description,62 and this dissertation attempts to 
respond to its challenges in part through expanding beyond conventional boundaries 
to address popular film, documentary, and performance.  Among many literary 
scholars of the past quarter century, any determination of the quality of a written 
work, its literary-ness, is inseparable from the engines of history that formed the 
mechanisms of aesthetic determination, in addition to the text itself, the writer’s 
experiences, the audiences, and their larger historical contexts of production and 
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reception.  An easy example of this change can be read in the critical response to 
Faulkner, probably the twentieth century U.S. author who is subject to the most 
extensive study, and whose representation of crime and punishment provide the basis 
for Chapter Two.  In 1963, at the height of the New Criticism he in part produced 
through reading Faulkner, Cleanth Brooks could describe Faulkner’s “masterpieces” 
and “greatest works” (William Faulkner viii, ix).  
Just two decades later, the de-centering of aesthetics and the problems 
attendant on valuation in literary studies demanded an edge of historically specific 
cultural critique to such championing.  Eric Sundquist argues, “Faulkner’s best work 
reflects a turbulent search for fictional forms” to address historical racial conflict 
(Faulkner ix-x).  Given changing trends in literary studies, a decade later, Philip M. 
Weinstein contends that Faulkner’s best work is fulfilled in conflicts of subjectivity.  
“Faulkner’s supreme novels are those in which the project of subjective coherence is 
under maximal stress” (2).  The criticism of works that constitute the basis for 
formations of literary history thereby emphasizes the representation of the cultural 
tensions of national history as written in characters as models of subjectivity.  
Literary history in the vein of critics from Avallone to Rafia Zafar is therefore an 
account of representative men and women of diverse races, ethnicities, classes, and 
sexualities.  History is the sum of actual lives, and recognizing difference offers a 
means of organizing what would otherwise be a Babel of proliferate voices, 
documents, and records.  Given that these identity differences have not been value-
neutral but written through with asymmetrical power relations, those performing 
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historically sensitive literary study trace those lines of difference, including that of 
incarceration—where lines of force are drawn with particular power and bleak 
consequences.
The texts surveyed in this dissertation often employ that very strategy—and in 
so doing, they maintain an imperative of dissent familiar in U.S. literary history.63  In 
Brown’s Clotel, George Green answers his death sentence by echoing the Declaration 
of Independence and itemizing the injustices inflicted on his race and himself:  “For 
the crime of having dark skin, my people suffer the pangs of hunger, the infliction of 
stripes, and the ignominy of brutal servitude” (226).  His words, echoing Frederick 
Douglass, themselves echo in the writing of Cleaver and the film The Farm.  Such 
dissent has become not only associated with the self-representation of black men, but 
their representation by others, a rhetorical strategy often relating twentieth century 
imprisonment to nineteenth century slavery.  
For example, the prison films around which Chapter Four groups its analysis 
all cite that race history.  Vexed as its depiction of black masculinity is, Kaye’s 
American History X closes its narrative of imprisonment and racist violence in the 
1990s with an epigraph from Abraham Lincoln calling for racial harmony.  The 
Hurricane draws verbatim from Rubin Carter’s autobiography written in prison, 
where he identifies “Carter” as the “slave name” from ancestors working fields in the 
South (The Sixteenth Round 4).  The documentary The Farm chronicles the lives of 
six inmates, four of whom are black, in the slave plantation turned penitentiary.  
Furthermore, Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses, with its central conflict beginning in 
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slavery in the Antebellum South, ends over a hundred years later with Butch 
Beauchamp’s imprisonment and execution, a trajectory rendered in his grandmother’s 
echo of a nineteenth century spiritual—“Sold him in Egypt and now he dead” (363).  
Not only activists and historians but also directors and writers draw the comparison 
between slavery and incarceration, the latter as the extension of the former.  The 
analysis of Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses in particular occupies a chapter of this 
dissertation precisely because of that previously unremarked but crucial strand of 
narrative coherence.  The cultural history the novel charts and its link between slavery 
and incarceration provides an organizing principle, as it suggests a decisive response 
to the question critics have raised since its publication as to whether the book even 
has a discernable structure.64
However, Faulkner’s position in writing Go Down, Moses is not the same as 
that of Cleaver in Soul on Ice or Carter in The Sixteenth Round telling their histories; 
there is no ethical equivalency or naïve postmodern collapse of all distinction 
between novel and autobiography.  While meaningfully related, there is a difference 
between the imprisonment of the character of Butch Beauchamp in a fictional 1940s
and those actually in prison then.  Mailer’s articulation of masculinity in the 
characterization of the “white negro,” though endorsed by Cleaver, does not equate to 
the blackness of Cleaver himself.  I am not interested in discussions of authenticity as 
such, untethered from historical and cultural contingencies.  However, critics such as 
Chevigny, Franklin, Barbara Harlow, and others usefully describe the literature of 
prisoners as prison writing, as opposed to prisons in writing, the representation of 
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prisoners by those not themselves incarcerated.  The selection for this dissertation 
fairly balances views from within and without prison walls; while Faulkner writes and 
Kaye films from outside, there is Cleaver writing from behind bars, The 
Executioner’s Song and The Hurricane both drawing from prison writing and the 
latter shooting on location, The Farm shot almost entirely within Angola State Prison 
with one inmate (Wilbert Rideau) receiving directorial credit, and “Live from Death 
Row” allowing prisoners to speak for themselves, an effort Webster’s Jury Duty takes 
pains to recreate.  
Prisoners’ self-representations and their presentations by others are joined in 
order to offer views from the margin and center with an eye toward clarifying how 
the identities of prisoners are defined both from within and without.  Such dual 
representation is a crucial component of identity formation.  Incarceration as a place 
of identity underscores how it at once constitutes and is defined by individuals and 
social groups, including those in and out of prisons.  If incarceration, like other 
cultural indices, can be understood as  category of difference, then, like those 
categories, identity is the hinge between the individual and the social, between the I
and the we.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with expansion in writs of habeas 
corpus, provided the basis for much prison reform of the 1960s.  The act makes this 
same point in its particular language prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, 
nationality, or religion:  “The term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, 
governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions” (emphasis added—sec. 
2000e).  Singular and plural conflate in cultural markers of difference.  
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Identity is therefore the axis between psychoanalytic and historicizing 
approaches so attuned to single and plural, the individual subject and social body.  
The books, films, and performances of this dissertation are all deeply invested in 
matters of human agency and the sense of its possibility with regard to criminality 
and imprisonment.  Those investments invite different ways of reading, particularly 
psychoanalytic and historicizing, two approaches often understood as occupying 
opposite poles.65  The difference can be understood as one of scope.  Psychoanalytic 
approaches offer a microphysics of authority focused on the individual subject, 
wherein the origins of character can be traced to an uneasy combination of difference 
and universality:  idiosyncratic personal history organized through psychoanalysis’ 
cross-cultural and transhistorical terms describing human experience.  
Historically nuanced study offers a macrophysics of power and its operation 
over time in cultural terrain split along fault lines of human difference:  race, gender, 
class, ethnicity, sexuality, and other engines of history.  This is part of the reason that 
most attempts to bridge the perceived gap between the two approaches have located 
themselves in the study of race66—psychoanalysis largely defined by Freud and 
Lacan, after all, was already organized by gender and sexuality.  Some critics and 
theorists bridge this gap, though given the prevalence of historical study, such efforts 
can sometimes seem as offered by apologists, or an attempt to leverage the cachet of 
history.  Cultural critics and theorists working in the register of psychoanalysis might 
object to this description,67 but even the most fully developed dual approaches often 
open with an apology regarding psychoanalysis’ traditional emphasis on individual 
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and family histories.68 The question so famously posed by Carolyn Porter, “are we 
being historical yet?” continues to ring among critics bridging theoretical 
vocabularies. 
This dissertation does not pretend to offer any unifying theory so much as 
traffic between the micro- and macro- approaches, as I am arguing these texts 
themselves do in their accounts of the individual and social forces that shape 
criminality and its attendant imprisonment.  I use some psychoanalytic terminology to 
describe the representation of character and agency in narrative, because such 
depictions offer a literary mirror of subjectivity.  Lacan’s sense of identification, 
originating in “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I” (Écrits), 
provides a powerful tool for understanding how characters in books and films are 
situated within symbolic orders, as well as how audiences and producers of texts 
misrecognize themselves in books, films, and performances.  However, Deleuze and 
Gauttari also prove useful in their rejection of the primacy of that “I” and of 
psychoanalysis’ investments in personal history.  They instead emphasize social 
context and place, nicely encapsulated in their claim, “A schizophrenic out for a walk 
is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch” (2).69  That approach 
applies well to strategies of reading that locate textual production and reception in 
particular public contexts, the time and space of sociality rather than a transhistorical 
and cross-cultural couch.  
Still, in the final analysis, I am less interested in reading these texts through 
the multiple and at times competing lenses of psychoanalysis than reading them 
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against one another, as well as alongside other texts, particularly the cause and 
treatment of crime and punishment as offered by prison officials themselves and 
national statistics of imprisonment.  The tension of such contrastive reading is the 
basis for the arrangement of multiple texts in each chapter, as their groupings 
emphasize their differences, the conflicts and investments that fracture the autonomy 
of even singular texts—and subjects.  In addition, the annual proceedings of the 
American Prison (and later Correctional) Association demonstrate that prison 
officials have relied heavily on psychological analysis with regard to the formation of 
the criminal.  Employing particular psychoanalytic terms (whether Freudian, 
Lacanian, or Deleuzo-Guattarian) is thus not conducted as an ahistorical approach,
but as a fulfillment of the investigations and taxonomies developed in the texts 
themselves, as well as in their contemporaneous history.70
For example, Faulkner’s narration of criminal consciousness in Sanctuary and 
Light in August is coincident both with competing psychoanalytic models of 
individual development and with the employment of those models in actual prisons, 
as demonstrated in the transcripts of the American Prison Association.  However, 
Faulkner’s willingness in Go Down, Moses to emphasize racial injustice and broaden 
social agency would not be spoken by prison officials themselves until decades later.  
From the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, Cleaver, Mailer, and Deleuz  and Guattari 
were all variously theorizing what they describe repeatedly as national or cultural 
“schizophrenia,” which all specifically relate to race.  Soul on Ice and The 
Executioner’s Song undertake analytical and narrative methods with a level of 
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cultural and historical engagement that U.S. literary criticism did not broadly engage 
until the 1980s.  Cleaver’s (and Deleuze and Guattari’s thereafter) attention to the 
revolutionary possibilities of black and carceral identities are at first shared and then 
largely dismissed by some of the officials writing prison policy and practice from 
1968 to 1979, according to the American Correctional Association transcripts—and 
the beginning of a sharp increase in incarceration concludes that period.  
As those trends intensified at the close of the twentieth century, race became 
the dominant sign in the equation of criminality (and its attendant incarceration) with 
black masculinity.  The films of 1998 and 1999 surveyed here, as well as the 
performance “Live from Death Row,” variously challenge and capitulate to the 
misrecognition of blackness and criminality, the fears and desires circulating around 
black men in prison.  Jury Duty departs in this regard from the prior texts, broadening 
who might be considered a criminal and thus a prisoner.  However, though the drama 
does not reinforce the misrecognition of black masculinity with criminality, it does, 
like many of these texts, simultaneously draw attention to injustice in incarceration 
even as it thwarts identification with the prisoner.  Facilitating such identification is 
likely a crucial step for creating meaningful investments between those outside of 
prison and those within.  At the close of the twentieth century, the carceral identity—
the criminal who is therefore a prisoner, as incarceration became the sole response to 
criminality—is split between lived experience for an unprecedented number of U.S. 
citizens and a polymorphous sign in the cultural imagination.  Describing the 
relationship between the history and the representation of incarceration requires 
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historiographical approaches joined with ways of reading that illuminate and clarify 
evolving notions of the causes of criminality and imprisonment, the cultural identities 
of those incarcerated, and the social responsibility for prisons and prisoners.  As 
Cleaver writes in a different though related context, “I think all of us, the entire 
nation, will be better off if we bring it all out front.  A lot of people’s feelings will be 
hurt, but that is the price that must be paid” (Soul on Ice 36).
***
The first two chapters are organized around the five literary texts surveyed in 
this dissertation, representations of imprisonment written from both sides of prison 
walls:  Faulkner’s three novels from without, Cleavr’s account from within, and 
Mailer’s crossing back and forth.  Chapter Two, “jails were the true records”:  
Faulkner’s Changed Sense of Criminality and Literary Execution,” examines 
representations of crime and punishment in Sa ctuary and Light in August against Go
Down, Moses.  All three novels close with the deaths of characters condemned for 
murder; in the latter two, the characters are of mixed race.  The earlier novels treat 
criminality as the product of a psychoanalytic model of the individual subject, with 
the attendant investments in family history and early childhood.  It is a model that the 
narration in these early novels does not seem to trust but for which no option seems 
available.  The views of subjectivity offered correspond to that of prison officials of 
the time, who viewed records of personal history and psychological classification as a 
strategy of individuation for prisoners.  In contrast, Go Down, Moses offers a social 
rather than personal history producing the criminal, a genealogy spanning from 1840 
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to 1940 and ending with the execution of Butch Beauchamp.  Its narrative trajectory 
implies a radical claim, suggesting that twentieth century incarceration is the 
inexorable conclusion of slavery and Jim Crow, and is thus an explicitly raced 
practice.  In the final pages of the novel, responsibility not for the crimes but for the 
condemned falls to the white male business community, in effect acknowledging a 
social accountability for raced criminality.  The crowd that gathers to see an executed 
black male character’s body return home to Jefferson’s “Corporate Limit” is not the 
unified voice and vision of many of the town’s other representations in Faulkner’s 
fiction, but an invoked diversity assembled to witness.  The writer’s representation of 
incarceration and execution at times capitulates to assumptions of blackness, 
masculinity, and criminality, but Go Down, Moses in the end challenges 
contemporary views of wardens and other prison officials as recorded in the 
transcripts of the American Prison Association.  
Chapter Three, “Cleaver’s Soul and Mailer’s Song:  Subjects in History, 
Schizophrenia, and Diminishing Possibilities,” focuses on depictions of incarcerated 
black and white men in its paired reading and emphasizes the matters of testimony or 
“speaking for,” as well as trading on their “true” stories.  These narratives claim to 
unveil the actuality of how imprisonment shapes their characters, but their focus 
regularly shifts from individual identity to contemporary historical events, situating 
prisoners within larger cultural and historical frames.  These two book-length and 
arguably non-fictional testimonials of imprisonment self-consciously write into and 
out of prison.  In Soul on Ice, it is the discursive shift between biography and cultural 
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critique, while in The Executioner’s Song, it is not genre but method that grows 
complicated as Mailer’s multi-vocal texture unravels Gilmore’s claim to autonomy.  
In 1968, both Cleaver and Mailer were participating personally through direct 
involvement and writing in efforts of cultural change at a time when radical 
transformation seemed possible, not only to them but to ACA prison officials of the 
time.  That would change by the time of The Executioner’s Song 11 years later, after 
the revolt at Attica in September of 1971 violently concluded under the orders of New 
York’s then Governor Rockefeller, after he commissioned and then disregarded a 
survey of rehabilitation programs (which was thereafter widely misused), after his 
harsh drug laws became a national model even as he became Vice President, and after 
the beginning of the precipitous rise in incarceration rates.  
The shift from Soul on Ice to The Executioner’s Song is one from attention to 
the social and cultural implications of raced criminality, to a bleak account of 
seemingly inevitable, unexplainable, and race-neutral violence.  That narrowing of 
possibility is reflected in the discussion of the ACA from 1968 to 1979 as well.71  The 
causes of crime and the character of the criminal collapse in those transcripts and 
between the two books from race, socio-economic forces, and revolution to violent 
and intention-less phenomena without cause or direction.  However, just as Cleaver 
locates his sense of self in multiple social investments, Mailer offers his bleak 
account of the character of Gilmore’s effort to maintain autonomy even at cost of 
death through a narrative method sensitive to historicity and the unavailability of that 
very individual autonomy. 
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Films are the focus of Chapter Four, “Real, Imagination, and Telling the 
Difference:  Prison Films from Realistic Fiction to Based on a True Story to 
Documentary,” which continues the focus on an engagement with history.  American 
History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm share a stake in the real. They range from 
realist fiction featuring elements of cinema verité to the social cachet of “based on a 
true story” to documentary, and all to varying degrees claim the real, show what 
prison is “really” like.  All three of these films implicate personal and social histories, 
inviting critique inflected by psychoanalysis and history.  Deleuze and Guattari’s 
expansion of subjectivity to be understood as a collection of social investments again 
proves useful, though for not wholly expected reasons.  Transformati ns in the ways 
in which films are produced and viewed necessitate analysis attendant to media 
company mergers that make film distribution just one component of a supra-
company’s efforts to market its products through various outlets, including theatrical 
distribution, rentals, cable viewing, and soundtrack sales.  Realistic films such as 
these thus become part of a mediascape helping define the shape of a given reality.  
Furthermore, all three films have been screened strategically as part of one activist
project or another.  These three films in various ways produce history, repeatedly 
attempting to substantiate the actuality of their representations of incarceration, race, 
and masculinity.  
The representation of carceral identity in these films draws ttention to raced 
incarceration, though problematically.  American History X overwrites its own anti-
white supremacist tag line, “Some legacies must end”—accompanied by a skinhead’s 
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swastika tattoo—in its whitewashing of racism’s causes and costs.  In The Hurricane, 
the combination of biographical and fictional elements, the juxtaposition of 
documentary footage with the feature film, poses risks to the “apprehension” of 
history, both the claim to history and the anxiety over its misrepresentation.  Like 
American History X, The Hurricane offers racism not as a set of social structures but 
as consolidated in particular individuals.  The Farm more successfully represents 
contemporary raced imprisonment as a consequence of history, but it also fills a shape 
established by prior fictional films, demonstrating how documentary can capitulate to 
the same popular expectations as would-be blockbusters.  The elements of specific 
history are cited in popular fiction to leverage the real, even as narrative conceits of 
prior fictions shape the production of documentary.  
The conclusion in Chapter Five, “Staging Prisons and the Performance of 
History,” turns from books and films to two performances from the fall of 1999 that 
directly concern imprisonment.  Implicated in the ethics of criminality, incarceration, 
and execution, both make their claim to social justice with a stake in the real.  A 
staging of “Live from Death Row” offers a chance for dialogue between a community 
audience and prisoners.  To hear them speak is annvitation to take a stand against 
the death penalty, as well as against raced incarceration practices.  Jury Duty is a play 
based on a true story and was performed in one instance as a fundraiser for a social 
work program.  Ken Webster’s drama draws from his experience on a criminal trial 
jury to recount in a series of retrospective monologues a white female character’s 
crime and trial, as well as the deliberations of members of the jury.  The former 
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demonstration emphasizes how race and class create the exp ctation of the 
criminality of black men and their consequent imprisonment, while the latter departs 
from the racial focus to point how gender and sexuality inform cultural expectations 
of crime and punishment as well.  Like many of the texts this dissertation surveys, 
these performances make apparent the subalternity of prisoners.  Furthermore, as 
events with materially present audiences, they also provide some insight into how 
performances situate themselves vis-à-vis audiences and cue particular responses, 
such as hailing their respective audiences as a social body.  
“Live from Death Row” in particular goes the farthest in fostering 
communication between those in and out of prison, communication upon which the 
dismantling of the essentiality of their difference is likely predicated.  More than any 
of the books and films previously surveyed except for Soul on Ice and The Farm,  
Jury Duty and “Live from Death Row” give voice to otherwise largely silenced 
populations.  However, both performances also reinforce the difference between “we” 
and “these people,” a distinction that limits just how far the borders between social 
identities might be breached.  Perhaps most importantly, as performances rather than 
texts, they provide a sense of the immediacy and actuality of incarceration in their 
claims for a broader social responsibility for prisons and prisoners.  Lastly, as 
ephemeral performances whose interpretation here is a type of record of their passing 
into history, their incorporation into a broader survey of the representation of 
imprisonment in U.S. literature destabilizes what counts as “literature.”  In the case of 
“Live from Death Row,” the analysis also reverses the historicizing of literary texts—
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not the aestheticization of history in the manner that W lter Benjamin has famously 
associated with fascism, but a literalization of history, its textualization and the 
historically specific analysis as to how its fleetingly available experience operates 
rhetorically.
All of the texts represented in this dissertation feature characters (or real 
people in the case of Cleaver, the prisoners of The Farm, and those featured in “Live 
from Death Row”—or problematically “based on” real people, as is the case in The 
Executioner’s Song, The Hurricane, and Jury Duty) largely defined by their 
criminality and imprisonment.  These representations of imprisonment and my own 
rendition of those texts, their arguments and contingencies, are understood as 
political.  Depictions of incarceration demonstrate a set of assumptions about the 
causes and nature of crime, imprisonment, and prisoners.  Because they depict 
imprisonment in the U.S., they mirror the over-r presentation of black men in state 
and federal facilities.  In addition, I attempt, for the most part, to level the presumed 
value of their various media and literary-ness while remaining attentive to the 
distinctions among texts popular and canonical, fiction and non-fiction, and those 
written in and out of prisons.  Imprisonment is a matter of discussion in various 
publics, from popular media to academic conferences to congressional committees.  
Those conducting work in prison studies, U.S. history, and literary criticism would do 
well to work more closely and critically with both dominant and subaltern texts, 
margins and centers, and writing in and out of prisons (and universities) to destabilize 
the distinctions and asymmetries that not only materially but textually produce those 
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differences.  This dissertation attempts to participate in that difficult work by tracing 
the cultural force of literature in twentieth century prison writing and prison in 
writing, conducting its readings of books, films, and performances and their 
representation of incarceration circulating in the cultural imagination.  
“Reading” is here a twof ld term, describing both the process of making sense 
of the words and images and also rendering that meaning in one’s own writing.  The 
readings this dissertation writes are situated in the most nuanced way I can manage 
within the respective historical moments of the texts not because I have taken an 
Althusserean turn to history without a subject, but because I find historicity a 
pedagogical imperative.  In the teaching of literature, inviting students to read with a 
sense of history means inviting them to understand the ways that events, beliefs, and 
cultural forces contemporaneous to the writing and reading of a text shape the 
available meanings and strategies of that text.  These efforts have proven the most 
convincing means by which to encourage them to view themselves as participating in 
the history of now.72  Such pedagogy at least in part strives to work within Jameson’s 
description of the vexed term “postmodernity” as nothing more complex than the 
effort to think historically in an age that has forgotten how to do so (Postmodernism
ix).  That imperative is not merely a matter of teachers in classrooms, but attendant to 
this dissertation itself, given that scholarship itself teaches.  Undergirding this 
dissertation is the explored assumption that scholarship and teaching operate as 
mutually constituting pedagogical performatives, reifying or contesting ideas such as 
literature and American.  Gregory Jay makes only half of this point in his 
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introduction to American Literature and the Culture Wars (1997) when he claims, 
“For the humanities critic, the classroom is more often than not a laboratory, a place 
of experimentation whose hard-earned results eventually (with any luck) find their 
way into publication” (11).  The reverse of this statement is of course true as well, 
that publications, or proto-publications in the case of this dissertation, make their way 
into classrooms, either directly (read and discussed by students) or indirectly 
(informing the teacher’s position).  This dissertation embodies incompletely but as 
fully as I can my own position, the belief in the power of representation to imagine 
possibility and difference, to distill sprawling cultural crises into character and 
narrative, to present if not solutions at least situations that are not so much calmer or 
better, but more stark in laying bare the cultural wounds of history—and the power of 
teaching and scholarship to stage their redress,73 to suggest how to get from here to 
there, from now to then.
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CHAPTER TWO
Literary Execution:  Faulkner’s Changing Sense of Crime and Punishment 
from Sanctuary and Light in August to Go Down, Moses
If I’m going to finish my crop in this county or finish somebody else’s 
crop in Parchman county, I would like to know it soon as I can.
—Lucas Beachamp in Go Down, Moses
Most whites thought of Parchman as a model prison, and the press 
carried endless stories of its profitable ways […].  William Faulkner 
lived in Oxford, only eighty miles east of the farm.
—David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”:
Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice  
William Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha County, his “own little postage stamp of 
native soil,”74 offers a mythic South at once Old and New, fictional and immediately 
recognizable, a product of the author’s imagination and his history, both the history of 
his personal experiences and the tensions of cultural difference deeply marking the 
United States from the 1920s to the 1950s.  Nineteen novels and many shorter works 
in their aggregate produce the fictional county and survey over a hundred years a 
common landscape.  Antediluvian characters with extended and entwined genealogies 
cultivate relationships among the 1,200 lively fictions populating the 2400 square 
miles of wilderness, farmland, hamlets, and towns.75  To see what stays the same in 
Yoknapatawpha, and what changes, is to mark how Faulkner, his world, and his view 
of it alter as well.  At stake is not the consistency or variance of particularities of 
character, determining for example whether the Lucas Beauchamp of Go Down, 
Moses is the same as that of Intruder in the Dust, or noting that houses built of wood 
are elsewhere brick.  Instead, readers may note how in the passing of time, the 
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writer’s representation of the set of human relations alters, how human agency and 
possibility change in the steepening shadow of history.  It is the work of 1929 to 
1942, particularly The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, Absalom, Absalom!, and 
Go Down, Moses, that most critics suggest includes Faulkner’s most significant 
writing,76 a historical period most recognizable as the Great Depression yielding to 
World War II, when harsh economic and cultural effects were suffered sharply in 
rural communities.  Yoknapatawpha illustrates the poverty, class and race conflicts, 
transient populations, and shift to urban spaces experienced in the actual South as 
well as elsewhere in the country.  
Less well known regarding this time is that it was the period of the greatest 
number of executions in United States history.77  From 1930 to 1942, between 123 
and 199 state executions took place each year, more than any other 13-year period 
since.  During that time, black men disproportionately received the death penalty in 
comparison with white men.  While the frequency of lynching reached new lows by 
the 1930s, some historians suggest a correlation of that racial violence to execution 
practices (Tolnay and Beck 202; Oshinksy 209- 13).  Furthermore, a statistical 
correlationbetween lynching and execution has received insufficient notice.  Arthur 
F. Raper’s groundbreaking study of lynching in 1933 demonstrates that while the 
terrorism of lynching rested upon the myth of a black man’s rape of a white woman, 
just under one-sixth of the documented lynchings between 1880 and 1930 involved 
such accusations (36).  Exactly the same proportion of state executions of black men 
between 1930 and 1942 were for the crime of rape, over eight times the frequency of 
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white men, hinting at a substitution effect between lynching and raced execution; 
arguably, the latter practice replaced the former.78  It was against this historical 
backdrop of race-based lynching giving way to the relatively frequent state 
sanctioned hangings, shootings, and electrocutions that the first readers of Sanctuary, 
Light in August, and Go Down, Moses encountered the death sentences of Lee 
Goodwin, Popeye, Joe Christmas, Rider, and Samuel “Butch” Beauchamp.  This 
chapter demonstrates that the t ree texts demonstrate a shift in Faulkner’s depiction 
of criminality, from its cause rooted in personal history t  a social standpoint focusing 
on agency and social responsibility.  Furthermore, those five characters split the 
difference between lynching and execution,  but where the practices are only hazily 
distinguished in the earlier work—Christmas’ death is both—they are sharply 
distinguished and explicitly raced in the latter novel.  That transformation is thereby a 
repudiation of racist lynching, even as it acknowledges that the turn from mob to jury 
does not release the society that executes from the responsibility for the condemned.  
Noel Polk points that in Yoknapatawpha’s county seat, “The two chief 
features of Jefferson, Mississippi’s architectural landscape are the courthouse and the 
jail” (159).  It is surprising, then, that crime and punishment in Faulkner’s fiction 
have received so little notice.  Just as Faulkner studies have not addressed the matter 
of incarceration and execution, Guest’s survey of the representation of the death 
penalty in twentieth century U.S. literature, Sentenced to Death, does not touch on 
any of Faulkner’s novels.  Go Down, Moses has heretofore received insufficient 
notice for its culminating representation of criminality as a crucible for human 
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agency, a motif developed in Sanctuary and Light in August.  Correspondingly, the 
degree to which Sanctuary serves as a sort of raw material for the two later and more 
highly regarded novels deserves more attention.  This essay first demonstrates the 
extent that the three novels develop from one another, each progressively offering a 
more complex view of human agency, at times lifting the same language wholesale 
from the earlier work.79  Then, and at greater length, the focus narrows to Faulkner’s 
representation of the origins of criminality and its punishment, most particularly 
Christmas’ death contrasted with the execution of Butch Beauchamp at the 
conclusion of their respective narratives.  Those closures differ as personal 
psychoanalytic history gives way to larger social, genealogical history in creating the 
criminal.  Sanctuary and Light in August end with the romantic tragedy for which 
Faulkner is so well known, where the aesthetic of the language offers the saving 
grace, but Go Down, Moses closes with a starker vision that stages how criminality is 
the responsibility of a society defined in the cultural differences of a democratic 
Jefferson, the county seat of Yoknapatawpha.
The three novels offer a changed sense of crime, criminals, causes of 
criminality, and punishment.  The definition of crime and the purposes of punishment 
have been and remain culturally and historically contingent.  Relevant definitions are 
offered by the American Prison Association, which reaffirmed in 1930 the first of its 
Declaration of Principles, that crime “inflicts an injury upon others,” criminality is
determined by “competent courts, and punishment is “suffering” designed for the 
purpose of “reformation” (1930 249).  The condition of criminality is treated through 
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punishment intended to reform, to re-make the criminal.  However, what acts are 
considered criminal and the strategies of improvement vary in place and time.  A 
variety of policy changes in the New Deal era of the 1930s were a culmination of 
Progressive efforts and addressed the matter of reformation, including education, paid 
labor, psychological classification and treatment, and parole programs.  Such 
strategies of rehabilitation came under sharp scorn in Faulkner’s own Mississippi, and 
one newspaper, the Daily Clarion-Ledger, claimed in a 1934 editorial that it was 
“dangerous for society to fall into the error that science can, through a little 
remodeling, make model citizens of all hardened criminals” (qtd. in Taylor Down 84).  
None of these five of Faulkner’s criminals is remodeled; rather than reformed, made 
anew, they are destroyed in their death sentences.  What this chapter describes is 
Faulkner’s changed representation of criminality, its causes, its punishments, and the 
social responsibility for them.
My claim of an evolved sense of criminality in Faulkner’s writing then 
involves matters of human agency and the sense of its possibility at particular times 
and places, and thus incorporates both psychoanalysis’ emphasis on the individual 
consciousness and the plural sense of social history.  Faulkner himself shifted from 
emphasizing the former to the latter in his account of forces that shape criminality 
between his writing of Sanctuary and Light in August and then Go Down, Moses a 
decade later.  I do make some use of Freudian and Lacanian terminology to describe 
the characters of Popeye and Christmas.  However, I am less interested in reading the 
three novels wholly within a psychoanalytic framework than reading them 
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comparatively as bracketing a change in the writer’s sense of individual autonomy, 
state retribution for crime, and social responsibility.  Their respective accounts here 
are situated with respect to other texts as well, particularly the credence prison 
officials gave to psychological classification and the individuation of prisoners from 
1929 to 1942.  The proceedings of the American Prison Association demonstrate the 
authority given to psychological analysis in the formation of the criminal by prison 
officials.  That emphasis on personal history participated in their individuation.  Most 
importantly, the causes of criminality and the relation between the criminal and 
society described in those transcripts provide a historical record in tension with the 
history Faulkner imagines.  
The narratives of all three novels are determined largely by violent crime, and 
the commission, discovery, and punishment of those crimes serve as the points of 
gravity around which Faulkner’s trademark style of narrative loops and whorls until it 
circles back to tell and retell events that, chronologically, occur before.  Sanctuary
builds in tension first until Popeye murders Tommy and brutally rapes Temple Drake, 
for which Goodwin is accused; Horace Benbow, in defending Goodwin, tracks 
Temple to a Memphis whorehouse, where Popeye has confined her.  Temple falsely 
accuses Goodwin, who is thereafter lynched, while Popeye vanishes only to reappear 
and be tried, convicted, and executed by his tacit admission to a murder he did not 
actually commit.  In Light in August, Joe Christmas’ childhood memory of a sexual 
scene is linked through the racial epithet “nigger” to his ambiguous race.  Those 
associations bind sexuality and racial violence for him until he finally kills Joanna 
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Burden, who has run the gamut from rape victim to lover, and he is thereafter 
indicted, escapes, and is then shot and castrated by a eputy of the posse.  
Chronologically speaking, Go Down, Moses begins with Carothers 
McCaslin’s rape of the slave Eunice and then their daughter Tomasina, a genealogy 
extending through that patriarch’s white sons’ pursuit and capture of the escaped 
slave who is their half-brother, which leads to the marriages that perpetuate black and 
white McCaslins both.  Those raced and entwined genealogies provide much of the 
shape the baggy monster of the novel has.  The narrative outline of Go Down, Moses
is cast in sharper relief in noting its two ends.  First, in the penultimate section of 
“Delta Autumn,” the sins of the father, incest and miscegenation, are renewed in Roth 
Edmonds’ son borne by his distant relation, she by four generations and he by five 
removed from Carothers McCaslin, the all-father.  The second finish is Butch’s 
execution in the titular chapter, a son four generations removed from McCaslin, 
though his is a genealogical dead end.  It is also an official death in counterpoint to 
Rider’s lynching at the midpoint of the novel.  The narrative ends of Goodwin, 
Popeye, Christmas, Rider, and Butch are deaths brought about by the intersections of 
criminality, blackness, sexual violence, or some combination of these.  Goodwin 
offers the exception proving the rule, a rare to the point of unique representation of 
the lynching of a white man in the twentieth century.  The crimes and punishments of 
Christmas, Rider, and Butch Beauchamp are tied directly to their race, and Goodwin 
and Christmas are accused of rape, resulting in their sexual mutilation.  Lynch mobs 
kill Goodwin and Rider, in contrast with the judicially sanctioned deaths of Popeye 
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and Beauchamp.  Christmas’ castration and death at the hands of the ad hoc deputy 
Percy Grimm falls between lynching and execution.  
Juries sentence Goodwin, Popeye, Christmas, Rider, and Butch, or Faulker 
describes such verdicts as foregone conclusions.  Goodwin’s and Popeye’s respective 
juries each deliberate just eight minutes before returning with conviction.  For 
Christmas, the “Grand Jury was preparing behind locked doors to take the life of a 
man whom few of them had ever seen to know” (Light in August 416).  Rider’s 
lynching is a given to the deputy sheriff (and deputy narrator) of the second half of 
“Pantaloon in Black” even before the jailbreak, and news of Butch’s impending 
execution is carried on the news wire.  Indeed, incarceration in Faulkner’s fiction at 
first seems anachronistic, as cells serve only to hold prisoners until their punishment 
in all of these cases, rather than the confinement serving as the punishment itself.  
That is, pre-Revolutionary practices housed prisoners in jails to await their 
public and bodily punishment, but Enlightenment arguments offered in Europe by 
Cesare Becarria and in the U.S. by Benjamin Rush shifted bodily punishment at the 
turn of the eighteenth century to the containment, concealment, and control of 
imprisonment (On Crimes and Punishments; “An Enquiry”).  The incarceration in the 
cases of all five of these characters is only a brief period prior to their deaths by 
execution in the cases of Popeye and Butch, and lynching for Goodwin and Rider, 
while Christmas’ death is held in tension between the two.  Regarding these two 
practices, Faulkner in his letters—belles and otherwise—does not always significantly 
differentiate between the acts of mobs and juries.  In a 1931 letter to the Memphis 
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Commercial-Appeal, he suggests that “both had a way of being right” (qtd. in 
McMillen and Polk 6).  The mutual legitimacy Faulkner offers in that letter is at odds 
with the negative view of lynching in the short story “Dry September,” written the 
same year, or Light in August a year later.  The attributed rightness of mob and jury is 
one that should trouble readers of Faulkner, but their relation in the South is a matter 
of historical record.  
The seeming anachronism of punishment in these of Faulkner’s novels as well 
as his dangerous equation of mob and jury reflect related matters of criminality and 
race in early twentieth century punishment in the South in general and Mississippi in 
particular.  First, the public spectacle of lynching perpetuated the visibility of 
officially conducted bodily mutilation and execution more common of eighteenth 
century punishment practices continuing until the Civil War.  In addition, branding 
and other maiming for white and black criminals, even for minor crimes, continued in 
Mississippi decades past the national norm (Oshinsky 6).  However, the overdue 
revisions to Mississippi’s criminal code in 1835 did not protect slaves, and 
postbellum racial tensions perpetuated violence against black men and women, 
particularly with the end of Reconstruction.  Lynching decreased by the 1930s, during 
which time executions ceased being public, and states assumed the responsibility for 
executions from cities and counties.  Given the identical statistics of raced lynching 
and the execution of black men in the case of rape, the latter practice may have 
perpetuated the practices of the former, offering another explanation for high ates of 
execution in Southern states.  
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The statistical parallel between lynching and official execution is not their 
only correlation.  Law enforcement officials in the South regularly abetted lynch 
mobs, whether directly by handing over victims, or indirectly, by providing 
insufficient protection for prisoners.  Such complicity drew national scrutiny in the 
1906 lynching of Ed Johnson in Chattanooga, Tennessee.  Three years later, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined that law enforcement officers had insufficiently protected 
Johnson.  The court initiated the only criminal trial in its history to find the sheriff 
and two deputies guilty of contempt of Court in U.S. v. Shipp (1909).  Still, Congress’ 
failure to pass the Costigan-Wagner Act in 1935, which would have made such 
complicity a federal crime, resulted from the opposition of Southern states.  The 
blocking of the Costigan-Wagner Act demonstrates the embeddedness of lynching in 
Southern culture in the 1930s, thus establishing the basis for it to inform official 
execution practices as conducted by state governments.  For example, a Mississippi 
sheriff initially appointed the rape victim’s father as hangman in a 1934 case, a trial 
where the jury debated all of seven minutes (Oshinksy 211).  The eight-minute juries 
of both Goodwin and Popeye in Sanctuary seem eerily prescient of such cases.  The 
prison officials of the APA could “rejoice that their day of activity is 1930, rather 
than 1830, that vengeance of the state, of retribution, has largely given way to 
correctional ideals” (1930 69).  However, the APA from 1870 to 1930 largely 
featured Northeast membership, and those ideals did not necessarily extend to the 
South, to Faulkner’s Mississippi.
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What this means for Faulkner’s fiction is a reappraisal of distinctions between 
lynching and execution, and a treatment of the sensational and violently retributive 
cases of Goodwin, Popeye, and Christmas as less exceptional than representative.  
Goodwin’s conviction in Sanctuary includes the District Attorney Eustace Graham’s 
closing argument in court for lynching, to which Goodwin’s defender Horace 
Benbow objects and the judge sustains; in the end, the townspeople have their will 
done.  In like fashion, Percy Grimm is at once deputy and knife-wielding mob 
member.  The blurring between the punishments, coupled with Faulkner’s 1931 letter 
to the Memphis paper equating juries and mobs, offers them a mutual legitimacy in 
his writing of the early 1930s, an equation that Faulkner no longer found tenable a 
decade later.  In place of a lawyer’s argument for lynching in court or a deputy 
castrating a criminal, there is a sharp divorce between mob violence and 
jurisprudential decision in Go Down, Moses, between the tragedy offered in ironic 
register of Rider’s lynching in “Pantaloon in Black” at the center and Butch’s 
execution at the end.80
The shared narrative closures of jurisprudential decision and consequent 
violent deaths among these novels suggest their comparison, but the most interest lies 
in the differences among their criminals, their origins and executions, and the 
difference those differences make.  From Popeye and Joe Christmas in the novels of 
the early 1930s to Butch Beauchamp in Go Down, Moses a decade later, there is a 
changed sense of criminality, a shift in cause from personal history to social history, 
with a corresponding shift in human agency and responsibility.  Also, with regard to 
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race, the virtual equation of black masculinity with criminality—a calculus by no 
means Faulkner’s alone and one of the most pernicious in U.S. history—is not 
effaced in the later work, but their relationship is more complicated than in the earlier 
novels.  Indeed, with its setting, which spans from 1840 to 1940, Go Down, Moses
implies in its narrative trajectory a radical claim, suggesting that twentieth century 
incarceration is the inexorable conclusion of slavery and Jim Crow thereafter, and is 
thus an explicitly raced practice.81  While more of Sanctuary likely takes place in jail 
than any other of Faulkner’s novels, possibly surpassed only by Intruder in the Dust, 
imprisonment serves more as a gothic set-pi ce rather than a culminating thematic 
force, as it does in Go Down, Moses.  That novel’s sprawling historical setting and at 
times only tenuously linked characters has as one of its most central narrative drives 
the critical representation of the enslavement and imprisonment of its black 
characters.  Tomey’s Turl as a slave in “Was” gives way to Lucas Beauchamp, who 
twice considers reaping cotton not on the Edmonds’ plantatio  but the prison fields of 
Parchman Farm (33- 4, 68), yields to Rider’s incarceration and lynching, and reaches 
its conclusion in Butch Beauchamp’s seemingly inevitable execution.  Faulkner 
breaks from the bleak certainty of that narrative trajectory in the final coda, when the 
white male business community takes financial responsibility for Butch’s funeral and 
the entire town of Jefferson assembles to witness his return. 
To return to Sanctuary, the first of the novels for which crime and punishment 
are so crucial:  much has been made of Faulkner’s dubious claim regarding Sanctuary
as hack work cranked out to pay the bills, satisfying what he imagined to be the lurid 
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tastes of the popular reading public.  At the opposite extreme are the critics variously
championing the novel.82  The scope of the present analysis does not allow for a 
resolution to this particular tension, but it is both relevant and worthwhile to point out 
the degree to which Sanctuary offers an early attempt to develop the investigation of 
criminality, justice, and execution that informs Light in August and Go Down, Moses.  
Faulkner critics from Joseph Blotner and Cleanth Brooks onward have pointed out 
Faulkner’s tendency to mine his earlier writing for his near constant themes of race, 
family, and cultural history, as well as the characters, settings, and relationships of his 
Yoknapatawpha County.  
More than most of Faulkner’s such returning to the wealth of his earlier 
words, Sanctuary, Light in August and Go Down, Moses demonstrate an arc of 
revision and reworked views in which the third novel is the culmination of narrative 
events and themes Faulkner developed over the 11 year span of their publication.  
There are of course the author’s well-noted idiosyncrasies, such as the ironic Christs 
of Popeye, born on Christmas, and Joe Christmas, left at the orphanage on that day.  
Of far more significance to the analysis at hand are the substantive resemblances 
among the three novels, and more importantly, how the differences in character and 
action among them chart a refined sense of agency, of act and cause.   That changed 
sense of agency, particularly in the context of criminal acts, make for the tension 
between actor and acted upon, the subject-to and subject-of history written in scenes 
of criminal violence that precipitate the characters’ eventual imprisonment and 
executions.
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First, there are a multitude of similar events and identical phrasing across the 
novels, many relating to matters of chance and choice surrounding incidents of 
criminality and violence.  The bootlegging pair of con and fool in Light in August, 
Christmas and Lucas Burch/Brown, gives way to the unwilling partners of trickster 
and clown, Lucas and George Wilkins in Go Down, Moses.  The poker game that 
resolves “Was” in Go Down, Moses reproduces nearly word-for-word a scene from 
Sanctuary.  In the earlier novel, there is an anecdote known in the town of Jefferson 
in which the District Attorney Eustace Graham bets in a livery stable against the 
owner, a Mr. Harris.  After Harris recounts the bets, he questions his opponent.
“Hmmm,” the proprietor said.  He examined his hand.  “How many cards did 
you draw, Eustace?”
“Three, Mr. Harris.”
“Hmmm.  Who dealt the cards, Eustace?”
“I did, Mr. Harris.”
“I pass, Eustace.” (263)
In Go Down, Moses, the wager is far higher and the game is stud rather than draw.  
But Hubert Beauchamp, after recounting the stakes, asks the same question of his 
opponent and folds in kind.   
“H’m,” he said.  “And and you need a trey and there aint but four of them and 
I already got three.  And you just shuffled.  And I cut afterward.  And if I call 
you, I will have to buy that nigger.  Who dealt these cards, Amodeus?”  […]  
“I pass, Amodeus,” he said. (27-28)
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The first dialogue is a throwaway set piece, only suggesting that the attorney cheats.  
The second scene establishes the complicity between “that damn white half-
McCaslin” Turl (6) who dealt the cards and his half-brother Amodeus, which results 
in the former’s union with Tennie, thereby perpetuating the tangled McCaslin 
genealogy, generative of Lucas and therefore his grandson Butch.  
The question of foreclosed chance here in the cards appears elsewhere in the 
novels as well.  In their verbal sparring, Temple Drake and Popeye repeatedly tell one 
another, “I gave you your chance” (233), just as Lucas Beauchamp twice exclaims to 
Zack Edmonds, “I gave you your chance” and intimates that chance has been given 
back and forth between them in the exchange of the razor (52, 55).83  Their contest, a 
mix of mutual assault and attempted murder with razor and pistol, murder only 
averted through the pistol’s misfire, recapitulates the face-off between Joanna Burden 
and Christmas of Light in August.  The pistol in each novel’s scene even has two 
bullets chambered, one for each opponent, and both narrative moments feature the 
first bullet’s deciding misfire.  Burden’s pistol’s failure, of course, ends not in uneasy 
reconciliation but in her near decapitation by Christmas’ razor.  That violence is itself 
anticipated in Sanctuary by the black man imprisoned for slitting his wife’s throat, 
and followed thereafter by Rider’s murder by razor of Birdsong in Go Down, Moses, 
the killing he commits as an elaborate form of suicide on the pretext of Birdsong’s 
weighted dice.  Then, in Christmas’ half-hearted escape, Light in August features the 
tragicomedy of the posse’s dogs pursuing Christmas, dogs that howl “with the 
passionate abandon of two baritones singing Italian opera,” a scene which is doubled 
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by the comic undertones of the McCaslin twins hounding their half-black half-brother 
in “Was”84 (Light in August 297; Go Down, Moses 4-5).  Across many of these 
replications and revisions is the common theme of possible actions, chances taken 
and given, though rarely equitably.  Gambling in Faulkner’s fiction, like reading of 
the works themselves, is always as pre-determined as the novels’ endings when 
readers open the first page—the game is always fixed, and we always play.85
This network of intertextuality suggests the degree to which these novels draw 
from one another, and the reworked scenes share common themes of chance, agency, 
and criminality.  The similarities are interesting in themselves, but become more 
meaningful when, in closer comparison, the subtle differences emerge, particularly 
with regard to the act and cause that constitute agency.  Faulkner describes such 
causality at crucial points in each of these novels in terms provocative in their 
resemblance and compelling in their evolution.  The narrative turning point of 
Sanctuary is Popeye’s rape of Temple Drake, of which she at its onset warns, 
“Something is going to happen to me […] ‘Something is happening to me!’” (102).  
In Light in August, Christmas kills Joanna Burden, similarly setting in motion the 
subsequent narrative, and he describes his situation before he walks to her house, 
“Something is going to happen to me.  I am going to do something” (104), which as 
he approaches the house becomes, “He didn’t even think then Something is going to 
happen.  Something is going to happen to me” (118), bookended with “‘I have got to 
do something.  There is something that I am going to do,’” as he waits still (271).  
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Faulkner writes Temple as subject to Popeye’s rape, while Christmas views 
himself as exactly balanced between agent and instrument.86  Less evident is the 
corollary moment in Go Down, Moses, though the closest is the battle between Zack 
and Lucas early in “The Fire and Hearth,” the resolution of which establishes the 
uneasy balance between the Edmonds and Beauchamps, which continues in that 
section, through “Delta Autumn,” to its end in the titular section, “Go Down, Moses.”  
As Lucas waits to face Zack and resolve the place of his wife Molly between them, he 
thinks, “He will do something and then I will do something and it will be all over.  It 
will be all right” (50).  The resemblances among these passages include near identical 
phrasing of something happening, something done, further emphasized by the italics 
used in Light in August and Go Down, Moses.  Furthermore, the narrative position of 
each of the iterations immediately precedes and comments directly on a violent crime.   
Temple, Christmas, and Lucas all exclaim that something is happening or they 
will do something prior to the most crucial of the several scenes of violence in each 
book.  There is a similar family resemblance among the novels with regard to how the 
characters situate themselves in time with respect to the violence so crucial to the 
respective narratives.  Temple foresees Popeye’s murder of Red with a balance of 
inevitability and indeterminacy:  “it has already happened. […] it couldn’t have 
happened yet” (237).  Related in phrasing and meaning is Christmas’ musing as to 
whether he has killed yet, “‘Maybe I have already done it,’ […]  ‘Maybe it is no 
longer now waiting to be done’” (111).  Lucas’ cast is more resolute:  “He will do 
something and then I will do something and it will be all over” (50).  “It,” the 
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violence that the characters perceive as resolution, in the course of the narratives only 
begins the ending—and in the case of Lucas and Zack, the “it” of murder never 
happens between them.  Like each articulation of something, the three accounts of 
“it,” of what will have happened for Temple, what Christmas will either do or wait to 
be done, and what Lucas will do, similarly chart a shift in agency, from its lack to its 
ambiguous enactment.  
The similarity in language and narrative placement invites the comparison 
among them, and the critical difference lies in the subtle shift from Temple as acted 
upon, to Christmas held in tension between acted upon and acting, to Lucas as one 
actor of several, though even he does not know exactly what he will do.  Gender 
informs the difference, as Temple’s actions throughout Sanctuary remain largely 
passive or subtle.  Her most direct action, as Goodwin’s denouncer, is itself a lie, and 
several critics comment variously on Temple’s lack of agency.87  In contrast, the two 
male and mixed race characters retain agency, however ambiguously.  It would be 
reductive to suggest that race trumps gender for Faulkner generally, that even 
tenuously “black” characters are capable of action and female characters are not, 
either across Faulkner’s novels in general or even these three in particular, 
considering the mobility and endurance of Lena Grove and Molly Beauchamp.  I am 
not suggesting that the textual power and agency of Faulkner’s female characters are 
unproblematic, as even a cursory survey of his fiction, or the criticism of it, 
demonstrates.  However, in Sanctuary, more than the role of gender, criminality 
informs Popeye’s agency.  He acts, and his criminal violence and the threat of it 
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largely guide the characters throughout the novel, whether in his rape of Temple and 
murder of Red, or in keeping Horace Benbow at the pond in the beginning to the 
silent threat he poses to Goodwin throughout.  
And yet—Faulkner is not so schematic, even in this work that closely 
approaches genre fiction, and one of Popeye’s fundamental characteristics is his 
impotence, his inability to act sexually.  In an extended coda to the novel’s primary 
narrative, Faulkner offers a near parody of a Freudian sketch for the cause of criminal 
character. The account offered in the vignette directly precedes Popeye’s hanging, an 
explanatory model that sees expansion in Christmas’ personal history and its end in 
Light in August.  That account of cause for criminality rooted in early development is 
largely overturned in the case of the execution that ends Go Down, Moses, the case of 
Lucas’ grandson, Butch Beauchamp.  A primary reworking in that work from the 
prior two novels of criminality is the relocation of agency, agency predicated upon 
subjectivity and identity, how characters act and what that makes them.  The shift 
occurs from a subject determined by a personal history and original cause to a social 
subject in tension with a larger history.  One of the most significant changes from 
Sanctuary and Light in August to Go Down, Moses is the difference in characters’ 
sense of themselves in the narrative action and their responsibility in and for it—in 
effect, the literary mirror of subjectivity and agency.  
“this modern trend” of crime—and psychoanalysis
Faulkner’s depiction of Popeye’s impotence and the symbolic substitution of 
his sexuality take on explicitly Freudian implications numerous times, not the least of 
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which is Temple stealing his pistol or repeatedly calling him “daddy” (225, 229, 231, 
236).  Indeed, their sexual relationship, such as it is, mediated by Red though 
orchestrated by Popeye, at times seems not only derivative but also a parody of 
Freudian myths of erotic neuroses.  With Popeye’s whinnying like a horse in his 
voyeurism, he is a gelding to go alongside the Rat Man, Wolf Man, and the rest of the 
mythological zoo of sexual disorders.  Psychoanalytic readings are pervasive in the 
criticism of Sanctuary and accounts of Popeye, Temple, and Horace and Narcissa 
Benbow.  Given the name of the last, Freud’s accounts of narcissism, the repeated 
motif of mirrors throughout the novel, and Lacan’s claim of mirroring in identity 
formation (Ecríts 1-7), it is not difficult to see why.  
However, most relevant to the matter of criminality and causality at hand is 
the coda that takes place in the final chapter, the trial, after Goodwin’s lynching.  
Popeye’s arrest for killing a policeman when he was instead shooting Red 
immediately gives way to his unremembered infancy:  his mother’s courtship, 
marriage, abandonment, and disease; Popeye’s own near murder as an infant, his 
sickness, curtailed sexual development, and homicidal tendencies even as a child 
(302-9).  Framed as it is between his arrest and trial seven pages later, it is difficult 
not to read that curt life story as an explanatory cause, what Guest describes as a 
diagnostic biography and what prison officials at the time sought in a case record, 
retroactively tracing crime to early biography:  “A case record should reveal a man’s 
very soul,” the criminal type determined in “the individual’s life history” (APA 1929 
79; 1930 202).  In the case of Popeye, the coda offers a causal narrative for the crime 
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he actually committed (the murder of Red) to balance his execution for the crime of 
which he is innocent (the murder of the policeman).  
Faulkner claims in the introduction to the 1932 Modern Library edition of 
Sanctuary that his mercenary writing process for the novel deliberately catered to his 
imagined audience, “what a person in Mississippi would believe to be current trends” 
(vi).88  Among those “current trends” Faulkner sought to exploit are criminality in 
general and its psychological cause in particular.  The pulp detective fiction of the 
1920s as well as films such as Alfred Hitchcock’s Blackmail (1929) and Murder!
(1930) may have been some of the crime fiction Faulkner surveyed, and he was not 
the only one viewing that cultural landscape.  The APA President George C. Erksine 
began his presidential address of the 1929 annual congress by pointing out the 
centrality of crime in the cultural imagination, and “the morning paper, the table of 
contents of the current magazines, a casual glance at the shelves of any book store 
[…] all bear witness to this modern trend” (1929 2).  Erksine’s “modern trend” of the 
pervasiveness of the representation of criminality is likely one of the several “current 
trends” to which Faulkner refers; psychological analysis is another.  Erksine closes 
his address with an emphasis on the necessity of psychologically profiling criminals 
(8, 9), and five of the 42 papers presented during the general session of the 1929 
conference focus specifically on psychological approaches to criminology with an 
emphasis on childhood experience.  
The approaches endorsed by the APA less resemble Freudian emphases on the 
unconscious and sexuality than the individual personality development described by 
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Alfred Adler, who split from Freud and his approach in 1907.  One indicator of that 
association appears in the discussion following a paper given at the 1930 APA 
congress that treats criminality largely as a psychological disorder, prompting an 
anxious questioner to suggest that the profiling described in that presentation might 
give a prisoner “a real inferiority complex” (222).  That complex is a misreading of 
Adler’s theory of self-assertion, though that slip, as well as the hazy distinction 
between Adler’s and Freud’s approaches, was common at the time.  A 1925 New York 
Times article archly suggests that the psychological disorders “Freudians attribute to 
repressed sex impulse, Adler attributes to a deficiency in the mechanism of self-
assertion to the ‘inferiority complex,’ which today is on the tongue of thousands who 
have no idea of what they are talking about” (Oxford English Dictionary On-line).  
So “a person in Mississippi,” or the larger audience that Faulkner knew, 
believed, and hoped to gain might have difficulty sorting between schools of 
psychoanalysis which developed through the late 1920s, notably with the publication 
of Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (1930) and Adler’s and The Case of Miss 
R:  The Interpretation of a Life Story (1929) in the years immediately preceding the 
release of Sanctuary.  Psychoanalysis as part of the texture of culture at the time thus 
informs the diagnostic narrative Faulkner offers, and Popeye’s seems particularly 
Freudian.  The character’s infancy and impotence are fairly easily understood as a 
sum of the primacy of pre-conscious sexual development and anatomy as destiny, the 
two Freudian maxims of psychoanalytic subject formation.  The explanation of 
Popeye’s criminality narratively follows the crime much as psychoanalysis 
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retroactively locates original cause as secreted in unconscious memory.  Still, given 
its almost tacked on nature, it seems possible to read Popeye’s biographical vignette 
as Faulkner’s capitulation to a model of behavior he did not believe, but for which he 
did not have an alternative.  Not until Go Down, Moses would he develop a social and 
cultural genealogy for subject formation as an alternative to a repressed personal 
history based largely on sexuality.
Though Faulkner radically expands the sophistication of character in Light in 
August compared to Sanctuary, Christmas’ crime and thus his subsequent execution, 
like Popeye’s, has an explanatory narrative, an original cause in the primal scene.  
Whereas Popeye’s Freudian coda is triggered by his arrest, the return to Christmas’ 
childhood occurs immediately after he begins walking to Burden’s house, where he 
will kill her.  The recollection of the primal scene, written through with the obligatory 
guilt, even opens with a fair description of the operation of a Freudian unconscious:  
“Memory believes before knowing remembers.  Believes longer than recollects, 
longer than knowing even wonders.  Knows remembers believes” (119).  That 
introduction gives way directly to the description of the orphanage, the setting of his 
theft of toothpaste, his observation of the dietitian and Charlie’s sexual encounter and 
the origin of Christmas’ guilt, tied subsequently to Christmas’ race when the dietitian 
names him “nigger bastard” to end the scene (122).  That moment is easily read as 
simultaneously one of birth and entry into the social (symbolic) order, albeit an order 
of violence, sexuality, and racism.  Upon Christmas’ declaration of “here I am”—his 
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first speech offered as a child—to interrupt their intercourse, the dietitian drags him 
“violently out of his vomit” to name him.  
That moment lays the basis for the subsequent 100-plus pages accounting for 
Christmas’ battles with that misplaced guilt, not the shorthand diagnostic biography 
of Popeye, but one still chronicling both his youth and his crucial violent acts:  first, 
against the black woman in the shed, and second, felling McEachern.  The first stages 
again the primal scene, and in case readers are to miss the association of sexual 
maneuvers in the dark, Faulkner provides Christmas’ recollection in that shed upon 
seeing the woman—“There was something in him trying to get out, like when he had 
used to think of toothpaste” (156).  Whatever Christmas knows, remembers, or 
believes of sex is bound with that originary moment, his entry to a sexed system that 
names him “nigger bastard,” and links sex with blackness and violence.  That first 
criminal violence against women rises with Bobbie, escalates further with the 
nameless prostitute beat nearly to death, and culminates in the murder of Joanna 
Burden.
Like the personal history that scripts the beginning of Popeye’s criminality 
and is offered narratively as the basis for his end, Christmas’ origins direct him to his 
death, though the strictly Freudian structure of the former gives way in the latter to 
one best understood through a combination of Freud and Lacan.  The originary 
moment, his witnessing of the primal scene, is the one that enters him into the 
symbolic order, the “here I am” of linguistic participation in a world beyond himself.  
Those Lacanian associations increase when he fells the adopted parent McEachern at 
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the dance hall.  The Oedipal violence of vanquishing the father ceases to be entirely 
literal and shifts to the symbolic.  In assailing the elder McEachern with the chair, 
Christmas commits the “Shalt Not” (206-7), striking down the literal father, a scene 
Faulkner casts in the terms of the name-of-the-father in gesturing to the Ten 
Commandments.  Light in August later repeats the scen  of railing against the Father, 
down to the detail of wielding furniture, when Christmas suspends his own 
ambiguous escape to interrupt a revival hymnal to preach blasphemy from the pulpit, 
brandishing a bench leg (323).  Whereas Popeye’s criminal psyche eems not entirely 
satisfactory, but either the best Faulkner could offer or what he considered his 
audience expecting, Christmas offers a much more complex figure in terms of his 
violence and its constituent causes.  Still, a symbolic narrative larger than the self 
collapses back to the individual, the personal guilt of witnessing the primal scene.  
Faulkner returns to that admission for the adult Christmas, when he stops running and 
says to himself, “Here I am” (337).  The repetition is a surrender to consequence, and 
its verbatim repetition links the two moments, traces his punishment back through his 
personal history to the emergent consciousness.  
Christmas’ history is personal, its deployment determined, a chain of events 
tracing back through dysfunctional and raced sexual relationships, to an abusive 
father, to an unpunished theft of toothpaste.  In that originary moment, Faulkner 
seems again to almost parody a psychoanalytic subject, a psyche unable to abandon 
the burden of unconscious guilt.  That sense of self is entirely singular, determined by 
the circumstances shaping Christmas’ character, the rich description taking place 
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largely between the definition of the unconscious, “Memory believes before knowing 
remembers,” and Bobbie’s “that will do,” which halts Christmas’ beating, a command 
half-heard as he fades into unconsciousness (119, 219).  I am not suggesting that the 
development of Christmas’ character takes place outside of history, for the racing and 
gendering of the sexual violence that areth  beginning and the end of his criminality 
are matters of social difference and its powerful inscription.  Instead, it is a matter of 
emphasis on the relationship between subject and history—in effect, the location of 
agency.  One of Light in August’s many narrators, Gavin Stevens, describes one of its 
other storytellers, Christmas’ grandmother Mrs. Hines, as narrating in terms that “had 
already been written and worded for her” (448).  Stevens describes Christmas’ 
criminality in a similarly determined manner, criminality defined by his incarceration, 
itself built from “whatever crimes had molded him and shaped him and left him at 
last high and dry in a barred cell” (448).  According to Stevens, the criminal is what 
events have made him.
These are two different sorts of determination, one of scripted events as 
foregone conclusions, the other as the sort of naturalism Richard Wright would 
employ eight years later in Native Son, a comparison Sundquist makes as well in 
Faulkner:  The House Divided.  That sort of naturalist determination of criminality is 
also described by Howard A. McDonnell a year after the publication of Wright’s 
novel.  McDonnell, a state Representative in 1941, suggested in a speech in the 
Mississippi House of Representatives that “crime and criminals are the natural results 
of a given cause” (qtd. in Taylor 86).  Still, regardless of whether narrative events are 
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treated as scripted, “written and worded,” or determined by environmental conditions, 
both sharply curtail agency.  Such agency, or personal choice in a given circumstance, 
is regularly described as the axis between the determining forces of heredity and 
environment at the APA conferences (1929 21-28; 1930 73-74, 202-3).  However, 
what those forces of heredity and environment might be, specifically, remains largely 
unspoken in the discussions, and the question of race is never raised.  Indeed, the 
proceedings of the annual congress from 1929 to 1932 never substantively mention 
race, and a census of prisoners provided in the 1929 report makes no mention of it at 
all (168-175).
The history not recorded there is imagined in Faulkner’s writing.  For 
Christmas, the fundamental indeterminate determination is racial difference, and 
blackness in the novel is regularly associated with criminality.  At one point in Light 
in August, to be accused of being black is worse than to be accused of crime.  When 
Lucas Burch/Brown tells the marshal that Christmas is “a nigger,” the officer 
responds, “You had better be careful what you are saying if it is a white man you are 
talking about […]  I dont care if he is a murderer or not” (98).  To the sheriff, being 
called a “nigger” is imagined as worse than being a murderer.  Such logic reads in 
reverse as well, that to be black is to automatically be a criminal, the ruthless 
irrational logic of racism in early twentieth century Mississippi.  One white local told 
a visitor in 1908, “When there is a row, we feel like killing a nigger whether he has 
done anything or not” (Oshinksy 100).  Punishment does not actually require a crime 
when blackness and criminality are not separable in the cultural imagination of the 
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early twentieth century South.  To the townspeople of Jefferson, the two compound 
one another.  Hearing of Burden’s death, they “believed aloud that it was an 
anonymous negro crime committed not by a negro but by Negro and who knew, 
believed, and hoped that she had been ravished too” (288—emphasis added).  Like 
the description of Christmas’ unconscious, which “Knows remembers believes” half-
truths of Christmas’ race and original sin, the town is of one mind and “knew, 
believed, and hoped” murder to be explicitly raced and sexualized.  
Crucial to the town’s unconscious, then, is the fantasy of a black man’s rape 
of a white woman, an imaginary that inextricably binds lynching and execution even 
as it conceals the historical actuality of white male slave owners raping black women.  
Light in August reveals the former while concealing the latter, and so it largely would 
remain in Faulkner’s writing until Absalom, Absalom! and to a far greater extent in 
Go Down, Moses.  The Jefferson of Light in August sees the imagined unity in blood 
vengeance fulfilled in Christmas’ execution on Grimm’s terms, directly hailing that 
fantasy:  “Now you’ll let white women alone, even in hell” (464).  It is toward this 
end that Christmas walks with an inevitability pervasive in the novel.
He leaves the scene of Burden’s murder, “moving from his feet upward as 
death moves” (339), and thereafter sees, according to Stevens, “an incipient 
executioner everywhere he looked” (448).  Given how any passers-by might join a 
lynch mob, Christmas might very well see in any face a potential executioner.  
Christmas may perceive his position as held in tension between actor and acted upon 
(“Something is going to happen to me.  I am going to do something”) before Burden’s 
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death, and walk as if surrounded by executioners thereafter, but the killing is not the 
crux.  Directly before the thanatos of walking toward execution, he thinks, “‘I have 
never got outside that circle.  I have never broken out of the ring of what I have 
already done and cannot ever undo’” (339).  In fine modernist fashion, he is a circle 
enclosed on the outside.  By race, deed, and name, he is the simultaneous capitulation 
and resistance to what other people have called him:  “nigger,” Christian, McEachern.  
He repudiates the name of the father even as he assumes the implacable ruthless 
violence by which the father is defined and which constitutes Christmas’ string of 
sexual violence.  In the last instance, he returns to the beginning, as circles do, in the 
repetition of “here I am” that binds the commission of murder with the originary 
moment, in which the perceived crime of toothpaste theft is inextricable from the 
observation of the primal scene.
Faulkner represents such doomed resistance to inevitability in the ironical 
romanticism with which he depicts Christmas’ end.  Christmas’ executioner Percy 
Grimm’s very name links him to knightly court and fairy tales, but his actions are 
entirely shaped by the personal experience offered in his own brief coda, a 
complement to Christmas’—or Popeye’s, for that matter.  He is introduced with the 
generic convention of fairy tales, once upon a time (“In that town on that day lived a 
young man”), and the subsequent few pages script a miniature biography to explain 
his actions (449-51).   Indeed, his actions are so determined as to make him a game 
piece, and he is described as such, his actions governed by “the Player who moved 
him for a pawn” (462).  According to Michael Oriard in Sporting with the Gods
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(1991), Faulkner’s characters are “engaged in desperate contests with a cruel but 
sportive deity” against the backdrop of “the social and political forces that lay behind 
those contests,” forces of “race, sex, caste, religion, history” (296).89  For Oriard, 
Christmas and others characters achieve what tragic grace they can through facing the 
challenge of an omnipotent opponent, through “sporting with the gods.”  
Oriard identifies at length how game and sport in the United States became 
complex tropes in literature, signifying at once conflict, play, and in the case of sport, 
the acknowledgment of a worthy adversary—games imply no such sense of fair 
competition.  Thus, Christmas in his final footrace challenges doom not in Grimm but 
in a higher opponent with whom points are won and lost over a cosmic chessboard.90
Oriard identifies Light in August as the novel in which Faulkner’s use of “[t]he 
rhetorical figure of the sporting contest against fate is most explicit” and traces at 
length its various appearances in the text (304).  The rhetoric of sport in Faulkner’s 
fiction elevates the human subject, pits the character against a “sportive deity” in a 
contest at once doomed and triumphant.91  Such a reading elides the degree to which 
that “sportive deity” is Faulkner himself, the “sole owner and proprietor” of the 
imaginary lives and land, but either way, Christmas is doomed in the contest.
Christmas in sport against his maker, whether God or Author, for contol of 
his death is a romantic image, a noble and doomed gesture in the manner of 
Prometheus stealing fire or Ahab’s mad pursuit of myth.  However, Faulkner 
undercuts the romantic nobility of the contest by lacing its depiction with an ironical 
voice.  For example, Grimm pedaling furiously in circles while pursuing Christmas 
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becomes “the delicate swiftness of an apparition, the implacable undeviation of 
Juggernaut or Fate” (460).  The undermined dignity is not either/or, comic or tragic, 
fair or unfair, sporting or child’s play, victory or defeat, but maintains the resolute 
tension of both-and.  Rather than strictly the fulfillment of either the death wish of the 
condemned or the capricious cruelty of an omnipotent opponent, Christmas’ 
execution ends for him—if not for the community—the play of tensions, of 
ambiguities of character and action.  The uncertainty of his blackness and parenthood 
occupy the central ambiguity of a character encased in non-absolutes.  Is he black or 
white?  Was Joanna’s death murder or self-defense?  Is his death execution or 
lynching?  For Faulkner, too, there is that ambiguity, the complex and contradictory 
sense of race, crime, and justice.  Nowhere is that “is-is not” of the riven self made 
more clear than in the writer’s equation f lynch mobs with juries in that both “have a 
way of being right” from the letter cited earlier and printed a year before Light in 
August.  
There is no such rightness in Christmas’ death and mutilation, committed with 
sufficient savagery to see one would-be executioner vomit.  Faulkner offers the 
violence as tragic, then transcendent in the dying Christmas, a romantic assumption 
wherein the character is lifted bodily into the community’s memory.  
[Christmas] seemed to rise soaring into their memories forever and ever.  
They are not to lose it, in whatever peaceful valleys, beside whatever placid 
and reassuring streams of old age, in the mirroring faces of whatever children 
they will contemplate old disasters and newer hopes.  It will be there, musing, 
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quiet, steadfast, not fading and not particularly threatful, but of itself alone 
serene, of itself alone triumphant.  Again from the town, deadened a little by 
its walls, the scream of the siren mounted toward its unbelievable crescendo, 
passing out of the realm of hearing. (465)
Christmas’ end in Light in August is the first of its three closures, the other two being 
those of Hightower and Grove.  The ironical romanticism of contest with a sportive 
God of Christmas’ last pages turns to the linguistic redemption of romantic style.  The 
nameless, omniscient narrator foretells the future, knows the townspeople’s memories 
present and future “for ever and ever.”   Christmas’ ghost somehow looms in 
Jefferson’s shared memory, forever harmless, calm, and somehow vict rious.  My 
repeated “somehow” draws attention to the indefinite quality of this description, the 
“seemed,” the three times repeated “whatever” of valleys, streams, and children in a 
town whose courthouses, churches, and jails disappear in this imagined future of 
natural and transcendental imagery:  “streams of old age” where time is a river in 
which one might fish.  The indefinite description makes that future history as 
inevitable, impotent, and all too late as the siren’s scream, which is “unbelievable”
and fades to silence.  The possibility for romantic redemption is worn out, but it lacks 
a substitute.  Similarly exhausted but without alternative is a psychoanalytic model of 
character, the cause of criminality and its attendant incarceration and execution in 
Sanctuary and Light in August.
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Invoking Jefferson’s “Corporate Limit”
Ten years later, in Go Down, Moses, Faulkner repudiated that model of 
criminality, and by extension subject formation.  There are similarities across the 
characterizations of Popeye, Christmas, and Beauchamp, who as criminals all play the 
role of the stereotypical gangster, the hardman.  In Se tenced to Death, Guest 
describes the myth of the “hardened convict, or criminal ‘hardman’ […] a cold-
blooded, unpredictable, and violent persona” (135).  These are the definitive 
masculine traits of invulnerability, mastery, and activity.  Christmas reproduces 
Popeye’s gangster caricature nearly to the last detail, with his sloping hat and 
drooping cigarette, his casual violence and more casual crime of selling liquor, and 
the rumors of business with a gun in Memphis.  In Go Down, Moses, Butch is literally 
hard, his face “impenetrable,” his hair “lacquered” and head “bronze,” his name 
“Butch” a parody of masculinity, and he answers the census-taker question about 
what will happen to his corpse with the words of the hardman:  “What will that matter 
to me?” (351-52).  The hardman does not resist his death sentence, but according to 
Guest, “accepts it and seems to welcome death” (135).92  Like Christmas, Butch plays 
the hardman.
However, how they each became that way differs dramatically between the 
novels.  Instead of personal history as the first cause of criminality, the sum of 
determining forces embodied in a single life but nevertheless traceable to an originary 
moment, there is a larger social frame, history as the tracing backwards of genealogy.  
Whereas Quentin Compson cuts his Psychology class in The Sound and the Fury in 
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order to play his own analysand in the talking cure of stream-of-consciousness 
narrative, the schooling offered by Cass and Ike at the heart of “The Bear” is History, 
assembling the ledgers to envision and revise a narrative of their family, and by 
extension the South.  Go Down, Moses ends as the original text of Sanctuary begins; 
in the drafts prior to its final publication, Sanctuary began with a black man accused 
of murder awaiting his execution.93  Butch, like Popeye, is condemned for the murder 
of a policeman.  Popeye offers no defense, and Butch does not offer much of one, 
though what he says of himself is at least true of Popeye:  “It was another guy killed 
the cop” (352).  The substitution of accusation for actuality in the case of Popeye is a 
sheer unknown for Butch, for readers are never sure whether Butch did in fact kill 
anyone.  That ambiguity features in Christmas’ crime as well, as his murder of 
Burden is at least partly self-defense.  Nevertheless, while their respective narratives 
leave undecided or at least problematic the question of agency in the commission of 
crime, all three characters are named as criminals in courts, which the APA’s first 
principle defines as separate from the commission of crime.
The novels themselves cannot fully resolve that uncertainty, as the moments 
of the crimes are not narrated; with regard to punishment, only Christmas’ death is 
directly rendered.  The narration of Popeye’s execution stops just short of his actual 
death, as the sheriff opens the trapdoor of the hanging scaffold, and description does 
not as closely approach Butch’s end.  Readers encounter him in his cell the day before 
his execution and then afterwards, his casket returning to town.  Most important, 
though, is the lack of an explanatory narrative for Butch’s criminality.  The 
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explanation of biography offered for Popeye and Christmas lacks a parallel in the 
case of Butch, one end of the McCaslin genealogy.  Like Edgar Allan Poe’s 
Fortunato, Beauchamp is introduced to the reader only to be sealed away behind walls 
to his death for reasons obscure and unavailable.  What little readers know of 
Beauchamp’s past we know through the District Attorney Stevens’ remembered 
reading of the “papers of that business,” the authoritative discourse that scripts the 
condemned man as “some seed not only violent but dangerous and bad” (355). 
However, that narrative is not the only one available, and the reader possesses the 
preceding episodes of the novel, also “papers of that business,” which offer a 
competing narrative, an entire other discourse.  That narrative, its chronicle of 
miscegenation and sexual violence, of tangled or misplaced desires, writes a history 
of character thematically similar to that of Christmas:  raced and gendered violence 
shaping the acts that make the criminal, the prisoner.  However, Butch’s story is 
different in terms of scope, as he is claimed by a social body extending beyond his 
own skin.
I am highlighting distinctions of individual and social subjects and their 
histories as well as between atomistic and social senses of selfhood, because the 
process of individuation is one means by which institutional forces such as 
incarceration function.   Discussions at the annual APA meetings were rife with the 
aim of individualization:  “We must learn to individualize”; “Throughout our prisons 
we need individualization” (1929 293; 1930 41).  That repeated imperative seems 
most often to refer to treating prisoners either in humanist fashion as unique, or in line 
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with Adler and as the products of their respective personal histories.  However, there 
is a less favorable reading available.  Individuals and the means of their production 
are framed in two specific claims made at the APA conference at moments 
contemporaneous to the publication of Light in August and Go Down, Moses.  One 
member, Maud Ballington Booth, was in 1932 a sufficiently prominent Volunteer of 
America and member of the APA that she received a standing ovation in introducing 
another speaker later in the conference (440), and years later would haveservice 
award named in her honor.  In her presentation, “Individualization in Prisons,” she 
describes the means of making prisoners into individuals in terms of work and 
emotion, that they should perform hard labor to earn individual, personal, 
congratulatory attention from wardens and officers.  She suggests that the discipline 
of such work and its rote affective response will transform convicts into soldiers, 
prepared so that upon leaving prison, “they go out into the world and they take up that 
burden and they fight that battle” (189).  Recognition as reward purposed to further 
good works sutures the rhetoric of hailed individuality—Althusser’s “hey, you 
there!”—to the Victorian hymnal “Onward Christian Soldiers,” made popular as a 
marching tune in the early twentieth century.
Ten years after Booth’s speech, the rhtoric of war became tenuous in the 
context of actual battles and required refining.  The 1942 APA conference 
proceedings include much commentary on the role of the prison system in wartime.  
One lecture in particular focuses on military service and the psychopathology of 
criminality and determines that some released, paroled, or even current prisoners may 
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be drafted for military service—such as is the case of Lee Goodwin’s service in 
World War One in Sanctuary.  However, those with long records of even minor 
criminality must not serve.  Even if such a person has only a single and minor 
conviction, a long arrest record (even without conviction) demonstrates “a wholly 
undesirable fellow,” a psychopath, discipline problem, or gangster (50).  Given that a 
record of arrest rather than conviction determines the nature of such a prisoner, the 
truth of guilt is not legislated by the judicial system but rather by the police, the 
prison board, and the Selective Service.  Such a practice is the sort Foucault critiques 
in his analysis of a prison system that continues surveillance of released prisoners, 
“pursues as a ‘delinquent’ someone who has acquitted himself as an offender” (272).  
The surveillance of records thus produces the psychopath and gangster through the 
selective reading of criminal history.  Such a man cannot be drafted because he 
already is a soldier, one at war with the U.S.
For governing bodies to interpret criminals as at war with the U.S. effectively 
legitimizes violence against them.  One definition of a nation-state is the right to the 
legitimate enactment of violence; such is the legality of war.  Imprisonment, the 
forcible incarceration of a citizen or a population, demonstrates one means by which a 
nation-state wages war on its own people, and execution demonstrates the most 
severe expression of that war.  Isolating inmates demonstrates the military strategy of 
defeat in detail, where an army beset by a superior number isolates one component of 
that force to develop localized superiority.94  There is a race-based precedent dating 
back to the eighteenth century, when Boston Selectmen proclaimed, “If more than 
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two Indians, Negroes or Mulatto servants or slaves were to be found in the streets or 
highways […] every one so found shall be punished at the House f Correction” (qtd. 
in ACA 1972 109).  The eighteenth century ruling is one of white racist hysteria 
manifesting itself in the refusal to allow to the extent of criminalizing any social body 
distinct from its own whiteness.  
The military metaphor of divide and conquer seems particularly apt in the case 
of incarceration, given the understanding that defeat in detail when applied to prisons 
presumes at some level the superior numbers of criminals—which is true inside 
prisons, where there are proportionally fewer number of correctional officers and 
administration.  In the South of the early twentieth century, those numbers were 
similarly disproportionate, and Faulkner’s account of Yoknapatahpwa County’s 
population as “Whites, 6298; Negroes, 9313” in the map included in the first edition 
of Absalom, Absalom! speaks to actual population proportions in Mississippi.  Jim 
Crow era laws, through such ill-defined “crimes” as mischief and loitering, 
effectively criminalized blackness.  Criminalization and incarceration then function as 
a strategy of racial containment, and individuation demonstrates the fullest extent of 
that detail,95 and execution the grimmest defeat. Prisons defeat in detail through 
isolation, producing individuals in order to overcome them, and the death penalty 
does so absolutely.  Such individuation then favors biographical first causes and the 
personal histories of Popeye and Christmas.
Go Down, Moses presents a different case.  Instead of a personal story as 
diagnostic biography, a social and genealogical history is the only explanation readers 
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have for Butch’s criminality and execution.  At one point in L ght in August, Gavin 
Stevens suggests that Christmas literally embodies the conflict of black blood and 
white blood.  The conflict between black and white blood ending in Butch is staged 
not in his singular body, but in the sequence of battles perpetuated through the book, 
the incest and miscegenation that make the book and Butch, and text and character 
both end in Death Row and the return to Jefferson.  The contests of black and white 
blood begin with Carothers McCaslin’s presumed rape of Eunice and their daughter 
Tomasina, and continue in her son Tomey’s Turl fleeing from his half-brothers and 
dealing the cards to Hubert Beauchamp.  The blood feud carries on in Lucas’ violent 
physical contest with Zack and battle of wits with Roth thereafter, the same Roth who 
sees Butch leave Jefferson.  Butch lacks a personal diagnostic biography, but his 
genealogy locates him as emerging from a history of acial violence.  
At first glance, Christmas and Butch, their deaths, and the histories that 
precede them seem quite different.  Readers have substantial access to Christmas’ 
thoughts, actions, and perceptions leading up to his crime and following it, and we 
have a fairly clear sense of Joanna Burden’s death.  Beauchamp remains a cypher, his 
story brief, the murdered policeman unknown and Butch’s own culpability for it far 
less known than that of Christmas.  Also, Faulkner renders Christmas’s execution at 
the hands of a single rogue deputy in horrific detail, while the scene of Beauchamp’s 
death by anonymous penitentiary officials is textually absent.  Christmas’ personal 
history, which comprises much of the novel, offers the forces of race, childhood 
experience, and circumstance to shape the hand that holds the razor.  Since we know 
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virtually nothing of Samuel Worsham Beauchamp’s narrative, it is neither 
Sanctuary’s brief interlude of Freudian coda or Light in August’s lengthier description 
of Christmas’ upbringing, but the acts of generations scripting his end.  However, 
despite the differences between the streams of action that lead to the executions, and 
the wake that follows each, Faulkner includes textual cues that suggest and even 
demand a paired reading, particularly in the appearance of the District Attorney, 
Gavin Stevens.  
Stevens appears at the close of each novel as a sort of psychopomp, shepherd 
of the dead and arranger of funerals.  In each case, Stevens negotiates with the 
condemned men’s grandmothers to make sense of the raced deaths of their grandsons.  
In Light in August, Stevens is the “District Attorney, a Harvard graduate, a Phi Beta 
Kappa:  a tall, loosejointed man with a constant cob pipe, with an untidy mop of 
irongray hair, wearing always loose and unpressed dark gray clothes” (444).  Clearly 
Faulkner has his mind on that description when he writes the attorney ten years later 
in Go Down, Moses as having “a wild shock of prematurely white hair,” “a thin, 
intelligent, unstable face, a rumpled linen suit […] Phi Beta Kappa, Harvard, Ph.D” 
(353).  In the earlier novel, the lawyer imagines Christmas’ end for his friend the 
professor, a proxy for readers of the novel.  He plays the role Shreve makes axiomatic 
for Faulkner’s most acclaimed work, the “let me play a while now,” which so many 
scholars have gestured towards as the crux of Faulkner’s most involved narratives, 
the hinge of meaning-making where various audiences, including readers, share in 
narration.  
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Part of Stevens’ play in the narrative is a lengthy account of Christmas vexed 
escape attempt, which t e attorney describes in terms ofc mpeting black and white 
blood.  Faulkner critic Jay Watson indicts that racing as “at best shaky, at worst racist 
and absurd” (93).  However, Stevens undercuts his narrative authority with regard to 
what the grandmother, Mrs. Hines, might have told Christmas before his doomed 
escape, as he admits, “But of course I dont know what she told him.  I dont believe 
that any man could reconstruct that scene” (448).  Not any single narrator in Light in 
August can tell the story, but a decade later, several might.  Narrative reconstruction 
is method and topic of that central section of “The Bear,” where Cass and Ike mirror 
Shreve and Quentin, retelling not only much of the narrative to that point, but the 
Civil War and Reconstruction as well.  
The Gavin Stevens at the end of Go Down, Moses does not tell the story of 
Butch, whom he knows, remembers, and believes to be a “bad seed”; he does not 
because he cannot.  Instead of assuming the role of narrator for a story not his own, 
like the deputy who tells Rider’s story but remains unmoved by it, Stevens is less 
narrator than actor at the end, less unmoved than constantly in motion through 
Jefferson’s square, from his office to that of the newspaper editor, back to his office, 
back to the newspaper, then from “store to store and office to office about the 
square,” then to Miss Worsham’s.  Stevens is no analysand on a couch, but a man of 
two minds out in the city, believing Butch a “bad seed” but offering time and money 
for his return.96  Stevens has added to Worsham’s $25 what change he collects from 
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the businesses in the square and nearly $200 out of his and the editor’s pockets to buy 
Butch’s passage back to Jefferson.  
That return figures differently to those who bring him back, and not only in 
terms of money.  To his grandmother, Molly Worsham Beauchamp, Butch is 
understood in symbolic terms, in biblical terms, Benjamin sold by pharaoh; to 
Stevens, Butch is somehow the responsibility of a white, middle-class community.  
While first convinced that the death that has not happened yet can be ignored or 
concealed, Stevens at the unmade bequest of a woman he barely knows ends up 
footing much of the bill in labor, time, and money for bringing the body back to 
Jefferson.  Stevens’ act is an acknowledgement of half-understood responsibility.  In 
Light in August, Christmas bears a personal guilt, which sets him to self-destructive 
behavior such as taking the braggart Lucas as his partner in the moonshine operation 
or confronting the black parishioners.  Go Down, Moses, in contrast, features a social 
responsibility in Stevens’ work to have the town bring home its own, funds gathered 
as coins in a door-to-door mission to retrieve a man described in Stevens’ words as “a 
dead nigger” but acknowledged in his actions as a native son of Jefferson (360). 
Stevens’ concluding actions and their result demonstrate a far richer model of 
community than the singular town whose memory Christma is to haunt.  Beauchamp 
does not vanish into memory but returns to become materially present in town, as the 
funeral procession circles the twin bastions of the New South, the “Confederate 
monument and the courthouse” (364), to bury him just outside it.  The sign passed—
“Jefferson.  Corporate Limit”—marks Butch’s return to the social body, his life and 
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death to be recorded in the public voice of the local newspaper at Mollie’s demand.97
Butch’s relationship with the social sphere, then, represents a different sort than that 
of Christmas, the mixed race criminal of a decade before.  Faulkner offers Christmas’ 
isolated individuality in terms of an atomistic self, and the location of that self—
“Here I am”—is an acceptance of punishment.  Elsewhere in Light in August, Byron 
Bunch describes that self-declaration as “I-Am, and the relinquishment of which is 
usually death” (393).  Ten years later, in Go Down, Moses, Faulkner’s Beauchamp is 
claimed by a wider social system that acknowledges his body as part of a “We-Are” 
when he returns to the town’s corporate body, the simultaneity of collective and 
singular that is Jefferson.  In Light in August, Jefferson as a town often has a single 
and typically white point of view.  Of Bunch’s Saturday work, “the town itself or that 
part of it which remembers or thinks about him, believe that he does it for the 
overtime” (47).  That unified point of view is brought home at Christmas’ death and 
assumption to memory, when Jefferson knows, remembers, and believes as one 
mind.98
The differences between this conclusion and that of G  Down, Moses are 
tremendous.  Jefferson’s town square in the latter novel is not that a priori monolith, 
but is far more deeply divided.  Stevens must call on the town’s members individually 
in his breathless request for funds for the funeral:  “It’s to bring a dead nigger home.  
It’s for Miss Worsham.  Never mind about a paper to sign:  just give me a dollar.  Or 
a half a dollar then.  Or a quarter then” (360).  Like Lucas facing Zack, Gavin is 
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going to do something, then other people are going to do something, and then it will 
all end, and be all right.  
Of course, it will not be all right.  History is not corrected so easily, accounts 
so simply set in balance.  However, Stevens succeeds in some regard when he hails 
them, calls on them with his rote speech for donation without writ petition or receipt, 
a sort of Progressive activist.  What change he gathers offsets his and the editor’s 
personal expenditure, but what he largely gains is the crowd itself, the body of people 
to receive the casket, a reception narrated not as of one memory or single opinion, but 
by a crowd described in the differences of those who come to watch.  There are “the 
number of people, Negroes and whites both.”  There are the “idle whit  men and 
youths and small boys and probably half a hundred Negroes, men and women too.”  
There are those “who had given Stevens the dollars and half- ollars and quarters and 
the ones who had not” (364).  No longer the monolith, Jefferson is black and white,
young and old, men and women, jobless and working class and businessmen, an 
audience made of their differences of race, age, gender, and class that nevertheless, 
however briefly, is one crowd of watchers to witness the history that Mollie demands 
be recorded.  It is no request she makes of the editor, but a command:  “You put hit in 
de paper.  All of hit” (365).  Where Christmas somehow enters an imaginary 
unconscious memory of a singular town, Butch’s staged return before an audience 
and entry into the records of history is conceived and midwifed, bought and paid for 
by four people working and paying together, the four who ride behind the body:  
Mollie Beauchamp, Miss Worsham, the newspaper editor, and Stevens.
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I do not mean to suggest that Butch’s funeral and the audience for that return 
are the saving grace of Go Down, Moses, its relief, a reparation or absolution of racial 
injustice, letting anyone off the hook.  Faulkner describes the editor and attorney in 
ironic register, as “the designated paladin of justice and truth and right” and “the 
Heidelberg Ph.D,” respectively (364).  Their acceptance of responsibilityconstantly
is forced upon them, directed by others—other in terms of race and gender—by 
Mollie Beauchamp and Miss Worsham.  Stevens capitulates without being asked not 
to repudiate but to accept, to be made accountable in a manner that does not level the 
balance but acknowledges the existence of debt.  
Many critics have missed this.  Erik Dussere’s “Accounting for Slavery:  
Economic Narratives in Morrison and Faulkner” compares the ledgers in the fourth 
section of “The Bear” in Go Down, Moses with Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1987) and 
Sula (1982) to draw excellent points regarding the challenge to and impossibility of 
balancing the historical debt of slavery.  However, by restricting his reading of G  
Down, Moses entirely to “The Bear”—a common misreading of the novel—he misses 
the role Butch’s return plays.  Phillip Weinstein, rather than ignoring him entirely, 
reads Butch as “not there” and at some level Faulkner’s failure (63-64).  Similarly, 
though worse still, Eric Sundquist suggests Go Down, Moses would be better off 
without Butch.  In Faulkner:  The House Divided, his survey of the author’s writing 
from 1929 to 1942 and a landmark critique, an early component of the more 
historically and culturally nuanced approaches developed in Americanist study in the 
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1980s and 1990s, Sundquist suggests that Go Down, Moses would be improved if it 
ended with “Delta Autumn” (159).  
I am not suggesting that Butch is the novel’s focal point, a move akin to 
Thadious Davis’ polemical gambit in Games of Property (2003) of treating Tomey’s 
Turl as the main character of Go Down, Moses.  However, reading him as “not there” 
or wishing him gone misreads what I am suggesting is one of the dominant narrative 
trajectories that structure the novel, not a novel of Aristotelian accord of time and 
place, or one united by the modernist emphasis on the external world interpreted by 
the singular consciousness.  Instead, the framework for the novel is a patchwork 
history, disjointed and barely held together by the force and the struggle for its 
making and telling, its span over a century, narratively suturing slavery, to Jim Crow 
and lynching, to raced incarceration and execution.  The fictional Northern court 
convicts Butch and sends him to death; however, the townspeople of Jefferson are 
assembled as a court of public opinion that fulfills the right of habeas corpus, in that 
the accused is present for their judgment.  Lynching demonstrates the complete 
equation of courts of public opinion with judicial process in the execution of mob 
“justice”—such is the case in these novels for Goodwin, Christmas, and Rider.  Go 
Down, Moses in its final pages presents a different resolution, in which Stevens 
painstakingly brings back the body of Butch and assembles a public to witness the 
return.   
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Go Down, Moses in that last instance offers a thick description of how history 
is staged in a community comprised of the tension between singular and plural, a 
collective of individuals called together, however briefly.  Light in August relies on an 
exhausted rhetoric of redemption to imagine social unity at Christmas’ death in the 
first of its three closures.  Sanctuary does not even offer that much in its two endings, 
the first of which is the nearly parodic account of Popeye’s execution, when Popeye’s 
curt scaffold request for the sheriff to fix his hair receives the reply, “I’ll fix it for 
you” as the trapdoor opens (Sanctuary 316).  That death sentence also precedes 
flights of language, though the turn to Temple seems not redemption but indictment.  
She departs with her father from a “gray day, a gray summer, a gray year” into 
dissolution, in the final line into “the embrace of the season of rain and death” (316, 
317).  Go Down, Moses does not rely on either strategy, the exhausted and 
unbelievable siren over Christmas’ assumption, or the ironic dissonance of execution 
quips juxtaposed with Temple’s fading into a Baudelairian vignette in three anapests 
and an iamb.  In contrast, the two finales of the titular “Go Down, Moses” are offered 
in the register of simple circumstantial description, Butch stripped and shaved before 
his execution, and Stevens commenting that he has been away from his office these 
past two days.  
However, it is not Stevens’ last words but Butch’s final sentence that grow 
richer in a reappraisal of the final section of the novel—“What will that matter to 
me?”  In the atomistic terms of the hardman, it will not matter at all, for the death of 
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the self is the end of history.  However, it does not end there, because Butch does not 
end there.  Stevens thinks it ends, “it’s all over and done and finished” when Mollie 
Beauchamp sees her grandson “come home right” (365).  That ec o of Lucas seems 
as unlikely to finally resolve racial and filial tension as Lucas’ own thoughts as he 
faces Zack:  “He will do something and then I will do something and it will be all 
over.”  Butch’s death and homecoming are recorded in the paper, written down, but 
that cannot finish the matter completely.  As the ledger section of “The Bear” 
emphasizes, and what the novel’s reworking of Faulkner’s previous themes of 
criminality and human agency demonstrates, what is written down allows for its own 
reading and rewriting.  
It has become something of an accepted practice to read Faulkner as writing a 
sort of Southern history in Yoknapatawpha County.  Morrison, whose own work, like 
Faulkner’s, demonstrates a deep commitment to telling history, suggests that her 
investment in reading Faulkner and his “subjects had something to do with my desire 
to find out something about this country and that artistic articulation of its past that 
was not available in history” (296).  In Go Down, Moses in particular, that history and 
its writing are at once personal and extend into a broader cultural frame.  Michael 
Grimwood treats Faulkner’s final version of Go Down, Moses as the author’s redress 
for his negative stereotyping of blackness in some of the stories that in their aggregate 
served as an early draft of the novel (267).99
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However, there is a larger history and broader acknowledgement the novel 
makes.  A provocative passage from Intruder in the Dust proclaims that “not 
courthouses nor even churches but jails were the true records of a county’s, a 
community’s history” (320), and the Gavin Stevens of Requiem for a Nun similarly 
locates “the history of a community” written in “the walls of the jail” (616).  Those 
later novels demonstrate the raced expectation of criminality, s Lucas Beauchamp 
spends most of Intruder in the Dust anticipating a lynch mob motivated because he 
refuses to “be a nigger,” and Nancy Mannigoe is repeatedly termed “nigger dope-
fiend whore” or variations thereof (Intruder 296, 299, 327; Requiem 511, 513, 515, 
518, 520, 553, 554, 557, 579, 612).100  It is in Go Down, Moses that Faulkner offers 
his first and fullest account of the historical process linking blackness and criminality, 
where social history in large part defined by race shapes human agency, from Butch’s 
presumed criminality to the community that sees the executed criminal return home.  
In Faulkner’s fictional South, there are painful connections between lynching and 
execution, between slavery and imprisonment, and these too need to be put in the 
paper—so that like Molly Beauchamp, we know where to look.  
129
CHAPTER THREE
Cleaver’s Soul and Mailer’s Song:  Subjects in History
and Diminishing Possibilities between Two Prison Narratives
From the beginning, America has been a schizophrenic nation.
—Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice
He had come to believe that the center of America might be insane.
—Norman Mailer, The Armies of the Night
In the decades following the publication of Go Down, Moses, the history 
equating blackness and criminality that contributed to containing black men in prison 
in Faulkner’s South became a matter not of region but of nation, even as Southern 
politics and problems became national matters in the 1950s and 1960s.  The rise of 
the South might be charted in any number of ways, including Lyndon Johnson’s 
renewed presidency in 1964 as the first elected Southerner in 92 years, Texas 
Representative Sam Rayburn’s extended tenure as House Speaker from 1949 to 1961, 
and specifically regarding prison policy, the increasing Southern leadership of the 
American Correctional Association, formerly the American Prison Association.101
Such Southern representation mandated its own difficult negotiation of regional and 
national conflicts, and Johnson capitulated to Southern states in limiting the civil 
rights bills he oversaw in 1957 and 1960 as Texas senator and majority leader.  
Thereafter, the national political implications of southern racism, of social and 
electoral disenfranchisement, like the compromises of one hundred years before, 
could no longer be reconciled.  
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The divisions were most stark in the violence and riots of the first of the 
“long, hot summers” surrounding the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights 
Act, the highest profile of Johnson’s “Great Society” initiatives, enforced by federal 
troops, unlike the earlier toothless recommendations.  The civil rights ruling in 
particular provided a constitutional basis for prison reform.  For example, in 1970 the 
U.S. District Court in Arkansas ruled in a culmination of a series of cases through the 
late 1960s that the entire state’s prison system violated prisoners’ civil rights, 
constituting cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.102  The 
1972 Furman v. Georgia decision regarding the death penalty ended a decade-long 
series of appeals, ruling in favor of three black men sentenced to death in the South, 
one for murder and two for rape.  In their decision, the Supreme Court placed a 
moratorium on the death penalty because the racial bias of its practice violated not 
only the Eighth Amendment but also the Fourteenth, enacted after the Civil War to 
protect the newly established rights of black Americans.103  However, while the 
court’s decision sanctioned what had been an unofficial moratorium since 1967, the 
ruling also laid the grounds on which states could make the death penalty 
constitutional.  The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of those revised 
codes in 1976, and the moratorium ended in 1977 with Gary Gilmore’s voluntary 
execution, a matter that drew the nation’s (and Mailer’s) attention.  Again, prison 
history is national history, and inseparable from divisions of race.  
This chapter turns to Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song, 
and the ACA transcripts from 1968 through 1979 in order to demonstrate how this 
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period marks a fundamental shift in the direction of cultural change in the nation as 
embodied in the stories of its prisoners.  This central place of the dissertation is most 
attuned to offering a detailed narrative account of historical transformation, a shift 
from revolutionary possibility, from politicized racial and criminal identities and the 
social responsibility for them, to a nation exhausted by perceived threats of change, 
race, crime, and plural identity.  Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization in Anti-Oedipus
of tensions such as these helps elaborate what is at stake in the collapse of Cleaver’s 
cultural and political “we” to Gilmore’s alienated and apolitical “I.”  The bleakness of 
the latter’s autonomy is undermined in Mailer’s discursive process of simultaneously 
implicating Gilmore in history and documenting its narrativization, the process by 
which the past “becomes.”  Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song exemplify 
reverse accounts of the process of a carceral identity, an emergence and a 
disappearance.  Cleaver gained his release in the attention his prison writing elicited 
from Mailer and others, while Gilmore’s defining act is his acceptance of his death 
sentence.  In more theorized terms, Soul on Ice demonstrates a social subjectivity, an 
implication of an individual’s acts within a social body and its history, while 
Gilmore’s desire of autonomy is not a becoming, but sees its fullest expression 
through his desire to “not be.”
I offer this argument in three sections.  First, an account of prison history 
bracketed by Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song demonstrates that 
transformations in the views of crime and punishment parallel the shift between 1968 
and 1979 in Cleaver’s and Mailer’s writing.  During that time, there was a radical 
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foreclosure in the potential for alternatives to imprisonment due to the expansion of 
criminalization and sentencing through the Rockefeller drug laws, the perceived lack 
of alternatives in treatment, and the fear of black militancy.  This shift in carceral 
practice contributed to the widespread imagination of prisoners as “not only violent 
but dangerous and bad”—as Gavin Stevens reads Butch Beauchamp—even as prisons 
grew overcrowded, filling with drug users.  Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song
each testify on behalf of prisoners, enacting a sort of habeas corpus in the cultural 
imagination, and both Cleaver and Mailer in 1968 use the term “schizophrenia” to 
describe the racial divides they describe.  
The second section focuses on Soul on Ice (and to a limited extent, he short 
story “The Flashlight”) to demonstrate Cleaver’s focus on cultural difference in terms 
of race, gender, and the carceral in a manner resonant with what Deleuze and Guattari 
would later term schizoanalysis.  The prominence of Cleaver’s prison writing in the 
late 1960s cut a wake in history that echoed in the discourse of those he critiqued, 
from then California Governor Ronald Reagan to the prison officials of the ACA.  
The third section has its own three parts:  Mailer writes national history in Gilmore’s 
story; the writer identifies not with his ostensible subject in the prisoner, but with the 
producer Larry Schiller and thereby the process of telling history; that historical 
narrativization demonstrates Gilmore’s double-bind, his want to not be that is the 
impossible desire to both autonomy and opting out of history.The culmination of 
Cleaver’s and Mailer’s respective senses of subjects in history describes the 
diminishing possibilities in prison (and thereby national) history between 1968 and 
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1979, between a politicized Black Panther who ran for president, a d the aimless 
violence of a white sociopathic racist fighting for his own execution.
Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song are not idiosyncratic accounts of
imprisonment pulled from the dustbin of history, but, in their prominence at their 
release and resonance with the historical record of the ACA transcripts, indicative of 
larger cultural trends both contributing to and affected by U.S. prison policy.  The
shift between them is one from revolutionary possibility and a sensitivity to the 
politicality and historicity of raced carceral identity, to a bleak account of seemingly 
inevitable, inexplicable, and race-less violence that demands its own incapacitation.  
Cleaver articulates a subjectivity of “becoming” in prison, constituted both in history 
and in its various and sometimes conflicting desires and cultural identities.  Mailer’s 
narration of Gilmore offers a far bleaker vision of an atomistic self:  unified and 
violently aimless, an intentionless phenomenon careening on a path to execution.  
However, even as the object of Mailer’s analysis emphasizes the individual and 
personal, the writer’s method privileges the multiple, the social, and the historical.  
Indeed, The Executioner’s Song documents not only historical events and their 
representation but also the process of becoming history, of historical narrativization.  
While demonstrating those narrative ends makes some use of theoretical 
vocabularies, this chapter is not exclusively a Lacanian and Deleuzo-Guattarian 
account of the degree to which Cleaver and Mailer describe a psychoanalytic or 
historical subjectivity.104  Instead, this chapter emphasizes the degree to which Soul 
and Song, in their testifying, bracket a critical period in U.S. imprisonment, a time 
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when the possibility of radical change tilted first to progressive reform and then 
veered to an extreme expansion of incarceration.  A rich history of prison policy 
drawing from the ACA conference proceedings remains to be written.  What follows 
is a partial account of those meetings organized largely around discussions of social 
change and race that provide an annual record of the history bracketed by Soul on Ice
and The Executioner’s Song.  In the beginning of that 11-year period, not only 
Cleaver and (at times) Mailer, but also prison wardens and ACA leaders recognized
the possibility of radical reform, viewed criminality often as a political matter, and 
emphasized the factor of race in incarceration.  By 1979, diverse strategies of 
rehabilitation widely disappeared as more frequent and longer sentences became 
standard, the term “political prisoner” met disparagement, and race dropped as a 
broad topic, replaced by the problems raised in the overcrowding brought about by 
increased imprisonment
Correctional history between Soul and Song
The domestic “war on crime” effort Johnson sponsored as the Safe Streets and 
Crime Control Act passed Congress in 1968 as the Law Enforcement Administration 
Act, with a $63 million budget that grew ten-fold by 1971.  Nearly half of those 
increased funds were dedicated to corrections programs and dramatically expanded 
the ACA, while increasing crime rates and perceived failures of imprisonment drew 
national attention.105 The sense of social crisis in 1968, the simultaneity of hope and 
catastrophe, is as apparent in the discussions of wardens and other prison officials of 
the ACA as it was elsewhere in the U.S.  In his presidential address, the warden 
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Parker L. Hancock describes the present in terms of radical change, claiming that “the 
pace of American social revolution is accelerating,” and “the past blurs and the future 
seems uncertain” (ACA 1968 13).  Hancock adopts a historically informed and 
progressive approach, claiming that more severe punishments during cycles of 
increased crime are both a transhistorical phenomenon and counterproductive.  
Instead, he observes that prisons are adopting a “more enlightened correctional 
philosophy,” including community-based alternatives, increased access of inmates to 
education, work, and counseling.  All told, “Corrections today is experimenting with 
programs that hold promise for the future” (15, 19).  He associates university protests 
with an evolving view of crime, and the potential for transformation in national 
culture.  “The revolt of youth, as seen in student demonstrations from New York to 
California,” has caused crimes committed in the name of war protest, drug use, and 
civil protest against racism, and he concludes that “we must reaffirm our traditional 
values or create new ones” (23).  The ACA, like the universities “from New York to 
California,” seemed poised to consider broad cultural changes—specifically, a 
changed sense of criminality and how prisons might recognize and respond to it.106
The overall tone of the 1968 presenters is open to reform, optimistic, and suggests the 
possibility of broad-based transformation of carceral practice.107
Eleven years later, in 1979, all that changed utterly—indeed, the change in 
tenor begins in 1972, the first conference after inmates revolted in Attica Prison in 
New September 9-13, 1971, in which 43 people died, 11 of them hostages, 39 shot by 
the state troopers sent by Governor Nelson Rockefeller.  Rockefeller’s Goldman 
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Panel, established to ensure prisoners’ rights after the riot, cleared the authorities of 
any wrongdoing, and the ACA’s 1972 panel concerning “Rights of People” 
appropriated liberal rhetoric, employing the language of human rights in safeguarding 
prison authorities against criticism.108  In 1973, a “tough on crime” posture fueled the 
changes in the criminal code for drug violations that Rockefeller implemented in New 
York, including broader criminalization, mandatory sentencing, and longer sentences.  
That approach dismantled the state’s extensive treatment program and 
signaled a departure from the rehabilitation the Governor seemed to have endorsed 
just a few years before (ACA 1972 50; 1975 106).  In 1967, he had established a 
special committee to recommend transformations for the state’s prison programs, and 
that committee conducted a survey of 231 best rehabilitative practices as published in 
journals.   The committee headed by sociologist Dr. Robert Martinson had their 
review ready for publication in 1969, but the state suppressed the findings until a 
subpoena released them (ACA 1975 107).  With the widespread adoption of the 
Rockefeller laws and their lengthy prison sentences for drug use and sale—for 
example, possession of a distributable amount of marijuana mandated a minimu  15-
year sentence in New York (Schlosser 56)—Johnson’s “war on crime” largely 
became President Richard Nixon’s war on drugs, which expanded further in the 
1980s and 1990s.109  Increasing criminalization and mandatory sentencing created a 
prison overcrowding crisis that by 1976 would be a national one and initiated an 
unprecedented period of prison construction and accompanying spending.110
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However, New York’s budget shortfall in terms of how to pay for new prisons 
was no longer Rockefeller’s problem, as he became President Gerald Ford’s Vice 
President in 1974.  That same year, Martinson’s “What Works? Questions and 
Answers about Prison Reform” appeared in The Public Interest and immediately 
received widespread misrepresentation (King 591).  The survey of programs from 
1945 to 1967 concluded that no single treatment significantly reduced recidivism, 
regarded as the sine qua non of rehabilitation.  According to Martinson, Nixon’s 
Attorney General William B. Saxbe and many newspapers inaccurately distilled the
findings to “nothing works” (ACA 1974 108-109).111  Martinson sought to redress 
those misconceptions, but the damage had been done—a 2000 Newsweek cover 
article points to Martinson’s research as providing the “intellectual rationale” for 
shifting from a treatment model to more frequent and longer prison sentences (Cose 
48).  That increasing rate of incarceration beginning in the mid-1970s 
disproportionately affected black men.
The beginning of that contentious period saw a split in the perception of 
criminality and race.  In The Cultural Prison (1996) and its survey of the 
representation of imprisonment in common U.S. periodicals, John Sloop identifies the 
popular view of black male inmates in 1968 as at the cusp of change.  His terms speak 
directly to characterizations of Cleaver.  The view of black inmates as violent and 
irrational felons shifts to a divide between on the one hand revolutionaries and on the 
other irredeemably dangerous criminals, though potentially violent either way; white 
male prisoners remain “forever open for rehabilitation” (16, 63, 91).112  The 
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transcripts of the ACA largely follow that split perception of black inmates.  In the 
years immediately following 1968, discussions of black inmates are sharply polarized 
between accounts that recognize a legitimate political grievance for black prisoners, 
and derisive and occasionally hysterical descriptions.  
For example, on one side, a director of a correctional council in 1969 draws 
from empirical research to depict an “exaggerated” fear of crime in big cities, where 
those living in the safest neighborhoods are the most afraid of violent offenses.113  He 
is critical of these predominantly white and affluent citizens who make baseless 
demands that police begin “cracking down on black militants” (ACA 1969 85-86).  
The same year, a U.S. Army Major and Director of Mental Hygiene offers a very 
different description of the “Militant Black:  A Correctional Problem.”  The 
administrator portrays such activists in terms of generally lower intelligence scores, 
possessing “infantile, narcissistic needs,” psychological disorders “of psychotic 
proportions,” a “primordial people using primitive functioning,” and highly paranoid 
(1969 222-224).  The director suggests that education in black history, group 
counseling, and role-playing can prove constructive for borderline cases, but “the 
very militant inmate” is a lost cause, demanding psychiatric hospitalization and 
segregation (224, 227-228).  In this view, the black militant cannot be a U.S. soldier 
because he is already at war with the U.S., a matter clarified when a later participant, 
an Associate Warden, describes Cleaver and those like him as committing an “act of 
war against the state” (ACA 1972 113).  At this same time, the formation of a chapter 
of the Black Panthers at Angola State Prison prompted its associate warden to claim 
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that “a certain type of militant or revolutionary inmate, maybe even a Communist 
type” must be held in constant isolation (qtd. in Fleming 230).114
That view from the radical right was not the norm in the ACA, and District 
Court Judge Leon Higginbotham asked in 1970, “Is Yesterday’s Racism Relevant 
Today in Corrections?” (ACA 19-35).  The answer, he implies, is yes.  The judge 
traces a Philadelphia prison superintendent’s blame of a riot on “hard-core black 
militants” to the U.S. Constitutional Convention and the revisions to the constitution 
that allowed for slavery, then to the 1857 Dred Scott case, then to Plessy v. Ferguson
(19, 24-26).115  From 1968 to 1972, the divide over the perceptions of black inmates’ 
activism and the surrounding violence seems informed not just by a conservative or 
liberal bias, but by the degree to which those on one side or the other are prepared to 
situate contemporary problems in a historical framework. 
The revolt at Attica in September 1971 and the state troopers’ violent 
incursion that concluded it further galvanized both sides at the next ACA conference.  
A New York correctional commissioner recognizes that administrators must 
acknowledge the self-appointed political prisoners and the basis for their arguments 
regarding raced and classed adjudication and sentencing.  However, he immediately 
dismisses those concerns—while “the problem is there, […] it has no merit” for 
corrections (1972 108).  The next speak r, an Illinois prison administrator, performs 
the same reversal, acknowledging that the system of justice is racist and economically 
discriminatory, but that systemic injustice does not equate to political imprisonment 
(110).  A chaplain’s paper titled “Attica:  Anatomy of the New Revolutionary” first 
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cites the prevalence of racism in prisons and the general failure of corrections, then 
characterizes and subsequently condemns black militancy at length, even including 
verbatim two pages of Black Panther Party materials (1972 193-195).  The chaplain 
demands that corrections administrators not confuse legitimate criticism with 
revolutionary critique.116
Other participants found those two inseparable.  Also in 1972, Vernon Fox, a 
Florida State University criminologist, argues that prison officials must maintain an 
awareness of history, especially slavery, offering statistics of slave populations and 
quoting at length a deed of slave ownership, and identifying the 1964 and 1965 race 
riots as another iteration of regularly occurring conflict (1972 175-178).  He claims 
that a history of inequity produces contemporary racism in law enforcement, 
courtrooms, and prisons, thereby resulting in both an ideology of black resistance and 
a white reactionary response.117  He concludes with a detailed account of the violence 
at Soledad Prison from 1970 to 1971 and its fallout, including the deaths of Jonathan 
and George Jackson, tracing the latter’s shooting as the immediate cause of the riot at 
Attica, within the larger social causes of racism that can only be addressed through 
education involving cultural history both in and out of prisons (181-82).  Several 
other papers in that session support the necessity of understanding contemporary 
racial problems in prison as implicated in broader social struggle outside of 
imprisonment, and the product of a history of racism.118
However, as quickly as the storm of Attica raised discussion of race in the 
ACA in 1972, those voices almost entirely disappeared, and the legitimacy of 
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political prisoners thereafter sees only derision.119  Race was a central issue in eight 
presentations from 1968 to 1972, but entirely disappeared thereafter until 1979.  That 
year, both plenary addresses deal centrally with race and imprisonment, including the 
keynote address “Race, Crime, and Corrections” by Charles Silberman and a follow-
up by Higginbotham.  However, his speech “Is Slavery Relevant to Corrections 
Today?” repeats almost verbatim in its title, argument, examples, and language his 
1970 conference paper.  Apparently, so little had changed in the nine years that the 
same material could serve anew.  Questions of race and social struggle were broadly 
discussed as underlying issues of carceral policy and practice from 1968 through 
1972.  Thereafter, the vast majority of presentations ignore these matters, instead 
reflecting the national shift in favor of more frequent and longer sentencing, which 
precipitates the over-crowding crisis.  Numerous participants remark that corrections 
was shifting away from a rehabilitative paradigm based on psychological 
classification and treatment, but no new model had appeared to take its place.  The 
rise of “just deserts”—flat sentencing irrespective of mitigating individual or social 
circumstances120—as the prevalent punishment matched the “tough on crime” 
rhetoric adopted by Rockefeller and others to promote broader and harsher 
criminalization and incarceration, and thereby initiated the dramatic expansion of 
imprisonment in the U.S. beginning in the late 1970s.121
Cleaver and Mailer document the tumultuous time between 1968 and 1979, 
each in his own unique register.  Soul on Ice is alternately autobiography, literary 
criticism, myth, cultural theory, and a prison cell view of the mid-1960s, the Watts 
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riots, protests of the Vietnam War, and the conflicts of race, class, and gender in the 
history of his now.  The book quickly sold over a million copies and was named a 
Book of the Year of 1968 by the New York Times (Rout vii), and Cleaver leveraged 
that prominence to run for president with the Peace and Freedom Party, a cross- acial 
alliance between that group of largely young white radicals and the Black Panther 
Party.  Mailer describes Cleaver in terms of his blackness and criminality, as the 
“talented Black writer and convicted rapist” in Miami and the Siege of Chicago, and 
he suggests he might vote for Cleaver for president (213, 223).  Cleaver for his part 
admires Mailer as well, describes his “The White Negro” as “prophetic and 
penetrating,” containing a “solid kernel of truth” (Soul 123).  Drawing further 
associations between the two, one subsequent reviewer disparagingly describes 
“Cleaver’s Mailerian rhetoric,”122 and Playboy in 1968 began its calendar 
interviewing Mailer and ended it in dialogue with Cleaver.  Each in his writing that 
turbulent year emphasizes a shared sense of political investment in cultural 
transformation, though Cleaver’s revolutionary fervor is buoyed by optimism, while 
Mailer’s participation in the protests chronicled in Miami and Armies of the Night is 
cut through with the doubt that radical change might make anything better.123
By 1979 and his Pulitzer winning The Executioner’s Song, Mailer’s brand of 
cynical hope had considerably decreased, and Cleaver had swapped extremes, a 
wholesale switch from revolutionary to reactionary.124  The most significant 
connections between Cleaver’s and Mailer’s texts lie in the blurring of genres and 
methodologies as each turns to an actual setting of incarceration to explore their 
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mutual fascination with what they view as the painstaking task of writing the prisoner 
as a participant in history.  The Cleaver of 1968 looks to hope of revolution, whereas 
Mailer writes Gilmore’s desire for his death sentence and escaping into language in 
the telling of his story.  Cleaver and Mailer emphasize in the shared settings of 
imprisonment matters of history, representation, and testimony, bearing witness and 
speaking on behalf of both one’s self and others.125  In Cleaver’s critical account of 
his crimes and imprisonment as they relate to U.S. cultural history in the 1960s, and
Mailer’s complex narration ofGary Gilmore’s crimes, execution, and the media 
circus that surrounded him in 1976 and early 1977, the writers each present book-
length and arguably non-fictional testimonials of incarceration, and their respective 
publications bracket not only tremendous transformation in U.S. imprisonment 
policies but several Supreme Court cases concerning the development of U.S. 
prisoners’ right to self-representation and writing.126  Like those plaintiffs, Cleaver 
and Mailer contest for representation and against silencing, and each text 
demonstrates what Brook Thomas describes in another context as a “power of 
engagement” (x), an imperative to confront readers with history.  And, like the 
officials of the ACA, Cleaver and Mailer are shaped by their historical moments even 
as they write the words that in part define that history.
Cleaver’s Soul on Ice is a difficult book.  There is of course his immediate 
acknowledgment that “I’ve been a rapist”—and it is easy enough to stop there, and 
perhaps many readers do.127  Furthermore, its packaging regularly misrepresents the 
text.  The back cover of most paperback editions identifies it as a “spiritual 
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autobiography” or “classic autobiography.”  The front cover operates in the 
convention of a whole corpus of writing by black prisoners128 and former prisoners of 
which Soul on Ice is a both a part of and apart from:  Cleaver’s face in a close-up 
black and white photograph, a view similar to the most common book jackets of The 
Autobiography of Malcolm X (1964), George Jackson’s Soledad Brother (1970), and 
Rubin “Hurricane” Carter’s The Sixteenth Round (1974).129 Soul on Ice, however, is 
far more a work of cultural theory and criticism than it is any sort of conventional 
autobiography, its discursive legacy in Frantz Fanon more than Malcolm X.  
Cleaver’s carceral identity as number A-29498 is the result of his criminality, but its 
meanings and effects are offered less in personal than national history.  
Of its four parts, only the initial “On Becoming” of “Part One:  Letters from 
Prison” conducts a retrospective account of the author’s life, and the subsequent eight 
letters are snapshots of the time of their writing during 1965, offered out of 
chronological sequence.  “Part Three:  Prelude to Love—Three Letters” conducts a 
correspondence between Cleaver and his lawyer and is by far the shortest section, 
shorter than some of the individual chapters of Parts Two and Four.  The analysis 
conducted in those sections, the longest par s of the book, distances itself rhetorically 
from the “I” so prevalent in the letters of Parts One and Three, which feature a litany 
of “I was eighteen years old,” “I was black,” “I love you,” “I hate you,” “I declared 
myself for Malcolm X,” “I seek the profound.”  The identity of the perceiving eye of 
Parts Two and Four is occasionally the first person, but rather than the close quarters 
of self-reflection, the expository gaze spans culture and history:  youth activism, the 
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racial connotations of boxing and literature, the Vietnam War and riot suppression as 
concomitant police actions, the legacies of slavery, all offered with wry wit in tracing 
their connections.  Cleaver’s prose is indeed “Mailerian,” though he not only follows 
him as he claims (“I say, after Mailer”) but advances beyond the other’s far more self-
absorbed view in Armies of the Night and Miami and the Siege of Chicago130 to a 
more centrifugal rhetoric.  To read Soul on Ice as Cleaver’s life story is to undo its 
outward direction and read the political as personal, cultural history as a person’s 
past, and theory and criticism as autobiography, which overturns the trajectory the 
text itself maintains, wherein the self is constituted in and understood through its 
social investments. 
The Executioner’s Song seems to highlight an opposite sense of identity, 
beginning as it does with personal history, memories of childhood.  “Brenda was six,” 
the novel begins, a vignette that ends, “That was Brenda’s earliest recollection of 
Gary” (5).  However, the multi-perpectival accounts that define the discursive method 
of narration begin here, for it is not Gary’s memory but Brenda’s.  More significant 
than that brief recollection is the first chapter’s title, “The First Day,” suggestive of 
beginnings as mythic or allegorical in the tradition of biblical Genesis.  The first six 
pages telescope the nearly three decades from Gilmore’s childhood through 
imprisonment to parole, a period offered primarily through Brenda’s sense of their 
letters back and forth.  Gilmore is arrested for two murders 260 pages later, meaning 
that three quarters of the book’s over 1000 pages cover a period during which he is in 
jail awaiting trial, in prison, then executed—and the trial occupies only 30 pages.  So 
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the book Joan Didion famously describes as “absolutely astonishing”131 largely 
concerns one character in prison and the various and conflicting efforts of those who 
would contact or conceal him, including his family, newspaper and television 
reporters, tabloids, lawyers, judges, activist organizations, television and film 
producers, writers, and prison officials.  The representation of the prisoner by the self 
and others and the struggle for agency in that prisoner’s life and death determine the 
events Mailer offers in a structure of literally thousands and thousands of fragments.  
The Executioner’s Song is divided into two halves, “Western Voices” and 
“Eastern Voices,” each of which features seven parts.  The last of the first is “Death 
Row,” itself comprised of three chapters, the first two with nine numbered sections, 
the last with four.  Each section further subdivides by line breaks into bits from a few 
lines to almost a page.  That patchwork narration of many points of view is not only a 
consequence of Mailer’s work from the undreds of interviews, court transcripts, and 
other documents, but a reflection of communication in prison itself.  As Mailer has 
Gilmore describe it, “I like language, but I tell the truth [… I]n the hole you can’t see 
the guy you’re talking to, ‘cause he’s in the cell next door or down the line from you.  
So it just becomes necessary to . . . make yourself clear and heard because there 
might be other conversations going on and a lot of other noise” (850).  Self-
representation through communication means sorting among the “other 
conversations” in pursuit of clarity amid other noise—but Gilmore acknowledges 
well earlier that he refuses to appeal his death sentence because “the noise is too 
much for me” (489).  Two days before his execution, he says to his lawyers in an 
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interview, “It, man, is so noisy.  If I could have some quiet” (868), but the subsequent 
120 pages before the execution bring no quiet, continuing to include other 
conversations, the noise of news excerpts, dozens of points of view.132  The sounds 
Gilmore seeks to escape in his death are exactly what Mailer strives to reproduce in 
writing him.   
The respective narrative ends of Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song
differ dramatically, most obviously in the conclusions of Cleaver’s imminent releas  
and Gary Gilmore’s execution—Cleaver is, after all, released by the time the book is 
published, though he thereafter becomes a fugitive, and Gilmore is already dead in 
1979.  More to the point, Mailer writes Gilmore on the latter’s path to death while 
Cleaver quite consciously speaks his own life.  Cleaver’s self-declarative, auto-
performative prison sentence—nine years, the time during which he “began to form a 
concept of what it meant to be black in white America” (21)—writes him into 
becoming with and through the very awareness that only in communication does a 
self-aware subjectivity emerge.  
There are Lacanian (and Foucauldian) resonances to that equation of language 
and the subject, but the wording of the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the autority 
of writ lawyers supports it as well.  In Johnson v. Avery (1969), it upheld a District 
Court decision against a prison regulation prohibiting writ lawyers, prisoners serving 
as legal representatives for other prisoners, because according to the court, that 
ordinance had “the effect of barring illiterate prisoners from access to federal habeas 
corpus.”  In basing their ruling on habeas corpus, the court effectively equated one 
148
prisoner representing another’s legal interests in writing with the actual physical 
presence of that prisoner in the courtroom.  In that decision, Justices Hugo Black and 
Byron White dissented, suggesting that the writ lawyer was less “motivated by 
altruism rather than by self-aggrandizement, profit, or power.”  While an aside might 
note the circumstantial racing of the dissenting justices’ surnames or suggest the 
degree to which Mailer’s writing of Gilmore matches their minority opinion, the 
emphasis of this chapter lies more in the majority ruling, the incontrovertible binding 
of subject and statement—even when, as in The Executioner’s Song, where Mailer 
tells Gilmore’s story, the language that speaks the subject belongs to another.  There 
are moments where Gilmore does write himself, as in his letters to Nicole Baker and 
his occasional poetry, a parallel to Cleaver’s letters to Beverly Axelrod and his own 
“To a White Girl.”  Such writing in prison offers a linguistic escape past bars and 
walls and is a right upheld by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez (1974).133
However, the necessity not only to provide a space for prisoners to speak for 
themselves but to recognize the need for those not in prison to speak on their behalf 
underwrites this entire dissertation.
Cleaver’s account of himself and Mailer’s chronicle of Gilmore each 
demonstrates the struggle of a prisoner to enter history, to communicate an identity 
beyond the carceral.  Still, while Cleaver’s Soul and Mailer’s Song share investments 
in history and employ similar discursive strategies by which those investments ar  
made manifest, they do not operate the same rhetorically.  Cleaver’s strange text, a 
mix of cultural theory and self-representation, demonstrates his effort to write in 
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order to make himself; Mailer’s Gilmore presents a different sort of prisoner, 
deliberately unwriting himself in his diminishing letters, until only Mailer remains.  
Having scrupulously recorded the conditions surrounding the crimes and subsequent 
execution, the realist author scripts that consequential death as inevitable—it is what 
happened after all, the novelist of non-fiction might say with the hipster’s shrug. That 
trajectory projects inevitability onto situations of imprisonment and execution.  Like 
Joe Christmas walking toward death, Gilmore’s is not a becoming, but a want to not 
be.  While the strict truth of that deathward plotting unravels when we recall that 
Mailer’s meticulously documented text opens and closes with the titular “old prison 
rhyme” that the author has in fact invented—and others have charted Mailer’s bait 
and switch of journalism and fiction134—his account of imprisonment shares with 
Cleaver’s autobiographical writing not only a powerful engagement with history but a 
contest with history.  Theirs is a struggle to have one narrative of imprisonment and 
self-determination write alongside or over and thereby compete with other accounts 
available.  
Both writers combine various discursive strategies in describing self-
conscious identity formation inside prison walls.  Cleaver’s and Mailer’s accounts 
demonstrate the concomitancy of language and subjects in history, both personal and 
social.  Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song conducts a meticulous historicization and 
narration of Gilmore that sharply demarcates possibility, while Cleaver’s Soul on Ice
writes the author as a tense reflection of larger national history in transformative 
ways.  Each embodies a reverse trajectory (Cleaver making himself, Gilmore 
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unmade) with regard to the conflicts of writing a subject constituted in the tensions of 
a specifically national history, which both define as schizophrenic.  Cleaver writes, 
“From the beginning, America has been a schizophrenic nation.  Its two conflicting 
images of itself were never reconciled”:  the white image of “freedom and justice for 
all” and the black image of oppression and resistance (98-100).  The same year, 
Mailer regularly identifies schizophrenia as a definitive characteristic of U.S. culture.  
In Miami and the Siege of Chicago, Mailer writes, “We call it hypocrisy, but it is 
schizophrenia, a modest ranch-house life with Draconian military adventures; a land 
of equal opportunity where a white culture sits upon a Black.”  His description of “the 
hierarchies of schizophrenic ranch-house life in America” appears in The Armies of 
the Night as well (Miami 140; Armies 197).  Cleaver and Mailer both employ 
“schizophrenia” as the popular misreading of multiple personality disorder.  In the 
medical discourse of psychology, the medical study of disorders of the brain, 
schizophrenia is actually a disassociation from reality, the inability of the subject to 
engage the world around him or her.  However, Cleaver and Mailer both articulate 
schizophrenia in plural and raced terms that make explicit the power differential in 
culture, a disease of the social body that produces a filure to acknowledge the fault 
lines of history, the cultural differences that must be named and engaged.  Though 
Cleaver and Mailer generally view the term negatively, the more positive description 
in how Deleuze and Guattari theorize it clarifies aspects of Soul and Song when they 
are read alongside Anti-Oedipus.135
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Deleuze and Guattari’s titular aim is the rejection of the Oedipal “I,” the 
autonomous, unified self, in which Oedipus is the offspring of Freud and Lacan, 
whole in his divorce from totality in a psychoanalytic version of the paradox of the 
Fall.  The loss of completeness is the split, the cause of the lack upon which the sense 
of self is predicated, the manque-à-être, the lack that is the want to be.136  Deleuze 
and Guattari turn to Friedrich Nietzsche and Antonin Artuad for a different sense of 
self:  if “every name in history is I,” then “I have been my father and I have been my 
son.” (14, 21).137  “I” thereby loses its power.  Their hypothetical schizophrenic says, 
“‘I won’t say I any more, I’ll never utter the word again; it’s just too damn stupid.  
Every time I hear it, I’ll use the third person instead, if I happen to remember to.  If it 
amuses them.  And it won’t make one bit of difference.’  And if he does chance to 
utter the word I again, that won’t make any difference either.  He is too far removed 
from these problems, too far past them” (23).  Writing against psychoanalysis means 
overwriting its privileged categories with those of the schizoanalytic:  replacing the 
Oedipal subject with the schizophrenic, the individual with the social, the symbolic 
with the concrete, the expressive with the productive, and theatre with history (381).  
The schizophrenic is an ever-shifting body of “we’s,” and schizoanalysis is the 
project of tracing such various social investments.138
Schizoanalysis works against oedipalization, an individualization that is less a 
matter of a Freudian sexual dynamic of desire for the mother than desire for the 
Other, the strategy by which selfhood itself is interpellated, brought into being 
through divorce from an imaginary whole and thereby defined by the lack of the 
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whole it desires.  Paranoia is a condition of oedipalization whereby the self 
misrecognizes its autonomy, a separate-but-equal individuality situated in a world of
stable meaning.  Paranoia thus describes a condition in which meaning is one with 
fact, social structures are inviolable, and power maintains an a priori fixity not even in 
institutions but is unified, indivisible under a god- rdained leader.139  Schizoanalysis 
attacks the primacy of “I” and its stable singularities.  Of course the joke is that “I” 
saturates their text and Cleaver’s as well, and “I won’t say I” doubly violates itself, 
invoking the forbidden as both the subject and the object of saying, of discourse.  
However, the contradiction does not make any difference for those who situate 
themselves beyond these difficulties, as such plural selves are accustomed to living 
with contradictions.  
Cleaver and Mailer both describe identity in a manner that gains clarity when 
understood in terms of the Deleuzo-Guattarian schizophrenic.  Cleaver writes, “I was 
very familiar with the Eldridge who came to prison, but that Eldridge no longer 
exists.  And the one I am now is in some ways a stranger to me.  You may find this 
very difficult to understand but it is very easy for one in prison to lose his sense of 
self” (35).  Certainly for the prisoner, this claim is a self-s rving dodge.  
Imprisonment rests upon the assumption that the person in prison is the same one who 
was determined in court to be a criminal; to be any other than the “Eldridge who 
came to prison” is to no longer need to be imprisoned, as he has been corrected, re-
formed.  However, Cleaver’s point is that the subject in history is ever in flux.  For 
the self to be constituted in its social investments—in the first passage after the 
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opening section “On Becoming,” these identities include being a prisoner, black, and 
a convicted rapist, as well as having a “Higher Uneducation” (36)—is to shift in the 
ebb and flow of those partial and conflicting participations in the social.
As Mailer has it in “The Man Who Studied Yoga” (1952), “Modern life is 
schizoid” (179).  That claim is less interesting than the opening description of the 
character who utters it, Sam Slovoda, rendered by a narrator who begins, “I would 
introduce myself if it were not useless.  The name I had last night will not be the same 
as the name I have tonight” (157).  That narrative dissimulation, the first person 
sleight of hand at once rev aling and concealing the speaker, is refined slightly in 
Mailer’s account of himself in The Armies of the Night and Miami and the Siege of 
Chicago, in which he generally refers to himself in the third person.  Still, the 
“Mailer” in the text and the “Mailer” of the book cover are presumed the same—
indeed, the Pulitzer for non-fiction of the former depends on it, the authority of the 
narrator contingent to the credibility of the writer.  In those two texts, though, there 
remains the disproportionately heavy weight of the single point of view.  In The 
Executioner’s Song, Mailer’s best work is produced as he faces his toughest 
challenges:  not writing about himself, and representing the social investments of a 
man who builds his identity on the self-realization performed in his own death.  
Imprisonment in its practice as described in both Soul and Song seeks to oedipalize; it 
individualizes, isolates, and alienates, produces paranoia and surpasses that paranoia, 
such that the question in the condition of Cleaver’s and Gilmore’s imprisonment is 
not, am I paranoid, but am I paranoid enough?  These texts resist that oedipalization, 
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though the history in which each seeks to implicate character has diminished in terms 
of the social transformation it offers.  Separated by that gulf of possibility, each 
author traces different models of the subject in history, actor and acted upon, the 
subject of and subject to, a tension of identity and agency perhaps written most 
severely in the position of prisoners.140
“You’re crazy” – Henry Louis Gates, Jr. to Eldridge Cleaver 
Cleaver’s prison writing of 1968 demonstrates the implication of 
imprisonment in broader historical and cultural contexts, the black man in prison as 
part of a larger network of misplaced desires.  Soul on Ice functions to a significant 
degree as an integrated schizoanalytic critique as described in Anti-Oedipus:  the 
combination of radical politics, aesthetics, and historical analysis, the synthesis of 
“the artistic machine, the analytic machine, and the revolutionary machine” (136-37).  
In a definitive passage of such practice, Deleuze and Guattari turn to a letter from 
Vincent Van Gogh to Artaud, an image of prison escape, a wall “penetrated with a 
file,” where the effort is not escape but, “at once the wall, the breaking through this 
wall, and the failures of the breakthrough” (136, 389 n. 64).  The metaphor of 
imprisonment, the simultaneity of the wall and the breaking of it, and the integrated 
critique all aptly describe Soul on Ice.  At a literal level, Cleaver acknowledges that 
the political project of the book keeps him incarcerated.  “If I had followed the path 
laid down for me by the officials, I’d undoubtedly have long since been out of prison” 
(36).  The text itself, in its account of the radicalization that Cleaver claims prolongs 
his stay, is the wall, while the letters back and forth in and out of prison and his own 
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becoming are the breakthrough.  The failures of that breakthrough might be viewed as 
the lack of the transformation of U.S. domestic and foreign policy Cleaver 
envisioned.  The breakthrough and its failure are bound to the degree to which the self 
Cleaver writes is a subject constituted in history, even as he tries to rupture that 
history, not break from it, but fracture history itself—for what else is revolution but 
the shattering of history?  
Cleaver in 1968 was in search of revolution, a political project that superseded 
divisions of incarceration and race.  He regularly identifies with the young white and 
black protesters of 1965 and points out his desire to “look with roving eyes for a new 
John Brown,” acknowledging that Malcolm X would “accept John Brown [to the 
Organization of Afro-American Unity] if he were around today” (38, 79).  The degree 
to which race as a signifier slips from skin color to radical action is a gesture to the 
revolt against barriers of racial difference and oppression Cleaver views as 
epitomized in imprisonment.141 Speaking for himself also becomes the means by 
which he can invite cross-racial identification. 
Soul on Ice demonstrates Cleaver’s effort to articulate himself, to speak his 
position in and view from prison and thereby re-o ient himself (and thereby those that 
identify with him) politically and personally, to put his individual situation in the 
larger context of U.S. racial history.  Much of Soul on Ice accounts for the acts of the 
self historically, and it often reads like a litany of pairings of the personal and 
historical:  Cleaver’s imprisonment and Brown v. the Board of Education, his 
violently divided and raced sexual desire and the lynching of Emmitt Till (21, 29).  
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The implied argument is that personal acts are best understood within narratives 
larger than personal history.  The Cleaver of the book is schizophrenic, in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s terms.  His account of his psychiatric treatment in prison grows in 
focus and importance when viewed in the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s exchange 
of the autonomy of Oedipus for the social subject in history. 
I had several sessions with a psychiatrist.  His conclusion was that I hated my 
mother.  How he arrived at this conclusion I’ll never know, because he knew 
nothing about my mother; and when he’d asked me questions I would answer 
him with absurd lies.  What revolted me about him was that he had hear  m  
denouncing whites, yet each time he interviewed me he deliberately guided 
the conversation back to my family life, to my childhood.  That in itself was 
alright, but he deliberately blocked all my attempts to bring out the racial 
question. (30)
This parody of psychoanalytic treatment, the tracing of all experience to the 
childhood relationship with the mother and the attendant blocking of the desire to 
address socio-cultural concerns, demonstrates Cleaver’s rejection of his 
oedipalization.  He instead opts to understand himself in terms of “the dynamics of 
race relations in America” and a Marxist critique of U.S. capitalism (30-31).  Deleuze 
and Guattari describe that shift as the schizophrenic turn from “daddy-mommy” to the 
“economic and political spher s” (23, 105).  The Oedipal self impedes the flow in the 
circuitry of the social, which, in the case of Cleaver, blocks the attempt to rupture the 
boundaries of skin color and prison walls, to act and write across lines of difference in 
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terms of race and incarceration.  In Soul on Ice, Cleaver is writing against 
conventional psychoanalysis, as Deleuze and Guattari would later do, the latter even 
abandoning his personal practice for cultural critique.  
Cleaver’s rejection of his psychiatric session can be viewed in the comic tone 
he engages so often and so successfully, as when he applauds the revolutionary 
possibilities of desiring beef steaks or prepares to describe the mystery of the holy 
trinity as three-in-one oil (49, 51).  However, tricksters have regularly masked their 
masterstrokes in humor, and keeping in mind the schizoanalytic imperative—the 
political psychoanalysis of desire in social bodies—foregrounds the richer 
implications of Cleaver’s argument.  Analyst and analysand must alike leave behind
the reductive, isolated, and isolating interpretation of personal history for wider 
contexts.  Soul on Ice effectively invites the racial history of now to get up from the 
couch and walk around the city in order to talk about its troubles.  He adopts the 
theoretical approach of implicating the seemingly autonomous author and book in 
intertextual relationships with the diachronic and synchronic milieus, with their 
historical and cultural situations.142
The discursive impulse of such contextualization guides Cleaver’s best 
writing in Soul on Ice and his short story “The Flashlight,” which appeared in 
Playboy in 1969 and won an O. Henry Award.  The story features the becoming of 
the main character, Stacy Mims.  He transforms from leader of a band of petty 
criminals, to a loner with the titular flashlight who uses it to interrupt drug activity in 
his neighborhood, to becoming a participant in the gang of “Marijuanos.”  In her 
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commentary in Eldridge Cleaver (1991), Rout under-reads “The Flashlight,” missing 
its emphasis on the social.  Overall her book offers far more a critical and (meta-
critical) survey of Cleaver’s primary writings than a biography, but the story merits 
less than a page and half, describing it entirely in terms of a coming of age story 
emphasizing the singular individual, replete with the stock psychoanalytic terms of 
Freud and Adler both, from “phallic symbol” to “self-assertion” (10).  However, 
Cleaver takes pains to implicate the main character in a particular cultural space, 
written in social rather than personal history.  
The initial description of Stacy is in terms of an incarnate social body 
comprised of himself and his gang members, made in “knowledge of each other, the 
thick glue of the brotherhood of youth, of their separate selves bound into one” (120).  
The subsequent thick description of the main character emphasizes the neighborhood 
as its own sustaining environment with its own history, but it is described as already 
passing into the past, both literally, as the dilapidated but historied houses are 
replaced by projects, and figuratively, as the nearby diminishing wilderness is cast in 
terms of the pastoral, from the gang’s hunter/gatherer activities there to its “Indian 
burial ground” and shepherds (124).143  The middle passage describes Stacy’s own 
poorly understood resistance to both his gang’s criminal activities, which have lost 
their meaning for him, and the terrorism of surveillance he initiates on the drug users 
and dealers, until he becomes first their target and then their peer. Cleaver describes 
the process of becoming in terms of two warring voices in one body—resonating both 
with DuBois’ famous claim and a sense of the schizophrenic—as Stacy identifies 
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himself joining them through the ritual of smoking (and presumably, later selling) 
marijuana.  “He had the sensation of being two disembodied beings fighting to inhabit 
one yielding body.  His body, offering no resistance, became a battlefield on which 
two rival armies contended” (302).  His identity at the close is that of “Marijuano,” 
part of a different social body than his previous gang.  
The story trades on the cachet of Cleaver’s fame as a former prisoner and 
fugitive as of November 1968.  The term “prison” appears on each of the first three 
pages of the story, and it is easy to do as Rout does and read Stacy as Cleaver, who in 
1954 first went to prison for selling marijuana, then a felony in California.  By 1969, 
the cultural climate had changed, and a cartoon accompanying the story in Playboy
features a doctor telling his patient, “I want you to lay off that alcohol and switch to 
pot, Mr. Fuller.  Your kidneys are in terrible shape” (288).  Also alongside Cleaver’s 
story in that issue is the article “Hunger in America” by U.S. Senator Jacob Javits, 
who joined Senator and later President Johnson in supporting the 1957 and 1964 civil 
rights bills.  The story itself chronicles a material and spiritual poverty that 
precipitates Stacy’s pursuit of meaning caught between his desire to act and to 
belong.  Identity becomes a plural, social sense of selfhood defined in space, 
subculture as a place of mind, described as “that underground world, psychologically 
as far beneath the consciousness of a city’s solid citizens as a city’s sewerage system 
is beneath its streets” (288).  Individuals and social groups are both understood as 
collectives, and ghettoized communities become the cultural unconscious of the 
society that suppresses them.  In a related vein, the two issues of Playboy
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immediately prior to that featuring “The Flashlight” offer articles on “the demise of 
Freudianism” and survey psychoanalytic approaches less invested in personal history 
than community.  So the very psychoanalytic emphases on individuation and personal 
history that Rout reads in “The Flashlight” are resisted not only in the text itself, but 
in the context of its original publication.  
Cleaver’s own most fully developed theoretical framework of socio-historical 
analysis focuses on the racial difference and oppression he describes as blocked in his 
earlier parody of Freudian psychoanalysis.  In “The Allegory of the Black Eunuchs” 
(183-204) and “The Primeval Mitosis” (205-220), he offers a structure of difference 
on the twin axes of race and gender, defining black and white men and women with 
respect to one another in terms of sexual desire, power, body, and mind, all key points 
of reference in Anti-Oedipus as well.  Cleaver identifies four allegorical types.  The 
white man as Omnipotent Administrator, the mind of systemic power suffering from 
the “negation and abdication of his Body,” is in dialectical opposition with the black 
man, the Supermasculine Menial.  The white woman as “beautiful dumb blonde” and 
Ultrafeminine, is desired by men black and white but available only to the white, 
who, lacking the body, can ever fully satisfy her.  The black woman is therefore the 
abject object, Subfeminine, subordinate by gender and race, but nevertheless the 
“strong self-reliant Amazon.”  The image binding these types is drawn straight from 
confinement, the “two sets of handcuffs that have all four of us tied together” (191).  
The allegory escapes the symbolic for the concrete in being embodied in Cleaver’s 
own desires, which are symptomatic of the history of racism and slavery in the U.S. 
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that situates white men as conceiving of themselves as superior to black men.  Given 
the economic circumstances of production, that superiority made black men the force 
of labor, body without mind to white men’s mind without body.  Raced femininity 
doubles and exacerbates this double hierarchy.
In Cleaver’s description, the surrender of the body inadvertently relinquishes 
the (Freudian) phallus to black masculinity while maintaining social power (the 
Lacanian phallus), creating a network of blocked desire in a set of relationships of 
gender and race, the relationships that determine class and sexuality.  Estranged from 
their bodies, white masculinity hysterically asserts dominion over the physicality it 
lacks and thus desires in blackness.  Black masculinity desires the white femininity 
from which it is barred, and is separated from black femininity in the shame of its 
inferiority.  White femininity can only be satisfied by the bodily engagement 
whiteness has surrendered, and black femininity “is lost between two worlds” 
(219).144  There are of course clear problems with this model, the greatest of which 
include how class becomes a symptom of race and gender, homosexuality is 
denigrated, and black women are doubly subjugated.145  Still, that model has some 
critical use-value with regard to literary study, though only a few have noticed.  In 
1974, Robert Felgar points out in Negro American Literature how the theory might 
apply to Richard Wright’s Native Son (235), and Lucas Beauchamp’s relationship 
with his landlord Roth Edmonds in Go Down, Moses works within this framework 
even as the former’s success in the physical and mental worlds of the trickster 
subverts it.146
162
Cleaver recognizes the introductory nature of his analysis.  “Just how this 
[psycho-sexual dynamic] works itself out is a problem for analysis by sociologists 
and social psychologists on the mass level, and the headshrinkers and nutcrackers on 
the individual level” (217).  The pejorative terms here (“headshrinkers and 
nutcrackers”) mark Cleaver’s reiteration of his dismissal of conventional 
psychoanalysis, focusing instead on outlining study for “social psychologists on the 
mass level.”  He is less concerned with what such ideological structures mean than 
with what they do.  Deleuze and Guattari would similarly challenge psychoanalysis in
their own formulation of schizoanalysis.  Cleaver’s attention to indices of difference 
and the interplay among diverse textualities in Soul on Ice should be better 
recognizedin cultural studies and postcolonial theory approaches sensitive to history, 
identification, and subjugation.  Certainly his analysis is preparatory:  “What we are 
outlining here is a perspective from which such analysis might be best approached” 
(217).  Cleaver’s heuristic is provocative because it develops a model of cultural 
psychology implicated in historical process; it is compelling because its deployment 
even acknowledges its preliminary role.  He advocates a plural psychoanalysis in 
order to trace the historical causes of cultural conflict—specifically, the national 
divides along lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality, of which, he argues, his own 
criminality and incarceration are symptomatic.  
There were clear difficulties for some in treating violence as a symptom.  In 
1968, the year of the publication of Soul on Ice and the student strikes at Berkeley, 
where Cleaver was teaching an experimental course, California’s then Governor 
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Ronald Reagan warned, “If Eldridge Cleaver is allowed to teach our children, they 
may come home one night and slit our throats” (CNN).  That year also saw Reagan 
contend for the Republican nomination for president against both Nixon and 
Rockefeller, even as Cleaver headed the Peace and Freedom Party.  The Oedipal fear 
demonstrated in the warning by the then California Governor is generalized in the 
address of “our children,” a generational anxiety that begs the sort of mass level 
social psychology Cleaver advocates.  
Reagan was not alone in his condemnation of Cleaver.  Prison officials 
comment on Cleaver regularly from 1970 to 1972, and some do so erisively even as 
they, like Cleaver, dismiss psychoanalytic inquiry—but without proposing an 
alternative, as he does.  For example, one ACA presenter in 1970 suggests that penal 
practices are about to undergo a paradigm change, making the requisite gestur to 
Thomas Kuhn.  That participant suggests that the rehabilitation model of the 
individual is “attributable to Sigmund Freud,” but it is about to change to a model of a 
community of citizens (1970 335).  However, that speaker then specifically distance  
himself from the primacy on social environment and its history maintained in Soul on 
Ice.  “Eldridge Cleaver tells his followers that crimes committed by members of the 
Black minority are not crimes at all but protests against and compensation for 
deprivation.  Of course this rationalization will not do” (337).  The speaker does 
recognize a need for change and recommends a social renewal akin to Johnson’s 
“Great Society” in broad-based social programs, but the present and the past, and the 
social and the particular, cannot have any bearing on one another in his view.
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The year after Attica that saw the divided image of the black prisoner as 
incorrigible and revolutionary further divide is reflected in the split between 
perceptions of Cleaver.  Another ACA participant similarly dismisses both 
psychoanalysis and self-proclaimed political prisoners.  A San Quentin Associate 
Warden writes, “During the 50 years of the psychoanalytic fad, prisoners became 
quite skilled in tracing their aberrations to unhappy early experiences,” and he makes 
a joking reference to prisoners exchanging the Oedipal epithet—possibly the only 
reference to “motherfucker” in the 134 years of the ACA proceedings (1972 112).  In 
addition, he claims contemptuously, “Handsome rewards have been furnished men 
who gave themselves whole-h artedly to the role of ‘political prisoner,’” a part he 
links specifically to Cleaver (112).  Like Reagan’s hysterical fears, the warden 
demonstrates the social anxiety Cleaver inspired in the fusion of his various identities 
of black man, convict, political prisoner, writer, teacher, political leader, and 
candidate for office—at various times, he campaigned for president, senator, mayor, 
and city council member.   That social fear was the sort of phenomenon for which he 
offered an investigative approach.  
Some participants in the annual conference recognized aspects of this.  Two 
participants suggest Soul on Ice to prison administrators because it describes 
contemporary “racial questions.”  One, a sociologist, recommends the book twice and 
describes how a colleague “became physically ill for three days because of his 
reaction to reading” it (ACA 1972 180, 188).  The individual body’s illness itself 
becomes symptomatic of its social investments, a description of physical sickness that 
165
has its own parallel in Soul on Ice, when bodily illness is the response to the 
estrangement of and challenge to racial expectation (185, 229).147  That anonymous 
prison sociologist’s violent reaction to the book is a physical embodiment of the 
“convulsive spasms of change” perceived as imminent in the U.S. in 1968, according 
to both the ACA president and Cleaver (ACA 1968 13-14).  Personal and social 
bodies and their violent reactions are understood best historically not in terms of 
personal past, but in the larger cultural histories of difference and struggle.
In his own analysis, Cleaver’s utopian vision is one in which the bodies of 
black men and women are the “wealth of a nation,” the “human raw material upon 
which the future of society depends and with which, through the implacable march of 
history to an ever broader base of democracy and equality, the society will renew and 
transform itself” (220).  But the mechanics of that utopian Marxist history give way 
to a romantic utopia in the subsequent and final ending of the book, in which Cleaver 
invokes the black woman to claim her place not as Subfeminine but sovereign:  “But 
put on your crown, my Queen, and we will build a New City on these ruins” (242).  
While previously adopting the social and historical sense of self that Deleuze and 
Guattari type as schizophrenic, he remains enamored with the individual autonomy 
that is quite literally Oedipus, the singular King to match the Queen.  It is difficult to 
sort exactly to what degree desir  here flows away from the postulate of a social 
subject, to what extent the allegorical singular is part-for-whole, or a retreat to 
imagined autonomy.  Likely, the problematic final section so at odds with much of 
the rest of the book is in part an apology for the third part, the letters to and from his 
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white female lawyer, letters that Ishmael Reed dismisses as “gushing” and “cloying” 
(3).  
It is also possible that the final conclusion is less a bait and switch of 
individual and social subjects than a consequence of the book’s difficulty:  Cleaver 
shifts so rapidly among various approaches, including conflating personal and 
historical, so as to often (though not always) substitute vitality for rigor.  He clarifies 
that his theorization of race, class, gend r, and sexuality in “The Allegory of the 
Black Eunuchs” and “The Primeval Mitosis” is preliminary, and, like subsequent 
literary critics of a historicist bent, he ranges among documents literary, historical, 
and popular to provide the basis for his cultural critique.  However, he does so in a 
wide-ranging rush and with a reliance on an extended quotation of others that at times 
borders on bricolage and can be hasty or wrong.148
Most often, though, he is more successful.  One of the final sections of the 
book, “Convalescence,” is a culmination of the earlier theorization of the raced and 
gendered split of mind and body.  It reads like a Birmingham School polemic, starting 
with Brown v. The Board of Education, and continuing through an analysis of 1950s 
and 60s popular music and writing inflected by racial critique, to a litany of injustices 
including the lynching of Till, to a reading of the Beatles as minstrels playing a black 
Jesus performing the Eucharist (222- 35).  This approach is so broad as to seem 
scattered, though it is held together by Cleaver’s fierce style and wit and remains a 
powerful and playful model of cultural criticism as a capstone to a book that has a too 
unremarked place in the history of theory.  As the investigations Cleaver engages 
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have taken firmer root and seen tremendous elaboration in historically nuanced 
cultural studies, critics have mistakenly passed over his work that adopts, combines, 
and deploys what were at the time largely nascent lines of inquiry in U.S. letters.  
Soul on Ice is valuable strictly in this regard.  Cleaver’s is an adaptation of Marxist 
historicism, part of a tradition that transformed Marx’s single gravitational point of 
class to a more complex system of race, gender, and class, to which others would add.
In addition, his indictment of 1960s U.S. geo-p litics speaks directly to the 
history of now, at the outset of the twenty-first century, when international police 
actions are regularly compared by some to those of 1968.  Cleaver argues that a 
conservative presidency and Congress can “manipulate the people by playing upon 
the have-gun-will -travel streak in America’s character” (117).  Cleaver’s point of 
Vietnam echoes in criticism of the U.S. at the beginning of the twenty-firs  century, 
the international and omestic policies of violence and domination, particularly with 
regard to the war in Iraq and the limits on civil liberties.  “Justice is secondary.  
Security is the byword” (137).149  Furthermore, as catalogues and studies of prison 
writing in the vein of Chevigny’s and Franklin’s expand, Soul on Ice demonstrates 
that the tendency to autobiography and testifying on one’s own behalf also includes 
not only the prison writer’s self-reflection, or mirroring of the culture that 
incarcerates, but reflection on that culture, situating the condition of imprisonment in 
a much larger cultural history.  Celebrating those efforts faces its own difficulties, 
given the crimes of theft, assault, and rape that precede his imprisonment, and the 
degree to which he argues that those criminal efforts were part of his will to 
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become.150  However, the most vituperatively dismissive critics of S ul on Ice—the 
conservative non-profit Intercollegiate Studies Institute places it, along with Armies 
of the Night, among the 50 worst books of the twentieth century—read it as if it were 
an apologist autobiography, a blame-casting story of “I,” though Cleaver far more 
often writes against that sense of self.  Speaking for himself becomes Cleaver’s 
strategy of testifying to larger scars of history.  
“the deepening schizophrenia of America” — Poirier on Mailer’s obsession
Mailer goes further than Cleaver in exploring how “modern life is schizoid,” 
but by 1979, carceral difference loses all but a small trace of its raced practice.  
Schizophrenia is one of Mailer’s preferred words, which he associates variously with:  
“modern life”; an “American public” in its view of Nixon, its international wars and 
domestic race relations, its policemen and criminals the same; the American dream, 
activist students, the popular perception of the Vietnam War (“The Man” 157; Miami
42, 140, 174; Armies 141, 161, 188, 189, 197, 270).  Mailer is not particularly 
consistent in his use of the term, nor rigorous in his pursuit of it—it is among his 
favorites, after all, so he wears it in a wide range of fashions.151  Still, like Deleuze 
and Guattari’s schizophrenic, the narrated “Mailer,” the “reporter” of both 1968 texts, 
is constituted in his partial and conflicting investments with various groups, both a 
part of and apart from the cocktail party of liberal academics, the marchers at the 
Pentagon, and his fellow protesters in jail in The Armies of the Night.  
In particular, racial conflicts are cast in the terms of the “schizophrenia” he 
describes in each book as the “ranch-house life” split on cultural lines, the normalcy 
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of the American dream concealing sharp divides between black and white (Miami
140; Armies 197).  He documents his own participation at the line of that very 
division at the Chicago Democratic Convention.  He distances himself from sharing 
ideals with black leftists, until his guilt gets the better of him when, on stage, “some 
young Negro from the Panthers or the Rangers or from where he did not know” raises 
their black and white hands clasped together, and he “felt rueful at unkind thoughts of 
late” (190).  These thoughts that include Mailer earlier grudgingly admitting that “he 
was getting tired of Negroes and their rights” (51).152  Like the Cleaver early on in 
Soul on Ice, loving and hating white women, the Mailer of 1968 proves deeply 
divided in his allegiances.  
Eleven years later, The Executioner’s Song shows rather than tells this sense 
of the schizophrenic—though as the nation fulfilled Mailer’s expectation of 
exhaustion at the questions of race and revolution, the schizophrenic becomes less 
specifically aligned with racial difference than drawing attention to the oppositions 
beyond those contained in the writer.  Mailer’s use of the term in 1968 describes lived 
contradiction; his writing in 1979 embodies it, as it shifts from the individual point of 
view to the social.  Armies of the Night opens with Time magazine’s account of 
Mailer’s speech at the Ambassador Theater and then his arrest at the Pentagon (3-4), 
a shred of the historical record the book in its entirety retells and expands.  The point 
of view may be the third person, but the author remains the first character, his 
unspoken “I” the reader’s eye, his point of view the guide as much as Cleaver’s in 
Soul on Ice.  On the other hand, Mailer is absent as a character in The Executioner’s 
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Song, and the entire work consists of competing points of view, incorporating diverse 
documents to record not only history but its narrativization, the way those who tell 
the story shape the events even as the participants do.  The book in topic and focus 
capitulates to the virtual abandonment of racial questions, cultural change, and plural 
identity that characterize the shift in national tenor from 11 years before, instead 
emphasizing an anti-social and apolitical Gilmore’s relentless quest for the death that 
asserts his individual autonomy.  However, the means by which Mailer narrates that 
want to not be demonstrate that there is no way out of the sociality of history and its 
conflicts, in which individuals embody political positions and narration is at once a 
matter of personal identification and the retroactive production of contradictory 
views.
Toward the end of the book, at Gilmore’s execution, the warden reads what 
one viewer describes as “some official document,” which he hears only as “blah, 
blah, blah.”  Mailer overwrites the official papers of that business with competing 
responses to Gilmore’s own words, “Let’s do it.”  Gilmore’s uncle Vern Damico 
views the statement as demonstrating the “most pronounced amount of courage,” but 
the lawyer Ron Stanger sees instead that his former client “couldn’t think of anything 
profound” (983, 984).  Such accounts are not merely different interpretations of the 
same event but exactly opposite, the conflict in perception rendered visible as Mailer 
offers some 20 competing fragments of seven points of view of the execution.153
Furthermore, much of the second half of the book incorporates not only the 
transcripts of interviews but excerpts from newspapers as well, and two lengthy 
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accounts following the execution include stories carried by The Salt Lake Tribune:  
“ACLU Calls Hansen Murder Accomplice,” and “Justice Has Been Served, Hansen 
Says of Execution” 1024-25).154  Again, the juxtaposed articles offer diametrically 
opposed perspectives of the same event.  Cleaver describes his simultaneous love and 
hate for white and black women, his raced desires and crimes, as symptomatic of 
larger cultural divides.  Mailer largely dodges the issue of race and desire in depicting 
such divisions.  Schizophrenia in The Executioner’s Song functions as a social 
negative capability, wherein it is not an individual’s capacity to sustain mystery or 
contradiction, but a society’s ability to do so and not tear itself apart.
Like Soul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song faces challenging questions of genre 
between biography and history, between non-fiction and fiction, and the book itself 
cannot determine the matter for certain.  The back cover of the 1998 Vintage 
International Edition155 splits the difference, as its category code lists it as 
“Literature/Current Affairs.”  The accompanying praise from the Miami Herald
identifies it as “Literature of the highest order,” but Random House broadens that 
claim to begin the jacket summary with, “In this monumental work of journalism.”156
In a Harper’s review, Jonathan Dee turns to that problem of genre in terms that speak 
directly to the guiding imperatives of this analysis, suggesting that such blurring 
imagines that “the chasm between action and self—between the record we leave 
behind on this earth and the hidden complexity of the living mind—has been closed.  
We can call it, for lack of a better term, the birth of the psycho-historical novel” (80).  
Dee condemns this impulse, concluding that such works signal the surrender of the 
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novel’s “unreal power to apprehend, and meditate on, the nature of our existence” 
(84).  Dee’s use of the term unreal emphasizes both fiction’s extreme power and lack 
of the real.157  In effect, constructing the interiority of actual people based on their 
historical documents represents a disavowal of the novel’s proper authority, a slip 
from meditation to mediation, from philosophy to history, from imagination to 
psychology.  
However, the differences between these categories have grown complicated in 
the wake of deconstruction and other aspects of postmodernity in the writing of 
fiction, history, and the analysis of each.  Furthermore, this dissertation focuses on 
texts that challenge distinctions between personal and social history, restlessly and 
relentlessly trafficking back and forth between imagination and history.  In addition, 
Mailer’s method of writing Gilmore by integrating various textualities has as much to 
do with illuminating Gilmore as it has to do with the writer’s own dissimulation.  
Mailer encounters the difficulty of representing imprisonment defined by 
concealment, and the text regularly features the subterfuge and mediation of 
television producers, journalists, lawyers, and others attempting to interview Gilmore, 
often thwarted by prison policies and Supreme Court rulings such as Nolan v. 
Fitzpatrick (1971) and Pell v. Procunier (1974) either allowing or limiting such 
contact.  However, Mailer’s meticulous account working with so many sources is also 
a vain effort to conceal his discursive authority in a surfeit of documents, the effort to 
write a story of nation with an invisible hand.
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Because of that effort, contextualizing The Executioner’s Song within larger 
fields of discourse seems a little redundant, particularly with regard to documents of 
law and history, as those tactics of literary scholarship of a historicist bent are already 
part of the discursive strategy of the novel.  There is the author’s general treatment of 
history as a novel and the novel as history, the declar d subtitle of Armies of the Night
and undeclared assumption of so much of his work, most especially the “true life 
novel” account of Gilmore’s difficult end.  These are not actual events rewritten as 
fiction, as Richard Wright acknowledges in “How Bigger was Born,” where “the 
newspaper items and some of the incidents in Native Son are but fictionalized 
versions of the Robert Nixon case and rewrites of news stories from the Chicago 
Tribune” (xxviii).  Mailer interweaves his piecework account of the time of Gilmore’s 
time with headlines and opening excerpts from the Salt Lake Tribune and other 
papers and their account of events Mailer sees as related to the events of his text.  
For example, one page incorporates a letter from Gilmore to his lover Nicole, 
a narrative account of the Utah Attorney General’s citation of Pell v. Procunier, and a 
newspaper excerpt on Gilmore’s execution status complete with a neighboring 
headline, “Carter Wins Election” (511).  Mailer in his text offers a flurry of claims 
and counterclaims for the reader to sort.  However, juxtaposition is not analysis, and 
Mailer acknowledges in the afterword that his hand has shaped the material not only 
in selection but in choosing for and against competing accounts, reorganizing, 
rewriting, and entirely recreating certain moments (1051-52).  To some degree, 
Mailer’s effort to write himself out of The Executioner’s Song functions as a response 
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to the excesses of in propria persona in Armies and Miami, where he speaks too 
much for himself.
In comparison with both Mailer’s earlier work and Soul on Ice, where Cleaver 
at times testifies for himself, The Executioner’s Song seems to offer a much different 
puzzle, as it attempts to efface the author’s view in a meticulous documentary 
narrative through which to locate Gilmore.  That effort bears on the central question 
here of testimony and the competing forces of the want to not be and the will to 
become, of unwriting and writing the prisoner as a subject in history.  Mailer, in 
incorporating hundreds and hundreds of “interviews, documents, records of court 
proceedings, and other original material” (1051), creates a pastiche of competing 
scripts regarding Gilmore’s plotted execution.  Mailer’s involvement is inextricably 
bound with the work of Larry Schiller, who purchased the media rights to Gilmore’s 
life and death, and is thus the proprietor of the records and the recorders.  Mailer 
acknowledges in his postscript his debt to the interviews Schiller conducted with 
Nicole, the basis for narrating “this factual account—this, dare I say it, true life story, 
with its real names and real lives—as if it were a novel. […] Without Schiller, it 
would not have been feasible to attempt the second half of The Executioner’s Song” 
(1053).  
The Schiller of the text offers more than an indispensable source for the 
narrative; in his obsession with recording the truth through documenting history, he 
becomes a stand-in for Mailer.  In the attempt to write Gilmore (and the U.S.), Mailer 
instead writes himself in the mirror of Schiller; Mailer misrecognizes himself in 
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Schiller, perhaps because he expected but failed to do so in Gilmore.  The shift occurs 
in part because of the schism between Mailer’s schizoanalytic method and his desire 
for a romantic subject, a unified self that finally proves impoverished in the face of 
historical process and its narrativization that thereby shapes subsequent history.
Mailer works from a diverse set of texts in writing the bulk of The 
Executioner’s Song, the three quarters set in jail and prison and thus having the most 
in common with Soul on Ice, the section that has seen less critical review (Merrill 
129), the bulk of which is interspersed with excerpts from local and national media 
accounts.  Many of those newspaper, magazine, and television descriptions have been 
regulated by Schiller and Gilmore:  the photocopied letters, the interview questions 
and transcripts, their piecemeal publication in Playboy, the reports Schiller’s team has 
leaked to the press or the reports from journalists who have accessed Gilmore despite 
Schiller’s best efforts.  
The writer Schiller contracts for that Playboy article, Barry Farrell, begins the 
role of writing Gilmore, a role that Mailer plays more fully in The Executioner’s 
Song.  What Mailer writes of Farrell he could as well write of himself.  Gilmore “was 
being his own writer, [but Farrell] was being given the Gilmore canon, good self-
respecting convict canon,” and “was loving the job even more than expected. […] 
What a delight to be altogether out of himself.  By God, Barry thought, I have all the 
passions of an archivist.  I’m proprietary about the material” (793, 831).  Drawing 
upon the prisoner’s own letters to write the prisoner resonates with the expansion of 
habeas corpus in Johnson v. Avery, but unlike the writ lawyers Cleaver describes 
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(Soul 69), Farrell is not in prison.  The thought Mailer locates in Farrell here is a 
provocative one:  there is an attitude of ownership in “proprietary” balanced by the 
abandonment of his own identity in being “altogether out of himself.”  The 
textualization of the prisoner charts a discursive space in between and mutually 
occupied by Gilmore and his writer, two men who have never met but whose 
language together produces “Gilmore,” who is thereafter shaped by Mailer. 
The Executioner’s Song conducts in the register of fiction a historiography of 
its present as it simultaneously conducts and reveals the historical narrativization in 
the stops and starts of multiple channels of communication.  There are the questions 
invented and revised by Farrell and Schiller, posed to Gilmore by the lawyers Bob 
Moody and Stanger, answered by Gilmore and recorded on tape by the lawyers, and 
transcribed by Schiller’s secretaries.  They become documentation that serves as a 
sort of raw material first for Farrell and then for Mailer, even as Schiller releases 
pieces of the story to the news agencies in an effort to control the wider 
representation.  Critics too quick to underwrite that mediation thereby overwrite the 
relationship between Mailer and Gilmore.158
Gary Gilmore in 1976-77 offered Mailer a true life Stephen Rojack from An 
American Dream to make it real, a proxy for “the themes I’ve been dealing with all 
my life” (Conversations 263), but a person other than the author so that he could try 
his hand at writing himself out of the story.  As he does for Schiller, Gilmore presents 
for Mailer the opportunity to render history through writing a person.  Mailer does 
face a problem in that he admits that “when I started The Executioner’s Song, I 
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thought I would like him [Gilmore] more than I did” (Conversations 348).  Mailer is 
not alone in that response, as the various writers involved in the process of 
collaborative narration regard Gilmore similarly, including the convict himself, 
Farrell, and Schiller.  Gilmore regularly recognizes himself in negative terms, 
harboring uncontrollable, source-l ss violence, but he repeatedly blocks any desire to 
trace that criminality to any childhood cause (715, 734, 736, 799, 802, 833, 850-851).  
Others attempt to resolve that difficulty in searching for conventional 
psychoanalytic causality for violence.  According to Farrell, “The key to every violent 
criminal could be found in the file of his childhood beatings, but Gilmore claimed his 
mother never touched him, and his father never bothered to” (834).  Like Farrell, 
Schiller turns to such an Oedipal model as an interpretive framework as he questions 
Gilmore with regard to his childhood relationship with his mother, offering in that 
interrogation the recognition, “Maybe that’s psychoanalytic bullshit, and if so, I stand 
accused” (851).  Gilmore’s mother Bessie is more circumspect, suggesting that 
regarding her son, she did not know “how much was her fault, and how much was the 
fault of the ongoing world” (496). From the late 1960s through the 1970s, Cleaver, 
ACA prison officials, and even Playboy may have begun acknowledging that 
Freudian and Adlerian emphases on childhood history were limited and limiting, but 
in 1979, journalists and producers were still testing those worn paths of inquiry. 
Even Mailer occasionally turns to such psychoanalytic expectation, as the first 
of the book’s three endings turns back to Gilmore’s mother saying she has the same 
guts Gary has, before turning back to himself with his own prison rhyme, then his 
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apologia (1049, 1050, 1051-56).  However, Mailer more often turns away from the 
psychoanalytic, using the symbolic and personal as a springboard for broader inquiry.  
For example, Nicole once asks Gary if he is the devil, a comparison her sister makes 
as well, and in a long letter to her, he writes, “I might be further from God than I am 
from the devil,” a letter that concludes with him referring to her as Angel, a repeated 
nickname (106, 235, 305).159  The psychoanalytic talking cure of such freeform letters 
becomes a methodological starting point for exposition extending well beyond the 
personal.  
Rather than leave the devils and angels in the realm of the symbolic, 
expressive of the personal, Mailer makes them concrete and social.   He titles Chapter 
32, “The Angels and the Demons Meet the Devils and the Saints,” which focuses not 
at all on Gilmore directly but entirely on the legal struggle, the contest among many 
groups for determining his fate.  Deleuze and Guattari overturn psychoanalysis in 
favor of a schizoanalysis that nevertheless depends on its predecessor as something to 
push against (just as postmodernity does).  Cleaver uses the personal and historical as 
twin focal points for his looping, swirling cultural analysis, while Mailer sees in the 
person of Gilmore a center of gravity by which to organize the claims and 
counterclaims, the Eastern and Western Voices that are the two halves of the book 
and the nation.  
In the process of writing how Gilmore in his celebrity becomes a screen for 
the nation, it is not Gilmore but he producer Schiller who becomes Mailer’s proxy in 
the text.  Mailer repeatedly describes Schiller as obsessed with recording history, in 
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part for personal prestige, to be a man of truth.  He tells himself, “You recorded 
history right.  If you did the work that way, you could end up a man of substance” 
(600).  More often, however, his attention is less to his own “substance,” what he is 
made of, and more to the stuff of the real, history as truth.  In a telegram Schiller 
writes to Gilmore, the former states, “I am here to record history, not to get involved 
in it.  Regards”—a claim he immediately overturns in acknowledging that he is 
already in the story (714).  To the lawyers, Moody and Stanger, the interview 
mediators Schiller uses to communicate with Gilmore once he has been banned from 
the prison because he is a film producer, Schiller says, “‘Forget Larry Schiller the 
businessman,’ he told them.  ‘That’s a side of me, but we’re forgetting it.  We have 
history here.  We have to get that. […]  It’s all part of history’” (719).  When he tells 
himself the story of what he is doing, Schiller says, “For the first time, Schiller, you 
can’t fictionalize, you can’t make it up, you can’t embroider,” as such embellishment 
would run counter to his “desire to record history, true history, not journalistic crap” 
(857, 859).  
Schiller obsesses over how he might maintain a posture of objectivity, 
capturing history and placing it on view like a curator, accessing and representing an 
unmediated real.  Like the character of the District Attorney Gavin Stevens at the end 
of Go Down, Moses, who no longer narrates out-of-hand but must turn to the “papers 
of that business” and meet with the newspaper editor to track down what has 
happened to Butch, Schiller wants not to tell a story but reveal it even as he 
orchestrates the revelation.  It requires some int rpretive acrobatics not to read 
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Schiller’s account here as a proxy for Mailer’s own purposes in the book, particularly 
after the incessant self-aggrandizement of Armies of the Night and Miami and the 
Siege of Chicago.  
The proposition that Schiller’s and Mailer’s points of view are deeply 
implicated becomes more compelling with the later history of their collaboration.  
Schiller directed the television film Master Spy:  The Robert Hanssen Story (2002) 
from Mailer’s screenplay based on the life of the FBI agent and Russian spy, and 
Schiller subsequently authored the novelization of Mailer’s screenplay.  The working 
title of the project was Into the Mirror (Lacayo 8), richly suggestive of the degree to 
which the discursive work of each reflects the other.  The mutual identification that 
began in their collaboration in the case of Gilmore also begins their twin tendencies to 
write national tragedy in particular biographies.  Both are obsessed with reading U.S. 
national culture in the lives of its imprisoned anti-heroes, as Mailer and Schiller 
collaborate on the stories of Gilmore and Hanssen, and Mailer wrote the screenplay 
adaptation of Schiller’s book account, co-written with James Wilwerth, of the O.J. 
Simpson trial, American Tragedy (1996).  Then, Mailer has his Oswald’s Tale:  An 
American Mystery (2002), while Schiller interviewed Oswald’s killer Jack Ruby on 
the latter’s deathbed.  Schiller titled his film on Dennis Hopper American Dreamer 
(1971), and then there is Mailer’s fictional novel of celebrity murder, An American 
Dream (1964)—and Mailer considered titling The Executioner’s Song “American 
Virtue” (Mailer Conversations 239).  In their mutual fascination with imagining the 
dream of America told in the representation of its anti-heroes, and through their 
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frequent collaboration to the extent of re-writing one another’s work, Mailer and 
Schiller offer a reversal of the popular misreading of schizophrenia as multiple 
personality disorder, two voices in one body.  Instead, the voices of their two bodies 
become one.  
At stake in those various “true” stories around which they grouped their often 
collaborative efforts is the ability of a criminal case to represent a sort of national 
consciousness.  Mailer had grappled with these questions before.  In an overall 
negative review of Mailer’s Of a Fire on the Moon (1969), Richard Poirier quotes 
Mailer’s claim that “there is an unconscious direction to society, as well as to the 
individual” (167).160  To a far more successful degree, The Executioner’s Song
conducts its narration of a nation’s fears and desires vis-à-vis Gilmore’s death 
sentence through the diverse array of texts from and through which Mailer writes the 
novel.  Steve Shoemaker suggests that Mailer’s “The White Negro” (1957), in its 
cross-cultural observation, serves as a proto-New Historicist examination in an 
anthropological vein (343, 349, 353).  In that essay, then, Mailer off rs a sketch of a 
method for interpreting the subject of culture through the subject in culture.  
Eleven years later, in Armies of the Night, Mailer extends that project to 
understanding cultural history in a novel form, the history of now as written by the 
author participating in it.  Eleven years after that, The Executioner’s Song refines that 
historiographic imperative by writing the author out of the book, though Mailer 
cannot help but read himself in Schiller.  The evolution of discursive technique 
represented in these three works also marks the high points of Mailer’s oeuvre in 
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terms of critical acclaim, as the first is among his most anthologized essays and the 
two books won Pulitzers for non-fiction and literature, respectively.  Like Cleaver, 
then, Mailer works best when blurring distinctions between fiction and non-fiction in 
the challenge of tracing the outline of the subject constituted in history.  Like Schiller, 
who does “get involved in it,” becomes one of history’s characters whose choices 
affect the narrative, Mailer also plays his part in describing how the narration itself 
changes the course of the action.
The game of finding Mailer is of interest in its own right.  However, that 
effort takes on greater meaning when keeping in mind the degree to which the 
schizophrenic self is constituted in its participation in history, even as that history is 
mediated.  Mailer is like Gilmore in that he may “like language” but is committed to 
“tell the truth.”  However, unlike Gilmore (and far more like Schiller), the Mailer 
who drafts The Executioner’s Song recognizes that the truth of history is multiple, 
conflicting, and shaped in the telling.  It is Gilmore who is tired of the sounds of 
others and Mailer who reproduces that noise in the competing scripts.  That 
incessantly multi-perspectival narration is at odds with the object of his analysis, with 
Gilmore’s effort to gather himself at the culmination of his violent and aimless 
personal history that in retrospect fulfills his deathward trajectory.  He admits upon 
returning to jail for the two murders, “I am in my element now” (359), and later tells 
his lawyers-cum-interviewers, “I figured I’d probably spend the rest of my life in jail 
or commit suicide, or be killed uh, by the police” (797).  Paradoxically, all of those 
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ends reach fulfillment when Gilmore calls the state’s hand in his death sentence, 
resists the stays of execution purposed on his behalf, and faces the riflemen.  
That will to death contrasts with the lack of clarity he has regarding the crimes 
themselves,161 a reverse of the case of Wright’s “Bigger” Thomas, whose life gains 
focus in the killings even as his fatalistic trajectory toward execution is orchestrated 
by social and historical machinations.  Gilmore looks even less like Cleaver, who 
views his criminality largely as the product of the forces arrayed against him.  
Gilmore instead in his carceral identity resembles Butch Beauchamp, described by 
Gavin Stevens as “some seed not only violent but dangerous and bad,” just as 
Gilmore is frequently violent and describes himself as “not a likable person” and 
“vicious” (715, 799).  However, the execution of the character Butch comes at the 
culmination of a genealogical history providing coherence for much of the prior 
episodes of Go Down, Moses.  The nearly 1000 pages prior to the scene of Gilmore’s 
execution do not provide a similar sense of cause situating the personal in broader 
social history.
The book has less to do with tracing cause for effect—Gilmore’s personal or 
cultural history leading him to commit senseless murders—than the complication of 
causality, agency, of personal and social history.  Just as acts are never entirely ours, 
they affect more than just us.  Documenting “true history” in The Executioner’s Song
has less to do with meditation on the nature of Gilmore’s crime than with recording 
the mediation, the media flurry surrounding his impending execution, reporting that 
consequently affects the case.  Writing history produces a version of events that in its 
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telling shapes subsequent events, and Mailer represents the process of that 
narrativization and its effects.  In response to a New York Times front-page article on 
Gilmore, David Susskind, who early on competes with Schiller for the rights to 
Gilmore’s story, recalls a story by his friend Stanley Greenberg.  
Stanley had written a TV story fifteen years ago about a man awaiting 
execution.  The man had been so long on Death Row that he changed in 
character, and the question became, “Who was being executed?”  
Metamorphosis the play had been called, and Susskind always felt that it had 
had some effect on the end of capital punishment in New York State, and 
maybe even a little to do with the Supreme Court decision that saved a lot of 
men’s lives on Death Row. (602)
The teleplay was a script for the series The Defenders, and the Supreme Court 
decision at hand is Furman v. Georgia, a moratorium on executions that would end 
with Gilmore’s death sentence.  The assumption is that telling a “true” story can 
affect history.  In a discussion between Susskind and Greenberg regarding a 
television or film account of Gilmore, the latter says, “I even think that reaching a 
large audience can probably save the guy’s life” (603).  Early in the development of 
his case, popular representation of Gilmore might make him sufficiently recognizable 
or sympathetic so as to offer reprieve.  However, that hope quickly gives way to the 
emphasis on a voluntary execution to end the ten-year hiatus as a more valuable 
media event than a life sentence.  The turning point comes at a press conference 
featuring Farrell and Gilmore’s lawyer prior to Moody and Stanger, Dennis Boaz.
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“Don’t you think,” said Barry Farrell, “that if Gilmore isn’t executed, he’ll 
slip right back in with four hundred and twenty-four other condemned men 
and women?  A lot of them may have more tragic stories than Gilmore.”
“Gary is the only one,” said Boaz, “who has the courage to face the 
consequences of his act.”  
“How,” asked another reporter, “is Susskind going to do the film?” (627)
Farrell and Boaz’s dialogue emphasizes the tension between individual 
agency and social identification, foregrounding one of the novel’s central questions.  
The immediate transition to the reporter’s banal question undercutting their debate is 
one of the book’s most powerful moments.  In The Armies of the Night or Miami and 
the Siege of Chicago, such a disjuncture between history and its narration, between a 
man’s death and the film style of its narration, between the high and low of human 
possibility, likely would merit an extended expository rant.  Here, the sharp turn is 
not even emphasized with a line break.  However, it would be too easy and inaccurate 
to cast the reporters as the ones whose participation makes Gilmore’s life or death a 
matter of publicity, ratings, and money.  When Newsweek puts Gilmore on the cover, 
they caption his mug shot with “DEATH WISH.”  His lawyer, Moody, “felt it gave a 
big push to the bidding [for his story]” (651).  The lawyers themselves, Moody and 
Stanger, are as much Schiller’s link to Gilmore as Gilmore’s own legal 
representatives, transceivers in a network that includes Gilmore, Schiller, lawyers on 
both sides of the case, the Utah Attorney General, the reporters, and the larger media 
networks themselves.  The prison administration is involved as well, as the Director 
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of Corrections Ernie Wright demands, “No movie producer is going to make one 
dime out of Gilmore.”  Gilmore’s lawyers—one of whom is a member of the State 
Building Board that approves prison construction expenditures—contest that claim, 
demanding the written policy preventing it.  “Oh, it isn’t written,” the Director 
responds, “It’s prison policy” (711-712).  
Of course, as the ACA transcripts demonstrate, some policies were written, 
but the Director’s complaint sees partial fulfillment:  producers such as Schiller may 
still profit, but most prisoners will not, as cases such as Gilmore’s encouraged state 
laws passed in the 1980s barring prisoners from accepting royalties (Franklin Priso  
Literature xii).  Different versions of events compete with one another as newspapers 
pick and choose among reports, and Schiller carefully chooses the reporters with 
whom he works and what he tells them. “A pipeline into the biggest local paper could 
enable him to affect the output on the AP and UP stories” (669).  However, not all 
papers make use of the material in ways the producer anticipates.  What Gilmore’s 
earlier lawyer Boaz says regarding himself to reporters is also true of Schiller; he is 
“a character,” “being acted upon by the real author of these events” (627).  In the 
“true life story” Mailer authors, Schiller is a one of many in a narrative in which he 
has partial but not complete agency.
So is Gilmore, though his stakes are far higher.  His desire to opt out of the 
social spherebecomes his definitive characteristic in the second half of the novel, and 
it is part of the narrativization that subsequently scripts his acts.  Farrell asks if 
Gilmore appeals, “he’ll slip right back in with four hundred and twenty-four other
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condemned men and women?”; later, he suggests that “if less attention had been paid 
to Gilmore he might have changed his mind and looked to avoid his execution.  Now 
Gary was trapped in fame” (831)—no execution, no film, no book.  In a paradoxical 
and quite literally anti-humanist reversal of the Lacanian subject, the subject 
constituted in the symbolic order of language, for Gilmore to enter language, he must 
die—becoming “Gilmore” means no Gilmore.  His narration is predicated on the 
certainty of his death.  Gilmore’s self-erasure offers his only means of self-
presentation, of establishing an identity differentiating himself from others in his 
similarly fraught position; his urge to be an individual trumps the desire to be alive.  
In Farrell’s view, scripting his own death validates Gilmore’s life more than the living 
of it, but Farrell (and Schiller) have time and money invested, while the prisoner has 
his life in the balance.  Anthony Amsterdam, a consulting lawyer to Gilmore’s 
brother and counsel in Furman v. Georgia, suggests that “discharging a competent 
lawyer, when you are under a death sentence, is a form of suicide in itself.  Gary had 
raised questions about free will and self-determination” (703).  
Gilmore in effect accepts the very same existentialis  model of subjectivity 
that Lacan rejects in his trope of the prison in “The Mirror Stage,” in which liberty “is 
never more authentic than when it is within the walls of a prison,” when “a 
personality realizes itself only in suicide” (6).  Whereas Cleaver writes in order to 
save himself, and his prison sentence is the time in which his reading and writing are 
the means of his becoming, Gilmore’s entry to history as written by Mailer depends
entirely on his literary execution as a historical fact.  Willing the death of the self 
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becomes a gambit to realize that self and t escape th  formative processes of history.  
Owning his death to the extent of orchestrating it resists the implication that in his life 
he is subject to forces beyond his ken, either th impulses from within that he cannot 
control or the historical forces from without.
However, as Deleuze and Guattari make clear (and Lacan suggests), there is 
no subject outside of history, and such is the case for Gilmore.  Gilmore believes that 
his execution fulfills his own individual will, but Mailer writes that according to 
Richard Giauque, another lawyer peripheral to Gilmore’s case, “Gary was being used 
by many people.”  According to Giauque, the Attorney General and others, “a great 
many other conservatives obviously wanted to use Gary’s willingness to die for their 
own political ends. […] Right now, to recognize one man’s right to die could have a 
deadly effect on four to five hundred lives in death row” (841).  The fear then 
becomes that Gilmore’s will to death could legitimize a broader sense of the 
righteousness of the death penalty, execution as a fulfillment of the prisoner’s own 
intent.  Mailer offers the similar view of ACLU representative Shirley Pedler:  
“Capital punishment was not only wrong, but his execution might touch off others, 
for it would demystify the taking of life by the state. […A] methodical, calculated 
turning of the machinery of the State against the individual” (773).  
Still, Mailer records Farrell’s consideration of the exact opposite possibility, 
that “if Gilmore were not executed, a major wave of executions might be touched off.  
Every conservative in America would say:  They couldn’t even shoot this fellow who 
wanted to be shot.  Who are we ever going to punish?” (639).  Farrell’s position 
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seems far less likely, though Mailer’s inclusion of his view emphasizes the 
simultaneous and competing points of view in the participatory spectatorship that is 
culture.  The larger social context of competing ideological positions demonstrates 
that the potential effects of Gilmore’s execution extend beyond his own life and 
death; like it or not, agree with it or not, he is part of a larger body of death row 
prisoners whose fates are attached to his.  Also embedded in the available 
responses—either Gilmore’s execution or its stay will set off a string of executions, 
depending on who Mailer records—is a sense of the schizophrenic, where instead of 
the individual’s life until death as a single vanishing point, life and death both offer 
disjuncture and undecidability.  
Unlike Cleaver, who constantly places his own imprisonment in the context of 
allegiance with other prisoners, Gilmore himself resists the political implications of 
his execution in contesting his own representativeness.  When the ACLU and 
NAACP turn to Gilmore’s case as a point of leverage to maintain the moratorium on 
executions, Gilmore’s response is immediate and vituperative.  The Provo Herald
published his open letter to the NAACP:  “I’m a white man.  Don’t want no uncle tom 
blacks buttin (sic) in.  Your contention is that if I am executed then a whole bunch of 
black dudes will be executed.  Well that’s so apparently stupid I won’t even argue 
with that silly kind of illogic.  But you know as well as I do that they’ll kill a white 
man these days a lot quicker than they’ll kill a black man” (784).  History proves 
Gilmore wrong with regard to raced execution, and this is only one of Gilmore’s 
many racist comments.  However, the prognostic veracity of Gilmore’s claim is less 
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significant than Mailer’s curious narration some pages later.  Gil Athay is a lawyer 
who involves himself in contesting Gilmore’s execution not for Gilmore, but because 
he seeks to avoid the death penalty for Dale Pierre, a black man he believes to be 
innocent, convicted “because he was black, a condition to avoid in the state of Utah” 
(872).  Working for Gilmore’s stay would help maintain the moratorium of Furman v. 
Georgia, staying Pierre’s as well.  For Athay, both of them being on Death Row is a 
more important bond than one being white and the other black.  The social category 
of condemned prisoner necessitates cross- acial identification; the death sentence 
writes over color.  Athay’s involvement, which began with him as an unwilling court-
appointed defender, has cast him as lenient on crime and thereby cost him the race for 
Attorney General versus the “tough on crime” Bob Hansen, who pursues Gilmore’s 
execution.  
In an odd passage, Mailer describes Athay supporting Pierre because he saw 
him as innocent, and as “a complex man, a difficult man, but now, to Gil Athay, 
rather a beautiful black man, and besides, Athay had always hated capital 
punishment” (873).  Mailer is quick to insert the attribution “to Gil Athay” between 
“difficult” and “beautiful,” almost writing in the quotes to attribute the description to 
an interview transcript rather than to himself.  Athay’s perception of “a beautiful 
black man” possibly speaks to the race slogan of the linguistic reversal, “Black is 
beautiful”—or it is some other recognition of Athay’s, or just one of many words 
offered in interview that Mailer seized and rewrote.  Regardless of what the 
description means, what Mailer’s direct attribution does is distance Athay’s view 
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from his own.  Athay views a black man as innocent, complex, and beautiful, but 
Mailer had grown even more tired of race since he stood on a platform 11 years 
before and clasped hands with a young black man moments after telling his 
assembled audience, black and white, men and women, “You’re beautiful” (Miami
190).  
Athay is just a bit player in the proceedings, and Pierre never appears directly.  
Black characters are scarcely present in The Executioner’s Song, largely mentioned 
only in racist comments by Gilmore as he attests to the over-representation of black 
men in prison and thereby their local superiority there.  The cross-racial identification 
Athay engages is absent in Mailer and Gilmore.  The racism of the latter, coupled 
with his adherence to imagined autonomy, means that he cannot, will not ally himself 
with a larger social body of prisoners, so many of them black men, and it is Gilmore’s 
story that Mailer tells.  It would be historically inaccurate to suggest that Gilmore was 
or is representative of U.S. prisoners in general or Death Row prisone s in particular.  
Mailer’s chronicle makes exceptional what was in 1977 already a special case, given 
that his would be the first execution following the Furman v. Georgia decision.  And 
in a final analysis that extends beyond the scope of the book itself, Athay’s fears, as 
well as those of the lawyer Giaque and the ACLU, seem justified, as Pierre was 
executed in 1987, 10 years after Gilmore, and the number of executions since 
increased in the 1990s to the levels of the 1950s.  Perhaps if Mailer had written about 
Dale Pierre instead of Gilmore—but there is no place outside of history from which to 
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judge that conjecture, and at the end of the 1970s, Mailer and the majority of the 
ACA (and America?) had grown tired of racial questions.
The historical events and the real people who participate in them as narrated 
in The Executioner’s Song quite literally know that they are its characters, taking part 
in the various actions that are its story, and that awareness shapes the telling.  Before 
his execution, Gilmore tells his brother Mikal that he does not know how to conduct 
himself for his execution.  “Maybe that’s why I need Schiller.  He’ll be there 
recording it for history, so I’ll keep cool” (860).  Schiller in the story and Mailer in 
the account of it—so dependent on Schiller’s own interviews—set the stage for the 
“true history” of this “true life story” to be performed, and its very pretense of 
objectivity scripts the roles for its characters.  Gilmore will “keep cool” so that his 
posthumous representation meets his expectations of how a man should behave.  
Given that Schiller functions as Mailer’s proxy in the novel, the last exchange 
between written subject and writer is especially telling:  when Schiller says goodbye 
to Gilmore at the execution, he shakes hands and says, “I don’t know what I’m here 
for,” to which Gilmore replies, “You’re going to help me escape.”  Schiller responds, 
“I’ll do it the best way that’s humanly possible” (983).  Where Cleaver writes in order 
to save himself, Gilmore paradoxically opts out of events to become the story by 
which Schiller, via Mailer, will write him into history.  Writing Gilmore offers him 
escape from participation in the world.
Except, of course, it does not.  Gilmore’s will to not be as orchestrated and 
contested by the condemned himself, the Utah judicial system, the ACLU, the prison 
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officials, the NAACP, the U.S. Supreme Court, and as rendered by his doubled 
narrators, Schiller and Mailer, all make his unmaking not his own but the result of a 
cascade of claims and counter-claims.  And in the final analysis, Gilmore’s effort to 
escape the prison system capitulates to the very ends of that system:  his ultimate 
silence and erasure, historically two of the primary functions of incarceration in the 
U.S.  Gilmore’s case as offered by Mailer in The Executioner’s Song at one level 
perpetuates a dangerous myth, a myth alongside those of prisoners as universally 
guilty of violent crimes and of blackness and criminality as equivalent—the myth that 
death row, the most final expression of incarceration, fulfills the self- rasure those 
imprisoned are themselves seeking.162  The prison system may have made him and 
may control his life, but he maintains some control over his death, first in not 
appealing his execution and then twice in trying more directly to kill himself.  
Determining one’s own death, however, is possibly the bleakest of all spaces for 
human agency and possibility.  Deleuze and Guattari argue that schizoanalysis seeks 
to allow desire to circulate freely by destroying the unified Oedipal subject.  
Gilmore’s want to not be perversely capitulates to their thesis, as his desire for a 
unified, autonomous sense of self can be fulfilled only in his death.  
However, it is not Gilmore but Mailer who has the last word, and Mailer’s 
multivalent narration of Gilmore locates him in a set of relations outside of himself.  
Mailer through his proxy, Schiller, at once abets Gilmore’s escape in writing him into 
The Executioner’s Song and blocks Gilmore’s attempt to escape, to opt out of history 
as the course of human events, the condition of being subject to forces beyond one’s 
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self.  Farrell observes that Gilmore is “trapped in fame,” but Gilmore, Farrell, Mailer, 
and Schiller—writers all—are implicated in the media operations that are the trap and 
the means of fame.  Gilmore’s celebrity status relies on and thereby perpetuates his 
demand for his own execution.  That desire stems from how tired Gilmore is of the 
“noise” of prison, the sounds of other competing voices, the sum of everything ever
said and done that is history.  However, these are the very noises that fill the book, 
including, at the end, the rifle shots, the babble of Gilmore’s lawyers and writers, the 
doctor’s chatter over the autopsy, the conversation over drinks among the 
executioners, the conflicting newspaper accounts.  Executed, Gilmore does not 
somehow ascend bodily into social memory like Joe Christmas; Mailer’s entire effort 
has been to sing the song that assembles the readers to view what it means for the 
state to kill a man.  Just as Butch is the product of a town’s, a community’s history, 
Gilmore is part of a larger national self-image, its schizophrenic sense of itself in its 
death sentences.  
***
Mailer’s account of the prisoner’s participation in his individuation is nicely 
encapsulated at the end of the Chapter 17 of the second half, “I Am the Land Lord 
Here.”  Like most of the chapters, it recreates many perspectives and textualities, 
including excerpts of Gilmore’s letters, many conversations, a fragment from the 
local newspaper, part of an interview transcript, and the chapter closes with a poem 
by Gilmore from which it takes its name. Gilmore answers one of Schiller’s 
questions, “Right now, I’m a prisoner of my own body—/I’m trapped in myself—
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/Worse than jail!”  In Gilmore’s poem, written a few years earlier, the speaker goes 
inside himself to see “A mirror of me reflecting myself.”163   Despite the harsh litany 
of sins and evil represented, “There was no scorn to menace here,” because “I built 
this house    I alone / I am the Land Lord here” (736-738).  The poem is subtitled “an 
introspection by Gary Gilmore,” so the speaker and author, like the “Mailer” as 
narrator and author of The Armies of the Night and Miami and the Siege of Chicago, 
are implied to be the same.  There is a tension between the poem’s ownership of self-
as-body and the response of feeling “trapped” in the body.  Gilmore in prison stops at 
the skin but does not want to, his individuality limited, limiting, and inescapable.  
In telling contrast, in his short story “The Flashlight,” Cleaver describes the 
body as at once a prison and extending beyond the self.  He initially describes the 
main character as feeling like “a dynamo imprisoned in the blood, the flesh and bone 
of his own body,” a limit of bodily self which thereafter becomes his school and his 
gang, which all seem like prisons (120, 122, 289).  Where Gilmore accepts the prison 
of his individuality, Cleaver challenges it.  The point of view character Stacy likens 
his “own body” to a prison, but his body and the social body of his gang are described 
as mutually constituting composites, “separate selves bound into one.”  Likening 
social organizations thereafter to prisons speaks as much to the duality of personal 
and social bodies as it does to the likeness of an organization with an excessive sense 
of its autonomy to a repressive state.  
The distinction between the two is summarized in Foucault’s argument in 
Discipline in Punish that it is not the body that is the prison of the soul, but “the soul 
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is the prison of the body” (30).164  The rhetoric of individual autonomy enacted by 
Gilmore represses the ability of the subject to participate in a social identity extending 
beyond the self, the social subjectivity Cleaver represents.  It is worthn ting that in 
these instances, both Cleaver and Gilmore write in terms of figurative imprisonment, 
a tendency critiqued in Chapter One of this dissertation.  However, prison as a 
metaphor for those themselves incarcerated is a slippage that means differently than 
non-prisoners using it.  Just as “black is beautiful” served as a rhetorical reversal of 
racism in the 1960s, metaphors of incarceration, like pejorative terms of identity, are 
re-appropriated and thereby transformed, such as when black rap artists Tupac 
Shakur, DMX, and Eve all employ the call and response of social belonging in re-
writing a pejorative term, “Where my niggas?”  Identity is not only in flux in the 
tension between subject and history, but changing as historically transitory 
associations and meanings themselves alter.  Words may carry with them the places 
they have been, but the street makes its own use of them as well.  The situational 
meaning and use of metaphoric imprisonment, like the racial epithet, changes 
depending on who employs it.
Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song chart reversed 
readings of the process of identity formation in prison, a becoming and an erasure.  At 
a quite literal level of identity, Cleaver ceases to be a prisoner through writing, as his 
writing encouraged the activist efforts (including Mailer’s) that saw him paroled, 
while Gilmore ceases to be a prisoner by dying.  In a more theorized sense, Cleaver’s 
model of self produced in his narrative most often resembles a social subjectivity, the 
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self that extends past the skin to create space for radical consciousness beyond the 
isolation of individuality, while Gilmore’s desire to be an individual and to die are 
one and the same.  
The difference does not resolve neatly into Cleaver assignin too much 
responsibility for his criminality to social and historical forces, and Gilmore taking 
too much responsibility for his.  Both books provide more space than that for the 
multiple points of view of lived experience situated in history, as opposed to the 
rhetoric of singular autonomy, of the individual versus history.  Cleaver’s book 
regularly implicates the self in history, and though Gilmore opts for a more 
impoverished model, Mailer’s narration testifies to the inadequacies of imagined 
autonomy.  In both books, there is a tension in the relationship between the singular 
and plural, the both-and of the subject in history.  For Cleaver, this is manifest in how 
sexual desires of the body are shaped by the sedimentary history forming the social, 
how his desire for his white lawyer and his desire to desire the allegorical black 
woman belong both to him and to a broader culture in which he, she, whiteness, and 
blackness are all constituted.  For Mailer, the tension is even sharper in his multi-
perspectival, schizophrenic account of an individual autonomy that can only fulfill its 
desire in its death.  
In 1968, readers of Soul on Ice were prepared to view the prisoner, 
particularly the black male prisoner, in political and historical terms.  As 
demonstrated in the ACA transcripts, even some prison officials could accept the 
book and its author as resisting U.S. racism, understanding the book and its writer as 
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revolutionary.  In 1979, The Executioner’s Song met a different readership, and there 
is nothing political in Gilmore’s defense for his murders of Ben Bushnell and Max 
Jensen, no larger historical injustice testified to in the narrative.  When Mailer claims, 
“The public could live with a killer who was crazy, mixed-up, insane,” the “public” to 
which he refers is as much the one initially reading the “true life novel” as the one 
inside the book (814).  That particular observation of what “the public” can accept 
appears in a fragment sandwiched between two of Schiller’s perspectives but without 
direct attribution to anyone in particular, thereby situating the view as ambiguously 
Schiller’s and Mailer’s, as is so much of the latter half of the book.  The gulf between 
expectations of prisoners in 1968 and in 1979 offered in these two books parallels the 
discussion of actual imprisonment policies and practices in their cultural contexts.  
The ACA seemed headed toward a perspective of historical and social forces shaping 
incarceration, before turning instead in the 1970s to attempting to keep up with the 
radical expansion of imprisonment irrespective of mitigating factors or alternative 
judicial responses.  
Cleaver and Mailer between 1968 and 1979 mark diminishing possibilities in 
the condition of prisoners as subjects of and representatives for the United Stats.  
The films of the next chapter all represent these of race, representation, and 
imprisonment in ways that directly address the tensions between history and its 
narration as explored in Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song.  Those films are 
further inflected by the events of the two decades following 1979.  This period is one 
of an event horizon narrowing even further, so that incarceration is the final solution 
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to nearly every criminological problem, blackness equates to criminality without any 
sense of social or historical factors, and imprisonment in its imagination presumes 
guilt of violent, most often murderous crime.165  In the last two decades of the 
twentieth century, the number of people incarcerated in prisons and jails ballooned 
from under 500,000 to nearly two million, and rates of incarceration increased almost 
fourfold, while the “war on drugs” targeted inner city communities largely comprised 
of black and Hispanic citizens.  Even as early as 1977 and 1978, keynote speakers at 
the ACA conferences cite overcrowding as the most significant problem facing prison 
administration.  Anthony Travisono, the ACA Executive Director from 1975 to 1990, 
titled a 1977 article in The American Journal of Correction, “Prison Crisis – Over 
280,000 Men and Women i  Our Nation’s Prisons.”  Presumably, if that number 
presents a crisis, then itsoverfour-fold increaseby 1999 is a disaster.  
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CHAPTER FOUR
History, Imagination, and Telling the Difference:   
Prison Film as Realistic Fiction, Based on a True Story, and Documentary
The cinema provides us with an understanding of our own memory.  
Indeed we could almost say that cinema is a model of consciousness 
itself.  Going to the cinema turns out to be a philosophical experience. 
—Henri Bergson
Serving time is just like a puzzle, a 2000 piece puzzle.  There it is, 
throw it to you, and it’s scattered every which way.  Now, put it back 
together.  That’s the way your life is.  When you are sentenced to a 
penal institution, your life is scattered.  You is the one who has to put 
it back together.
—Eugene “Bishop” Tannehill in The Farm:  Angola, USA
Norman Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song stands as one historical landmark in 
U.S. audiences’ attention to accounts of imprisonment that blurs the difference 
between fictional and actual.  The story of Gilmore in prison seeking his execution 
was told several times, suggesting both book and television audiences’ interests and 
producers’ efforts to capitalize on related properties through multiple media. 
Gilmore’s sentence, after all, appears in Mailer’s Pulitzer-winning novel and Larry 
Schiller’s television film starring Tommy Lee Jones and Roseanna Arquette (1982), 
as well as Gilmore’s brother Mikal’s own version in his book and its HBO film 
adaptation, both titled Shot Through the Heart (1994, 2001).166  Two decades after 
Mailer’s novel, three prison films further complicate the difference between reality 
and imagination in representing criminality and imprisonment.  American History X, 
Hurricane, and The Farm:  Angola, USA span the spectrum from realistic fiction to 
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biographical picture to documentary, and they demonstrate how incarceration 
functions as a field that organizes race and masculinity in the transformation of 
criminal character.  
This chapter shows that the court-determined guilt naming the subject a 
criminal initiates the carceral identity, which all three films describe as man-making 
irrespective of the commission of crime.  In these films, racial conflict directly leads 
to incarceration, and all three point out that to identify blackness is to misrecognize 
violent criminality.  The process of imprisonment thereafter functions as a sign of 
redemption, whereby even men innocent of their crimes are personally improved 
while incarcerated, and cross-racial identification among inmates is the irreducible 
sign of transformation, wherein a raced “I” becomes “us.”  The fallacy of these prison 
films’ redemption narratives lies in their implicit endorsement of the legal system 
they suggest unjustly imprisons but nevertheless improves black men.  That fallacy 
becomes more pernicious when o e places these three films in their historical context.  
All three appear in the last years of the twentieth century, a time when the U.S.’s 
three decades long experiment with incarceration reached enormous proportions, 
creating a system where black men are dramatically over-represented.  That history is 
crucial for films making claims to the real.  Even as fictions trade on the cachet of 
true life stories, historical records such as that of documentary film can conform to 
the shape of prior imaginings—as stories such as The Shawshank Redemption, a 
phenomenally popular film that consolidates nearly every component feature of prior 
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movies set in prison, affect the narratives of subsequent films with far greater stakes 
in historical actuality.
This chapter begins with a description of how and why the prison population 
expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, and how the ACA responded to that 
transformation.  Then, I demonstrate how changes in the movie industry in general 
and the production and reception of American History X, The Hurricane, and The 
Farm in particular situate these films in a highly problematic tension between the 
cultural imagination and historical actuality.  Thereafter, readings of each of the films 
draw attention to their shared characteristics, as a wholesale fiction’s “documentary 
realism” gives way to “invented characters and fictionalized events”  in one version of 
the story of Rubin “Hurricane” Carter, yields to a verité account of Angola with 
“nothing made up, this is for real.”  Each of those three sections emphasizes the 
cinematic construction of the carceral identity:  crime or its lack, definition of
criminality, and imprisonment as transformative.  The chapter concludes by 
identifying the consequences of “reel” effects:  these films at onceimagine the real
and realize the imaginary in a wish fulfillment that affects actual prisoners.
The nation’s incarceration rates nearly quadrupled between the end of the 
1970s and the release of these three films at the end of the century, largely b cause of 
increasing sentences for offenses that previously had not even merited prison terms, 
and the racial differences in those prison populations grew stark.  Critical comment 
did not always accompany that expanding disparity, and the ACA Presidential 
Address in 1980 acknowledges the disproportionate increase in black inmates only to 
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then say, “I will not attempt to explain the reasons for the racial imbalance.  Suffice it 
to say that they are complex and varied” (ACA 1980 21).  The problems and their 
“complex and varied” causes expanded in the next two decades.The nature of the 
crimes yielding prison terms changed dramatically between 1980 and 1999, according 
to the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Statistics.  Adjusted for the population 
increase between 1980 and 1999, the number of sentences for violent crime increased 
by 265%, property crimes by 221%, both more than doubling.  However, during that 
same period, rates for both property offenses and violent crime actually decreased, 
property offenses steadily declining since the mid-1970s, violent crime remaining 
steady until 1994, at which point it decreased sharply each year (“Violent Crime,” 
“Property Crime”). Even more significantly, the number of sentences for drug crimes 
increased more than ten-fold, and the number of offenders imprisoned for public 
disorder offenses increased by a factor of nearly eight.167  Compared with violent 
crime and theft, the proportionally far greater increases in prison sentences for drug 
and public order offenses are the defining factor in the rapidly expanding prison 
population.  More than 30% of prisoners were incarcerated for offenses in 1999 that 
in the 1960s and early 1970s might have led instead to treatment programs, a matter 
driven home by the likelihood that according the Atlantic Monthly, approximately 
10% of offenders have a mental illness (Schlosser 54).  Those increases meant that in 
1999, there were 476 people in prisons for every 100,000 U.S. citizens, a number that 
had increased every year since 1980, doubling in each passing decade (“Incarceration 
Rates”).  
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That increase has not been race-neutral.  In 1999, there were 3,408 black men 
under state or federal jurisdiction for every 100,000 black men in the U.S., 1,335 
Latino men per 100,000, and 417 white men per 100,000 (“Prisoners in 1999” 9).  
That over-representation of black men in prison means that more than one out of 
every four black men likely will be incarcerated during their lives, compared to a one 
in 23 chance for white men (“Lifetime Likelihood”).  While white and black men 
reportedly use illegal drugs equally, black men are five times more likely to find 
themselves arrested for it, and U.S. prison historians and journalists describe white
offenders as receiving a greater availability of alternatives to imprisonment by a 
prejudiced judicial process (Schlosser 54; Morris 215- 6; Sloop 174; Tonry 19-20).  
Indeed, the reported narrowing of the wage gap between black and white men of the 
1980s and 1990s is artificially inflated due to the uncounted joblessness of 
incarcerated black men (Western and Pettit).  These are difficult numbers for a nation 
dismantling many Affirmative Action programs, locating its racism in the past.  
Imprisonment became the same response to a broad array of offenses, many of them 
“victimless crimes” and matters that had previously meant drug treatment or alternate 
custody such as that administered by the halfway houses.168  Such a total solution 
meant that the increasing construction of prisons still failed to address overcrowding.  
If crime rates dipped, it was because of prisons and more were needed; if crime rates 
increased, more prisons were needed.  As Franklin E. Zimring, director of the Earl 
Warren Legal Institute points out, regardless of the question posed to the criminal 
justice system in the past thirty years, “prison has been the answer” (Schlosser 52). 
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, prison officials returned to a model of 
inquiry—“what works?”—as opposed to the “nothing works” model that emerged in
the 1970s.  The reason for the shift is clear:  the overcrowding that began in the mid-
1970s rapidly accelerated thereafter, and prison administrators searched for 
alternatives.  The keynote addresses of the ACA during these two decades remain as 
generally progressiveas they had in the past, emphasizing shared responsibility for 
social inequity and long-term solutions to problems of crime.169  For example, in 
1982, Houston, Texas Chief of Police Lee P. Brown argues, “Crime is the natural 
consequence of the social, economic, and political systems of this country; and as 
long as unequal means of achievement exist, there will always be crime” (ACA 11).  
His criticism of national policy gestures to the rhetoric of war so often characterizing 
imprisonment:  “President Reagan leads us in the crime battle, but in the wrong 
direction,” as the administration’s policies treat criminality as an innate matter of 
morality.  
However, unlike during the 1970s, the willingness to treat crime and 
punishment as social phenomena is apparent not only in the plenary addresses in 
many of the general session papers, such as a Rehabilitations Commissioner from 
Atlanta evoking a “we” that understands that “poverty, discrimination, lack of
opportunity and poor education cause crime” (ACA 1982 175).  As prison 
populations soared even as crime rates dipped, the professionals most experienced 
with imprisonment saw firsthand the failures of the system.  Presentations in the
1980s and 1990s suggest expanding parole options and call for alternate facilities 
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such as community-based corrections.  At the same time, national legislation 
dismantled parole at the federal level and the furlough programs came under harsh 
attack following the Horton debacle.  Prison officials of the late 1980s and early 
1990s regularly repeat, “America can’t build its way out of the crowding problem” 
(ACA 1988 104; 1989 8, 12, 108; ACA 1992 5).  However, state and federal 
lawmakers continued to try to do so, which identifies the political root of the 
dilemma.  A survey of each state’s director of corrections in 1988 led the researchers 
to conclude, “The political climate clearly does not support” scaling back the 
increases in sentencing and reductions in parole (ACA 1988 108).  Prison officials 
initiated stopgap measures to an escalating problem that they viewed as a 
consequence of at best uninformed and at worst pernicious legislation.  
In the 1990s, the ACA intensified its criticism of the policies that increased
the prison population.  Its president in 1993 points to “unjust sentencing” and 
excessive criminalization and imprisonment(ACA 3-4); the Pennsylvania corrections 
commissioner identifies that the “fiscal and crowding crisis is the result of our having 
politicized the issue of crime around a ‘war on drugs’” (77).170 At the same 
conference, the chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission suggests scaling back 
mandatory sentences, and a senior circuit judge recommends their immediate 
reduction (107, 112).  In 1996, a Virginia Democrat reiterates calls from the late 
1960s and early 1970s for a long-term commitment to social programs of prevention
rather than political expediency, and an ACLU director and Southern juvenile facility 
administrator both sharply criticize the political failures of escalating “tough on 
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crime” rhetoric (ACA 1-6, 19-22, 111-112).  A Republicansenator’s general address 
that year is substantially less clear in its criticism and offers the requisite paean to 
family values; nevertheless, he pushes for gun crime to be the top federal priority, a 
tacit departure from the emphasis on drug crime at the time (101- 03).  Critique of 
wholesale incarceration proved bipartisan and cross- egional.
Among the best approaches to posing the question of what works is that 
voiced in 1997 by ACA president Reginald A. Wilkinson.  He offers a series of 
perspectives of those involved in corrections, evoking points of view of staff, 
administrators, and inmates, an unconventional rhetorical strategy surveying equally 
unconventional practices.  In terms reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Nietzschean turn, he offers a litany of I’s:  “Imagine that I am a records office 
supervisor”; “I have been a member of a street gang”; “I am a state probation 
officer”; “I am a fifty-six-year-old inmate”; “I am a lifer at a large prison for women” 
(85-91).  If every name in history is I, then I am a prisoner and I am a warden.  His
recognition of alternate practices for correctionsand his rhetorical approach are both 
innovative, and he acknowledges that it is “a risk to step over known boundaries” 
(92).  Nevertheless, he proposes that such approaches are necessary to depart from 
increasing incarceration.171
However, the descriptions of prisoners the ACA president offers in his speech 
were not their only imaginative construction.  As Wilkinson makes clear in his speech 
the following year, television and the “silver screen” shape the perception and thereby 
the actualityof incarceration (ACA 1998 85).  At the close of the twentieth century 
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and the begining of the twenty-first, the ACA itself capitulates to the power of 
media presentation.  Keynote speakers of 1999 to 2001depart from past tradition.  
Attorney General Janet Reno and Sarah Brady, chair of the Handgun Control lobby, 
spoke in 1995, and the ACA president and Michigan Governorgave the general 
address in 1998.  However, in 1999,CNN’s Greta Van Sustren and ABC News’ 
20/20’s Hugh Downs offer the keynote addresses.  The next year saw such speeches 
by singer Tony Orlando and a New England Patriots football player turned 
motivational speaker, as well as ctress Patty Duke.  In 2001, the general assembly 
was addressed by Hunter “Patch” Adams, the doctor whose biography informs the 
based on a true story film Patch Adams (1998) starring Robin Williams.  That speech 
is immediately followed by one from Burl Cain, the warden of Angola, the Louisiana 
State Prison where the documentary The Farm is set and in which Cain features. Not 
only American History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm blur distinctions between
actuality and imagination; the ACA complicates the differences among prisons, their 
representation in television news, entertainers and sports figures whose lives become 
news, and fictional and documentary accounts.
The actuality of carceral practice shapes films leveraging the cachet of the 
real, even as such films also capitulate to the historically inaccurate fantasy that all 
prisoners are guilty of violent crime, typically murder.  In Shots in the Mirror:  Crime 
Films and Society (2000), Nicole Rafter suggests that the bleak history of the past 
three decades of actual imprisonment sharply divides the two sorts of prison films, 
“commercial entertainments and […] political truth-telling,” and the “two may 
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eventually merge in some way” (137).  The films of this chapter demonstrate that 
merging and its ramifications.  American History X quotes directly the racial over-
representation of incarceration patterns, though twisted to serve the interests of white 
supremacist characters.  Raced criminality and imprisonment is the background to 
Rubin Carter’s story in The Hurricane, and the contemporaneous history of racial 
profiling and the over- epresentation of black men in prison gives its 1999 release 
further relevance.  The Farm’s occasional voiceover recounts racial statistics of 
imprisonment even as the camera records black men of dubious guilt behind bars.  All 
three films make claims to the real in representing imprisonment.  The emphasis in 
this chapter on these films’ deployment of a carceral identity with conflicted purpose 
and dubious historicity is not an attempt to sort truth from fiction, questioning the 
veracity of the statistics Vinyard offers in his racist rants, pointing out where The 
Hurricane deviates from the “real” biography of Rubin Carter, o  challenging the 
representativeness of The Farm’s six inmates.  Instead, I am interested in 
demonstrating a far more vexed relationship of history and imagination in their 
account of the tensions of difference between black and white men, people in and out 
of prison, and individual autonomy and social belonging.  
These films are not only part of the historical and cultural landscape by which 
viewers situate themselves, but are self-consciously crafted as such, not with the sly 
wink-and-nudge of late twentieth century irony and self-reflexive pastiche, but in the 
service of earnestness.  They signify their own effort to tell the truth.  They conduct 
that claim to the real—in all three cases, the actuality of carceral identity, of 
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criminality and imprisonment as formative of selfhood—through narrative techniques 
and film technologies that fracture a sense of unbroken reality.  Non-linear, 
fragmented, multi-perspectival accounts stake claims as really real, a contentious 
matter given that the fictions and fictionalizations shape the patterns of prison film 
narrativization and thus documentary itself.  The carceral identities produced in these 
films draw attention to raced incarceration, but the films in attesting to their truth-
value thereby locate the resolution to that injustice within the reality constituted in the 
film.  The Hurricane and American History X fulfill this logic, sharing a secret 
knowledge with viewers:  we know the system of justice is racist, but in watching this 
film, and seeing justice be done in this film, then there is in fact social justice.  That 
feature films fulfill culturally normative roles—what leftist critics a generation or two 
ago might have described as “bourgeois”—is not news.  However, the stakes are 
higher for films attesting their historical accuracy in a cultural climate when 
audiences increasingly encounter “reality” entertainment.  Therefore, before engaging 
the production of carceral identity in each film, it is necessary to note how recent 
industry changes have fundamentally altered how films operate in the contexts of 
their production and reception.  In addition, each of these films has been strategically 
screened to particular audiences, demonstrating a consequence of their claims to 
historical actuality and social relevance.
The space of prison more than most places defines the position of its 
subjects—in this case, prisoners as participating in a carceral identity.  For prisons 
films, in which the subject characters are incarcerated and thus relatively immobile, 
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the camera creates the sense of movement.  In terms of Certeau and Deleuze and 
Guattari, inmates may not be out for a walk in the prison, but the camera is, and the 
fragments of shots are pieced together in editing like jigsaw pieces connected to the 
larger blocks of scenes in a puzzle whose overall shape and size is determined largely 
in editing, the process of assembly.  That in itself has held true for movies for most of 
the twentieth century, but due to transformations in development and distribution, 
films themselves are freed from the theater and circulate in space in a manner that 
invites a combination of various ways of viewing.  Much film criticism in the U.S. 
has been guided by psychoanalytic inquiry, the study of how fear and desire operate 
in identification, the misrecognition of the self vis-à-vis the screen.  
It is not difficult to see how this became the case.  The vocabulary of 
psychoanalysis and the technology of film developed concurrently.  The 
interpretation of dreams structured early Freudian analysis, and theatrical film could 
be addressed as shared dreams, the audience seated in darkness alone, together, 
watching the projections of the fantasies they had paid to see.  However, industry 
restructuring of the past two decades coupled with technological developments 
radically transformed the ways in which films are made as well as their conventional 
viewing experience, changes that include the horizontal and vertical integration of the 
film industry, the expansion of cable networks, and the development of VCRs and 
then DVDs.  Therefore, while I occasionally make use of Lacanian and Deleuzo-
Guattarian terms to describe film characters, I am more interested in drawing 
attention to how desire functions as a social and market force, and my attention is 
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thus focused at least as much on movie industry mechanics as on the mechanisms of 
identification on and across the screen.  
The Hurricane was produced and distributed by Universal Pictures, a property 
of NBC Universal—itself 80% the property of General E ectric as of October 2003.  
The book publisher Houghton Mifflin, which NBC Universal acquired in 2001, 
released James S. Hirsch’s Hurricane:  The Miraculous Journey of Rubin Carter
(2000).  The soundtrack for the film is an MCA property, which is also an NBC 
Universal company, and the album features numerous artists also distributed by 
MCA.  As the parent company also owns the NBC network and USA cable channels, 
it is in a position to exploit the related properties among its multiple media outlets of 
fil m, DVD, television network, cable, music CD, and trade paperback.  
Similarly, American History X was produced and distributed in the U.S. by 
New Line Cinema, a Time Warner company.  New Line Cinema grew to prominence 
as a factory for 1980s “slasher” films, then became the parent company’s second tier 
distributor for specialty markets, including “quality,” horror, teen, and black films.  
Through the 1980s, the company thrived on the Nightmare on Elm Street franchise, 
but with the profit ratio of House Party in 1990 and its sequels in 1991 and 1994—the 
initial film grossed $26.4 million on a budget of $2.5 million—the company 
increasingly developed films with largely black casts to capitalize on the market share 
of African American audiences, who historically have high numbers in theater ticket 
sales.  The Ice Cube Friday franchise, the ‘hood comedies from 1995-2000, offers 
another example of New Line’s production and distribution in this genre.  In the late 
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1990s, the production company expanded its role in the “quality” film market of hot 
new directors, ensemble casts, and unconventional narrative, producing director PT 
Anderson’s critically acclaimed work, such as Boogie Nights (1997) and Magnolia
(1999).  New Line’s production and distribution of American History X—with its 
subject of racism, its ensemble cast, and its first-time director Tony Kaye—then, 
occurred at a point when the company had a recent history of racially topical themes 
and was increasingly packaging medium budget projects of established actors with 
new directors aimed at Academy Award recognition to build industry prestige and 
expand its market share.  
The production company is just one of many interrelated components of the 
process of development and the chain of distribution.  A viewer might first encounter 
American History X in its 1998 theatrical debut, rent or buy the videotape or DVD as 
a Warner Home Video release, watch the film on the movie stations HBO or Cinemax 
(both of which are Time Warner companies) or regular cable stations such as Time 
Warner’s TBS or TNT via their cable company, or see an advertisement or read a 
review in Time, People, or Entertainment Weekly, all Time Warner magazines.172
The film failed to break even during its theater run, for which the common response 
of production companies is to recoup such losses in overseas distribution, cable, and 
rental sales.  The Time Warner media conglomerate was in a position to exploit its 
vertical control (producing and distributing the film, overseeing first-run theaters, 
owning not only the premiere and standard cable channel companies but the material 
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cable network itself) by releasing the film over many of its ancillaries, from pay-per-
view services to the specialty movie channels such as HBO to standard cable stations.  
That saturation means that the film can play on any number of stations in 
various time slots.  Viewers might watch a segment of it as they scan through 
hundreds of channels, or it might play in part or its entirety while a potential spectator 
works from home, studies, eats, does housework, or participates in any number of 
household activities—or it might be viewed in another context entirely.  In 2003, for 
example, I saw part of American History X muted but close captioned on a large 
screen television behind a bar in Austin, Texas in between live band sets.  Rather than 
pay for a film one intends to see, a viewer can see a film by accident in unexpected 
public locations.  Films leave the interior seclusion of traditional spectatorship and 
become part of a larger network of sensory stimuli where they compete for attention.
Filmmaking has both contributed to these transformations and responded to 
them.  Editing practices such as rapid-fire cutting between shots and alternating color 
footage with black and white (all three films employ the latter method) demonstrate 
the influence of the short format commercials and music videos where directors such 
as Kaye get their start.  Black and white spliced with color has since Wizard of Oz
differentiated reality from fantasy; Kansas, after all, is in black and white, the film of 
dream in color.  Black and white is also a device signifying the past, either personal 
memory shared in its telling or public history, and the piecing together of that past 
leads to a disjointed narrtive that is both really real (because it is in black and white 
and fragmented),173 and its reconstruction demands viewers’ engagement.  
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Incorporating black and white with color is then both an aesthetic gesture—
particularly for films engaging race as a topic—as well as a preventive measure 
against channel switching.  Furthermore, the increasingly digital format of video, 
coupled with transformations in computer technology and the radical expansion of 
file sharing networks, has changed the ways that people acc ss and view film and 
television programs.  Audiences for major features such as American History X or
Hurricane might, after the theatrical releases end, view them on cable.  Or, they 
might purchase a DVD or illegally download the digital files from any number of 
newsgroups or file-sharing networks to watch on a laptop computer at their leisure.  
Video becomes something that moves with viewers, seen in transit, stopping and 
starting at the convenience of the audience.  Instead of Hollywood as a dream theater, 
films can become akin to the video billboards of the futuristic Los Angeles of Blade 
Runner (1981), viewed in media res, part of a saturated cultural landscape.  
Film viewing in these contexts has less in common with the Freudian or 
Lacanian analysand on a couch than with Deleuze and Guattari’s schizophrenic on the 
move, Certeau’s sense of subjectivity as demonstrated by a walk in the city, an urban 
landscape one might read.174  Just as the setting of the psychoanalytic subject (the 
couch, the narration of personal history) foregrounds its investments in 
individualization, the schizophrenic in the city foregrounds the investments in 
mobility, collective identity, and larger social history—all key elements in American 
History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm.  And, more than either model, desire as a 
market force proves paramount, how directors and producers work to meet, 
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manufacture, and challenge audiences’ sense of the real and how films produce it.  
People moving through the city sometimes situate themselves vis-à-vis that reality 
through the reference points of fictional films.  For example, Loren Hemsley, a bail 
bondsman in Los Angeles, describes conducting a home visit at “Normandy and 
Crenshaw, in case you don’t know, that’s the neighbor hood Ice Cube and Chris 
Tucker lived in the movie Friday” (personal e-mail).  The shared cultural imagination 
of the mediascape becomes a city a la Certeau, one by which people relate 
themselves to one another, and films serve as imagistic reference points by which 
viewers locate themselves and others in the space and time of culture and history.    
The landscapes of all three of these films are determined by the prisons 
prominently featured as their settings, prisons populated by white and black men—the 
latter often of dubious guilt.  In American History X, the black and white flashback 
that recounts the main character’s incarceration is the longest stretch of the film, 
while Jewison shot much of The Hurricane on location in Ralway Prison, and The 
Farm takes place almost entirely inside a Louisiana State Prison.  The first two films 
chronicle main characters arrested for race-related murder, imprisoned, and thereafter 
released; The Farm is organized around six men and depicts their day-to-day 
existence in the prison. 
The most crucial scenes in all three films center on white-black race relations, 
scenes of aggression enacted against black men either jurisprudentially or through 
racial murder.  In American History X, that central moment is Derek Vinyard’s 
(Norton) brutal killing of a black man he has already wounded with his pistol.  In The 
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Hurricane, it takes place when Carter (Washington) and Artis (Garland Whitt) are 
pulled over by the police, who say they are looking for two black men in a white 
car—“Any two will do?” Carter responds.  In The Farm, the pivotal scene occurs 
when a black inmate accused of raping two white women offers new evidence of his 
innocence at his parole hearing; the parole board does not even consider the evidence, 
even treating the denial of parole as a foregone conclusion.  The scenes in the first 
two films set their narratives in motion, and all three scenes merit the most frequent 
and extensive commentary in reviews by film critics.  The narratives of all three films 
are structured by white or black men’s indictment, imprisonment, and response to that 
imprisonment.  All three films offer narratives of redemption regardless of the actual 
responsibility of a character for violent crime, and all treat black men as unjustly 
imprisoned.  Carter and two black men imprisoned at Angola, George Crawford and 
Vincent Simmons, are treated as innocent.  Even as Norton’s character is redeemed 
for his murder of two black men by his three years in prison, the friend he makes 
inside, Lamont (Guy Torry), a black man, is treated as unfairly held for six years for a 
crime of minor theft.  
The truth-claims made in these films affect their reception and the use specific 
audiences make of them.  They are advertised, reviewed, analyzed, and deployed with 
this or that agenda by one group or another.  First-time feature director Tony Kaye 
filed a lawsuit over American History X against New Line Cinema and the Directors 
Guild in 1998, claiming that the film listed him as director against his wishes.  During 
post-production, New Line assumed control of piecing the film together after Kaye 
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spent some year and a half and still did not have a completed film.  Edward Norton, 
who plays the role of the reforming white supremacist Derek Vinyard, oversaw the 
editing of the final cut, becoming the film’s centerpiece.  Kaye had filed to have his 
name listed in the credits as “Humpty Dumpty,” suggesting that all the king’s men 
could not put together a two-hour film from its many pieces, but the U.S. District 
Court in 2000 dismissed the case “with extreme prejudice,” therefore denying appeal 
(McNary 16).  The court’s ruling resonates with the film itself, given its chronicle of 
Vinyard’s racist crime, his time in prison, and his subsequent dismissal of his own 
extreme racial prejudice.
Despite that disavowal, the film is far from unequivocal in its depiction of 
racism, particularly the causes and effects of raced criminality.  Reviews of the film 
are split fairly evenly between on one hand reflecting the film’s ambiguities or even 
subtextual endorsement of white supremacy, and on the other praising its realism and 
tour de force acting.175  The divide can largely be attributed to the film’s post-
production history and Norton’s hand in the editing, which likely emphasized his 
charismatic performance, thereby facilitating the critical accolades he received.  He 
was nominated for an Academy Award for his role, and named Best Actor by the 
Southeastern Film Critics Association, a group of southern state film critics, and the 
Golden Satellite Awards, an International Press Academy group.  The film was also 
nominated for the “Peace” Award offered by the non-profit Political Film Society, 
slated for use as an educational tool by Amnesty International USA, and taught in 
some schools.176   The “Peace” Award in particular seems possibly out of place for a 
219
film whose style pays homage to Leni Riefenstahl as it attempts so persuasively to 
explain Norton’s neo-Nazi character that it can be read as glorifying him, a film that 
sees every black man a criminal, prisoner, or former offender.  It seems likely that the 
film’s difficult delivery produces some of its ambiguity; after all, the film is the 
problem child of two men, Kaye and Norton (three if one counts the screenwriter 
David McKenna),177 one of whom denied paternity, and its message of racial 
harmony is largely organized around the triumph of Norton’s will. 
On February 26, 2001, a group of student organizations at the University of 
Southern California sponsored the screening of Hurricane, Norman Jewison’s film 
account of Rubin “Hurricane” Carter’s life, from a tempestuous young man, to the 
up-and-coming boxer imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, to his years behind 
bars and the efforts of lawyers and activists that finally freed him.  The flier lists the 
student organizations in small type across the top, and they include the Black Student 
Assembly and the Student Senate Minority Affairs.  The banner just below reads 
“RUBIN HURRICANE CARTER,” the nickname and film title in larger letters 
conflating man and movie, and all of the text is white on a black background, 
including the date and location of the screening listed at the bottom.  The primary 
images of the flier are three vertical frames, a triptych that features in the leftmost 
panel a photo of Rubin Carter wearing boxing gloves, fists low, facing the camera, his 
torso and head visible.  The rightmost panel is a closer shot of the man playing the 
role of Carter in the film, Denzel Washington, his brow furrowed, eyes on the camera, 
one fist ungloved but taped, a more guarded pose than its twin.  The center panel 
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dividing the stills of Carter and Washington is white, blank.  That gap might 
emphasize the difference between the images of subject and actor, or possibly its 
whiteness framed by blackness reverses the racial politic of the film—or perhaps the 
photographs merely balance better that way.  Two months later, the film screened at 
the University of Texas at Austin as part of the Sweatt Symposium on Civil Rights.  
John Artis, Rubin Carter’s co-defendant and also a prisoner for 16 years before a 
federal judge voided the earlier decision, delivered the keynote address for the 
conference, his presence and personal experience with the raced inequities of the 
judicial system guiding the reception of the film.  The film cliché of the wrongly 
imprisoned protagonist assumes a greater urgency and authenticity when situated in 
the context of historical actuality and civil rights, with Artis there to tell the 
difference.
The Farm:  Angola, USA is a documentary directed by Liz Garbus, John 
Stack, and Wilbert Rideau, the last of whom is an inmate at the Louisiana state 
prison.178  As of 1999, Louisiana joined the nation’s capitol with the highest rate of 
incarceration in the U.S., placing one out of every hundred people in prison or jail, 
according to the U.S. Department of Justice (“Prison and Jail Inmates” 1).  The film’s 
representation of the maximum security facility is organized around six inmates:  
George Crawford, a 22-year-old black man beginning a life sentenc ; John Brown, a 
35-year-old white man on death row for 12 years and executed during the film; 
George “Ashanti” Witherspoon, a black man in his forties 25 years into his 75 year 
sentence; Vincent Simmons, a 45-year-old black man who has served 20 years of his 
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sentenced 100; Logan “Bones” Theriot, a 61-year-old white man 26 years into his life 
sentence who dies of lung cancer; and Eugene “Bishop” Tannehill, a 65-year-old 
black man 38 years into his life sentence.  Innocence and redemption are common 
themes in their representations.  Crawford and Simmons deny their guilt, the latter 
becoming a writ lawyer in the effort to appeal his case, as does Witherspoon, who 
regularly leaves the prison to perform community outreach and teach CPR, while 
Tannehill leads church services in the prison.  The film emphasizes the inmates’ 
experience of routine days, isolation from their lives prior to prison, and in the case of 
those who have already served many years, the dramatic difference between their 
current lives and the criminality that precipitated their incarceration.  
The film was nominated for an Academy Award and won broad critical 
acclaim.179 Variety describes the film as a “matter-of-fact—and, therefore, all the 
more devastating—indictment of the U.S. penal system” (Lovell).  However, the film 
also has been “roundly praised” by the Louisiana Governor’s office and prison 
administration, who expressed interest in using it in their guard training (“Lewis”).  
The video is also for sale at the Louisiana State Prison Museum, along with prison t-
shirts, hats, pens, hot sauce, and other memorabilia.  That the film means different 
things to different people is a banal observation.  That the documentary is perceived 
in such diametrically opposed ways is a matter for analysis, given that its often 
cinema vérité style of what Angola is “really” like nevertheless leaves available 
competing uses:  scathing depiction, training aid, cultural kitsch. 
222
These aspects of the supra-texts of the films draw attention to the ways these 
movies are directed not only by directors but by specific audiences:  the way in which 
one film sees critical indictment for its account of race relations even as it is 
nominated for human rights “Peace” awards, one was used as a teaching tool by 
university civil rights organizations, and another was employed by prison 
administrators.  These strategic projections of the films exemplify ways of viewing 
that emphasize the rhetorical—not what a text means, but what it is for, what it does, 
what it produces.  All three of these films implicate the personal and social.  In their 
claims to the real, they produce history, repeatedly attempting to substantiate the 
actuality of their representations of incarceration, race, and masculinity.  
“documentary realism” and the “heightened realism of the film’s style” 
American History X is at once brilliant and deeply flawed, a triumphant failure 
of excellent acting depicting a charismatic racist’s prison transformation.180  The film 
focuses on a white family, the Vinyards, especially the two sons, Derek (Norton) and 
Danny (Edward Furlong).  Derek is a prominent young leader of a white supremacist 
gang in Venice Beach, California, the DOC, the Disciples of Christ.  Three black men 
attempt to steal his truck from outside his house; he shoots two, the latter of whom is 
only wounded, and Derek kills him in an a scene of almost unwatchable violence.  
Derek spends three years in prison, where, through contact with two black men—the 
co-worker Lamont whose imprisonment is far out of proportion with his minor crime, 
and his former English teacher Dr. Sweeney (Avery Brooks)—he learns to repudiate 
the racism that caused his crime.  Released from prison, he spends a day trying to 
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undo the racial conflicts he has helped propagate, including violently rejecting the 
DOC patriarch Cameron (Stacy Keach), leaving the group, and severing his younger 
brother Danny’s participation in the white gang.  Those efforts take place during a 
skinhead rally edited in a sequence that has Kaye’s thumbprint, a frenetic montage 
described in Sight and Sound as one of “documentary realism,” suggestive of the 
film’s overall look and feel that the industry trade Variety describes as one of 
“truthfulness and integrity,” its style one of “heightened realism” (O’Hehir; 
McCarthy 41, 42).  The claim to the real is a defining feature of the film.
Much of the narrative is told largely by Derek to Danny or by Danny to the 
audience.  On the day of Derek’s release from prison, Danny has submitted a paper in 
his English class treating Adolph Hitler as a civil rights leader, landing him in the 
office of the principal, Dr. Sweeney.  Sweeney assigns a new paper to Danny, a paper 
titled “American History X,” in which he is “to analyze and interpret all of the events 
surrounding Derek’s incarceration,” in order to demonstrate how those events shaped 
Danny’s current view of contemporary culture.  That history is largely the assembly 
of memory in black and white, either Danny’s or Derek’s flashbacks, the latter 
offered as the elder brother narrates his prison experience as an explanation for why 
they both must reject the false consciousness of their racism.  The chronology of 
events is thus offered out of sequence:  a black and white first person shot from the 
point of view of one of the prospective car thieves opens the film, followed by 
Derek’s and then Danny’s perspective of the two murders, and the film thereafter 
regularly features the flashbacks—the events leading to the incarceration—as they are 
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invoked by the two brothers’ activities through the first 24 hours after Derek’s 
release.  The narrative is fairly complex, both a cause and a result of the crisis over 
the editing involving Kaye, Norton, and New Line.  The fractured sequence allows 
the graphic shot of the particularly gruesome murder to take place midway through 
the film, after audiences have had an opportunity to compare Derek’s persona before 
and after his incarceration.181
Memory serves as the narrative device linking chronologically disjointed 
scenes.  Danny’s point of view memories are triggered in two ways, either as he 
writes the paper to fulfill his assignment or invoked by aspects of the landscape as he 
walks through Venice Beach.  Furlong’s character presents both the conventional 
analysand performing a talking cure in his voiceover, reading his writing of the paper, 
and the subject taking a walk in the city.  He pauses at the municipal basketball court, 
which calls up the memory of the black-versus-white game that loosely instigates the 
carjacking and subsequent murder, landing Derek in prison.  Danny runs past 
dilapidated storefronts on his way home, his rapid pace and destination a parallel to 
the end of Derek’s three years in prison and release that day, leading to the memory 
of the elder brother’s return that morning in the accompanying black and white 
flashback of his welcome by the family.  The beachside southern California city 
where the film was shot on location is offered visually several times as a broader 
context for “the events surrounding Derek’s incarceration” as perceived by Danny.  
Furlong takes a walk in a city, amidst the ethnic diversity of its pedestrians, its 
graffiti, and crime, the “stylistic procedures” that Certeau suggests resist 
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textualization (102).  Those “pedestrian practices” trigger vignettes of memory, 
implicating Danny’s past and present, him and Derek, shaping the essay he writes 
upon his return home.  
Making sense of the racial (and narrative) difficulty of his brother’s 
development is thus the job of Danny in the film; the paper he writes is ffectively the 
film itself, so interpreting it is the viewers’ job as well.  The film foregrounds this fact 
when Danny begins writing the essay.  He sits at his computer and types the name of 
the film and essay, then types repeatedly, “Analyze and Interpret,” until it becomes 
“Anal sex and”—which is a bit of foreshadowing, as Derek’s anal rape in prison by 
white supremacist gang members plays its significant part in his reformation.  Then, 
Danny writes that when people look at him, they see his brother—much as Danny 
himself has, misrecognizing in his brother a coherent self he years for and strives 
toward.  The film is self-consciously fashioning itself as an object to analyze and 
interpret here, anticipating its own later role as a teaching tool in classroom , where 
actual students might write their own essays (or dissertations) about it.  There is a 
cued earnestness in the scene; just as Danny stops his own linguistic play to get 
serious, the film invites audiences to take the movie seriously, as Danny writes a 
fusion of his brother’s and his own diagnostic biography, which viewers watch played 
out on screen.  Regarding the essay, Dr. Sweeney tells Danny, “I will be the only one 
reading it,” but he is wrong on two counts:  Danny reads as he writes the film viewers 
are deliberately hailed to “read” as well.  
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The fusion of the two brothers means that they both can—and do—change 
their racist views, Derek during his prison sentence, Danny during the time it takes 
the older brother to offer a thick description f that time served.  The brothers are 
sufficiently doubled,182 so that audiences can look at one and see the other as well, 
meaning that it does not really matter which one of them gets killed to close the 
narrative.  Derek walks Danny to school, and on leaving looks back, seemingly 
hearing the “threat score” of rising violins anticipating violence, the precursor to the 
deadly retribution that befalls Danny at the end.  A black student shoots him in the 
school bathroom for a minor slight earlier in the film, providing the fulfillment of the 
film’s moral:  racial violence only begets more of the same.
However powerful that moral may be, the racial logic of the film is deeply 
flawed.  There is not sufficient narrative basis within the film for the black student to 
kill Danny—there is no indication that when the character shoots him, he is looking at 
Danny but seeing his brother.  In effect, the character is only signified by his 
blackness, and any black character might do as well as any other.183  Similarly, at 
least one of the three would-be car thieves loses to Derek and members of his gang in 
a racially charged black-on-white basketball game, but it is not clear if their actions 
are motivated by anything more than the loss of the game, such as Derek’s leadership 
in the DOC.  The two prominent black male characters of Dr. Sweeney and Lamont 
are largely relegated to helping the white Derek become who he needs to be to fulfill 
the story.184  Derek and Danny’s father, Dennis, was a fireman shot on duty by a 
black man, and even Dr. Sweeney suggests having spent time in prison.  Crime and 
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incarceration are connected to every single black man mentioned in the film.  There 
are virtually no black women, as Sweeney’s secretary, a black woman, is only 
partially and fleetingly seen, though several white women have prominent roles.  
The focus on the Vinyard family largely produces that exclusion, and also 
makes racism a family (re, an Oedipal) phenomenon:  Derek learned it from his father 
before him, and with the death of the father and the son’s assumption of the father’s 
place, Derek teaches it to Danny.  Any mention in the film of the broader causes of 
racism, such as economic disparities and historical disenfranchisement producing 
segregation, as well as a social psychology f racial fear, are either voiced by Derek 
or Danny and twisted to substantiate their racism, or immediately dismissed by them 
as irrelevant.  For example, Derek says, “One in every three black males is in some 
phase of the correctional system.  Is that a coincidence or do these people have, you 
know, like a racial commitment to crime?”  He speaks the unspeakable in racing 
criminality, the blatant “natural” or ontological racism so often politically decried 
while social welfare programs are dismantled and racial profiling is de facto police 
protocol.  Derek rallies his gang members around him with rhetorical and physical 
flourishes that are offered so as to seem persuasive to other characters in the 
narrative, and thereby foster the credibility viewers might hold for his character.  
However, the effectiveness of Norton’s performance (around which he edited the 
film) becomes a sizable obstacle for the occasional efforts of American History X to 
address a larger causal framework for racism and raced criminality.
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Derek’s racially motivated murder of the second would-be car thief depicts 
the crime that is the clearest origin of his imprisonment.  The actual shot of the near-
decapitation of the wounded man features plenty of warning, including Derek’s 
shirtless slow motion approach to the camera, pleas from both the victim and Danny, 
and the ubiquitous crescendo of violins.  Audiences are prepared so ruthlessly for the 
ultra-violent moment that they can look away, and likely many do.  Therefore, the 
scene of Derek’s crime that is the culmination of his racism, the crux of the film, and 
the one most commonly cited by viewers and reviewers, is quite literally not seen by 
many.  His sentencing, or any other jurisprudential proceeding, is not shown at all, 
and there is only a faceless parole officer occasionally mentioned.  The naming of 
Derek’s criminality as distinct from his criminal act is thus offered only obliquely 
when Danny offers his testimony, “It would have been life if I had testified,” a 
sentence he types and promptly erases.  Sweeney will not be reading this sentence, 
but Danny and viewers do.  
Derek’s imprisonment, which constitutes the longest stretch of unbroken 
narrative in the film, is organized largely around two inverse social arcs, a series of 
increasingly friendly discussions with his black co-worker Lamont, and Derek’s 
deteriorating relationship with the white supremacist prison gang that culminates in 
them raping him.  Both function as processes of prison rehabilitation.  The rape scene 
has its own ominous approach, a gradually emptying shower, the disappearance of the 
lone guard from the scene, and more of the camera’s adoring gaze, the slow motion of 
Derek’s naked skin.  This moment of violence is paired with the earlier one, 
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punishment matching crime in black and white flashback, the parallel complete down 
to the slow motion hyper-reality of impossible clarity as Norton approaches the 
camera to commit murder, as individual drops of water fall from his face in the 
shower.  Furthermore, the earlier sequence opens with Derek having rough sex with 
his girlfriend, ands its corresponding scene closes with Derek’s own violent rape.  
However, the Motion Picture Association of America ratings system has 
greater leniency for the graphic depiction of violenc compared to sex,185 which 
means that Derek’s rape is represented with far more discretion and is thus watchable 
in a way that his crime is not.  Derek’s victimization by white supremacy becomes 
more significant than the victimization of the black man he killed, a greater 
importance underscored by Norton’s extended time on camera, whether shirtless and 
triumphant in a reverse dunk on the basketball court, rallying his gang members by 
citing immigration and incarceration statistics—or after his reform in prison, using his 
power to reject his racism in assaulting the patriarch of the white gang and disarming 
one of its soldiers, or persuading Danny to surrender his own prejudice.  
Understanding the rape as Derek’s real punishment in the film reflects what prison
historians describe as the “just deserts” model of punishment prevalent since 1975 
(Irwin Prisons 230-240, Sloop 132-141, Sullivan Prison 211).  It is also a bodily 
punishment, a return to what Foucault deems old regime practice (Discipline), except 
rather than the state fulfill the bodily torture, inmates themselves conduct it.  And 
whereas Foucault claims that the visibility of public torture such as that of Damien 
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the Regicide sparked unintended sympathy for the criminal, the spectacle of Derek’s 
rape instead deliberately elicits the sympathy of the audience.
Norton, arguably one of the finest actors of his generation, effectively does 
too good a job in portraying a charismatic bigot, and the two hour edit of the film he 
largely oversaw organizes itself around him, highlighting the actor’s physicality, built 
for the film and deployed in a visual rhetoric of power.  Vinyard is language and 
body, and inadequacies in one can be compensated for by the other.  When a potential 
suitor of his mother challenges him over a family dinner, Derek can support any 
insufficiencies of argument by taking off his shirt, the swastika tattooed over his 
pectoral a threat to the Jewish teacher, an excess of visibility that appears repeatedly 
in various flashbacks, the black and white highlighting Norton’s musculature.  Within 
the context of the narrative, the physical threat he poses is daunting to other 
characters; extra-narratively, the camera loves him, and he gets the best lines.  In the 
absence of any competing discourse, his language of hate is narratively and visually 
fetishized.  And there is no competition.  The mother, Doris Vinyard, is played by 
Beverley D’Angelo in a largely understated if powerful performance, and the suitor—
and history teacher who sends Danny to Principal Sweeney—is a bit part for Elliot 
Gould as Murray Rosenberg.  D’Angelo’s and Gould’s characters proffer liberal 
rhetoric situated as outmoded and nostalgic, Doris even in a flowered mini- ress shot 
in soft focus outside her 1950s era home.  Sixties liberalism is not prepared to deal 
with harsher 1990s “reality.”  
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Coupled with Furlong and Norton, D’Angelo and Gould offer performances 
that help the casting itself create the opportunity for flawed white characters to be 
nuanced and convincingly portrayed, with backstory to provide cause to their 
behavior, while black characters serve as background.  Brooks is a polished, 
charismatic actor, but he has little room to maneuver playing an urban saint.  His role 
and that of Lamont are undeviating, serving Norton, and the other positions available 
for black men in the film, the basketball players fouling with violence, the car thieves, 
prisoners, and school bathroom shooter, are all cardboard cutouts with crime on their 
minds and few to no lines.  The film fulills the equation of black masculinity and 
criminality that has proven so prevalent historically in the cultural imagination.  
Though Norton’s character Vinyard claims that one out of every three black men will 
enter the criminal justice system, the film itself gives far better than even odds.
A contributing factor to the film’s latent bias is the degree to which the writer 
and director try to break the ontological category of race and make it a free-floating 
signifier.  When Derek breaks from the Aryan gan  during a party the evening he is 
released from prison, his former girlfriend Stacy repeatedly screams that he’s a 
“nigger.”  In the extended flashback in which he relates his prison experience to the 
younger brother—and by extension, the audience—viewers see how a Latino guard 
names Derek’s own whiteness as an epithet, which is contextualized later when 
Lamont tells him, “In the joint, you the nigger, not me,” and Lamont later uses the 
term to hail Derek several times.  During the rape scene—which is vaguely situated 
as a response to Derek first disavowing the Aryan gang in the prison for their political 
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inconsistency and then, after becoming friends with Lamont, playing in a mixed race 
basketball game—the Aryan leader says, “Want to be a nigger?  We’ll treat you like 
one.”186  Race is the X-factor of American history; who is white and who is black can 
be reorganized easily as power structures are rearranged.  The over-r presentation of 
black men in prison can create localized reversals of raced authority among prisoners, 
a claim Mailer’s Gilmore also makes to provide a basis for his own racism.  American 
History X presents a Hegelian recognition of the other recognizing the self:  “you the 
nigger.”  
However, the limits of such a racial reordering in U.S. culture, whose history 
is so predicated upon assumptions of racial difference, possibly contributed to the 
film’s failure at the box office.  That is, the film can be understood by genre as a 
variation on the ‘hood film, a white gang movie187 in the vein of John Singleton’s 
Boyz N the Hood (1991).  Both feature the constitutive elements:  gangs organized on 
lines of racial identity, violence criticized within the narrative but extra-narratively 
more ambiguous in the degree to which it is glorified, the displaced or absent father 
figures, the cult of masculinity in which manliness is activity, domination, and 
invulnerability, the family largely supplanted by gangs but offering the saving grace 
for the main character’s rejection of violence, which occurs too late to save brother-
figures.  The most visible difference between American History X and the ‘hood 
gangster films is that of race, and white masculine youth culture so suborned as to 
turn to violence, with violence’s attendant crime, imprisonment, and vengeful murder, 
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possibly proved unrealistic for audiences more accustomed to seeing gangs of young 
black men as a menace to society, doomed to incarceration and violent death.
American History X does not know what sort of movie it is, which is one way 
of saying that the overlapping audiences of popular audiences and film critics 
disagree among themselves what to make of it.  According to popular viewers 
recording their votes with the Internet Movie Database (IMDB), the film is the 62nd 
best film of all time at the end of 2003, placing it in such rarified terrain as The 
Wizard of Oz (58th—1939), Rashômon (59th—1950), and 2001:  A Space Odyssey
(67th—1968).188  One might dismiss this ranking as unrelated to more “elite” 
valuation, but typical distinctions drawn between “high” and popular culture are 
challenged by the close parallels between the IMDB rankings and the 100 best films 
as ranked by the American Film Institute.  American History X was released too late 
to be considered for the AFI 100, but in general, there is a high degree of correlation 
between the lists.  Of the AFI top 50, 22 appear in the IMDB top 50; 34 appear in the 
IMDB top 100, and only three films do not appear in the IMDB top 250.  
Users of the movie database can rank a film and also post comments, and 
American History X has generated fierce discussion among participants.  Through the 
end of 2003, more than 800 IMDB members had made on-line contributions, more 
than all of the AFI’s top three of Citizen Kane (1941), Casablanca (1942), and The 
Godfather (1972), all of which are ranked in the top 11 by IMDB voters as well.  
“Real” is the primary term of contention among the on-line posts, which are roughly 
split as to whether the film is realistic or not, though applause for Norton’s acting 
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performance is another focus.  Professional film critics are similarly divided and in 
identical terms, recognizing the ambiguities of the film’s representation of racial 
conflict while celebrating Norton’s acting and the film’s look and feel.  Norton’s 
performance is “history-making” in The National Review (Simon 50), and the 
industry trade Variety praises the story’s “truthfulness,” Kaye’s on-l cation direction 
as “gritty,” adding to the “heightened realism of the film’s style” (McCarthy 41, 42).  
The perceived visual quality of American History X is bound with the contention over 
its symbolization of the real, with the historical traumas of racism and incarceration.  
For these overlapping groups of popular audiences and critics, what makes the 
film great is its thematic and visual participation in a code of realism, its willingness 
to name and represent racial conflict without easy resolution in its substance, coupled 
with its stylish cinematography and location shooting.  When Danny (Furlong) walks 
along Venice Beach, the long shot substantiates the actual setting; when he dies at the 
end, the possibility of a happy ending is frustrated.  This is not the sacrificial death at 
the close of Cool Hand Luke (1967), Paul Newman’s pose of crucifixion signifying 
sacrifice and transcendence.  The prison of the central section of the film is outmoded 
steel bars and dirty blacktop rather than a studio fantasy of techno-fetishism, as in 
Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange (1971) and John Woo’s Face/Off (1997); nor 
is prison or city a utopian fantasy of racelessness, where black and white are not 
named.  The filmic world of the real is represented as nasty, brutish, and short, where 
people are born, they suffer, and then are murdered at street curbs and high school 
bathrooms because of racial hate.189  The camera’s unflinching gaze on that very 
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unpleasantness, its grittiness, are symptomatic of its integrity and “documentary 
realism.” 
Based on a true story—with invented characters and fictionalized events
The question of reality versu  its lack and championship acting is similarly a 
touchstone for the critical response to The Hurricane.  Whether or not it tells the 
“real” story is similarly at stake among viewers posting comments to its IMDB 
forum.  Like Norton, Washington’s portrayal of Carter garnered an Academy Award 
nomination for Best Actor, and his failure to win that year prompted discussion as to 
whether his 2002 Best Actor Award for his performance in Training Day (2001) was 
at all informed by white guilt (Kerr 43-44).  Critics in the major weeklies and dailies 
roundly praised Washington’s portrayal as “splendid,” “his best role,” a “knockout,” 
“a moving, fiercely compacted performance” (Steel, O’Hehir, Ebert, “In the Eye” 60).  
The latter of these two speak directly to the middleweight Carter himself, a gesture 
underscored by the director Jewison, quoted in Newsweek, in his praise that he could 
not tell the difference between the actor and the former boxer (“In the Eye” 60).  
Feature articles in the magazines Ebony and Jet, both geared to black audiences, 
further highlight the film’s claim to the real, the latter by including a set photo of 
Washington-as-Carter with the actual people of Carter’s life (Whitaker 154- 62, 
“Denzel” 59).  Such reviews juxtapose pictures of Carter boxing with film stills of 
Washington in the ring and count on audiences to tell the difference.  However, 
reading the history produced in the film presents more significant challenges than 
telling the two men apart.
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The conflation of historical documentation a d fictionalization poses risks to 
the “apprehension” of history, both the claim to history and the anxiety over its 
misrepresentation.  Before the film has even begun, it offers the obligatory disclaimer 
that frames its subsequent criticism:  “While this picture is based upon a true story, 
some characters have been composited or invented, and a number of incidents 
fictionalized.”  The inventions far surpass Mailer writing a dream and inserting into 
the unconscious of one of Gilmore’s analysts, as the systemic racial bias in the 
judiciary that imprisoned Carter is largely collapsed into one white detective with a 
vendetta, Della Pesca (Dan Hedaya), a heavy fictionalization of Lieutenant Vincent 
DeSimone (Hirsch 35-36).  The Nation’s review praises Washington’s performance, 
but is highly critical of the film’s overwriting of “truth,” a claim to the real the article 
itself embodies in being written by Lewis M. Steel, a member of Carter’s legal 
team—who, incidentally, is left out of the movie.  Unlike Gilmore’s lawyers, whom 
Schiller dismisses as “hopeless as journalists,” (835), Steel rises to the occasion.  If 
filmmakers are going to write history, then lawyers will review their films. 
This is not the first time that a Washington role has been at stake in questions 
of historical actuality and its film depiction.  He plays South African activist Stephen 
Biko in Richard Attenborough’s Cry Freedom (1987), a Union soldier in Glory
(1989), a film based on an actual colonel’s letters, and Malcolm X in Spike Lee’s so-
titled film (1992).190  There has been a flurry of criticism regarding historical 
docudramas such as these,191 and challenges pertinent to this film as well.  The 
Hurricane’s collapse of systemic injustice into one rogue cop is a conventional 
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narrative pattern reinforced by the film, effectively an individualization of 
institutional power that whitewashes more endemic problems.  Such fictionalization 
is one half of what Hayden White, among others, describes as “postmodern history,” 
where fiction is framed in a “real” context even as the real employs cues of the 
imagination (19).  The decisions made by cable network programmers offer an 
example of the complicated relationship of real and imaginary in such postmodern 
history.  For example, the Court TV Channel is part of many standard cable packages, 
and grew to prominence with the trial of O.J. Simpson, featuring largely news and 
documentary programming related to the legal system, from live trial coverage to a 
talk show hosted by former district attorney and juge Catherine Crier.  In the never-
ending effort to fill its schedule, the channel began showing syndicated fiction serials 
with law and order themes, so whether a real judge or actor or former judge turned 
host appears on camera may be difficult for viewers of Court TV to sort, depending 
on the time slot.  
The Hurricane would fit such programming quite nicely, with its many 
prominent courtroom scenes, prison settings, and “based upon a true story” legal 
battles for justice.  The film assigns a three-part structure to Carter’s biography.  The 
first follows the boxer’s life from childhood until his arrest (with Artis) for a triple 
murder in Paterson, New Jersey in 1966, a period defined by both Carter’s repeated 
unjust incarcerations and the meteoric rise of his boxing career.  The second, initiated 
by his 1967 sentence to life in prison, features his resistance to incarceration through 
performing his own autonomy, refusing the trappings of prisoner because to assume 
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them would, in his eyes, admit the criminality he disavows.  He will not wear the 
uniform of the prisoner, or eat prison food; he keeps largely to himself in his cell, 
writing his autobiography, The Sixteenth Round, and reading philosophy, literature, 
and law.  
The third stage of the story introduces Lesra Martin (Vicellous Reon 
Shannon), a high school-age black youth from Brooklyn who is the ward of three 
white Canadians, Lisa Peters (Debra Unger), Sam Chaiton (Liev Schreiber), and 
Terry Swinton (John Hannah).  They effectively adopt Lesra in order to facilitate his 
education, teaching him to read and preparing him for college.  At a book sale where 
the youth is the only non-white, he stares at a box full of books and focuses on The 
Sixteenth Round, its jacket prominently featuring Carter’s black male face.  In an 
invitation to participate in the identification, the point of view shot equates the 
camera’s gaze with Shannon’s, and his hand that extends to select the book in which 
he recognizes himself is thus the viewer’s hand. After reading the bok, Lesra and 
thereafter the Canadians meet Carter in prison and reignite the legal campaign to free 
him.  After 19 years of protesting his innocence, Carter becomes a free man.
In a manner similar to scenes of remembering in American History X, The 
Hurricane opens out of chronological sequence.  Where the prior film uses the pair of 
brothers as narrators, memory coupled with the writing of the titular essay invoking 
flashbacks, the connections in the puzzle of Carter’s life maintain largely thematic 
links established by the director, Jewison.  A black and white episode of a 1963 
boxing match cuts to Carter in color preparing to fight prison guards in order to 
239
maintain possession of his prison manuscript in 1973, cuts to faceless men 
committing the 1966 triple murder in Paterson (although audiences have no way to 
know this, Jewison shot the scene at the actual Lafayette Bar and Grill in Paterson, 
where the actual murders occurred), cuts to Carter and Artis being pulled over by the 
police.  Conflict organizes the coherence among the opening jump cuts connecting 
disparate moments in history.
That device is replaced by literacy for the duration of the film, as Lesra 
reading Carter’s biography cuts to Washington’s portrayal of that life.  The emphasis 
on literacy underscores the degree to which such editing emulates some of the 
conventions of the high modernist literary novel in the first half of the twentieth 
century, replacing the sequence of chronology with narrative movement triggered by 
characters’ personal meories and historical reconstruction, strategies which 
arguably see their ur-example in U.S. writing in Faulkner’s novels from The Sound 
and the Fury to Go Down, Moses.  Like Shreve’s “let me play” of Absalom, 
Absalom!, such fragmentation, discontinuity, and multiplicity engage audiences 
actively in constructing the narrative, piecing together the puzzle.  Late twentieth 
century U.S. films situated as art draw from this literary tradition as well as the mix of 
color and black and white, documentary style, jump cuts, and other techniques 
borrowed from French “new wave” cinema of the 1950s and 1960s and expanded in 
music video shorts and commercials in the 1980s and 1990s, radically altering late 
twentieth century U.S. films’ narrative styles.192
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Both American History X and The Hurricane make literacy itself a narrative 
device.  In the latter film, Lesra and Lisa reading The Sixteenth Round and the 
epistolary exchange between them and Carter provide the basis for the film’s 
movement in and out of prison, just as the letters between Cleaver and his lawyer and 
between Gary and Nicole pass back and forth.  In The Hurricane, Lisa reading the 
biography aloud cuts to Carter in prison, or Carter reading a letter from Lesra cuts to 
Canada.  Like American History X, then, writing and reading one’s own life vis-à-vis 
the life of the “other” of the prisoner serves as both structural and thematic device.  
Danny’s voiceover speaks his essay, writing how his perspective has been shaped by 
his brother’s incarceration.  Much of Washington’s dialogue comes directly from 
Carter’s book, and that actual prison writing, with its attendant emphasis on 
testimony, on relating the reality of imprisonment to those not themselves 
incarcerated, thus finds its way into this film largely set in prison.  Re-created prison 
scenes frame actual prison writing.  
Like the narrative of Kaye’s film, the sequence of The Hurricane is thus 
informed by treating reading and writing as fundamental to its story.  Such a basis 
does emphasize the centrality of bth Carter’s book and the account offered by two of 
the Canadians, Chaiton and Swinton’s Lazarus and the Hurricane (1999); both are 
primary sources for the film’s screenplay.  The narrative organization of the film, 
however, is that of the director, Jewison’s own effort to assemble the pieces in 
supervising the editing and telling the “truth.”  The director organizes the parts of the 
story through first an arrest and then three critical court scenes corresponding to the 
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three parts of Carter’s life, with visible and invisible cues to the historical actuality of 
the events depicted, gestures that complicate their own historicity.  
The most crucial scene of the film occurs when the police pull over Carter 
(Washington) and Artis (Whitt).  Artis, the younger man, is driving the boxer’s car 
and is very nervous.  Carter remains calm, and as it turns out, he and the first officer 
to approach the car know one another.  The policeman says, “We’re looking for two 
negroes in a white car,” to which Carter responds, “Any two will do?”  The moment 
is one of twin recognitions, not only Carter and the officer recognizing one another, 
but of the officer recognizing Carter first as a black man and then as a particular 
person, a celebrity, “The Hurricane.”  That initial recognitio  provides the first 
elaboration of the judicial racial bias that results in Carter’s life sentence, and the 
court’s recognition of that bias 19 years later is the basis for his release.  
The policeman’s declaration, “We’re looking for two negroes” makes the 
search akin to Faulkner’s description of the town of Jefferson’s desire for Joanna 
Burden’s murder to be “negro crime committed not by a negro but by Negro” (Light 
in August 288).  The police in this scene, like the lynch mob, are looking for 
blackness as criminality, and they find it where they see it:  Carter and Artis are 
stopped, arrested, and imprisoned.  The scene very nearly appears twice in the movie, 
thereby emphasizing its importance.  Later in the film, another black and white 
boxing sequence fades through a sly edit of a close-up of a red light that is not a 
police siren but nightclub illumination, and Carter and Artis depart from the club only 
to be pulled over.  The club they leave is an actual bar in Paterson, creating an 
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invisible claim to historical actuality for the subsequent arrest.  That arrest is the 
quintessential Althusserean moment, the policeman’s call of “You there!” hailing the 
subject.
The policeman’s call is the first scene of several in the film presuming Carter 
to be a criminal, and it sets the stage for the three times he is interpellated in court, 
named in the first and second instances as a criminal and in the third as innocent.  All 
three identifications directly relate to his race.  In the first, he is a child (played by 
Mitchell Taylor Jr.) accused of trying to rob an older white man, though the film 
situates him as first protecting his friend from sexual assault and then defending 
himself against murder.  The white judge who addresses him wishes he could try the 
black boy as an adult; the judgesentences him to reform school until he is 21.  
The scene directly follows Carter’s interrogation conducted by his nemesis in 
the film, the detective Della Pesca (Hedaya), whose name roughly translates from 
Italian as “a catch” or “fishing for anything.”  Pesca upon initially seeing the child 
says, “I see a nigger with a knife.”  That equation of blackness with violent 
criminality lays the basis for its numerous reiterations throughout the film, and it
makes Pesca the face of racial bias.  Carter’s race is called out repeatedly, police 
officers referring to him as a “black son of a bitch […] a life criminal” before the 
murders for which Carter will be accused even occur.  The detective is present in 
every courtroom and in the initial interrogation; he garners false testimony from 
witnesses, and upon arresting Carter after the latter’s escape from reform school and 
stint in the military, says, “You still owe me time” (emphasis added).  Pesca functions 
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as a personalization of the state, Carter’s years a debt to be paid directly to him.  
Jewison admits, “I love dramatic confrontations like this, the standoff between two 
actors,”193 and such standoffs are the “composites” that are “fictionalized,” to both the 
distressed and apologist reviews of critics.  Steel criticizes the “cinematic crime” 
committed by a “false Hollywood” (8), while Roger Ebert doubts that a chronicle of a 
“complex network of legal injustice” would have made The Hurricane a better film.  
In a Newsweek article that is at once about the story of Carter’s battle with racism and 
Washington’s fight against racial typecasting—another superimposition of subject 
and actor—the reviewer cannot decide if the blame for such narrative shortcuts lies 
with producers or audiences.  The review offers on one hand that “audiences like their 
villains unregenerate”; on the other, that it would be better if the film “trusted the 
audience to swallow a less simplistic view of reality” (“In the Eye” 60).  
Jewison does make some directorial effort to broaden the blame, cinematically 
representing the systemic racism arrayed against Carter.  In the second courtroom 
scene that culminates in the sentencing for the triple murder, the first shot is outside 
the courtroom, and the camera pans down from sky to white marble.  There is a cut to 
the inside of the courtroom, a long shot from the entry that frames the assembled 
audience before the judge, then a cut to the national seal on a white wall then 
downward to a medium shot of the white judge, who says that the defendants have 
been tried by a jury of their peers.  There is then a cut to a brief shot of the all-white 
jury for a black man.  That montage seems an effort on Jewison’s part to implicate 
nation, institution, legal system, and whiteness in a network of forces differentiating 
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the accused on the basis of blackness, isolating him in his criminality and attendant 
imprisonment, thereby fulfilling judicial racism’s “defeat in detail” (cf. Chapter 
Two).  In an all or nothing bid, Carter and his legal team opt to take their case above 
the state of New Jersey to a federal hearing, ar uing that the state trials were 
conductedimproperly.  That judge in the third courtroom scene overturns that verdict 
for the climax of the film, and that moment is paired with the earlier one through a set 
of visual cues to demonstrate that the subject’s rights and the state’s wrongs can be 
redressed.  The third scene similarly opens with a montage of the U.S. flag, the 
courtroom shot from outside, a close-up of the bas-relief of Justice, then Carter 
bidding farewell to fellow prisoners, then to the lawyers’ arguments inside the 
courtroom.  Those arguments culminate in Carter speaking for himself before the 
court, then the judge’s decision to free him.  
For the viewer schooled in the background of Carter’s actual case and the 
film’s production, the scene is a surreal composite of multiple historicities.  The judge 
is named Judge Sarokin, the arbiter of the actual trial.  Sarokin is played by Rod 
Steiger, the bigoted sheriff from Jewison’s In the Heat of the Night (1967), and now 
he rules that a racially biased prosecution violated the defendant’s constitutional 
rights.  His character recuperation is joined by that of an accommodating white guard, 
Jimmy Williams (Clancy Barnes), the sadistic prison officer of The Shawshank 
Redemption, who in this film aids Carter and then applauds Sarokin’s ruling.  The 
judge’s ruling exculpating Carter quotes verbatim from the actual decision, and 
Jewison recorded Sarokin on videotape rehearsing h s own role.  The director liked 
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the rendition, but preferred Steiger, who then rehearsed with the record of Sarokin’s 
own rehearsal taped almost fifteen years after the latter’s real courtroom performance.  
In the actual hearing, Carter was not present, bu  Jewison felt the scene would work 
better with Washington in it.  Washington’s lines quote directly from Carter’s 
biography, which was published 11 years prior to the actual hearing at which his 
speech is set.  The shots are fairly still and lengthy during that monologue, the editing 
subtle, lending “a reality to it,” according to the director.  While Carter and Lesra wait 
for the judge’s decision, they talk, Washington and Shannon’s dialogue offered in 
shot/reverse shot with the bars between.  This is an iconic shotso de rigeur of prison 
films, photography, and experience that when Bob Dylan visited Carter in a minimum 
security facility in 1975, an unused steel grille had to be appropriated to play the role 
of bars for a press photo (Hirsch 124).  Jewison describes the last of the film’s many 
through-the-bars scenes between Washington and Shannon as “too real.”194  To top it 
off, black and white footage of the actual Rubin Carter closes the film.  The 
combination of scenes culminating in Carter’s freedom is postmodern history at its 
best or worst, depending how separately one likes to account the imagined from the 
actual.
Again, I am less interested in sorting truth from fiction in the film than 
suggesting how the difference between the two becomes one that is old, occurring in 
the narrativization.  Jewison, as well as the screenwriters Armyan Bernstein and Dan 
Gordon—the latter also responsible for writing another “based upon a true story” film 
about injustice in prison, Murder in the First (1995)—draw from a variety of 
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narratives and documents.  These include the biographies of Carter written by the 
man himself as well as that co-authored by two of the Canadians, the transcripts of 
the trials themselves, and news footage of Carter, Dylan, and other actual figures 
involved in the case.  The staging of shots simulates the events of two and a half 
decades before:  the faces of the murderers are not shown in the early sequence, and 
the film offers the points of view of witnesses as similarly limited.  The 
undecidability of history nevertheless demands decision.  The film reproduces 
Sarokin’s actual verdict that reaches its conclusion of prior judicial bias, a decision 
that, like the film, simultaneously records and invents history, retroactively 
determining what has already happened.  In the federal district court of 1985, that 
meant dismissing the 1967 verdict as racially prejudiced, a verdict upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1988.  In 1999, that meant concluding the film with Washington on 
courthouse steps followed by 1993 footage of a free Carter.  The judicial process of 
indictment, incarceration, and exoneration offered as a “true story” in The Hurricane
becomes part of the cultural imagination, even as its story of carceral identity as one 
of personal transformation has its own contemporaries and precedents in narrative 
film.  
In The Hurricane, resistance and redemption defines Carter’s identity as a 
prisoner in visual and narrative terms strikingly similar to those of American History 
X.  The images of masculine power as body and language offered there in black and 
white flashback similarly occur in The Hurricane, as viewers see Washington’s year 
and half of physical training displayed in brightly lit boxing scenes.  The frequent 
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displays in each film thus offer chiaroscuro impressions of masculine hardness, of 
power and indomitability.  Black and white segments in these instances functions as a 
historical conceit, locating their scenes as prior to the primary narrative.  In The 
Hurricane, the historical anteriority of those scenes associates them with the really
real, as black and white footage of Carter boxing occurs alongside actual 
documentary black and white footage of 1960s civil rights demonstrations and the 
protests of Carter’s imprisonment 10 years later.  However, unlike the Lafayette 
murder, the nightclub, and the prison scenes of The Hurricane shot on location, those 
boxing scenes were recorded on a Toronto set.  Furthermore, Vinyard’s rhetoric of 
racial hate as offered to a television reporter prior to his incarceration pairs with 
Carter’s off-hand comments to a news weekly reporter, a mocking suggestion to 
shoot the “nigger-hating cops” beating protesters.  
In prison, both learn to disavow retributive violence and leave transformed.  
Lamont, one of the instruments of Vinyard’s salvation and the reason that he even 
survives prison, calls out for him on his departure to remember “the brothers!”  In one 
sense, that brother is the younger brother Danny (Furlong), and each brother spends a 
fair portion of the film remembering the other in various flashbacks throughout 
American History X.  In another sense, “the brothers” are black men, and in a film 
structured on male siblings as mirrors for one another, Lamont’s call is one for cross-
racial identification.  In The Hurricane, Carter at first denies the prison, refusing to 
conform to its identification of prisoner, but his very resistance capitulates to the self-
negation imprisonment intends.  The dialogue quotes directly from the last words of 
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Carter’s biography:  “In the end, there is no prison, no more Rubin, no more Carter—
only The Hurricane.  And after him, there is no more” (Sixteenth 338).  Autonomy 
produces the narrative destined to erasure; like the character of Butch Beauchamp, the 
character of Carter is a masculine identity of invulnerable mastery predicated upon 
autonomous individuality, wherein death is the end of history.  
A pair of scenes in the film captures the initiation into that autonomy as a 
practice of psychological resistance against a carceral identity, and then the 
repudiation of that isolation in favor of a social identity.  Carter arrives at prison after 
his conviction for the Lafayette murders, and meets the warden as a personification of 
the prison, who demands that he assume the position of prisoner, that he strip to wear 
a “standard inmate uniform with your number sewn on it so we can identify you.”  
Carter’s refusal merits him 90 days in solitary confinement.  Jewison offers that 
isolation in a montage of Washington in a series of shot/reverse shots, the camera’s 
fort-da, the gaze on the subject seeing cutting to what is seen.  After isolation for days 
marked by growing facial hair and Carter’s increasing despair, he begins hearing 
another voice, and there is another Carter in the cell, an angry mirror who proclaims 
that he is the tyrant of self:  “I’m running shit.”  The plaintive Carter replies, “What 
are we gonna do now?” and receives the reply, “Feel the hate” and the Oedipal 
epithet, “motherfucker,” and the first Carter cries in solitary.  He imagines a more 
complete version of himself in this doppelgänger, thereby emphasizing the lack, the 
inadequacy of the self on his side of the mirror.  
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Later, the Canadians visit for the first time, and Carter cuts their visit short, 
angrily denying their ability to identify with his situation:  “None of you can judge 
what I’ve been through. […]  What do you know about being in this place?”  
Washington’s dialogue in the scene is largely from Carter’s The Sixteenth Round, and 
he declares that he is free in prison because there is nothing he wants.  Separating 
himself from visitors means walling himself away from desire; wanting something 
means that there is something the prison can take away.  Desire becomes its own 
instrument of punishment in a reversal of Lacanian lack, as desire is not predicated on 
lack but itself produces the possibility of lack.195  Carter leaves them, and a crane shot 
rising up a level tracks space in the prison, the distance between the here of the 
visiting room and the there they cannot go, the cell itself.  Alone in his cell, Carter 
hears a litany of “don’t trust ‘em” from his other self.196  However, he decides that it 
is time to participate in a world outside the self, dismissing his doppelganger with 
“it’s time for you to go.”  The other Washington shouts, “Don’t you turn your back on 
me, nigger,” but the camera returns to the shot/reverse shot across the bars, Carter 
warming up through shadow boxing to the ubiquitous rising violins signifying 
emotional import, ready again to fight for his freedom, and a high shot from inside 
the cell emphasizes the light illuminating the typewriter.  Given that gesture to 
writing one’s self away from violence, communication with another to avoid the 
tyranny of one, it is worth noting that the scene draws directly from Carter’s The 
Sixteenth Round (310).
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These are the only two scenes in the film of Carter experiencing what might 
be understood as a schizophrenic episode, and they read as an amalgam of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  The medical condition of paranoid 
schizophrenia is understood as brain abnormalities causing mental disassociation, 
cognitive dysfunction, and verbal meory loss—though it also carries with it the 
popular misunderstandings of “someone is out to get me” coupled with multiple 
personality disorder.  In Anti-Oedipus, schizophrenia is the self divided, constituted in 
the multiple social investments and thereby positioned against the model of individual 
autonomy.  Carter’s extended isolation is an alienation from a world outside the self, 
fracturing his thinking, disconnecting him from any shared reality, precipitating 
anxiety and hallucinations.  His delusions of persecution are in the context of the 
film’s narrative true, and the question—like that of Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s 
Song—is not, is the prisoner paranoid, but is he paranoid enough?  Washington plays 
the rest of the symptoms of clinical paranoid schizophrenia in a scene Jewison 
describes as “probably some of the most brilliant film acting” he has shot—heady 
praise, given that he has directed three Oscar-winning performances.197  Jewison 
identifies the next scene as one of his “high emotional moments as a director,” as 
Carter participates in communication and trust across racial and carceral boundaries.  
In solitary confinement, the isolated, individualized subject (Carter) others the self as 
a response to alienation.  Isolation divorces him from the world, so the self fragments 
to create the multiplicity and conflict that constitute subjectivity.  
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That first episode matches Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the false 
autonomy of the Oedipal subject and the paranoia attendant to the self’s 
misrecognition of its singularity; Oedipus is a tyrant and a “motherfucker.”  Separated 
from the world, the self will imagine itself to death.  Jewison views Carter’s character 
in the first schizophrenic episode as suicidal, the step toward death that within the 
confines of individual autonomy means the end of history.  The second episode 
demonstrates the re-initiation of the subject to a social order, where the self is in 
Delueze and Guattari’s terms reterritorialized, re-inscripted with desire—in this case, 
to participate in a world beyond both the prison and the myth of isolated autonomy.  
The scene immediately cuts to a scene of Lesra and the Canadians in Toronto, with 
Unger’s voiceover of Lisa’s letter to Carter, “We get a rich, deep feeling of 
experiencing your presence here.”  The camera and careful editing perform a material 
reterritorialization, relocating Carter in the sequence.  The Canadians feel him “here,” 
and the cut between the shots takes the audience “there” before returning to Carter 
looking at a picture of the scene as his refusal to want becomes a desire to be in the 
world, the linguistic participation that the typewriter allows.
His return to history occurs through a chain of identifications.  The first 
moment of such self-recognition occurs prior to his false imprisonment for the triple 
murder, when he watches race riots on television in a bar and locates himself as part 
of an “us,” a black identity larger than himself.  Jewison acknowledges that this 
moment is when the picture “takes a turn.”  It is a historical turn.  Prior black and 
white sequences in the film featured footage of Washington boxing in a ring, scenes 
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shot on a set in Toronto; these black and white images are from historical footage of 
policemen beating black protesters.  Carter as he is performed in the film views 
documentary footage of a civil rights protest that invokes in him an “us,” a 
transubjective identification, a participation in an identity that is the link between “I” 
and “we,” between personal and social history.  In the film, however, Carter does not 
act on the recognition.  The slip in difference between self and other occurs later, in 
the mutual recognition that takes place between him and Lesra—and by extension, his 
white Canadian guardians.  Lesra identifies himself in Carter, first in choosing The 
Sixteenth Round, then as he reads the biography, proclaiming, “This book’s about my 
life!”  In writing the prisoner a letter, he initiates the chain of communication that will 
see Carter finally freed.198
For Carter, recognition is not inter-subjective identification, but a broadening 
of selfhood, a participation in the world beyond the self constructed cinematically 
through jump cuts between shots in and out of prison that are linked by speaking the 
other’s words in the letters between them.  Later, after he has participated in letters 
and visits with the world outside of prison as represented by the Canadians, a court 
appeal that he hoped would free him fails.  He attempts to repudiate the outside 
connection, asking them to no longer write or call him, a break described in terms of 
renunciation of any self outside of prison, fully assuming instead his carceral identity:  
“My number is 4572,” dialogue emerging from an actual letter of Carter’s.  That 
renunciation prompts a last-ditch effort from Lesra, who sends his high school 
diploma to Carter and a photo of the young man with his girlfriend.  Shannon’s 
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voiceover accompanies Carter reading in prison, and rising slow draws of violin 
strings score Washington’s composure cracking.  It is a cinematic cheap shot in terms 
of audience identification, as it cues viewers exactly how they should respond 
emotionally by making Washington’s response a guide for the audience—with 
accompanying orchestra—but it initiates Carter’s return to a world beyond the self, a 
plurality the film locates in the Canadians’ full-time bid to see him released.  
The Hurricane and American History X offer prison as a transformative place, 
educational, redemptive, where male characters repudiate race-based thinking and 
hard autonomy in favor of participating in a larger social world of emotional 
connection initiated and sustained through communication.  There are clear 
precedents in films of the prior decade, particularly in Spike Lee’s Malcolm X and 
Darabont’s The Shawshank Redemption.  The former already has a multi-level 
relationship with American History X and The Hurricane.  Like The Hurricane, it is a 
biopic starring Denzel Washington.  Jewison was actually listed to direct the earlier 
film before Spike Lee drummed up opposition to a white director telling the story of 
Malcolm X and took over the project himself.  Jewison makes a wry comment to this 
effect in shooting a scene of Washington reading a letter in a cell with a poster of 
Malcolm X visible on the wall in the background.  The poster is actually a picture of 
Washington playing Malcolm in the film, a sly wink and nudge to the confluence of 
reality and imagination, as well as to the director’s own personal history—he gets to 
film Washington portraying Malcolm after all.  
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American History X not only features the titular gesture of race as the X-
factor, but at one point the character of Sweeney (Brooks) refers to Norton’s Vinyard 
as the white supremacist patriarch Cameron’s “shining prince,” an allusion to actor 
Ossie Davis’ eulogy for the political leader.199  In the autobiography from which 
Lee’s film is adapted, one of the chapter’s chronicling Malcolm X’s imprisonment is 
titled “Saved,” and it includes his growing literacy and letter-writing, which feature 
prominently in the film version.  Indeed, the period of incarceration plays as the 
film’s second act, preceded by Malcolm X’s early life of crime and ignorance of 
racial politics, and followed by his life and end as a leader, an act culminating in 
footage of young children standing and identifying themselves in inter-subjective 
terms of (mis)recognition:  “I am Malcolm X!”  
Shawshank Redemption does not make the gesture to actuality but it does to 
literacy, and the development of the prison library nd a prisoner learning to read play 
their parts in the film’s tale of the mutually redeeming friendship between a white 
man guilty of no crime beyond not loving his wife enough, and a black man who did 
commit murder but has paid in decades of time.  The titular redemption is that of 
Andy Dupuis (Tim Robbins), who learns to love again, though the object of his 
affection is Red (Morgan Freeman).  Though cast as a homosocial rather than erotic 
relationship, the final shot of the film is pure Hallmark, a high, long shot in soft focus 
of them approaching one another and embracing on a beach in afternoon light, sun 
glinting on the water.  That film and The Hurricane share the happy ending of the 
uncomplicated triumph of the human spirit film, though the turn to footage of the 
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actual Carter and rolling text documenting events after his release substantiates the 
historical truth of its exultant denouement.
Within a year of their respective releases in 1992 and 1994, Malcolm X and 
The Shawshank Redemption were either financially or critically successful, and the 
latter in particular set the stage for would-be high concept prison films.  The earnings 
of Lee’s film doubled its budget during its domestic theatrical release, not even 
counting overseas distribution sales and Time Warner’s subsequent rental and cable 
earnings, and it merited two Academy Award nominations.  The Shawshank 
Redemption was marketed weakly and consequently did poorly at the box office, but 
its seven Academy Award nominations and, more importantly, its word-of-mouth 
accounts made it the number one video rental the subsequent year, and it continues to 
be screenedexhaustively on myriad cable outlets.  Indeed, the film is enormously 
popular.  It is the second highest rated film ever as of early 2004 among IMDB users, 
second only to The Godfather, is referenced or parodied in over 30 subsequent films, 
and spawned a documentary in 2001 chronicling its emergence as a cultural 
phenomenon.  
Its success speaks to the degree to which it meets audiences’ exp ctations—as 
cited in the Prologue to this dissertation, how the film fulfills the imagination of “how 
it must feel to be behind bars,” that recurrent place of fascination in the cultural 
imagination.  The Shawshank Redemption draws from the two prior most notable 
prison films, I am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang (1932) and Cool Hand Luke (1967) 
in offering wardens and guards as unremittingly evil caricatures,200 fostering an us-
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versus-them community among male inmates.  In Captured on Film:  The Prison 
Movie (1989), Bruce Crowther points out that along with the main character’s 
innocence, these are some of the fundamental characteristics in the development of 
prison films.  
However, in a sharp departure from the wholesale cruelty and punishment of 
earlier fictive prisons, homosocial bonds across race and personal transformation 
become crucial factors in imagining incarceration.  That prisons as writers, directors, 
and producers imagine themsomehow simultaneously fulfill the self-destruction 
prisoners seek and provide a humanistic personal improvement should come as no 
surprise, as actual prisons historically have been intended to somehow at once punish 
and rehabilitate.  The crucial differences in late twentieth century prison films from 
these two crucial predecessors (which are, incidentally, along with The Shawshank 
Redemption and American History X, part of the Warner film library) are the 
interracial milieu and the titular emphasis on redemption:  prisons are settings for 
conversion narratives, where white and black men learn to love one another and 
thereby fulfill their respective destinies after prison, becoming whomever they need 
to be.  The Shawshank Redemption made such male romance narratives201 organized 
around an actor with box office success the blueprint for subsequent prison films of 
the 1990s, not only Frank Darabont’s next direction in The Green Mile (1999) but for
American History X and The Hurricane.
Framed in these terms, the degree to which such narratives represent actual 
imprisonment becomes beside the point.  Films set in prison in this style are male 
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romance, with plots of spiritual redemption brought about by interracial and 
homosocial (though not sexual) love, scored with rising violins and featuring close-
ups of the tears of the men who are the focal characters to cue viewer responses.  
These films would not be expected to offer the “reality” of imprisonment any more 
than Harlequin historical romance novels might describe a “real” eighteenth century.  
Instead, the setting seems more likely to reinforce existing cultural norms.  
Such an endorsement is apparent at the close of The Hurricane, after Sarokin has 
declared Carter’s freedom.  A long, slow shot frames the golden sky in soft focus, and 
then the marble edifice of the courthouse fills the screen, its motto extending past 
even a theatrical ratio 1.85:1 screen:  “The administration of justice is the firmest 
pillar of good government.”202  Carter (Washington) stands amidst a crowd of 
reporters on the courthouse steps, and there is a close sh t/reverse shot of one asking 
Carter if he will remain the “Hurricane.”  The freed man replies, “I’ll always be the 
‘Hurricane,’ and a hurricane is beautiful.”  The line might imply the historically and 
politically resonant racial rhetoric of “Black is beautiful,” but the camera—like the 
two court shots preceding it—locates authority not in the language of revolutionary 
identity, but in the judicial system metonymically referenced in the marble monument 
that dwarfs the people on its steps.  Social justice for Carter occurs through relying on 
the same legal apparatus that placed Carter in prison 18 years earlier; the redemption 
that takes place is that of the judicial system itself.  
Watching the film, some viewers (myself, for one) may want Carter to be 
angry, violently angry at almost two decades in prison, but the orchestral score builds, 
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the high and long shot situating Carter beneath the imposing courthouse, and then text 
on a black screen relates a series of victories for the real-life characters.  The state of 
New Jersey appeals the case to the federal Supreme Court and loses, while Lesra 
becomes a lawyer, and Carter and Artis serve as civil rights advocates—and Carter is 
awarded an honorary title by the World Boxing Association.  The gestures to 
historical actuality legitimize the nearly two decades of judicial appeal radically 
telescoped to fit the cultural constraints of a two- hour feature film.  Judicial 
institutions trump revolutionary violence to fulfill mainstream ideology in 
fictionalizations geared to profit from a $30 million investment.203
“This is no dream or nothing made up, this is for real”
While Kaye shot American History X on location in Venice Beach, California, 
the characters projected there are simulacra, copies without originals.  And Rubin 
Carter’s historical actuality is cast in Washington, but the events of his life are 
rewritten to fulfill the narrative structure of a high concept Hollywood production, a 
multi-million dollar package organized around a proven asset (Washington), with a 
story easily pitched to producers and then to audiences.  It would seem that a largely 
cinema vérité documentary such as The Farm could resolve the tension between 
imagined and real imprisonment in film.  After all, its cameras circulate through the 
corridors of the actual Louisiana State Prison, its characters the actual prisoners, 
guards, and administrators.  The film is part of the historical record, an actual 
documentary rather than being shot in a documentary style; it is a true story rather 
than merely being based on one.  In directly psychoanalytic terms, documentary 
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filmmaker and theorist Jill Godmilow suggests, “Unconsciously embedded in these 
forms called documentary is the conceit of the ‘real,’ which substantiates the truth 
claims made by these films” (80-81).  Producers and audiences alike participate in the 
sense of documentary films as, if not the stuff of the real itself, less mediated, less 
constructed than fictional narratives of “documentary realism” or those based on a 
true story.  However, as Godmilow also points out, historically, documentary has 
borrowed from the conventions of dramatic narrative film (84).  Nancy F. Partner 
raises similar questions in “Historicity in an Age of Reality-Fictions” (1995), and 
Paula Rabinowitz emphasizes that documentary films typically maintain a reliance on 
both a political agenda and the narrative strategies of fictional film, which results in 
them “reinforcing dominant patterns of vision” (119).  Documentary films then 
capitulate to similar mainstream expectations as would-be blockbusters.
What that means is, even as the “conceit of the ‘real’” is embedded in the 
historical records of documentary film, narrative conceits of fiction help shape their 
production.  In an extended interview, Garbus claims that in the production of her 
work, the film is “something I came to very organically, rather than with a lot of 
intellectual ideas,” that “story and character” are “paramount to the formalistic 
concerns” (Stubbs 110, 111).  It is easy to conceive of that organic process of 
storytelling as an approach to history itself informed by previous narrativization, 
through what Jameson terms as “the political unconscious.”  History as the sum of 
actual lives exists in a surplus to its narration, its vagaries exceeding the possibilities 
of representation.  For example, in the two years that The Farm’s outside directors 
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Garbus and Stack visited the prison of more than 5000 inmates, they shot over 150 
hours of film, which they distilled to 100 minutes organized around six characters.  
Garbus acknowledges that the film “was really made in the editing room” (Stubbs 
120), a claim that is equally true of American History X and certainly a crucial matter 
for the disjointed opening of The Hurricane.204
Memory and history are offered as the scattered pieces of a puzzle that 
viewers have to put together in the watching.  Even as the editing of The Farm shapes 
the depiction of recorded events, the events recorded on the film are themselves 
shaped by the presence of the camera.  Grbus says of inmates with life sentences 
lacking the possibility of parole, they “see a camera and they think ‘there’s a chance’” 
(Lewis).  Godmilow addresses the related case of a documentary account of the 
Romanian revolution, when revolutionaries acted for their own camcorders in order to 
“play well on TV and produce a useful political record” (96).  This is the other half of 
White’s conception of postmodern history:  not only does the imaginary code itself as 
real, but history is offered with the grammar of the imagination.  The Farm, like 
American History X and The Hurricane, is shaped by the cultural expectations in part 
produced through the prison films that precede it, where prison is a place of 
redemption, where predominantly black men are condemned, many unjustly, but are 
nevertheless transformed—where the criminal violence of black and white men is 
converted to homosocial love, and autonomy becomes instead a social identity.
The Farm offers a largely synchronic account of the Louisiana State Prison, “a 
slice of life” more attuned to space than time, an impression of the place shot over 
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two years in bits and pieces of footage thereafter organized around six inmates.  The 
opening montage of brief clips and dialogue from later in the film sets the stag in 
medium shots of the inmates acknowledging their hopes, black and white mug shots, 
an Angola road sign, a hearse and burial, a score of harmonica blues underlying the 
bits of dialogue:  “God still exists behind prison bars,” “I am an innocent man,” “The
slaves that worked these fields came from Angola in Africa and it picked up its name 
from there.”  The measured tones of the narrator, Bernard Addison, introduce the 
place:  “Down in Louisiana lies America’s largest maximum security prison,” where 
most inmates serve life sentences, a place where the vast majority, 85%, will die 
behind bars.  Addison then offers the film’s narrative thrust:  “This is the story of six 
men trying to overcome the odds.”  There is some tension between that organization 
around character and the film’s emphasis on setting, and the broad experience of 
thousands at the nation’s largest maximum-security prison.  Representation is one 
means of bridging the gap, and the six men roughly match the racial breakdown of the 
prison, where 77% of the over 500 new inmates admitted each year are black men—
Crawford, Simmons, Tannehill, and Witherspoon are black, and Brown and Thierot 
are white.
The first narrative sequence uses the admission of Crawford as a means into 
the story of the prison, and even before viewers meet him, a white female guard 
overseeing processing points out that many new inmates arrive every Monday—
“We’re all guaranteed a job, we have good job security.”  Her matter-of-fact tone, 
lacking any irony, introspection, or critical distance, is maintained in most of the 
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film’s account of Angola’s 10% white administration.  There are the visual cues 
such as the red, white, and blue pen with which Crawford signs an admittance form,
and prison guards later practice for Brown’s execution, joking with one of their own 
playing the role of condemned.  During Crawford’s processing, the color footage 
gives way to a black and white still, a mug shot, a gesture to the official declaration of 
criminality, the initiation of the carceral identity and a conceit maintained for the 
other five inmates.  
After the new inmate’s arrival, there is a brief scene of Witherspoon 
conducting orientation during Crawford’s processing, but the film next focuses on 
Tannehill, who at 68 and 38 years into a life s ntence offers the young inmate’s 
opposite.  He suggests that there are three things that Angola will do:  “bring you to a 
crossroads,” “harden you,” and “number three, it will kill you.”  Tannehill’s 
retrospective prophesy of what Angola will do to a man to whom it largely already 
has been done provides a point from which to look backwards, a historical point of 
view from where he sees all and foretells the rest.  Crawford sifts through personal 
family photos, but in the Tannehill sequence, the camera’s gaze shifts to the broader 
history of Angola:  black and white photos of dogs chasing escapees cuts to footage 
of dogs in kennels today.  The editing implies the particular and particularly raced 
significance of pursuing dogs (like those of both Light in August and Go Down, 
Moses) on a Southern plantation turned prison.  The black and white stills function as 
the same gesture to historical anteriority and actuality as the mug shots, as the 
documentary footage Jewison employs repeatedly in The Hurricane, as the flashbacks 
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of memory in American History X.  In all three films, black and white means past, the 
past means history, and history is real.
The next sequence introduces Witherspoon, the model inmate who 
acknowledges that he has “done everything in prison that I should have done as a 
community leader in society.”  Garbus describes him as “Mr. Rehabilitated” (Lewis) 
after 25 years—one-third of his sentence—though his parole remains withheld.  There 
is a painful irony prefacing Witherspoon’s depiction in the film.  In 1982, he 
published a poem titled “The Lifer” in The Angolite (Sept/Oct 82); the same issue 
features a cartoon wherein a warden tells a prisoner, “Your rehabilitation went so 
well, we’ve decided to keep you as a model for others” (72).  Witherspoon also acts 
as a proxy for Rideau, the co-director of the film, who is also known as “Mr. 
Rehabilitated” and whose life sentence has been commuted, but all requests for a 
pardon have stalled (The Angolite July/August 1990 34).  After Witherspoon, there is 
Thierot, dying of lung cancer in the prison hospital, whose account of prison life is a 
litany of affirmations:  prison “is not as terrible a place as you would think,” “You 
can still have a life inside, you can help other inmates,” “You can help other people—
that’s not always self you have to look to.”  Things get a bit surreal after that, as the 
camera follows Crawford amid other black inmates to work in the fields of the 
prison’s farms for pennies a day, overseen by armed guards on horseback, shots 
scored to a spiritual cutting to the warden driving a truck.  
The warden, Burl Cain, admits, “It’s like a big plantation from days gone by.  
We hate to call it that in a way, but it kind of is because it’s inmates, it’s a prison.  
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This was a plantation.”  His words recall that the Thirteenth Amendment forbid 
slavery except in the context of imprisonment, “except as a punishment for crime” 
(Sec. 1).  The subsequent sequence in the film emphasizes the estrangement of the 
place, that the prison is a whole other world as the camera takes a walk through the 
city that is Angola:  aerial shots of the 18,000 acres of fields and buildings, on-site 
housing for staff, a baseball field for staffers’ children, the DJ at the prison radio 
station playing gospel and wishing the “brothers up on death row a beautiful day.”  
The montage seems to suggest the ambiguities of prison life, that it is at once an 
America viewers might immediately recognize and one completely foreign, where 
children play baseball and men in the J Block are in solitary confinement 23 hours a 
day.  One of the men on death row is Brown, fruitlessly awaiting an appeal to his 
execution.  After John Brown—whose own name, though unremarked, has its own 
historical resonances with race and racial violence in the Old South—the subsequent 
narrative sequence introduces the sixth of the film’s characters, Simmons.  He has 
served two decades of a century-long sentence, and 20 years after receiving a sixth 
grade education and defending himself because he lacked the money for legal 
counsel, he has become a self-trained writ lawyer appealing his case and protesting 
his innocence to the parole board.  
Almost every reviewer of The Farm comments on the scene of Simmons’ 
parole hearing, and the filmmakers acknowledge that it gets a “big response” from 
audiences.205  Because the documentary begins in the prison itself, it cannot film any 
of the actual court hearings that previously sentenced the inmates and thereby named 
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their criminality, initiating the carceral identity.  Simmons’ hearing and the 
consequent denial of his parole is therefore the re-inscription of his criminal status, 
his identity of prisoner.  He introduces what he describes as “exculpatory evidence,” 
which includes a statement from one of the victims claiming that s e could not 
identify her assailant because “all niggers look alike.”  Simmons’ blackness then 
identifies him as criminal, an “any one will do” to parallel Carter’s story, the 
anonymous “negro crime” of Light in August, the guilt of blackness facing Dale 
Pierre in The Executioner’s Song.  
During her own testimony to the parole board recorded on camera, the victim 
acknowledges the racial consequence of her rape in a dialogue that includes a 
member of the parole board, a black man. 
Victim: I have a problem with black people […]  I’m scared of ‘em.
Board member: You’re not scared of me this morning are you?
Victim: No […]  but I wouldn’t be alone in a room with you.
Board member: That goes both ways.
It seems unlikely that, had her assailant been a white man, she would have developed 
a raced and gendered fear of white men.  The white fantasy of super-menial black 
men sexually assaulting white women broadens violent personal trauma into a social 
pathology of race-based fear familiar to both who recognize the other:  “You’re 
black”/ “You’re white.”  A scene of the white Canadians tracking down a witness in 
The Hurricane includes this dialogue, but the Hegelian recognition of one’s self in the 
other’s recognition of the self is addressed and passed over in favor of polite 
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discussion over tea and cookies.  Here, the mutual recognition of “That goes both 
ways” means that the black parole board member participates in a reciprocal 
pathology of fear, that the victim’s fear of his black masculinity and its social and 
historical context of consequences (the judicial lynching of Simmons, for example) 
precipitates his fear of her white femininity.  It is as if the previous century and a half 
never happened, the past not even past but right now—the New South is just like the
Old South, and Simmons’ 100 year sentence is just like a noose round a neck from a 
century before.  
However, like the red, white, and blue pen, like the prison guard boasting of 
her job security, and most pertinently, like the warden acknowledging the likeness 
between plantation and prison, slave and inmate, the acknowledgement here does not 
precipitate any self-critical reflection on the part of the arbiters of justice.  In what 
appears to be about 40 seconds of unbroken footage—it is difficult to tell, as the 
editing of this sequence is particularly skillful—the parole board dismisses Simmons 
and conducts not discussion but half-spoken platitudes in ratifying their foregone 
conclusion of guilt before sending for Simmons:  “He did it.  He just didn’t... You
know, I have a…” “Of course he did it.  Of course.”  The scene is disorienting 
because the board knows they are being filmed, and they do not seem to care that 
their desultory judgment becomes part of the historical record not only in the denial 
of parole they sign, but in the far more public manner of what became a Sundance 
Award-winning documentary.206
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Certainly The Farm introduces Simmons’ case in a sympathetic manner and 
does not with any rigor subject his claims of innocence to any evaluation.  Nor does it 
make any comment on the likelihood that an appeal rather than parole hearing would 
address exculpatory evidence.  The parole board focuses on events between the guilty 
verdict and the parole hearing, and the parole board does suggest that Simmons 
appeal, which he does, and which the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently rejects.  His 
innocence or guilt is less at stake than the board’s failure evento pretend to listen to 
his appeal.  However, just as the record of the decision may shock audiences, they 
have seen it before.  The Shawshank Redemption features longtime convict Red 
(Freeman) protest not his innocence but his repentance and rehabilitation only to have 
his petition for parole denied.  Only in a later scene of a subsequent parole hearing 
when he renounces any meaning of rehabilitation, when he coldly acknowledges that 
he does not care if he is free or not, is his form stamped “approved.”  The 
capriciousness of the judicial system, particularly in the predominantly white 
administration of black prisoners, is what prison films anticipate as their audiences’ 
expectation.  
Tannehill presents another case of redemption without release, though his 
conversion is not a legal but a spiritual education.  He has become an ordained 
minister in his almost four decades at Angola, and the film includes one of his 
sermons, which begins, “There is a way to escape and be born again and live a holy 
life, a victorious life.  So what about being behind bars, Bishop?  God still exists 
behind prison bars.  Thank you, Jesus.  He sanctifies and he qualifies and he 
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specialize the individual that take knowledge of him and repent.”  Tannehill is 
minister and sinner, speaker and audience, voicing both halves of the call and 
response.  The sermon melds into a mythologized autobiography in which Bishop 
walks the Damascus road.  “As a young man, 24 years old, thank you Jesus.  Met a 
man, innocent man, a good man, on a railroad track one morning […].  I took that 
man’s life.  Went on down the railroad track.  Got into rock and roll […].  They 
picked me up and they rescued me and put me in jail.”  The sermon is completely 
insane, and brilliant, an apoplectic confession in rap rhyme, akin to the Reverend 
Hightower’s mad exposition of his grandfather’s Civil War exploits in his Sunday 
exhortations to Jefferson in Light in August, a fusion of myth and memory in a hail to 
salvation.  The Angola minister receives a better response than Hightower, and the 
closing applause beats the clapping hands that first bring Tannehill to the 
microphone.  Time served and service such as this have placed a recommendation for 
his pardon on the desk of Louisiana’s Governor, but he has in the course of his tenure 
never signed such a pardon, and has not done so by the film’s end.
All six focal characters are similarly cast in terms of transformation; 
irrespective of their guilt, they are saved by religion, good works or critical self-
reflection, made into better men in prison.  Like Malcolm X, Tannehill is “Saved”—
though by a Southern Baptist Christianity rather than the politicized Black Muslim 
faith the American Correctional Association tried and failed to bar from prisons in the 
early 1960s.  Crawford, even though just admitted, acknowledges that, though 
innocent of the murder that commits him, his prior crimes have caught up with him.  
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Witherspoon admits his guilt for his crime but points out that the man he is today “is 
a totally different person”—like Cleaver, the prisoner of now is not the same man 
sentenced years before—and the film supports that view, chronicling his community 
work as a trustee on behalf of the prison administration.  He and the warden even 
speak very nearly the identical line of not giving up hope even during a life sentence, 
though—like Simmons, like Red—his parole bid fails, according to the rolling text 
that closes the film.  In terms that coincidentally quote almost directly from Gary 
Gilmore, the death row prisoner Brown admits that he is further from Christ than he 
would like, but Brown now has “more concern about myself and others.”  Hi  affect 
coupled with the awareness that he has not gone far enough in the time before his 
execution nearly reproduce Theriot’s feeling that he “wanted more time,” and one 
need not only look to one’s self in the diminishing time one has.
Theriot’s final scene in the film hints at some of the challenges facing 
documentary film in the effort to testify, to tell the truth about imprisonment and its 
ends.  Theriot’s friends come to visit him in the hospital after he has ceased eating 
and has admitted that he only waits to die, and his friends think him lucky to expect to 
be buried outside of Angola.  He surprises them, telling them that rather than being 
buried outside prison grounds at a family plot, he has chosen to be buried here, 
“Where my friends are.”  Some of his black and white companions cry when they 
hear, and hands are held, his frail body embraced—“We love you.  We love you.”  
The scene is coded far differently from the romantic shot closing The Shawshank 
Redemption, though both feature black and white men transformed in the mutual love 
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fostered in prison.  There is no soft focus, no rising shot and orchestral cue, just a still 
camera, a cheap white room, a plate of leftover food foil wrapped and left on the 
floor, not to be eaten by a man who is not acting and will die and be buried at Angola 
during the course of the film.  
Real life is never as glossy and slick as Hollywood productions, even those 
with claims to the real in biographical narrative or the “heightened realism” of style.  
Nevertheless, there is the sense that the foreclosure that is life imprisonment has 
created the space for physical affection between men and across race.  I am not 
suggesting that the love among Theriot and his friends is not actually felt, that love 
might not be experienced within confinement, that prisons’ gendered populations and 
enforced time together do not ever foster valuable interracial relationships among 
men expressed through bodies and language in a manner beyond that generally 
sanctioned by mainstream U.S. culture.  However, I am suggesting that films such as 
Cool Hand Luke and to a far greater extent The Shawshank Redemption made that 
phenomenon part of the cultural imagination, a definitive aspect of what U.S. 
audiences expect from prison films, documentary or otherwise.207
To understand the historical record of documentary film as unconsciously 
shaped to reify dominant cultural norms is then to understand historical records 
themselves as shaped by prior imaginings, a matter underscored in a strange sequence 
after Theriot’s final scene, which takes place at Christmas.  A radio station DJ 
announces that the prison is on flood watch, which cuts to an aerial shot of the river 
near the prison and the narration, “That spring, the Mississippi River rose to its 
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highest level in a century.”208 The Farm has to this point in its narrative not been 
concerned terribly with telling time, and the cut here seems informed by the 
broadening of personal to public trauma and a shift from death in winter to a spring 
both renewing and threatening land and inmates.  The inmates work together through 
the night to stack the sandbags and build the levees to save the prison from a flooding 
Mississippi in a scene weirdly reminiscent of “The Old Man” section of Faulkner’s If 
I Forget Thee, Jerusalem, originally published as The Wild Palms (1939), where the 
“tall convict” also battles a Mississippi flood and afterwards returns to prison.  
The same historical and cultural forces that shaped Faulkner’s writing shaped 
the South and its river, built Angola, its land, racial identities, and history.  They also 
built the strategies and language of narration to tell that history.  Thus, e Farm
sounds like Faulkner sometimes, as when the warden comments on signs that the 
flood might be a grave matter:  “When they move the horses, you know it’s serious.”  
Floods are part of the South and its history, part of the novels that tell that history and 
become a part of it.  Rising rivers are imagined in novels and films, and recorded in 
documentary, as in the pair of films both titled The River (1938, 1984).  The first is a 
Depression-era documentary on the Mississippi floods released at the same time as 
Faulkner’s own (largely uncredited) film writing in Hollywood began in earnest, and 
also the time he began writing If I Forget Thee, Jerusalem, thereby possibly 
influential in the writing of the novel.  His title draws from Psalms 137:1-9, and the 
documentary was also titled “Our Daily Bread,” from Matthew 6:11.  The 1984 film, 
also set in the South, was nominated for five Academy Awards and similarly features 
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a battle against the rising waters that—like those of the novel and both 
documentaries—makes a natural disaster the objective corellative to some human 
conflict.  
Certainly the near-flooding of Angola during the two year filming of The 
Farm took place, and it earns two mentions in a presentation given by Angola’s 
Warden Cain (and Cathy Fontenot, Angola’s Director of Classification) at the 2001 
ACA meeting (23, 25).  However, just as there are 5000 other inmates besides the six 
whose stories are the ones around which Garbus, Rideau, and Stack organize the 
narrative, there is much besides the rise of the Mississippi that happened at the 
Louisiana State Prison from 1996 to 1998.  I am suggesting that, like the bonds 
among men and across racial lines formed inside prison walls, like uniformly violent 
crimes that lead to confinement, like the seemingly unjust imprisonment of black 
men, and like the inmates’ redemption, the flood of near biblical proportion
comprises the narrative in a manner that capitulates to the layers of prior 
representation that are the cultural imagination, in all of its dubious facticity and less 
determinate meaning.  
The stock pieces of prison films are in place, from administration to visitation 
to shot/reverse shot sequences across prison bars.  There is the casual cruelty of the 
admitting guard equating new inmates with job security, the prison warden who 
delays evacuating the prison during the flood—though it is not mentioned in the film, 
the warden eventually relocated 3000 inmates (ACA 2001 25).  Crawford 
experiences a poignant visit from his mother, just as Vinyard sees his own mother, 
273
and Carter meets his wife.  Crawford’s mother exclaims, “This is no dream or nothing 
made up, this is for real”—and viewers know it is real because we have seen the 
scene before.  Crowther’s Captured on Film details the shared characteristics of 
prison films first as offshoots of the 1920s and 1930s gangster films and then through 
the 1980s.  He identifies the generic features such as the main character’s innocence, 
visits from the inmate’s mother and her unremitting belief in his innocence, and cruel 
wardens and guards, types easily read in the documentary.  
The Farm does not wholly capitulate to the expectations of prison as a 
setting209 cast in the cultural imagination.  In The Hurricane, like so many courtroom 
scenes of films before, the full authority and power of the judicial system is embodied 
in magisterially robed justices, marble edifices, loquent arguments that in the last 
instance result in clearly righteous decisions.  In The Farm, Simmons’ hearing takes 
place in what appears to be a too small trailer with shoddy fake paneling, and 
Brown’s appeal of his execution includes competing arguments offered among the 
bad suits and folding chairs populating what might be a junior high school cafeteria.  
Lacking the imagined trappings, justice looks like a cheap and ad hoc process.  Still, 
the directors focus on the characters that they found most compelling, or that they felt 
audiences would find most compelling, which is another way of saying the same 
thing.  Directors, after all, aim the camera and thereby the field of view, the 
characters and stories that can be seen on-screen.  And one reason that those 
characters and those stories may be most convincing is because those stories and 
those characters are most recognizable.  At the end of the film, after all, both white 
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characters have died.  The remaining four are black men.  Crawford, Simmons,
Tannehill, and Witherspoon are in prison, and none are represented as belonging 
there.
“Not all black people are murderers,” “a prejudicial justice system isn't news” 
The fundamental problem with the logic of these prison films’ redemption 
narratives is that they largely endorse the use-value of the same judicial system they 
at least in part describe as unjust.  These films largely posit prison as man-making, as 
a setting for personal transformation, irrespective of an inmate’s responsibility for 
crime.  Simmons may or may not have committed the rapes of which he is accused—
though The Farm implies he did not—but he is named a criminal in conviction, 
incarcerated, and thereby becomes a better man, schooling himself beyond his sixth 
grade education so as to c ntest his innocence in legal discourse.  Tannehill and 
Witherspoon acknowledge their guilt for violent crime, but they are self-described 
changed men in the course of their decades-long sentences (38 and 25 years, 
respectively) who now participate in the functioning of the prison system that 
contains them.  Crawford protests his innocence of the murder that sentences him, but 
acknowledges his guilt for crimes for which authorities did not catch him.  
Similarly, In American History X, Lamont admits to stealing a television, but 
he thereafter participates in the racial re-education of a white supremacist murderer 
whose crime is greater but whose sentence is far shorter than his own.  The 
“Hurricane” trades his flurries of physical violence for reasoned argument made in 
court, asking that the judge “embrace that higher principle”:  justice is not fought for, 
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it is calm, compassionate, and rational.  All of these black men are described in the 
context of their respective films as unjustly incarcerated but thereby improved.  In the 
sedimentary layers of representation that constitute the cultural imagination, doing 
what comes naturally means understanding imprisonment in terms of a pair of 
contradictions regarding black men behind bars:  all black men are violent criminals, 
and black prisoners are innocent but made better through imprisonment.  
Two claims clarify this enigma, the first from one of the films, the second
from the discourse surrounding them.  In The Hurricane, Lesra becomes increasingly 
aware of his own race in the face of Carter’s blackness and incarceration, juxtaposed 
with the whiteness of his guardians, which precipitates a brief heated exchange 
between them.  Lisa offers that “not all white people are racists,” to which Lesra 
replies that “not all black people are murderers.”  Then, The Film Journal’s review of 
The Farm points out, “The filmmakers obviously set out to prove the existence of 
racism and other forms of prejudice in the judicial system that placed these men in 
Angola, and that continues to discriminate against them in parole hearings and 
appeals. However, a prejudicial justice system isn’t news” (Garcia—emphasis added).  
The well-known heuristic of Slavoj Žižek built around the story of “The 
Emperor’s New Clothes” helps sort this contradiction between blackness equated 
with criminality, repudiated or not, and the acknowledged injustice of justice.  In For 
They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (1991), Žižek offers 
an analysis of the apparent contradiction of willing participation in the false 
consciousness of an ideological symbolic order as immutable reality (249-253).  It is 
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a critique of the phenomeno  of members of a social order upholding the 
“naturalness” of cultural practices known to be arbitrary—in Lacanian terms, the 
simultaneous acknowledgment and disavowal of a gap between the symbolic and the 
real.  Žižek describes the three most common responses of the crowd observing that 
the emperor’s new clothes are in fact not there at all:  conformity, cynicism, and 
perversion.  The first recognizes that the Emperor has no clothes, but does nothing so 
as not to disturb the social order.  The second identifies the lack of completeness in 
the social reality but rather than call attention to it, pretends to believe in order to 
profit from those who do not know.  The third view is a capitulation to the need for 
completeness, the position that recognizes the gap but situates itself so as to fulfill 
itself the perceived completeness of the social order—the emperor only wears the 
clothes we give him (253).  
In terms of black men overrepresented in prison, these respective positions 
can be understood as follows.  The conformist acknowledges that the system of 
justice is racist, but for the sake of social peace says nothing.  The cynic knows that 
the system of justice is racist, but says, “Because I am white I say nothing, as I benefit 
from that system”; or, “Because I am black but not myself in prison, I say nothing.”  
The third response admits that the system of social justice is racist, but in watching a 
film depicting that prejudicial order, sees justice done in the film—then there is in 
fact social justice.  Representing racist injustice therefore runs related risks to those 
raised in familiar arguments regarding how representations of violence in film 
attempting to critique that violence nevertheless capitulate to the desire to see it, 
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inadvertently glorifying that which they sought to condemn.210 American History X
occupies the second and third of these positions.  There is an aspect of cynicism in 
Derek Vinyard’s racist murderous violence and consequently his imprisonment 
treated as the fulfillment of a prejudice originating in the Oedipal family rather than 
constituted in broader social history.  Imprisonment is not prejudiced because it 
happens to white people, too.  The way that the film treats race as a free-floating 
signifier seems cynical, but it is actually perverse.  The identification of “you the 
nigger” makes the equation of blackness and prisoner complete and therefore justifies 
a prejudiced social system; if a white man is a “nigger” in prison, then there is no 
racial prejudice in the judicial system.  
The Hurricane presents a more ambiguous case.  On one hand, throughout the 
film, the mise-en-scene, character, and dialogue repeatedly call out that the emperor is 
not wearing any clothes:  the all-white jury of Carter’s peers, the racist face of 
injustice in the white detective, Washington’s “Any two will do?”  On the other hand, 
the film radically condenses any harsh portrayal of Carter’s imprisonment to the 
initiatory scene of solitary confinement, which ends with the appearance of the 
conciliatory prison guard Jimmy (Barnes) who aids Carter’s fight against a carceral 
identity.  Extra-narratively, that characterization redeems Barnes’ prior role as the 
criminally savage prison guard in The Shawshank Redemption.  Within the narrative, 
the closing shot of Carter’s stance outside the prison on the steps of the federal 
courthouse endorses the ability of the justice system to make amends for itself, to 
correct its mistakes, an affirmation reinforced by the subsequent rolling text 
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describing events surroundig Carter subsequent to his release.  In the end, The 
Hurricane’s flirtations with politics and history fade to its generic classification as a 
“triumph of the human spirit” film.  Justice is slow but certain, and 19 years in prison 
readily collapses to a couple of scenes of glossy production and powerful acting 
framed by testaments to it being really real.  Both The Hurricane and American 
History X, in repeatedly attesting to their own reality, further capitulate to Žižek’s 
third position of perversity in suggesting that these are not fictions, that there really is 
social justice in carceral practice, justice made manifest in narratives of redemption. 
That aspect of salvation makes The Farm similarly problematic.  All of the 
prisoners, both white and black, are described in sympathetic terms, sympathy largely 
predicated upon their self-reflection regarding their criminality and attendant 
incarceration, and their transformation in response to that imprisonment.  The cynical 
viewer can claim, Simmons may not be guilty, but at least his twenty years in prison 
have provided him with an education.  Instead of resisting his carceral identity, 
Theriot adopts his prisoner status to the extent that he chooses to be buried on prison 
grounds.  Presumably, there are plenty of inmates at Angola that are far more 
recalcitrant, who do not seem to have learned so much in their time, embraced the 
salvation of prison, or adopted it as home.  Many Angola inmates might claim that 
prison has made them worse rather than better, but they are not in a film as limited by 
cultural expectation as by budget and administrative access—which is not to say that 
the film functions in a perverse capacity.  One of the aspects of lifetime incarceration 
as fantasized in the cultural imagination is the “institutionalization” of the long-term 
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inmate, wherein the prisoner so fully adopts the carceral identity as to be unable to 
function outside prison walls.  This view is offered most fully in The Shawshank 
Redemption, where one released long-termer commits suicide, and Red (Morgan) 
contemplates violating his parole so as to return to prison.  
In contrast, The Farm at its end includes lifers describing how much they 
desire to be free.  Tannehill says, “It would be so much overfloatin’ of joy that it 
would be hard for me to express myself”; Simmons says he has had “dreams of 
freedom for years.”  When performing community service duties outside of Angola, 
Class A trustees such as Witherspoon describe counting every blade of grass in the 
world outside.  Furthermore, the film does not end with the triumphant fulfillment of 
unprejudiced justice for black men in prison.  Tannehill’s pardon remains unsigned, 
Simmons’ appeal is rejected, as is Witherspoon’s, and Crawford’s family is trying to 
raise $3000 for trial transcripts so as to pursue an appeal, rolling text attesting to a far 
less optimistic reality than that which closes The Hurricane.  Instead of closing with 
the eponymous orchestral violins, there is the irony of the spiritual “Praise the Lord 
I’m Free” and Theriot’s burial on prison grounds fading to an aerial shot of Angola 
where so many are not free, where the odds are not beaten.  In the fi al analysis, the 
film suggests that justice is not blind and the Emperor is naked—an  in telling the 
difference, the film has produced at least one historical effect, as Simmons as a result 
of the film now has legal representation (Lewis).  The film thereby functions as a writ 
of habeas corpus in the court of popular opinion, reintroducing to the cultural 
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imagination the representation of the actual prisoner speaking for himself to actual 
consequence.
***
Directors have positioned films between the poles f actuality and imagination 
since the earliest movies were shown, and documentary and fantasy have provided 
points of reference throughout film history.  The Lumiere brothers’ cinematographe
displayed footage of a train pulling into a station in 1895 even as actual trains could 
be seen outside; thereafter, an audience member of that display, Georges Méliès, was 
a pioneer of special effects and the auteur of the fantastical Cinderella (1899) and A 
Trip to the Moon (1902).  American History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm, 
spanning realist fiction, based on a true story, and documentary, all leverage the 
cachet of the real, of history.  And cinema is not the only history.  Early practices in 
actual prisons echo in prison films of the 1990s, as the emphasis on readi g and 
writing therein echoes Benjamin Rush’s call for “good books” in late eighteenth 
century prisons and Zebulon Brockway’s reading and writing program at Elmira 
Reformatory in the 1880s.211  However, it is not only history that shapes imagination, 
either in the aesthetic axiom that art imitates life, or even in historicist imperatives of 
reading a correspondence between actual events and imaginative fiction in a 
documentary record.  The reiterative imaginations of the real have shaped the history 
these films offer.  To read the relationship between history and imagination in one 
direction, the realistic fiction of American History X features Norton touting statistics 
he culled from the California Governor’s office and The Hurricane’s dialogue 
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regularly quotes from Carter’s prison writing and actual court testimony.  To read the 
relationship in reverse, the documentary record of The Farm produces a history 
shaped by the fantasies of imprisonment as redemptive spaces of male bonding.  
Of course, anyone—director, film editor, screenwriter, Internet Movie 
Database contributing member, cultural critic— an show or say anything for any 
reason.  However, there are consequences, and some of those consequences are the 
assembly of the shape and size of a shared reality.  Going to the movies, one learns 
that going to prison is a philosophical experience, wherein one learnsbetter to situate 
ones’ self in the world and the size and shape of that world.  Going to the movies, one 
learns that history as public memory is a puzzle, pieced together retroactively.  
However, puzzles have a predetermined shape, and the cultural imagination 
demarcates the shape of carceral experience such that even prison film documentaries 
perpetuate types and narratives deployed in popular mainstream fiction.  
These films, in claiming the real, produce history.  History is made in these 
films less in the resemblances and differences among them for what carceral 
experience is more accurate, and more in the struggle of competing interpretations.  It 
is made in the representations and conversations surrounding cultural artifacts such as 
these films, the discourse that sanctifies, qualifies, and specializes in them, discourse 
that would do well to draw together their disparate audiences.  Popular audiences, 
critics, and theorists too often dismiss as irrelevant the viewing experience of those 
whose investments seem different than their own.  Part of the distance between 
popular and critical audiences develops from the latter’s over-emphasis on criticism 
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as censure rather than analysis.   Film critics so often too fully engage the pejorative 
sense of the job description, not seeming to like very much the films they have 
watched the numerous times that detailed accounts require.  This seeming absence of 
any pleasure in viewing distances them from the viewers who see films for 
enjoyment, education, and distraction.  Indeed, the separation among critics, 
audiences, and theorists is tremendous.
For example, the theoretically invested critic of these prison films might 
attempt to sort them in Lacanian terms, delineating between their status as phi (Ф) or 
objet petit a—that is, whether they represent the imaginarization or the symbolization 
of the unattainable real.212  Possibly uncritical viewing treats them as the former, 
critical viewing the latter, and criticism never affirming the completeness of the order 
of representation thereby fulfills Žižek’s fourth position, that of the naysayer who 
suggests that telling history is a matter of sorting among the flurry of competing 
scripts, a sustained revision, telling the difference over and over again.  That constant 
skepticism is more in line with Deleuze and Guattari, for whom sorting between the 
fields of imaginary and symbolic is similarly a red herring, as the production of the 
real is the crux.  Crucial to these films are the social investments in the racism that 
equates blackness and criminality, contrasted with the blocked desire of inmates such 
as Crawford, Simmons, Tannehill, and Witherspoon—their desire for life such as that 
spoken in the latter’s life-affirming sentence, “I want real freedom.”  Furthermore, 
The Farm functions within the field of what Deleuze and Guattari describe as “minor 
literature,” given Rideau’s position as prisoner and co-director (as well as co-editor of 
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the collection Life Sentences [1992]), and the film’s enunciation of the collective 
social identity of prisoners for audiences not themselves imprisoned.213  In Certeau’s 
terms, the films take viewers for a walk in the prisons that are their real and imagined 
settings, representing the bars, cells, crimes, and visiting rooms that define enclosure.  
Prisoners’ bodies are thereby written in space.  In a fusion of Foucault and Lacan, 
Certeau describes the relationship of law and subject in carceral terms:  “Because the 
law is already applied with and on bodies, ‘incarcerat d’ in physical practices, it can 
make people believe that it speaks in the name of the ‘real’” (148).  Incarceration as 
an effect of law therefore inscribes not only actuality but also righteousness:  all 
prisoners are guilty of violent crime because th y are in prison.214
What is most important in this theoretical glossing is the degree to which it 
foregrounds the simultaneous desire for and unavailability of the real, which is 
precisely the crux of the films according to their popular and critical reviews.  
Various audiences of theorists, critics, reviewers, historians, and popular viewers can 
be joined because most—and likely all—viewers do not exclusively inhabit one 
identity or another.  I have hoped to demonstrate such cross-over in working among 
these various discourses of theory, review, and criticism within a selection of 1998 
and 1999 films set in prisons and united by claims to the real.  The analysis here of 
American History X and The Hurricane demonstrates the pervasiveness of 
imprisonment in the cultural imagination and the difficulty of drawing connections 
between that visibility of imagined imprisonment and the accompanying scarcity of 
its actual corollary.  The Farm presents a more difficult case, wherein a documentary 
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film that is thereby part of the historical record fulfills expectations shaped in popular 
imaginings.  What is at stake is telling the difference.
Telling the difference, testifying in a present that is itself constantly becoming 
the past, casts history in terms of performance, participation in a “now” whose 
textualization is a record, but never can be the stuff of the real itself.  These films, in 
attesting to their actuality, are part of the flurry of documents narrating the history of 
now, but “now” is fluid, dynamic, and like Certeau’s walk in the city, resists 
textualization.  In The Hurricane, Jewison scores documentary footage of 1974 
protests of Carter’s incarceration to Gil Scott-Heron’s song released that same year, 
“The Revolution Will not be Televised.”  The lyrics begin, “You will not be able to 
stay home, brother,” because the revolution will not be mediated, closing with “It will 
be live.”  Crawford’s mother says in her visit with her son, imprisoned for life at 
Angola, “This is no dream or nothing made up, this is for real.”  As the next chapter 
will demonstrate, the best efforts of representing prisoners will be “for real,” will 
include prisoners’ testifying, performing themselves in the history of now.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:
Staging Prisons and the Performance of History
INTERVIEWER:  Then you think it is possible to reconcile politics 
and literature?  To use the theatre or one’s fiction to achieve political 
ends?
BULLINS:  Oh, yes, if that is what you wish to do.
—An interview with Ed Bullins in the Negro American Literature Forum
[W]e don’t expect to find anything the same even one minute later 
because one minute later is history.
—Huey Newton, Black Panther Party co-founder
Books such as those by Faulkner, Cleaver, and Mailer circulate among 
audiences leaving scarce traces of the actual experience of their reading, and while 
sales figures, book clubs, awards, reviews, syllabi, and subsequent critical attention 
provide types of records, the act of the reading itself remains largely closed from 
analysis.  Films, too, often are viewed in more private spaces, and even theatrical 
screenings pose challenges to gauging a sense of any particular audience’s responses 
and investments.215  Two live performances from the fall of 1999 directly concerning 
imprisonment provide the basis for the analysis of this final chapter, first because 
their overlapping activist agendas invite audiences on the grounds of a pre-existing 
social commitment, and second, those audiences are materially present, providing a 
sense of their immediate reactions.  “Live from Death Row” is a series of death 
penalty protests staged with some conventions of theater, while Jury Duty is a drama 
based on a true story, performed once in the context of a fundraiser for a social work 
program.216
The first is a social and political ritual understood in theatrical terms, while 
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the second is a more traditional dramatic enterprise explicitly staged in one instance 
as doing social work, and the field of performance studies provides the tactics by 
which to pair these different though related sorts of cultural events.217  Both the 
protest and the play demonstrate how race and class inform criminality and its 
attendant imprisonment.  The former maintains the emphasis on the degree to which 
black masculinity has become commensurate with criminality, while the latter, in a 
focal character who is a white woman, expands in an important manner the sense of 
who is imprisoned.  This matter is given greater urgency by the fact that women, 
particularly women of color, are the fastest-growing group of prisoners in the U.S., 
according to the Department of Justice (“Additional Corrections”).  In a manner 
distinct from the greater ambiguity of most of the works surveyed in the prior 
chapters, both of these performances clearly protest aspects of imprisonment and the 
death penalty.  However, like Go Down, Moses, Soul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song, 
and The Farm, “Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty are less concerned with 
attesting the innocence of particular individuals than inviting their audiences to view 
criminality and incarceration as matters of social responsibility.  
It is not only performance studies per se that makes use of the strategies and 
the descriptive terms of  theater,218 as activism concerning imprisonment and its 
appraisal has done so before.  In Barred: Women, Writing, and Political Detention
(1992), Barbara Harlow refers to the 1990 indictment of the U.S. Government for 
violating the rights of political prisoners such as Mumia Abu-Jamal, an activist and 
writer whose death sentence has garnered much public and academic attention.  
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Harlow writes, “The staging of the tribunal followed months of preparation [...and 
involved] a set of temporary role reversals, (casting defending attorneys as 
prosecutors and prisoners as plaintiffs)” (181–82, emphasis added).  Harlow points 
the way toward challenging the distinction between prisoners and their others; the 
tribunal, held at the New York City Hunter College Playhouse, represents a social as 
well as linguistic reversal, a staged deconstruction of judicial process.  According to 
Harlow, such performances offer an important social function (184).  To show 
injustice, while not an end in itself, is an act of signification and significance, giving 
public voice and representative body to thesubaltern in ways that make inequity 
visible.  
In the case of Abu-Jamal, that tribunal sat at the midpoint of two decades of 
activist involvement that has seen his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment, 
though an international struggle continues for a judicial re-examination of his 
conviction.  The degree to which staged events such as the one Harlow describes 
contribute directly to subsequent legal action is a matter beyond the scope of this 
analysis.  My purpose instead219 is to describe how two performances situate 
themselves with regard to specific actualities of criminality and incarceration, how 
they hail their audiences, and how they thereby provide a model of plural identity 
upon which social action likely depends.  Like the other works surveyed in this 
dissertation, both performances emphasize their implication in their contemporary 
history and its practices of imprisonment.  Indeed, the protest “Live from Death Row” 
is a historical event only understood in its analysis here as a staged performance.
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Both “Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty demonstrate the production of a 
social body, and each illustrates a different sort of activism and performance 
implicated in the ethics of incarceration and execution with stakes in social justice 
and claims to the real.  The former is staged activism, social protest that employs 
tactics of performance, sometimes to mixed results, while the latter is activist 
performance, more conventional stage drama deliberately located within a particular 
political project.  In that terminological distinction between these two performances is 
their difference and the difference the difference makes; in their similarity can be 
made a model of agency that competes with bleaker Althusserean versions of human 
subjectivity.  The audiences such performances address are not an a priori monolith; 
their unity is invoked, hailed into becoming.  Social protests such as these either 
deliberately or inadvertently draw on the conventions of theater to produce the shared 
convictions of communitas in addressing their audiences via their political 
investments, treating such spectators as a social body joined in affect.  The method 
and purpose of these performances is to call into being an audience unified through a 
shared social commitment, an alliance that may or may not be directed toward 
specific political action, whether renewed dedication to one’s cultural work, protest, 
voting practices, letter writing campaigns, or other forms of activism.  “Live from 
Death Row” and Jury Duty hail audiences in their staging of personal and social 
history, and both provide a model of at least potentially participatory spectatorship.
“Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty
The social protest “Live from Death Row” has since 1998 conducted an 
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ongoing series of protests and is sponsored by the Campaign to End the Death 
Penalty.  The organization held its September 23, 1999 forum at the University 
Teaching Center at the University of Texas at Austin in conjunction with Mumia 
Awareness Week.  “Live from Death Row” takes its name from Abu-Jamal’s 1995 
volume of prison writings, a collection of essays drawing from personal observation, 
court records, and other research, almost always pairing the experience of the 
individual with a broader cultural history.  It is a rhetorical approach that has its 
clearest precedent in Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and Rideau’s award-winning Angolite
essays of the 1970s and 1980s, many of which are collected in Life Sentences.  The 
series of community-held forums circulate fliers, blanket emails, and employ other 
grassroots methods to invite an audience to hear prisoners on death row tell their 
stories, offering an opportunity for dialogue between those in and out of prison.  The 
implication is that to communicate “live” with death row inmates is more fully to 
conceive of them as alive and thus take a stand against their executions.  That 
particular September evening drew an audience of almost 100 spectators, mostly 
white students from the university.  Two administrators—both white men—of the 
local chapters of the activist organizations sponsoring the event began the forum, 
before giving way to an African American woman, Rosa Thigpen, mother of inmate 
Kenny Collins.  Thereafter, the prisoners Jody Lee Miles, John Booth, and Collins 
phoned in from prison first to give speeches and then to answer questions. 
The other performance, Jury Duty, was written and directed by Ken Webster 
and based on his experience as a member of a criminal trial jury in Travis County, 
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Texas, which rendered a guilty verdict, onvicting Rebecca Walton in the shooting of 
Luis Flores, and a subsequent 60-year prison sentence.  The play recounts in a series 
of retrospective monologues the story of a white female drug addict and prostitute 
who murdered her pimp, her trial, and thedeliberations about her culpability both by 
the accused and by several of the jurors during her sentencing.  The playwright 
acknowledges that he “wrote the play as a protest of a broken justice system, and as a 
release for myself after the unpleasant experience of being a participant in the broken 
process” (Webster 2003).  Indeed, an e-mail to friends in which Webster describes the 
painful experience of serving on the jury inadvertently served as an early draft of the 
play.  The performance was offered as a fundraiser for the Diversity Institute at the 
University of Texas at Austin’s School of Social Work and was held in the Social 
Work auditorium.  Institute staff preface the performance with a discussion of the 
program, mentioning the play only with regard to its role as a “perfect fundraiser” 
both because of its content and its cachet in being “based on a true story.” 
“Live from Death Row” features local activists, families of condemned 
inmates, and, via speaker-phone, inmates themselves.  For the September meeting, the 
staff has taped a photo of Abu-Jamal behind the lectern to one side, and a large sign 
hangs in the middle: “Stop Executions!” in big letters, subtitled with the forum’s 
sponsor, “Campaign to End the Death Penalty.” The panelists and their tabl  are at 
the center of the stage; a speaker phone and a microphone to one side complete the 
mise-en-scène.  After reminding the audience that the inmates will call after seven, 
Reese introduces the first panelist, Jim Harrington of the Texas Civil Rights Project.  
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The audience is silent while he speaks, except for the scribbling of pens and the 
occasional murmur of agreement or disgusted half-laugh of acknowledgment when 
Harrington cites that those on Death Row are mostly minorities, poor, mentally 
disabled—grist for what he describes three times as the “machinery of death.” When 
he finishes, the audience applauds, and Reese again reminds us that the convicts will 
call a little after seven—the repetition suggesting that their call is what we are really 
here for.  Until then, Thigpen, mother of one of the death row inmates, will speak.  
Thigpen, an African American woman in her early forties, says “Good 
evening,” and we reply in unison, “Good evening!”—a call-response oratory that 
continues, contrasting with the uninterrupted monologue of the previous white 
speaker.  She provides a brief narrative of her son’s trial and the incompetence of his 
court-appointed lawyer.  Collins maintained his innocence, and Thigpen shows a 
photograph of her son, one of her last, as the SuperMax prison in Baltimore, 
Maryland, will not allow photos of inmates to be taken.  Unlike Harrington, Thigpen 
frequently elicits our verbal response and invokes a “we” of which the audience is a 
part.  She says, for example, “The lawyer andthe judge are in cahoots together, as we 
well know,” and there are murmurs of agreement from the audience.
There are two important implications here, the first regarding class and the 
legal system, the second of cross-racial identification.  The alliance arrayed against 
the defendant is one that Gilmore in The Executioner’s Song gestures toward as well 
when he points out that the state psychiatrist judging him competent to stand trial is 
“paid by the same people who pay my lawyers.”  The doctor, his defense, opposing 
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counsel, and the judge all represent the “State of Utah.  I can’t win for losing” (370).  
In a related manner, The Hurricane calls attention to an all-white jury finding a black 
man guilty, a group described ironically by the judge as a “jury of our peers.”  
Judge, jury, and the lawyers for both defense and prosecution become part of the 
same machine of the state arrayed against the accused.  The convention of court-
appointed defense does play into the paranoia fostered in such trial narratives
organized around the defendant as the focal character, narratives that become part of 
the cultural imagination.  However, also part of that imagination are matters of the 
historical record, and lapses on the part of court-appointed defense counsel are legion 
and a matter of regional and national media attention.220
Thigpen’s assertion of complicity between judge and lawyers is one that “we 
well know.”  She invokes a “we” joining audience and speaker in a community with 
already well-formed, shared knowledge, ven if she does provide us with more; for 
example, she points out that there are no educational courses for her son in 
SuperMax, as there had been in the previous penitentiaries where he had served.  She 
implores those in the audience to help—almost all of us are students at the university 
housing the event—as she addresses us as a “we” comprised largely of young, white, 
middle-class men and women.  She asks us to speak out later in life when we are the 
leaders of our communities, to help “these people,” assuming that these people are 
not us, and that her audience will have the power to speak that she lacks.  Her claim 
belies the circumstances, given that she stands at the lectern and we are her audience.  
Nevertheless, her performance is an incredibly sophi ticated one, bridging and 
293
dividing the gaps between herself, her audience, and prisoners in a demonstration of 
the ways race and affluence mediate voice.  
Thigpen makes rhetorical moves that both breach cultural difference and 
reinscribe it.  She identifies the audience of mostly white college students as those 
who can change what she cannot.  Her appeals to a shared humanity assume that “we” 
know the inequities of the legal system and are prepared to help “these people,” 
including her son.  Indeed, “Live from Death Row” largely shapes its audience’s 
sense of itself by distinguishing “us” from “these people” in prison.  We are there to 
protest the death penalty, but we are also there to be reminded that “we” are not 
“these people.”  She identifies the audience as those who can speak and thus change 
what she cannot, whether because of our youth, our education, our class position, or 
the color of our skin.  Thigpen appeals to an essential, shared, and simple 
humanity,221 assumed in our presence as that protesting audience, a “we” who know 
the inequities of the legal system, who can help “these people.”  “Live From Death 
Row” in part produced the shared identity of its audience by distinguishing them from 
those in prison and offered the means to renew its unity in advertising the next protest 
against the death penalty.  We were there to be reminded of ourselves.
After the closing applause for Thigpen, Reese reminds us of the next protest 
date.  He asks us to take a stand when then Governor George W. Bush or another 
politician speaks in support of the death penalty.  Then the phone rings and Reese 
cocks the microphone closer to the speakerphone.  It is Jeannette, our link to inmate 
Jody Lee Miles.  When prison officials discovered “Live from Death Row,” they 
294
barred the prisoners from calling directly to the performance.  The prisoners are 
allowed phone calls only to friends and family.  Jeannette is a friend and our link.  
We cannot speak directly to the inmates, and audience members instead direct 
questions for the inmates to Reese.  He repeats those questions over the phone to 
Jeannette, who repeats them to the inmates on a second phone, and then relays the 
prisoners’ responses by holding the phone receiver with which she speaks to the 
inmates next to the phone with which she speaks to Reese.  When Reese explains 
these Byzantine barriers to us, we laugh, a surprising sound in this room.  The whole 
procedure is absurd, a farce—but it does reveal the circuitry of power at work, a 
Foucauldean system of concealment, control, and dis-identification, whereby 
extrinsic and repressive forces block the flow of the communication and self-
representation so formative of identity.  
Some of what Miles has to say disappears in the static of this enforced 
dislocation, but we get the general picture as he reads his statement.  He has lived on 
Maryland’s Death Row for two years and spent a year in prison prior to his move to 
SuperMax; he “know[s] how the system works.” What that system might be becomes 
clear only after Miles speaks ofthe enforcement of the death penalty even while “it’s 
transparent that there is no clear consensus among legislators and citizens concerning 
[it],” and he reiterates race as a primary determinant in its implementation.  He argues 
that a white person accused of killing a white person may receive the death penalty, 
and a black person accused of killing a white person likely will, but he claims that a 
white defendant in the murder of a black person has at most received a sentence of 11 
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years—a claim with more rhetorical force than historical accuracy, though indicative 
of general trends.  Miles repeatedly asserts his innocence, pointing out evidence used 
against him in his trial obtained through an illegal wiretap, evidence not objected to 
by his court-appointed lawyer.  In Miles’ polemic, the system works as a closed 
circuit of race and class, of enforced difference between white and black, of victims 
of the judicial process, and as a stark contrast between those who can afford attorneys 
and those who cannot. 
Miles’ voice grows indistinct when the phone transmission fades, as it often 
does.  During these lags, the audience silently faces the speakerphone.  A few look 
down at their tables in embarrassment, frustration, or straining to hear.  After Miles 
finishes, we clap only for a moment before realizing that the enforced complexity of 
the telecommunications system connecting this room to a prison in Baltimore 
prevents Miles from hearing our response.  The technological mediation grows more 
crippling to discourse when Thigpen’s son, Collins, begins speaking and the 
transmission is virtually nil.  Adjusting the microphone and the telephone and 
tinkering with the amplifier do not help.  A few remarks are clear though:  “thirteen 
years,” “SuperMax,” “I basically don’t know what lies ahead,” “subjected to being 
placed in a situation such as myself,” and “no matter what color you are.”  Collins’ 
speech is far less distinct than Gilmore’s voice, recorded by his lawyers with 
smuggled tape recorders to be transcribed by Schiller’s typists, where even after 
death, “Gilmore’s voice coming in over the earphones” is clear (1001).  Still, even if 
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his voice is garbled, Collins speaks at length and in detail about the challenges he has 
faced in the appeals process.  
Ironically, the constraints imposed by the institution make his meaning 
clearer:  we in the audience may not be able to hear, but our understanding of 
imprisonment increases in part precisely because we are not able to understand what 
Collins is saying.  Playwrights, theorists, and critics have grappled with the tension of 
theater and the representation of pain at least since Antonin Artaud.222  Critics of 
Artaud have suggested that the French visionary “wanted spoken words delivered, to 
some extent, for the sake of their sonority, explosiveness, sensuous and associative 
properties”—for their connotative rather than denotative qualities—to communicate 
not language but experience (Bermel 106).  This is exactly the unintended result for 
Collins, whose speech in its very unintelligibility best conveys his circumstances.  
The audience cannot understand Collins’ words, but thereby better understands his 
position and thus hears him better.  If this account offers too easy a gloss of his 
contested subjectivity, it certainly illustrates the technological mediation by which 
institutional power accomplishes its object:  the constructed silence and invisibility of 
prisoners, the difficulty of communicating from the inside to the outside.  The voices 
of the condemned speaking in an uintelligible broadcast is a version of Bel-
Imperia’s letter written in her own blood from prison to Hieronoimo, in Thomas 
Kidd’s Jacobean drama, the Spanish Tragedy—the meaning invested in the condition 
of writing or speaking overwrites the words themselves.
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There are several key similarities between “Live from Death Row” and Jury 
Duty.  Though the inmates of the former are men in prison and those of the latter are 
two actors playing roles, both are concealed in one way or another.  Collins and the 
others appear only in voice, while the actual circumstances upon which Jury Duty is 
based are overwritten by the ironic disclaimer in its program,  “Any similarities to 
any person, living or dead, is purely coincidental”—even though the play is 
introduced as being “based on a true story.”  Both performances stage dialogue 
between those in and out of prison, and both make extensive use of biographical and 
autobiographical monologues, as do S ul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song, The 
Hurricane, and The Farm.  
The reliance on biography and telling one’s own story is not surprising.  
According to Ioan Davies, who surveys the writing practices of prisoners in Writers 
in Prison, the performance of the narrative of self matches the actual writing that 
takes place in prison:  “Most prison writing is autobiographical, and yet, like all 
autobiographies, it is inserted into other situations” (120).  When one’s subjectivity is 
contested—which Foucault and Melossi and Pavarini argue is the primary function of 
imprisonment—speaking or writing the self offers an affirmation of selfhood in face 
of forces arrayed against it.  In Soul on Ice, Cleaver claims, “I started to write.  To 
save myself,” in part because prison can cause an inmate “to lose his sense of self” 
(34, 35).  The self-declarations of prisoners then are inserted into “other situations,” 
in Gilmore’s letters reframed in Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song, passages of 
Carter’s The Sixteenth Round incorporated verbatim in Jewison’s The Hurricane, and 
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the spoken autobiographical vignettes of prisoners in Angola included in The Farm.  
For Jury Duty, itself the work of a dramatist and jury member reconstructing the 
situation of a prisoner testifying on her own behalf, one of those “other situations” is 
a fundraiser for a social work program celebrating human diversity and cultural 
difference.
Jury Duty’s performance on October 9, 1999, was a special one-night 
performance, a benefit-fundraiser sponsored by the University of Texas at Austin’s 
School of Social Work for one of its programs, the Diversity Institute, described in 
the theater program as “a collaborative, multidisciplinary project of faculty, staff, 
students and community members [...] dedicated to advancing better understanding 
and more effective working relationships among the unique cultures of our society” 
(Diversity Institute).  Two staff members of the School of Social Work introduce 
what they repeatedly describe as a “perfect fundraiser,” perhaps because of its 
representation of cultural difference and the inequities of the legal system, its local 
setting, or its blending of humor, social realism, and empathy in the portrayal of drug 
addicts, economic and social poverty, and the violence to which such lack 
contributes.  
The two Diversity Institute representatives do not mention the play, though, as 
they discuss their program and invite DI participants in the audience to stand and be 
recognized; some do, and there is applause.  Carol Lewis, Associate Director for the 
Institute, is introduced as having an “other life” as an actor and dancer, but she speaks 
instead of the Institute.  Introducing these people, as well as staging the performance 
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in the auditorium of the School of Social Work, frames the drama less as a play than 
as social work.  This particular audience does not seem in any way unsettled by this.  
Rather with those at the proscenium asking Institute staff in the audience to stand and 
receive acknowledgment—a reversal of the typical audience applause for those 
onstage—we seem to be other than a typical theater crowd.  
Let me illustrate the distinction even while acknowledging the problems of 
such terms as “typical” and “we.” I attended primarily because it was activist 
performance.  My friend Jane, now a theater history professor, received notice of the 
fundraiser through her work as director for a student services program.  We arrived at 
the School of Social Work early, so before the show began we walked to the 
University of Texas at Austin Theater Building, where both Bertolt Brecht’s 
Threepenny Opera and Tenessee Williams’ Vieux Carré were playing that evening.  
We spoke with some acquaintances, then returned to join the audience for Jury Duty.  
Back in the auditorium, each of us noticed a change between this audience and the 
theater-goers we had just seen; it is difficult to pin down the exact difference.  At Jury 
Duty, Jane and I were both a part of and apart from others in the auditorium.  We, like 
everyone else, were there to see an activist performance, but our clothes, our 
conversation, our lack of familiarity with others in the audience tagged us as “other.”  
An informal survey after the show suggested that almost all of those in the audience 
knew one another from the School of Social Work.  They discussed current classes 
and local services, while Jane and I talked of critical distance and dramatic 
convention.  There was a community-is-here feeling of which we two were not 
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entirely a part.
Concerning the play itself:  the blocking is simple, with the 12 jury members 
sitting in two rows facing the audience.  Ten of the jury remain seated and silent 
throughout the drama.  A chair set stage right is for the defendant who never sits but 
stands between chair and jury when she speaks, directly addressing the audience.  Her 
monologues are interspersed with those f other characters who also rise to stand 
between the chair and the jury when they speak.  The various characters abandon the 
speaking position with a voiced need to go to the bathroom, the repeated dramatic 
device for stage exit.  Other conventions established within the play are employed 
less regularly.  For example, though Bruce, the jury spokesperson, claims that his 
monologue is “all in my head,” his commentary does elicit some nonverbal response 
from the other jurors, and when one, Maggie, later speaks, she is very much aware of 
Bruce’s earlier monologues.  The jury members never speak while they sit, 
maintaining an unbroken gaze on the various speakers to their right, reproducing the 
audience’s communal spectatorship and focusing our gaze on the primary speakers.  
These include the defendant accused of murdering the pimp Chico, Becky Wallace 
(played by Mary Furse), as well as Michael, an accessory to the murder (played by 
Judson L.  Jones), and jurors Bruce and Maggie (played by Corey Gagne and 
Margaret Ann Hoard).  
Becky constructs a community of mostly absent characters, of other drug 
users, pimps, and prostitutes.  She talks about Michael and Chico before they arrive 
onstage.  The appearance of the dead pimp Chico (played by Titos Menchaca) at the
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close, exchanging his violence in life for complacency and knowledge in death, ends 
an escalating conflict between the defendant Becky and Bruce through mediation.  
The conflict between the two speaking jurors gives way to tension between Becky 
and her primary defender, between Bruce’s “self-righteous” defense of Becky on 
humanistic grounds and the failure of that argument to significantly reduce her 
sentence.  Other than a brief but telling interaction between Becky and Michael when 
she accuses him of telling her story and he replies, “It’s my story too,” the dialogue at 
the close is the first time that characters onstage have spoken to one another.  Bruce 
tells some of Becky’s story as well, “a grim tale of the worst possible childhood you 
can imagine,” though she narrates most of her own personal history.  She speaks of 
needing drugs so badly that she prostituted herself, and amplifies the magnitude of 
that need in acknowledging that, though a lesbian, she had sex with men.  Becky 
addresses the audience directly, asking the heterosexual men, “can you imagine 
sucking dick?” and similarly of the women, “or eating pussy? How bad do you want 
it?” Forced heterosexuality, against the grain of desire, becomes the high price Becky 
was forced to pay, the harsh terms and description an effort to force the audience to 
engage the pain they represent.223
Furse performs Becky Wallace in the Brechtian manner of epic acting that 
Harry Elam notes as common to social protest performance.  In this tradition, the 
actor “functioned not only as the character but as a commentator on the actions of the 
character [...and] compelled the audience to evaluate the social, political, and 
economic circumstances that created the character” (110).  Playwright and director 
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Webster constructs Becky’s lived history to position her in the denouement of violent 
murder, even as he presents the juror Maggie to challenge the inevitability of the 
violence emerging from that history.  Whereas Bruce sees her act as unavoidable 
given her circumstances, Maggie assumes Becky’s culpability.  The two offer a 
convenient binary of mercy and justice.  It is also the divide of historical determinism 
versus individual autonomy and agency, subject-to and subject-of, akin to the tensions 
raised in Faulkner’s novels and between Cleaver’s and Mailer’s sense of human 
possibility.  In terms of spectator identification, the social work students and 
professionals in the audience are not likely to see their present selves represented in 
the stories told by characters such as the self-described “crack whore” Becky and 
drug user Michael, both imprisoned for murder; or Chico as he is invoked early in the 
play, a purveyor of sex, drugs, and violence, and dead to boot.  In a move akin to 
Jewison’s ironic cut to Carter’s all-white jury in The Hurricane, Becky describes her 
own as a “jury of my peers, as they say [PAUSE]”—implying that they in fact are 
not.    
The jury may not see themselves in Becky any more than she sees herself in 
her jury; however, the jury does mirror the audienc .  In terms of staging, they are 
largely silent watchers, their gaze, like those of the audience members, fixed on 
whoever speaks.  The jury performs the reflection of the spectators, an expansion of 
what Vsevolod Meyerhold and Tom Stoppard sought to accomplish in scenery by 
framing the stage with large mirrors or suggesting a huge mirror as a backdrop 
(Bennett 6; Stoppard 2432).  The unpublished script of Jury Duty underscores this 
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role in its description of the jury:  “Ten of them are either audience members or 
special guest actors” (Webster 1999).  Actual spectators are intended to perform the 
jury’s reflection of the audience.  Within the context of the performance, the jury 
collectively bears witness and sometimes individually offers responses to Becky’s 
history and crime.  Bruce points out the institutional and personal causes for Becky’s 
current situation, addresses drug addiction as a disease, claims that the state’s social 
welfare and legal systems let her down, and repeatedly maintains that she was “forced 
to have sex to keep a roof over her head.”  On the other hand, Maggie opts for justice 
rather than mercy, asking what sort of “message” a soft ruling for murder would send.  
A prison sentence becomes exactly that, a linguistic act, communicating what is 
thought and believed to be true of crime and punishment. 
Both representative jurors perform the compromises necessary for the 
unanimity required of juries by the law.  After determining guilt or innocence, the 
jury must next, if delivering a verdict of guilty, determine the sentence.  The jury can 
deliberate as long as it needs— o long as its final judgments are singular.  Like the 
collective population of Jefferson brought together by Stevens to witness the return of 
Butch Beauchamp at the close of Go Down, Moses, the jury is an assembly defined 
by its riven differences; unlike those citizens, though, the jurors must not only witness 
history but decide it.  Jurors Bruce and Maggie occupy dramatically opposed 
positions concerning what constitutes guilt, agency, and just punishment.  Each also 
makes clear that the other jurors differ from them, particularly in terms of Becky’s 
reproductive rights, as both recognize that one group of jurors subscribing to eugenics 
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was primarily concerned that Becky remain in prison past her childbearing years.  So 
various allegiances form and lines of disagreement are drawn among the disparate 
jurors.  This is not the jury of the central trial of The Hurricane, whose only 
characteristics are a shared whiteness and verdict of guilty.  The jury of Jury Duty is a 
perfect illustration of an institutional social body, the state’s jury selection process 
“hailing” it into being.  The individuals summoned were not a jury until selected; 
once selected, their membership constituted a particular and localized sociality, which 
subsequently becomes for the audience a model of the plural subject.  The social body 
of the jury in the theater mirrors the social worker audience—an “I” comprised of and 
compromised by its various and contradictory “we’s.”
However, in performance, Jury Duty departs from its plural and conflicted 
jury, a “we” forced by a legal apparatus to speak in one voice, when the play departs 
from its “true story” to swing sharply to the imaginary, as the character of the murder 
victim Chico appears and offers Becky forgiveness.  Like Gilmore’s ghost in The 
Executioner’s Song visiting Pete Galovan to explain, forgive, and acknowledges 
(997), Chico appears to redeem Becky.  Considering that redemption comes from the 
murder victim himself, his authority is unequivocal.  Chico is less a deus ex machina
than machina ex deus, a machine of love and grace sprung from death to resolve the 
core conflict of the drama, transforming crisis into reconciliation.  Brechtian 
alienation gives way to conventional catharsis.  Chico offers a character who 
reflexively acknowledges his own past by both recuperating it and maintaining 
critical distance from it.  Chico identifies with violence and degradation, even the 
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ultimate deprivation of his own murder, while still manifesting empathy.  His cruel 
history and mysterious knowledge give him absolute authority in mediation; he is the 
social worker par excellence.  The auditorium audience sees itself physically mirrored 
in the rows of seated jurors—a collective audience—who offer until this point an 
excellent model of social agency, the various tensions that a person must resolve in 
taking a stand.  The arrival of Chico undermines that complexity, smoothing out the 
difficulties of human experience.  Audience members are invited to see themselves 
reflected in the transformed Chico, so knowing and forgiving.  
The magical resolution means that the jury, the audience’s mirror, no longer 
needs to debate the agency of human action working through the tension between 
circumstance and autonomy.  The symbolic order of the rule of law, where a social 
body is called upon after internal debate to speak univocally, is erased in favor of an 
imaginary unity, a specter of forgiveness.  For the audience of social workers, Jury 
Duty, in its last scene, dodges the complex social subjectivity it has heretofore 
modeled.  The tension played out in the jury’s debate with itself is evacuated by the 
fantasy of absolute knowledge.  In effect, the ghost of Chico lets the jury, and by 
extension the audience, off the hook—at least until the final lines of the play.  Becky 
asks Chico what death is like.  Chico, in the tradition of the ghost of Hamlet’s father, 
replies, “I can’t tell you.”  Becky asks, “Is it better than bein’ alive?”  Chico can only 
shrug, and exit; light fades on the jury and lingers only a little longer on Becky.  For 
this particular theater audience of social workers, the close of the play is a demand to 
renew their commitment so that those with whom they work can harbor more hope.  
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Like the audience of “Live from Death Row,” their personal commitments are 
addressed and affirmed.  Here the commitment is professional as well, and the box 
office proceeds to which they have contributed are donated to the social work 
organization in which many of them participate.  They are reminded of themselves.
Audiences as social bodies and “one minute later is history”
“Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty reflect both halves of what Richard 
Schechner describes as the “double-mirror” of performance:  the theatrical reading of 
cultural moments and the cultural account of theatrical representation (296).  That 
“double-mirror,” which has proven foundational for performance studies, offers a 
means to read activism and performance forward and backward, as staged activism 
and activist performance.  By activist performance, I mean a production explicitly 
acknowledging itself as theater and framed by dramatic convention that associates 
itself with a particular social project.  While such a performance may or may not 
utilize Brechtian or other forms of narrative disruption and audience estrangement, 
the subject matter of activist performance makes its alliances explicit.  Staged 
activism, on the other hand, even if it employs theatrical strategies of representation, 
asserts that what the audience experiences is really real. 
Just as in the films surveyed in Chapter Four, there is a crucial difference 
between Collins phoning in from Supermax prison and an actor performing a 
character on trial.  Indeed, like the case of John Artis appearing at a human rights 
symposium screening The Hurricane, one of the fundamental goals of staged activism 
is telling the difference between the two, providing the space for people to describe 
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their positions in their own words, communicating as fully as possible the 
circumstances and actualities of their circumstances.  Elaine Scarry argues that the 
collective effort to challenge inequity “depends centrally on its ability to 
communicate the reality of physical pain to those who are not themselves in pain,” 
and therefore “the human voice must aspire to become a precise reflection of material 
reality” (9).  The garbled transmission of Collins in “Live from Death Row” and the 
character Becky’s haunting final lines in Jury Duty both represent powerful examples 
of such aspirations of human voice—though there is the substantial difference of the 
actuality of the former and the fantasy of the latter.  However much the play may be 
based on a true story, that final dialogue is the playwright’s effort to stage a sense of 
despair rather than communicating exact circumstances.  Yet there are two actual 
people whose experience shapes those words:  the defendant upon whom Webster 
based the character of Becky, Rebecca Walton, and Webster himself, the director’s 
own pain regarding his participation in a “broken process.”
Though an activist performance, Jury Duty is extremely conventional in that 
the interaction between actors onstage and seated audience remains sharply regulated; 
they speak and move, while we sit and offer only laughter, silence, and applause.  
Similarly, “Live from Death Row” employs conventions that dictate how the 
principals and the audience interact.  The performance attempts to revise those 
conventions by facilitating direct communication between the audience and the 
inmates.  However, the mechanical difficulties that so precisely described the 
condition of those imprisoned also re-inscribed the gulf between those in and out of 
308
prison, inhibiting the dialogue it tried to establish.  The technical problems reference 
the cultural and material differences between those in and out of prison.  Jury Duty
may leave space for the audience to see itself reflected in the dynamic of its jury, but 
not its defendant.  
Both the play and the protest “Live from Death Row,” presume a social 
difference between their audiences and prisoners.  As Thigpen made clear, the agency 
she imagines of her audience was based on the difference between the free and the 
incarcerated, a difference suggested in the circumstances of that particular 
performance as one between white and black.  The audience may have more clearly 
understood Collins’ precarious position because they could not see him or hear him 
distinctly.  However, the audience did not necessarily hear themselves in the prisoner, 
a matter of identification.  This unbridged gap between those in and out of prison 
poses a strategic challenge to staged activism and activist performances positioned 
against imprisonment practices.  
The performances discussed differ greatly from prison theater programs which 
stage shows within prison walls for and by prisoners (Thompson 1998; Taylor 2001; 
Moller 2003).  Activist performance and staged activism both resemble some aspects 
of the “social protest performances” Elam describes, particularly in terms of their 
representation of specific social groups and opposition to what those groups conceive 
of as unjust conditions.  However, activist performance and staged activism differ 
from such social protest performances in the ways in which they communicate to 
their audiences.  Elam claims that the latter modeled resistance and “direct[ed] the 
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audience to take action,” “affirmed cultural unity,” and in all of the instances he 
describes is contingent upon shared race nd class markers and direct interaction 
between actors and audience (12, 14, 128).  Performances such as those of El Teatro 
Campesino and the Black Revolutionary Theater Movement treat the theater’s fourth 
wall as a two-way mirror which both reflects and can be seen through, a means by 
which spectators not only recognize themselves and their struggles on stage, but 
verbally or physically engage those representations during the production.  They are 
less apart from the play than a part of the work.  
Activist performance and staged activism, on the other hand, neither require 
the active participation of the audience nor reflect the identity of that audience.   
Staged for audiences not themselves in prison, reinscribing the differences between 
prisoners and audience members, and maintaining theatrical conventions of largely 
passive audiences, Jury Duty and “Live From Death Row” do not provide a clear 
directive for what their audiences should do with regard to their shared social projects 
of protesting the death penalty and addressing imprisonment as a raced, classed 
practice.  At one level, they only remind their audiences of their shared belief, 
without providing clear means by which to transform that belief to action.  
Given the lack of audience-incarcerated identification in the activist 
performance of Jury Duty and the staged activism of “Live from Death Row,” and the 
lack of a clear strategy for what their audiences should do after the performances, I 
seem to be painting a bleak picture of their efficacy.  However, what these 
performances do accomplish is of vital importance.  These performances invite their 
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audiences to share social and professional commitments in the opposition to the death 
penalty in “Live from Death Row” and the social work of Jury Duty.  Furthermore, 
these two performances conduct a rich model of social subjectivity, particularly the 
latter in its representation of the collective jury, its competing viewpoints, its final 
sentence.  Lastly, acknowledging the very gulf drawn between those in and out of 
prison re-inscribed in these events is a recognition of difference that allows it to be 
seen anew, its re-vision.
The social subjectivity modeled in these two performances is one of 
interpellated communal spectatorship.  Of course, “interpellate” immediately invokes 
Althusser, whose widely regarded—though not unchallenged—claim of subjects as 
hailed into being Janelle Reinelt and others have read as “anesthetizing” in that it 
“seemed to dematerialize agency and opposition” (4).  However, the manner in which 
Jury Duty and “Live From Death Row” address their audiences makes available a 
recuperation of interpellation, a recovery that strips the term of its repressive
connotations.  Althusser’s example of the policeman’s call hailing the subject 
involves both the threat and the guilt presumed in such a call (171- 74).  The example 
of the policeman assumes a wholly asymmetrical relation of authority, but that 
implication elides the more complex situation the term “interpellation” carries with it, 
that of “a question put by a member of a legislative assembly to a minister or member 
of the government” (Oxford English Dictionary Online).  This richer 
conceptualization of interpellation grants greater authority and shifts identity from the 
isolated singular to the participatory plural.  The subject is a participant, a member of 
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a larger assembly.  
In Jury Duty, the titular jury whose duty it is to consider its own conflicting 
positions before finally speaking in one voice best models such a social subjectivity, a 
union of singular and plural.  The “I/we” of that social body, like activism and 
performance read in the double-mirror, reads two ways.  Such a body is at once the 
multiple and contradictory investments of an individual, and the unity of a group
hailed by common allegiance.224  Staged performance thus becomes the crucible that 
fuses social body and individual body, united in affect.  Similarly, Scarry associates 
agency with a collective subject, the need for social action best predicated upon a 
larger understanding of self, a self beyond one’s own skin.225  The social body 
operates as a metaphor to mobilize social action:  if “I” extend beyond my skin, “I” 
am more likely to extend the boundaries of what will cause me to act on my own 
behalf.  
Scarry’s implication of enlarging one’s elf speaks to Foucault’s point that 
concludes Chapter Three:“The soul is the effect and instrument of a political 
anatomy:  the soul is the prison of the body” (Discipline 30).  That is, the rigid 
rhetoric of the autonomous individual sharply limits agency; de-stabilizing that 
subject enables social and contingent (rather than individual and autonomous) 
agency.  The I/we of the social body as audience of staged activism and activist 
performance226 is at once singular and plural, comprised of individuals hailed by 
allegiance to the activist project at hand.  Such a sense of hailed audienceship may 
counter some aspects of Althusser’s sense of singular interpellation, but it accords 
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with the claim specifically of theater (and Brechtian theater at that), which can offer 
“the production of a new spectator, an actor who starts where the performance ends” 
(For Marx 51).    
The value of such a hailed audienceship cannot be determined solely on the 
basis of what immediate historical changes it brings about.  For example, no prisoners 
are released, any more than the 1990 tribunal saw the immediate commutation of 
Abu-Jamal’s death sentence; resistance is a process of transformation pitted against 
tremendous social and historical forces.  The raced and classed prison populations 
contested by “Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty are only recent examples of a 
history that goes back at least as far the U.S.’s first prison, as a disproportionate 
number of black men and women filled Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Jail as early as 
1790 (Patrick-Stamp 95).  Nevertheless, the opacity and silence of the prison system 
is challenged by these kinds of public performances.  Prisons by definition conceal 
their practices of erasure in a manner rendered audible by inmates such as Miles and 
Collins.  To be enacted, social change must first be voiced, and Jury Duty and “Live 
from Death Row” both give voice to otherwise largely silenced populations, drawing 
attention to the actuality of incarceration at a time when many representations of 
imprisonment fill a shape determined in a cultural imagination in tension with 
historical actuality.  These two performances hail their respective audiences in a 
manner that reminds these audiences of their opposition to a raced and classed prison 
system.  However, both performances also reinforce the difference between “we” and 
“these people,” a distinction that limits just how far the borders of the social body 
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might be breached.  
Still, embedded within these performances are at least two distinct strategies 
by which those limits might be tested.  First, there is the role Webster plays as writer 
and director of Jury Duty.  In drawing from his own experience as jury member, he 
demonstrates that the mechanisms of the U.S. legal system are such that its citizens 
are implicated in the set of claims and counterclaims that determine criminality and 
its attendant imprisonment.  Second, while the analysis offered of “Live from Death 
Row” addresses it as a performance, it remains a historical event understood only 
here as staged, employing theatrical convention.  As such, that reading might seem to 
run the risk of aestheticizing politics, which Walter Benjamin has famously 
associated with fascism.227  However, there is a difference between deploying politics 
as art and interpreting political acts within a framework of analysis sensitive to both 
history and the mechanisms by which audiences may identify themselves vis-à-vis 
that moment.  The culturally and historically nuanced interpretive practices pervasive 
in the past two decades of humanities study provide a powerful set of tools not only 
for the analysis of books and films, but performances— ven, and perhaps especially, 
when what is performed is history itself.
Such an understanding is a literalization of history, its textualization and the 
analysis as to how its fleetingly available experience operates rhetorically.  Of course, 
it is not unexpected to explore what some event means; at stake is what some 
confluence of actualities does.  The juror Maggie is concerned about what sort of 
“message” mercy might send, and while she is a fictional character, her words echo 
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not only the playwright Webster’s fellow jury member upon whom her character is 
based, but the words of the “tough on crime” politicians and their electorates, whether 
cited by ACA officials or criminologists (Roberts and Stalans 31-3 ).  Such a sense 
of a verdict and its accompanying prison sentence sending a message understands 
historical events as functioning rhetorically, and performance is the closest 
opportunity to “read” the real of history, not what it denotes, but how it works.  Such 
an account is the reverse of the theatricality described in The Executioner’s Song.
Mailer describes events in theatrical terms, in Gilmore’s presentation in court likened 
to stage and film acting, the prison officials rehearsing his execution,228 and the 
execution itself as a play of stage and spectators (675, 677; 916; 974, 979, 980, 981).  
As staged and acted, the events seem unreal.  This is the sense of theater critiqued by 
Deleuze and Guattari, who would replace theater with history (Anti-Oedipus 381).  
However, just as the purposes and methods of literary studies change after a 
historical turn, and “the personal is political” and “always hi toricize” are axiomatic 
to the point of becoming clichés, reading history as performance need not aestheticize 
and thus anesthetize it.  Instead, such an understanding draws attention to the 
ephemeral quality of the real of history and the necessity to provide as full a record, 
as thick a description, as possible, even while recognizing the impossibility of doing 
so completely.  And just as the ephemeral quality of performances means that no two 
are the same, history as performance leaves available the possibility of change as 
suggested by Huey Newton.  No more than he can we “expect to find anything the 
same even one minute later because one minute later is history” (qtd. in Clemons and 
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Jones 30).At stake is what sort of historical change, what new possibilities prove 
emergent at the expense of others.  
Conclusion
The previous chapters of this dissertation chronicle how a Southern racist 
imagination cast black men as criminals, a trend recorded in the early National Prison 
Association transcripts and historiography chronicling the Jim Crow era, as well as in 
Faulkner’s fiction.  That dangerous equation broadened nationally to be represented 
and critiqued in the writing not only of Cleaver (and to a limited extent Mailer), but 
American Correctional Association officials, and it is also pervasive in films at the 
end of the twentieth century.  These chapters also document the diminishing 
possibilities for how various types of criminality might be defined and addressed, 
from the individuation of prisoners in the 1930s, to first the revolutionary possibilities 
of 1968 and then their foreclosure in the 1970s thereafter, with the nearly unilateral 
practice of incarceration for an increasing array of offenses through the 1980s, the 
enforcement of which specifically targeted inner city communities in a manner 
capitulating to cultural expectation.  Challenging the imagination and thereby 
contributing to the transformation of history demands writing its genealogy, naming 
the past and tracing the ways in which it has produced both the dramatic inequities 
and the imaginations of the present—testifying in order to imagine a different future. 
It is one thing to imprison those who have committed violent crimes in order 
to incapacitate them, to deprive of liberty the peopl  convicted of committing felonies 
that pose illegitimate threats to the liberties, lives, pursuits, and properties of others.  
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When prisons are imagined to contain only such violent, often murderous offenders, it 
is extremely difficult for those not in prison to recognize themselves in prisoners such 
as these.229  However, these two performances, like the previous texts surveyed in this 
dissertation, call attention to the degree to which punishment is a raced and classed 
enterprise.  Chapter One lays the basis not only for prison history to be best 
understood as national history, but demonstrates how it has been a raced practice, a 
matter best illustrated by a southern prison administrator in 1888 claiming that 
prisons exist in order to house freed slaves (NPA 70).  Chapter Two points out how 
Faulkner’s fictional Jefferson desires Joanna Burden’s murder to be a “Negro crime,” 
just as a nameless Southerner tells a visitor in 1908 that “we feel like killing a nigger” 
irrespective of guilt or even any offense at all (Oshinsky 100).  The narrative arc of 
Go Down, Moses follows Lucas Beauchamp’s father to Lucas’ grandson, the first 
pages opening with an escaped slave, progressing through the threats and 
persecutions of Jim Crow, to a Northern prison’s execution of Butch.  That native son 
returns to a Jefferson no longer imagined of one mind, but divided by lines of identity 
painstakingly united for a moment, assembled to witness his return.  
Chapter Three tracks the potential for progressive change and its loss, as
discussions of crime as historically and socially situated and punishment as raced in 
1968 transform to crime addressed as a raceless, random, and all-perv sive 
phenomenon that can only be met with incarceration.  These transformations are 
especially visible between the Cleaver (and Mailer) of 1968 and the Mailer (and 
Cleaver) of 1979, but the changes are just as visible in the presentations of prison 
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wardens, Governors, and members of the ACA during that period.  Chapter Four 
describes films set in prison i  the 1990s, prisons almost uniformly depicted as places 
of personal salvation, where even the black men unfairly imprisoned benefit from the 
experience.  At the same time, the U.S. prison system surpasses every other country 
in terms of both rates of incarceration and the overall population of prisoners, and 
black men are radically overrepresented in those numbers.  
In this fifth and final chapter, the “Live from Death Row” speaker and 
prisoner Miles, a white man, critiques at length the raced implementatio  of the death 
penalty, a critical matter as well in Abu-Jamal’s book from which the series of 
protests takes its name (12, 29-33, 77).  The ghost of Chico in Jury Duty tells the 
sympathetic juror, Becky, and the audience that the “death penalty is for killin’ cops 
or pretty white girls.”  The pairing of “pretty white girls” and police officers implies 
both the cultural myth of lynching cited in Chapter Two and the tension regularly 
igniting between police forces and black and ethnic communities that is the 
background to Chapters Three and Four.230  The character of Becky (and the real 
person upon whom she is based) will not be executed, but her criminality remains a 
foregone conclusion for the jury of her “peers, as they say.”  Chico acknowledges, 
“Those people had made up their minds. They didn’t see no person.  They saw a 
junkie whore.”  The jury had already decided her fate because they recognized her not 
as a human being but as an addict and prostitute, terms that recall the variations of 
“dope-fiend whore” so often repeated in Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun. Crime in 
these terms is a personal failure determined by identity difference, in which a jury 
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who would not see themselves as peers of the accused, who do not recognize 
themselves in the criminal, see in Becky what Gavin Stevens first sees in Butch:  a 
“seed not only violent but dangerous and bad.”
Re-imagining those incarcerated in other ways demands greater attention both 
to the broad cultural trends of race and class divisions just described, and to the 
historical actualities of imprisonment chronicled throughout the previous chapters.  
Imprisonment thereby is divorced from a direct correlation to a violent or murderous 
offense, linked instead to unemployment, poverty, drug use, and the racism of 
profiling, targeted arrests, and inequitable sentencing.  The 1993 president of the 
ACA cites an example of four black youths in Michigan all sentenced to life for 
simple robberies, just one case of many where the correlating indicators of sentencing 
are not the severity of the crime, but race, age, and gender (3).  Certainly, many 
people in prison have committed serious crimes that endanger others, crimes that 
demand their separation.  However, the conception that all prisoners are guilty of 
such offenses fails to take into account the radical expansion of incarceration as the 
sine qua non of punishment taking place in the U.S. since the mid-1970s.  According 
to the U.S. Department of Justice, property crime has declined steadily since 1973, 
violent offenses since 1993, yet the prison population doubled in the 1980s and again 
in the 1990s.231  Broadening the criminality of drug use, aggressively targeting black 
and poor populations, and dismantling treatment programs increased the proportion of 
substance abuse offenders and over-represents black men in prisons and jails.  Drug 
arrests among adults quadrupled between 1970 and 2002, from 322,300 to over 1.3 
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million (“Estimated Arrests”).  Prisons have filled not with murderers and rapists but 
with drug users, most often poor, black, and Hispanic.
There is thus a sharp divide in the quite basic matter between the crimes 
prisoners are imagined to commit and actual offenses.  For example, the prisoners—
real and imagined—surveyed in the books, films, and performances of this 
dissertation are all convicted of murder, assault, and rape, and these sorts of 
representations create in the cultural imagination a sense that prisons unilaterally 
warehouse dangerous, even murderous offenders.  The gulf between actuality and 
imagination in this regard helps foster the apathy and even more pernicious hard-line 
positions of politicians and electorates, a reactionary perspective insidiously made 
easier when criminals and thus prisoners are presumed to be black.  However, that 
very rhetoric of “tough on crime” can be turned against itself—for which crimes, and 
committed by whom, are targeted?   Participation in drug use and sex for money 
brands the Becky of Jury Duty a “junky whore (just as Nancy Mannigoe is a “nigger 
dope-fiend whore” in Requiem for a Nun) and thus predetermines her criminality in 
the view of the jury.  However, the back page advertisements of many large city 
weekly periodicals routinely feature advertisements for marijuana, as well as Xanax, 
Valium, Vicodin, and other prescription pharmaceuticals used recreationally, all for 
sale via on-line pharmacies promising discretion; other ads invite young women to 
work for escort services, and solicit customers.  It is not the general crimes of illegal 
drug use and prostitution that police and courts must strictly enforce and prisons 
thereby punish.  Instead, laws differentiate the manner in which particular populations 
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commit transgressions from how more privileged groups (such as white middle and 
upper classes) do so.  
The clearest expression of how offenses are distinguished brought into focus
in the huge disparities in minimum sentencing for possession of cocaine between its 
crack and powder forms.  The former is cheaper and more frequently used by low 
income, inner city populations.  The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 equated the 
possession of five grams of crack cocaine with 500 grams of powdered cocaine, an 
equation of personal use of the former with large-scale trafficking of the latter.  For 
example, given White House estimates, those quantities represent street values of 
$500 to $1000 of crack versus upwards of $25,000 to $50,000 of cocaine (Walters 3).  
Several high profile cases have further tagged crack as a “black” drug,232 though a 
federal commission determined in 1995 that only one-third of crack cocaine users 
were black.  However, nearly 85% of those convicted for possession were black, a 
factor at least suggesting targeted arrest patterns (U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Chapters 7 and 8, Appendices B and C).  A 1989 National Institute of Drug Use 
survey determined that 12% of drug users are black men and women, but 44% of 
those arrested for possession are black (qtd. in ACA 1992 197).  Norval Morris, who 
for over two decades has been the most prominent historian of the U.S. prison system, 
similarly references identical rates of drug use among racial groups.  However, while 
rates of arrest for drug crimes were the same among white and black offenders in 
1968, they had increased fivefold in arrests of black men and women by 1990 (“The 
Contemporary Prison” 214-215).  Racially targeted arrests thereby over-represent 
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black men and women in prison.  
That problem is compounded by the mandatory minimum sentences initiated 
by the Sentence Reform Act of 1984 and the far harsher penalties for crack cocaine 
instituted in the Anti-Drug Act of 1986. Radically increased sentencing meant those 
arrested were more likely to serve longer sentences, given incarceration’s increased 
frequency, duration, and mandatory minimums.  Drug arrests in the 1980s and 1990s 
targeted inner city populations, particularly black and Hispanic users (Tonry 19-20; 
see also Chapter Eight of The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 1995 report).  The 
tremendous discrepancies in sentencing for crack offenders are d scribed by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in a dissenting opinion as “three to eight 
times longer” than those meted for possession of cocaine in its powdered form (U.S. 
v. Christopher Lee Armstrong [1996]).  A senior circuit judge makes the same point 
at the 1993 ACA meeting (114) in a paper on the failures of mandatory sentencing 
titled “Revise the Guidelines Now.”  
Another paper at the same conference given by chair of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission identifies related problems and makes recommendations t  address them 
(ACA 1993 107-111).  The chair identifies that the “most logical resolution”  to 
mandatory sentencing would be to eliminate them and institute guidelines, but “such 
a prospect is not politically feasible” (111).  A Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections Commissioner similarly identifies“ that elected officials are reluctant to 
say or do anything that appears to be soft on crime” (ACA 1993 77).  Not 
effectiveness, fairness, or logic, but political weakness is the primary cause for 
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sentencing practices that continue to incare ate too many for too little.  In 1995, the 
ACA itself shifted from its declared principles that had defined criminality since 1870 
to a more “dynamic and flexible” vision statement advocating greater community 
involvement and legislative address of the causes of crime (347-348).  However, such 
vision is optative, and public policy remains far more myopic.
Like the “probable felon” list developed in Florida for the 2000 national 
election, arrest and sentencing patterns i  the 1980s and 1990s suggest that these 
punishments are not designed to eliminate crimes so much as incorporate them in a 
larger strategy of subjugation.  Whether or not incarcerating a raced and classed 
population of prisoners has been the intent of law enforcement, the judicial system, 
and prison administrations is immaterial.  As with the Voter Rights Act, it is the 
effect of disenfranchisement that is the key.  That effect begins with the Rockefeller 
drug laws spreading nationally in the 1970s, continues in the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984 that virtually eliminates discretionary sentencing at the federal level, and 
hugely escalates with the Reagan administration’s Anti-Drug Act in 1986, cemented 
by its expansion two years later.  William J. Bennett, the highly conservative critic of 
education, morality, and politics, served as both President Reagan’s and President 
George H. W. Bush’s drug czar, and his deputy John P. Walters became the Whi e 
House Director of National Drug Control Policy for the subsequent President Bush’s 
administration in 2001.  
The Clinton administration offered little in terms of difference in this regard.  
In his final year, President Bill Clinton granted clemency for five individuals serving 
323
extensive sentences for minimal participat on in the drug trade (Bernstein, Dumas), 
but resisted broader, more systemic changes, siding with Congress in rejecting the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission’s recommendations to address the racial disparities 
brought about by the inequitable minimum sentences initiated under Reagan.  A 
willingness to view black and low-income populations as criminals, a hard-line 
conservative stance casting drug use in general as a moral failure and certain forms of 
drugs as beyond the pale, and the political fear of being perceiv d as soft on crime 
combine to make pre-determined criminality at once the cause and effect of 
jurisprudential conviction.  Many prisoners—like the character and self-described 
“crack whore” Becky Wallace of Jury Duty, like Rosa Thigpen’s son Kelly Collins in 
“Live from Death Row”—are thereby differentiated less by their crimes than by the 
poverty, race, or other matters of cultural difference. 
The prior analyses of “Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty suggest that 
challenging incarceration demands an identification with prisoners by those not 
themselves imprisoned, but those performances also both highlight the difficulties in 
doing so.  The sense of “feeling imprisoned” addressed in Chapter One seems a poor 
strategy to foster such recognition, and the solip istic excess of prison as a metaphor 
does little to critique inequity.  Instead, what needs to be challenged is the 
relationship between crime and criminality and the equation of criminality and 
prisoner, the attribution and distribution of offenses.  The 30-year experiment in 
wholesale imprisonment for virtually all crimes has proven inordinately expensive, 
both fiscally and socially.  The mandatory minimum sentences for so many crimes 
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leading to lengthy imprisonment for millions of people is not a constant in U.S. 
imprisonment, but a historically recent approach that has not affected crime rates.233
Only in the past three decades has prison been the primary answer to questions of 
crime.  
Furthermore, the enduring first principle of the ACA declares that i  is not the 
commission of crime, but the conviction in court that names one a criminal.  From 
slavery, through Jim Crow, to anxiety over black militancy, to the history of now, 
whiteness in the U.S. regularly has feared and desired blackness to equatewith 
criminality.  That inequity has also contributed to a raced economic divide and its 
relationship to crime, conviction, and punishment.  As cited in Chapter One, research 
suggests that rather than incarceration rates matching crime rates, unemployment
provides the clearest correlation to imprisonment patterns.234  These are not new 
observations.  Former U.S. president and the NPA’s first president Rutherford B. 
Hayes recognized the relationship between unemployment and imprisonment as early 
as 1888, an equation reiterated throughout the next century and more of meetings for 
that particular social body.  Instead of basing identification across prison walls on 
everyone feeling like a captive or prisoner sometimes, it is necessary to point out that 
nearly everyone commits the crimes  that are part of the texture of everyday life, but 
raced and classed populations are far more likely to be targeted as criminals.  
Such historical awareness and cultural recognition shifts identification 
between those not imprisoned and those who are from the glib cynicism of “it is not a 
crime if you don’t get caught,” to the less openly sustainable cynicism of racism, as 
325
well as alienation and subjugation based on economic disparity.  Again, the first 
principle of the most prominent association of prison administrators since 1870 has 
remained that not crime but conviction in court names one a criminal.  However, 
determinations of criminality, conviction, and consequences historically have targeted 
disenfranchised populations in the U.S.  Ever since the Boston Selectmen’s 1723 
proclamation that a gathering of “more than two Indians, Negroes or Mulatto servants 
or slaves” was a punishable offense (qtd. in ACA 1972 109), and the 
overrepresentation of black men and women in the natio’s first prison, there has 
been a demonstrated willingness to name black and poor people as criminals.  
These eighteenth century cases are only precedents for late twentieth century 
arrest patterns, sentencing inconsistencies, and prison populations, which are all part 
of the historical record.  That history has been imagined, represented, and contested in 
the books, films, and performances described throughout this dissertation.  
Documenting that history and its imagination demands that rather than adopting the 
positions Žižek describes as conformity, cynicism, or perverse capitulation to raced 
and classed imprisonment practices, skepticism is necessary to challenge 
incarceration.  Again, undoubtedly it is true that many prisoners have committed 
crimes that threaten public safety.  However, criminalization, arrests, convictions, and 
sentencing in the past three decades have drawn on existing racist imaginations of 
black masculinity in determining crime and punishment.  
Certainly, identification across the boundaries of cultural difference can be 
difficult to breach.  However, incorporating incarceration as a division less of guilty 
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and innocent, and even less of immoral and moral, and instead as a category of 
cultural identity in its own right provides a means by which to foster such 
recognition.  The multiple indices by which selfhood is located at once divide and 
unite human experience.  Such determinations of subjectivity do not take place in the 
singularity of an idealized, pure and simple humanity or an imagined autonomous 
individuality.  Instead, strategies of selfhood are negotiated through the multiple lines 
of approach of gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, and the carceral, 
among others.  Those separated in their carceral identity from those not imprisoned 
are nevertheless joined in terms of other shared identities, other hinges of I and we.  
Performances such as Jury Duty and “Live from Death Row” offer models of 
materially present audiences, demonstrating the social bodies in which the negotiation 
of identity takes place, recognizing not the “I” in the other but in the “we.”They also 
emphasize the social responsibility of imprisonment.  Understanding the 
demonstration of “Live from Death Row” as a performance also provides a snse of 
how historical events themselves are subject to analysis sensitive to how they operate, 
what they produce. 
Such implications of identity, performance, politics, and history in texts both 
literary and otherwise echo the prescient claims of Richard Poirier in 1971, the title of 
his Performing Self itself resonating with more recent theories of selfhood as 
performed.  Chapter One cites his description of Mailer’s “engagements with 
language as political rather than simply literary ones:  they are a way of discovering 
how to hold together elements that perhaps by nature would tend to destroy one 
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another, both in a political and in a literary structure” (5).  As the chapters of this 
dissertation individually and in sum demonstrate, that claim holds true of all f the 
cultural works surveyed, not only because the producers of the books, films, and 
performances engage the political, but because literary studies in the past quarter 
century has emphasized the historical and cultural implications of production and 
reception.  
Those transformations in humanities study make Ed Bullins’ response in a 
1973 interview opening this chapter seem in its historical distance a little quaint.  His 
claim—that one’s cultural work might have political goals “if that is what you wish to 
do” (O’Brien 108)—comes before what has since become the larger sense that books, 
films, and performances already operate politically.  This matter certainly held true 
for Bullins, who found himself embroiled in a bitter dispute with Cleaver regarding 
the role of radical black theater with respect to politics, and with the Black Panther 
Party as a whole in the matter of black nationalists versus the practical edge of cross-
racial alliances.  These conflicts led to Cleaver maneuvering Bullins’ departure from 
the Party, though it was Cleaver himself who had appointed the playwright as 
Minister of Culture (Sell 61-62, 77-78 n. 37).235  That particular internecine struggle, 
one of many within a particular social body rife with such, demonstrates the value for 
those initiating social change to recognize the necessity of broad- ased alliances.  As 
an American Prison Association participant observed in 1929, “The trouble with good 
people is that they waste so much effort fighting one another” (295-296).  Those 
whose work is situated in literary, historical, and political studies must work together 
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and account for other forms of cultural work—or the divisions among them provide 
the means for defeat in detail, the division, isolation, and destruction that has been the 
very practice of imprisonment.  
A “we” of scholars, teachers, historians, critics, activists, and citizens may not 
agree on the best tactics for challenging the social inequities most starkly represented 
within the U.S. prison system.  However, we can agree that expanded criminalization, 
extended sentencing, and arrest patterns through the 1980s and 1990s targeting 
minority populations are practices that have produced a prison population radically 
over-representing minorities.  Accompanying these matters of the historical record is 
the saturation of imprisonment in a cultural imagination that equates blackness and 
criminality, even as practices of incarceration largely conceal the actual experience of 
what was at the end of 2002 over two million peo l  in prison or jail, with an 
additional 4.7 million people under another form of judicial control, whether parole or 
probation (“Probation and Parole”).  The effort of this dissertation has been to 
participate in the effort to bring a series of problematic dualities to the forefront of 
literary studies:  racism’s pervasiveness and invisibility, prison populations’ huge 
numbers and concealment, and the imagination of imprisonment and a lack of a 
corresponding critique.  
The texts surveyed in this dissertation not only make visible what is largely a 
concealed practice, they offer a variety of strategic positions by which to imagine and 
thereby produce the social transformations necessary to alter the ways in which prison 
history has shaped national history.  For example, Webster, the writer and director of 
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Jury Duty, draws attention to how the jury operates as a particular form of public 
sphere emblematic of the broader sociality of which it is representative.  As the play 
is staged, jury and Jury reflect both the audience and what he describes as a “broken 
process”; for the particular audience of social workers present for one performance, 
the play demands that they fix it.  Similarly, there are the participants in “Live from 
Death Row,” not only Collins and Miles, but also Harrington, Reese, Jeannette, and 
Thigpen, those not in prison but serving as intermediaries between those who are and 
those who are not, facilitating communication and thereby identification across prison 
walls.  
The previous chapters include a litany of such roles, both imagined and real.  
There is Faulkner’s character of the attorney Gavin Stevens, whose initial racist 
(mis)recognition gives way to his efforts at the unmade request of a black woman he 
barely knows.  In the final pages of the novel, he spends his time and money to 
assemble, if just for a moment, a community that is differentiated along lines of race 
and class but brought together to witness the return of its native son, initiated into 
history, recorded in the daily paper.  There is Cleaver’s depiction of his white female 
lawyer Beverly Axelrod working on his behalf, and Cleaver’s self-representation of 
himself as part of the nation and history in and through which he writes himself.  
There is Mailer, his efforts on behalf o  Cleaver’s release and his chronicle, however 
briefly, of the attorney Gil Athay and his work to free Dale Pierre, just a fragment in a 
larger whole describing the forces involved in imprisonment and execution.  There 
are Rideau, Garbus, and Stack, the prisoner as journalist and director working 
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alongside two documentary filmmakers to incorporate into the historical record and 
cultural imagination the lives of prisoners typically hidden from view.  These books, 
films, and performances all increase prisoners’ visibility and thereby provide an 
opportunity to revise national history, literary and otherwise, to incorporate more 
fully a sense of the lived experience of millions in the U.S.  
Making prison history central to the study of national history begins to 
account for the degree to which the former has shaped the latter.  Reading the writing 
of prisoners and their depictions by others is part of that project, incorporating 
narratives of imprisonment into a story of nation.  There is much more of this story to 
tell, including looking back further historically and in greater detail, in the early 
discussions of prisons involving Benjamin Rush and others, the expansion of the 
prison system through the nation in the early and mid-nineteenth century, its reform at 
the end of that century in part informed by the ideals of a liberal humanities 
education, even as a rhetoric of imperialism proved as pervasive in the NPA as 
elsewhere.  There are many, many more works whose representations of 
imprisonment demand a richer account, whether unremarked in familiar texts, such as 
Harriet Jacobs’ Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861), or in books and films that 
have thus far escaped attention.  Expanding the theorization and analysis of carceral 
identities will thereby foster more nuanced senses of how various matters of cultural 
difference shape and are shaped by the experience of imprisonment as it has been 
endured through more than two centuries. 
Such a body of study and accompanying framework is necessary in order t  
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bring a richer discussion of prisons and prisoners to the forefront of both academic 
and more general public discussion.  Scholarship in this vein works in concert with 
classrooms, which play their own roles in organizing knowledge, identifying lines of 
inquiry, and serving as places of staged readings, where materially present audiences 
engage literary, historical, and scholarly texts.236  Performed analysis in the sociality 
of the classroom is only one of the many spaces in which incarceration needs to be 
addressed in order to recognize its centrality to national experience and the necessity 
of a more informed critical discourse.  That discourse is necessary to challenge what 
has become among the clearest threats to the promise of the United States, the 
liberties curtailed, the pursuits limited, the lives ended behind prison walls in raced 
and classed populations targeted for arrest and warehoused with little recourse.  
Challenging those practices brings closer to fulfillment the impossible but necessary 
“becoming” of democracy, never to be realized, but nevertheless to be attempted.  
The Angolite poem quoted in Chapter One reads, “Go ahead/ Lock us up/ Lock us all 
up/ Lock away the ones you see/ In the mirror.”  However, we who incarcerate have 
locked up more than two million people and have over four and a half million more 
under judicial surveillance precisely because we do not recognize ourselves among 
then, and that is among the greatest failures in U.S. history.  
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1 Darabont reverses the raced innocence and guilt in his later prison film The Green 
Mile (1999), when the black character on Death Row, John Coffey (Michael Clarke 
Duncan) is innocent and one of the white guards (Brutus “Brutal” Howell, played by 
David Morse) is guilty of brutality.  However, it remains another white guard (Paul 
Edgecomb, played by Tom Hanks) who is healed through his relationship with the 
black prisoner.
2 The challenge of the real traces at least back to Plato’s cave, and the Lacanian 
“Real” is another iteration (if a powerful one) of a longstanding problem of symbolic 
representation.  The constant and defining unavailability of the Lacanian Real that 
nevertheless initiates the other two categories (imaginary and symbolic) is part of the 
reason Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari posit a lack of difference between the 
imaginary and symbolic, lumping them together (Anti-Oedipus 83, 90).  That lack of 
difference short-circuits the process of Lacanian subject formation, the individuation 
of the self as a subject divorced from imaginary unity and thereby entered into the 
symbolic order.  Deleuze and Gauttari identify such individuation as a by-product of 
capitalism, opting instead for the model of the schizophrenic subject for whom “I” is 
not the consequence of the tragedy of a lost imaginary, a whole, but a fiction itself.  In 
general, this dissertation avoids capitalizing “Real,” attempting instead to locate 
contextually the degree to which the term in its various usages refers to a specifically 
Lacanian sense or not.
3 Stories by prisoners themselves make ironical comment on such imaginings.  In 
Robert Kelsey’ story “Suicide!” anthologized in Chevigny’s collection Doing Time
(1999), inmates are watching Penitentiary III, commenting on its lack of realism in 
terms suggestive of Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange (1971):  “Later on in the 
movie, he would be chained up in the penitentiary basement and made to watch 
violent movies while smoking crack.”  Toward the end of “Suicide!” the narrator 
reads Bonfire of the Vanities by the light between his bars, and watches a movie on 
TV, Death Wish (89, 92, 93).  Such ironic juxtapositions of inmates and films extend 
at least as far back as Eldridge Cleaver beginning one chapter of Soul on Ice (1968)
with of a description of watching The Strangler (1964) in a prison theater.  The 
mention of a film loosely based on a true story and emphasizing psychoanalytic 
causes for violence (the strangler is apparently revenging himself on substitutes for 
his mother) has particular resonance for Cleaver’s book, which positions itself against 
such reasoning for crime.The Shawshank Redemption lacks such irony,as the men 
watch Gilda (1946), a Rita Hayworth film and a gesture to the title of the Stephen 
King novella upon which the film is based, “Rita Hayworth and the Shawshank 
Redemption,” from Different Seasons (1982).
4 That understanding of historicism in the U.S. can be traced to Jameson’s The 
Political Unconscious (1981) and its synthesis of largely French theory, rewriting 
Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser, and Foucault in a dialogue on the tensions 
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between history and the subject, between causality and narrativity, and among real, 
imaginary, and symbolic.  In a titularly definitive and oft-quoted passage, Jameson 
writes, “History is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an 
absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our approach to it 
and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, i s 
narrativization in the political unconscious” (35).  This description of historical 
process follows Nietzsche and Foucault in treating history as genealogy—lacking a 
telos, a direction, it is interpreted in reverse, always written backwards and shped by 
the time of its telling.  Jameson later reiterates history’s interpretation as textually 
mediated where he again and more explicitly defines history in terms of an equation 
of “Althusser’s ‘absent cause,’ Lacan’s ‘Real’” (82).  According to Jameson, the real 
without cause that is history cannot in its immediacy be apprehended, understood, or 
literalized, as its actuality remains anterior to its competing analyses, interpretations 
themselves the products of layers of understanding already shaped by the 
explanations offered by previous readings and the circumstances shaping that writing.  
Jameson’s sense of the concomitancy of the real and history is in part informed by 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1977), their reformulation of largely Lacanian
psychoanalytic method in cultural-historical terms and a formative component of 
Jameson’s argument for interpretation as reading the political unconscious.  H wever, 
Lacan’s own work contesting and revising Freudian psychoanalysis already lays the 
basis less for a subject without history than a subject composed in history (see n. 
65)—and even the Freudian superego, however under-theorized, leaves room for such 
cultural and historical contingencies.
5 Such a cultural imagination has been theorized in a variety of related ways with 
regard to public spheres, collective identity, and popular culture.  Martha Nussbaum 
uses the term “civic imagination” in Cultivating Humanity:  A Classical Defence of 
Reform in Liberal Education (1997).  Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities:  
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1991) has proven a watershed 
text in describing fantasies of nationality, which Timothy Powell uses in describing 
how nineteenth century texts constructed a “national imaginary” in Ruthless 
Democracy:  A Multi-Cultural Interpretation of the American Renaissance (2000).  
Stuart Hall summarizes dominant strands of Birmingham School cultural studies 
approaches to social identification when he describes popular culture, specifically 
film, as “where we go to discover who we are” (474). 
6 Wai-Chee Dimock makes this point in Empire for Liberty (1989), that “‘text’ and its 
‘context’ are in every case inseparable” (5).
7 The broader effect of such effort is in question for some officials.  In 1992, the 
Director of the National Institute of Corrections offered this account:
The film and the book are powerful mediums that have created a deep-root d 
notion of our business.  It is unlikely that many, if any, movies will ever be 
produced that will accurately convey corrections.  It would be rather boring 
viewing.  Furthermore, books that are accurately and fairly written seldom are 
334
read widely beyond the research lab, the classroom, or, indeed, our own 
profession and as such have little impact upon public perception.
(ACA 1992 3)
8 Criminologist Nicole Rafter touches upon on how films do play such a role in Shots 
in the Mirror:  Crime Films and Society (2000).  
9 These figures are according to the VideoHound’s Golden Movie Retriever 2003, 
edited by Jim Craddock.  Many of the women in prison films are largely exploitative, 
the most infamous of which is Caged Heat (1974), the directorial debut of Jonathan 
Demme, and it spawned a host of imitators.  Demme would move on to direct several 
films with powerful female characters, including the adaptation of Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved (1998) and Silence of the Lambs (1991)—for the latter, he won an Academy 
Award for best director.  As of December 2003, the Internet Movie Database listed 
943 prison films, but this included films scheduled for 2004, television series, non-
U.S. films, and films featuring metaphoric imprisonment.
10 Not all of the books, films, and performances necessarily depict only black men in 
prison.  In Faulkner’s Sanctuary, Popeye and Lee Goodwin are white, while Light in 
August’s Joe Christmas and Go Down, Moses’ Butch Beauchamp are both of mixed 
race.  Eldridge Cleaver, author and character of Soul on Ice, is black, but Mailer’s 
Gilmore is white.  American History X has as its topic racial violence, but focuses on 
a white family. The Hurricane focuses on a black man allegedly wrongly imprisoned 
for murder, and The Farm features a primary cast of four black male prisoners and 
two white.  “Live from Death Row” represents both white and black men slated for 
execution, though it is a black woman who speaks of her son behind bars, while Jury 
Duty offers a white female character’s trial and sentencing.
11 There is at least one broad-based analysis of the representation of imprisonment in 
the U.S. popular journalism of the latter half of the twentieth century.  In The Cultural 
Prison, John Sloop offers a book-length treatment of imprisonment in its 
representation in popular journals, offering a rhetorical critique of a selection of 
hundreds of articles.  
12 These comparative statistics are based on the U.S. Department of Justice’s records 
of the number of black and Hispanic male inmates per 100,000 black and Hispanic 
men compared to white male inmates per 100,000 white men in the U.S.  And while 
men still vastly outnumber women in state and federal penitentiaries by almost nine 
to one, the number of women in prison, particularly women of color, is increasing 
(“Incarceration Rates”).
13 These figures draw from various sources, including the 2000 census conducted by 
the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ Voting Irregularities 
in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election (2002),and an investigative series 
in the Washington Post (2001).  The controversy has not received extensive coverage, 
though partisan divide continues as typified by the 2003 debate between Harper’s 
Magazine and The National Review as to the raced intent of voter disenfranchisement.  
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14 Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza raise this point as well in “Democratic 
Contraction?  Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United 
States” (2002).
15 A related case can be found in the matter of the Cuban marielitos admitted to the 
U.S. in 1980, many of whom Fidel Castro had released from prisons and mental 
hospitals.  The influx of the 125,000 immigrants met with Immigration and 
Naturalization Service interviews.  On the basis of those interviews and in the 
absence of any records, 2,000 were identified as “probable offenders” and 
incarcerated in federal prisons (Keve 230).  Subsequently, “inmates who completed 
their sentences as prisoners were kept in custody as detainees because it was deemed 
too risky to release them” (231).  Another example can be found in the detaining of 
650 prisoners, primarily from Afghanistan, at Guatanamo Bay from 2002 to 2004.
16 A sociology professor at the 1972 American Correctional Association conference 
offers an account of “natural law” drawn from Aquinas in which he makes a 
provocative slip.  “Natural law can be defined as an assumed inmate [sic] capacity 
within man, found universally, which, if operative, would allow him to distinguish 
between morally right and morally wrong behavior” (197).  Whatever typographical 
error transformed innate to inmate illustrates how the criminal violates natural law, 
demonstrating the lack of the innate capacity for moral distinction, casting the 
criminal then as inmate and lacking in universal human capacities.  That l ck 
historically has been presumed in blackness in the U.S. and was an antebellum 
argument for slavery in the South.
17 Amy Kaplan makes a related claim of American literary realism in The Social 
Construction of American Realism (1988). 
18 A participant describes the mine at the 1929 conference of the American Prison 
Association (326), and it does not seem to be an entirely idiosyncratic example—a 
member of the 1970 congress identifies another mine as prison at Simsbury as the 
first prison.  
19 According to Gwendolyn Midlo Hall in Africans in Colonial Louisiana:  The 
Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century (1992), it is actually 
unlikely that the slaves originally populating the Louisiana plantation-tur ed-prison 
were in fact from Angola.  Portuguese slavers preferred to import Angolans over 
other ethnicities and, as such, themajority of Angolans brought into North American 
entered along the eastern seaboard during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
(Littlefield).  However, some Southern plantation owners nevertheless named their 
plantations “Angola”—including one Anthony Johnson, a free black man from 
Angola who so titled his property in early Virginia, according to T.H. Breen’s “Myne 
Owne Ground”:  Race and Freedom on Virginia’s Eastern Shore, 1640-1676 (1980).  
I am grateful to Timothy Buckner for the reference.
20 Since then, imprisonment has grown as an organizing topic for panels at academic 
conferences and collections of essays, but it remains insufficiently addressed as a 
central issue in U.S. history and literary studies. 
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21 This is most fully representative of Go Down, Moses, as Sanctuary and Light in 
August are far less invested in writing history.  Chapter Two generally treats the latter 
two novels as a counterpoint to the analysis of G  Down, Moses.
22 The National Prison Association was formed in 1870 in response to an examination 
of existing imprisonment practices that demonstrated their inhumane conditions.  
Members met to discuss prison reform, what they typically address as “the prison 
question,” though said question is never clearly stated or agreed upon, maki g the 
NPA similar to many earnest but ill-defined reform movements of the late nineteenth 
century.  That same period also saw the move to the professionalization and 
consolidation of a variety of fields and disciplines, which in part was accomplished 
by the formation of institutional organizations such as the NPA, the American 
Historical Association (1884), and the Modern Language Association (1886).  The 
ACA generally meets twice each year, though until 1989, they only published the 
summer conference proceedings.  Since then, the papers from each meeting have 
appeared in each annual volume.  
23 Since the watershed studies of Norval Morris and David J. Rothman—The Future 
of Imprisonment (1974) and Conscience and Convenience:  the Asylum and Its 
Alternatives in Progressive America (1980), respectively—there has been growth in 
prison historiography.  Thomas G. Blomberg and Karol Lucken’s American 
Penology:  A History of Control (2000) follows the thesis of Discipline and Punish
but with a more rigorous histori graphic method, and concludes that tactics of 
imprisonment are indeed broadening to a larger strategy of general social control.  
Scott Christianson’s With Liberty For Some:  500 Years of Imprisonment in America
(1998) provides too broad a view to be esp cially specific, but it does draw close 
relationships between slavery and imprisonment in U.S. history, pointing out how 
race and class have been implicated in social control and punishment since pre-
Revolutionary America.  Thomas L. Dumm’s Democracy and Punishment:  
Disciplinary Origins of the United States (1987) offers another Foucauldean history, 
arguing that producing and incarcerating criminality occurs in an opposition that 
helps define the idea of freedom as conducted in liberal democratic discourse.  Jay 
Adam Hirsch’s The Rise of the Penitentiary:  Prisons and Punishment in Early 
America (1992) anticipates many of Christianson’s points regarding the relationship 
of slavery and imprisonment.  Paul W. Keve’s Prisons and the American Conscience:  
A History of U.S. Federal Corrections (1991) serves as an administrative history, an 
official view from the inside and from the top, as he served as the Commissioner of 
Corrections in Minnesota.  Marc Mauer in Race to Incarcerate (1999) demonstrates 
that black men are in prison out of proportion not only with their overall population 
but also with the number of crimes committed.  Morris and Rothman’s The Oxford 
History of the Prison:  The Practice of Punishment in Western Society (1998) is an 
edited collection and includes essays offering a broad overview of U.S. and 
international imprisonment practices.  David M. Oshinsky’s “Worse Than Slavery”:  
Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (1997) is the most rigorously 
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documented account organized around the Mississippi prison, and itdemonstrates
how imprisonment in the Jim Crow South perpetuated practices of slavery.  William 
L. Selke’s Prisons in Crisis (1993) conducts a sociological study in determining that 
the U.S. prison system fails to accomplish its intent because its purposes (punishment, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation) are misguided or unreasonable and often 
contradictory; imprisonment practices often xacerbate rather than alleviate the 
problems the system seeks to solve.  John M. Sloop’s The Cultural Prison:  
Discourse, Prisoners, and Punishment surveys popular news periodicals from 1950 to 
1993 to demonstrate how the representation of prisoners has several distinct types at 
different periods, particularly with regard to raced and gendered criminality.  Michael 
Tonry has held a longtime commitment to the study of imprisonment as a vital 
component of criminology, and his edited collection The Handbook of Crime and 
Punishment (1998) is an invaluable survey of correctional policies and practices.
24 H. Bruce Franklin has the longest and most sustained history of arguing for the 
importance of imprisonment in constructions of U.S. literary history, an argument 
most fully developed in Prison Literature in America:  The Victim as Criminal and 
Artist (1989), and Prison Writing in 20th-Century America (1998), an edited 
collection of writing by prisoners.  Bell Gale Chevigny edits another collection of 
prison writing in  Doing Time:  25 Years of Prison Writing (1999).  Ioan Davies 
moves between philosophical and sociological critique in Writers in Prison (1990).  
Houston A. Baker in the closing pages of Turning South Again:  Re-thinking 
Modernism/Re-reading Booker T. (2001) traces late twentieth century imprisonment 
practices to Booker T. Washington’s complicity with raced subjugation.  Angela 
Davis and Ruth Gilmore are the most visible academics among the many critics of the 
U.S. prison system. The majority of these critics emphasize the self-representation of 
prisoners themselves rather than how imprisonme t circulates in the cultural 
imagination.  Sloop’s The Cultural Prison focuses on popular representations of 
incarceration, but he limits his study to news and periodical accounts.
25 Rage Against the Machine’s five album releases from 1992 to 2003 regularly 
feature songs linking U.S. imprisonment practices with larger matters of social justice 
and national and international policy.  They have championed the cause of Mumia 
Abu-Jamal, a prison writer and activist whose lengthy imprisonment has been 
protested internationally.  The album jackets identify the band members as “Guilty 
Parties,” and the liner notes to Evil Empire (1996) features a photo of book covers, 
the list of which reads as a partial bibliography of this dissertation:  Mumia Abu-
Jamal’s Live From Death Row (1996), Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, Frantz Fanon’s The 
Wretched of the Earth (1963), George Jackson’s Soledad Brother 1971), Mailer’s 
Armies of the Night (1968), and others.
26 Franklin likely proved an attentive audience to Rush’s presentation on prisons, as 
his own son, a Royalist, had been imprisoned on the charge of treason at Walnut 
Street Jail in 1777 (Keve 1).  A year before, and ten years after he signed the 
Declaration of Independence, Rush published a paper in which his language 
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identifying the function of literacy is identical to that of imprisonment.  He felt that 
literacy served a critical role in implicating citizens in what he described as the social 
“machine” of government (“Plan” 27).  Like literacy, Rush’s model for imprisonment 
made the social control of state punishment one of correction, a discipline that he 
viewed as including hard labor, moral training, and schooling in “good books” 
(Autobiography 230).  Other members of the Philadelphia Society agreed that such 
punishment should involve education.  When the Reverend William Rogers, who 
joined Rush in signing himself on to the charter presented in Franklin’s living room, 
first offered services and instruction to inmates at Walnut Street, the authorities were 
so concerned that a riot might occur that they mounted a cannon next to the pulpit and 
aimed it at the prisoners (Newman, Lewis, Beverstock 13).  Education and the 
reading of “good books” took place under the threat of violence in the first prison of 
the United States.
27 Rush offered his model for the penitentiary in “An Enquiry into the Effects of 
Public Punishments Upon Criminals and Upon Society” (10-12).  While Robert R. 
Sullivan locates Rush as the progenitor of U.S. prisons (333-344), the new model of 
punishment was not his idiosyncratic invention.  Jefferson’s Autobiography includes 
his response to Rush’s comments regarding representative government on the 
continent as well as his architectural designs, and Paul Kneper demonstrates 
Jefferson’s contributions to the Kentucky criminal code (129-149).  Christopher 
Adamson describes the Protestant imperatives articulated in Rush’s proposal in 
“Wrath and Redemption:  Protestant Theology and Penal Practice in the Early 
American Republic” (75-77).  Cesare Beccaria offers a similar model of reform in On 
Crimes and Punishments (1764), which saw extensive circulation in France and some 
comment in North America in the 1760s and 1770s (Dimock Residues 14-15).  David 
J. Rothman argues that the U.S. invention of imprisonment owed little “in ellectual 
debt” to English approaches (108-9), and Christopher Adamson also points out that 
prevailing Protestant conventions of work and self-discipline informed the 
transformation (75-111).  However, Rush’s arguments in his “Enquiry” in particular 
draw from Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757).  In the introduction to A Philosophical Enquiry, 
James T. Boulton points out that Burke participated in a student riot against the Black 
Dog Prison at Newgate in 1747, the year Burke probably wrote the Enquiry (xvii).  
28 Leslie Patrick-Stamp chronicles the over-representation of African Americans in 
Walnut Street Jail in “Numbers That are Not New:  African Americans in the 
Country’s First Prison, 1790-1835” (95-128).  Adam Jay Hirsch, Paul Keve, Dario 
Melossi and Massimo Pavarini, and David J. Rothman all emphasize the importance 
of the Pennsylvania and Auburn models in their histories of early U.S. prison 
practices.
29 Edgardo Rotman emphasizes the failures of prison reform (151-177), and Rothman 
describes the ethnic populations of prisons (100- 16).  The National Prison 
Association published transcripts of its annual meetings, and Hayes’ comments are 
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from his keynote address; a reverend’s speech thereafter suggests the proportion of 
those in custody who do not belong there (NPA 1888 14, 27).  In 1968, A community 
treatment manager says that half a million of the prison and jail population could be 
released to alternative facilities without danger, and an additional quarter million 
could be released within a year given community programs (ACA 81).  In 1977, a 
Pennsylvania Pardon Board member suggests the same argument as Hayes:  “When 
inflation and unemployment increase, so do prison and mental health institution 
populations” (58).  Unemployment remains the clearest corollary to incarceration 
rates (Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard; Western and Pettit).
30 The Elmira Reformatory practices were a matter of heated debate at the nnual
conference (NPA 1887 204, 273-5, 281), and Rotman discuses them as well.  
Brockway’s influence was considerable, as he served as NPA president in 1898 and is 
described by a 1970 participant in the annual congress as one of the “Big Three” in 
prison reform (ACA 1970 108).  Keve and Rothman survey the various therapeutic 
approaches to prisoner treatment, and the APA transcripts record the discussion of 
psychological approaches at length (1929 349; 1930 35-65, 210, 286).  A civil suit 
was brought against the Louisiana State Prison at Angola in 1975 regarding how 
conditions there violated prisoners’ constitutional rights and led to numerous reforms 
(Rideau and Wikberg 41).
31 The imprisonment of a black male character occupies much of William Faulkner’s 
Intruder in the Dust, and Lucas Beauchamp is innocent, his exculpatory evidence 
quite literally unearthed by the County Attorney Gavin Stevens’ nephew, Charles 
“Chick” Mallison, an effort engaged because the adolescent feels a debt to 
Beauchamp for a racist slight committed four years before.  His racial guilt extends 
far enough to include the awareness that Lucas “would die not because he was a 
murderer but because his skin was black” (338).  However, just as Sanctuary’s jail 
largely functions as a gothic set piece, the genre conventions of a detective novel 
largely overshadow the racial and social currents of the 1948 novel.  There is a 
question of which of the two corpses, the murderer, or Beauchamp is the intruder in 
the dust, and the emphasis on that discovery makes the real intrusio s the cultural 
critiques focusing on race that Stevens occasionally offers to his nephew.  Intruder in 
the Dust deserves closer examination than it has thus far merited, as it has received 
among the least critical response of Faulkner’s novels, but given the degree to which 
Lucas in prison serves as a backdrop to grave robbing and detective work, this is not 
the place for it.  The black female character Nancy Mannigoe is similarly in jail 
throughout all of Requiem for a Nun (1951), but she is equally a background 
character to Gavin Stevens’ interrogation of his niece- n-law, Temple Stevens.  
Chapter Two briefly touches upon these two novels.
32 Cleaver and Mailer offer highly problematic authors of their own characters, 
particularly with regard to their political shifts and changing commitments to civil 
rights.  Cleaver’s move to the far right and accompanying polemics saw the socially 
liberal Berkeley City Council threaten to eject him from a meeting in the 1990s, and 
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even the Mailer of 1968 writes that “he was getting tired of hearing of Negro rights 
and Black Power” (Miami 187).
33 These advances include the legitimacy of writ lawyers (Johnson v. Avery [1969]), 
the right to communication with the press (Nolan v. Fitzpatrick [1971]), and the right 
to receive both mail and visitors (Procunier v. Martinez [1974]).  Cleaver describes 
the limitations facing such writ lawyers in Soul on Ice (69).  The writing of both 
books depends upon letters passed back and forth between prisoners and those 
outside, and, inThe Executioner’s Song, the interviews with Gilmore provide the 
basis for much of the second half of the book.
34 The number of people in prison with sentences of death increased every single year 
between 1976 and 2000 (the total growing from 420 to 3,601), according to the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“Prisoners on Death Row”).  The number of people actually 
executed rose sharply in 1984, and from 1984-2003 returned to numbers not seen 
since the 1950s, an average of over 40 per year and in 1999 falling just short of 100 
(“Executions”).
35 That number grew to over two million for the first time in U.S. history by the 
middle of 2002, according to the U.S. Department of Justice (“Prison and Jail 
Inmates”).  In addition, another 4.3 million people were not incarcer ted but under 
another form of legal control, whether in an alternate facility or on probation or 
parole.  According to Corrections Today, the U.S. accounts for less than one-
twentieth of the world population, but accounts for almost one quarter of the prisoners 
worldwide, and in the nation’s capitol, one out every one hundred people are in prison 
(Coyle 8).
36 These factors continue past the South in the 1930s and 1940s.  Andrew Hacker 
argues that social and economic structural inequities contribute to raced prison 
populations in Chapter 11, “Crime:  The Role Race Plays” (166-183) of Two Nations:  
Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (1995).  Marc Mauer in Race to 
Incarcerate (1999) offers a more extended version of this argument, further 
demonstrating that the incarceration of black men is disproportionate not only with 
their overall population but with the number of crimes committed.  These differences 
compound in the 1980s and 1990s, when rates of illegal drug use between white and 
black men are similar, but rates of arrest for drug offenses are five to six times higher 
for black men (Schlosser 54; Morris “The Contemporary Prison” 214-215; Tonry 19).
37 Anthony Travisono reiterates the original goals in his 1990 plenary address 
“ACA’s Future,” his farewell after serving as ACA Executive Director since 1975 
(95-96).
38 One ACA participant points out in a 1990 presentation titled “Where Will 
Corrections Stand Ten Years Down the Road?” “Everybody’s child, virtually, is a 
criminal by the time they are in their teens, simply because of existing laws” (ACA 
1990 14).  That claim suggests the pervasiveness of criminality, though in this view it 
is crime rather than conviction that produces criminality.  However, the speaker is an 
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editor of the Tennessean newspaper and thus likely less familiar with ACA policies 
and principles.  
39 Slavoj Žižek suggests instead that Michel Pêcheux “has given us the most 
elaborated version of the theory of interpellation” (Sublime 3), and others trace the 
term back to Lacan (Nehring 139).
40 Althusserean interpellation is largely addressed as a single authority—the 
policeman, God—hailing a single subject.  The model of the judicial body in the APA 
declaration matches the sense of interpellation as not a singular call, but the 
interruption or summons offered in legislative assembly to one of its members 
(Oxford English Dictionary On-line).  As we shall see in Chapter Five, this plural and 
participatory sense of interpellation opens more possibilities than that those left 
available by Althusser.
41 Biology is not discounted entirely in cultural conflict over race, as demonstrated by 
Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve:  Intelligence and Class 
Structure in American Life (1994) and the controversy it elicited.  Kalpana Seshadri-
Crooks’ Desiring Whiteness:  A Lacanian Analysis of Race (2000) provides a concise 
survey of race as shifting in use and meaning among various fields.  Blackness—or 
rather, multiple blacknesses—as ethnicity dates at least as far back as Portuguese 
slave traders preferring Angolan slaves, according to Gwendolyn Midlo Hall and 
Daniel Littlefield.  The slip from blackness as a racial marker to ethnicity is 
sometimes a symptom of cultural anxiety, as can be seen in media descriptions of a 
highly acclaimed “black” man such as Tiger Woods as “multi-racial,” emphasizing 
his mixed ancestry (Kamiya).  That anxiety is predicated upon cultural expectations 
of race and thereby it becomes an ideological position, whereby former President Bill 
Clinton can be the first “black” president and Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice are not “really” black 
because of their political conservatism.  
42 Tania Modleski’s Feminism without Women:  Culture and Criticism in a 
“Postfeminist” Age (1991) and Kaja Silverman’s Male Subjectivity at the Margins
(1992), while hardly in agreement, were early entries in the effort to make “gender 
studies” not just another term for feminism and constructions of masculinity more 
than something to push against.  Fred Pfeil’s White Guys:  Studies in Postmodernism, 
Domination, and Difference (1995) and Calvin Thomas’ Male Matters:  Masculinity, 
Anxiety, and the Male Body on the Line (1998) are two examples of masculine studies 
following in the wake of such feminist theory.
43 Rideau discusses how the over-representation of black men in prison created a 
localized numerical superiority in the 1970s, wherein black men employed sexual 
violence against white men in prison as a retaliatory gesture to whie racism outside
of prison (Life Sentences 92-93).  Wideman also comments on this phenomenon as a 
fantasy (cf. n. 186), a matter relevant to the discussion in Chapter Four of American 
History X and its occasional treatment of race as a free-floating signifier.
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44 Of these texts, Light in August and American History X come the closest to 
capitulating to and thus perpetuating the automatic criminality of black men.  Jury 
Duty is the only text that operates outside of the narrow guidelines of always 
masculine and largely black criminals, and I offer it as both a counterpoint and a 
direction for further investigations of criminality and incarceration organized around 
representations of women, as well as greater diversity of class, ethnicity, and 
sexuality.
45 These protests reached the attention of prison administrators, and the president of 
the American Correctional Association in 1968 made reference in his keynote address 
to “The revolt of youth, as seen in student demonstrations from New York to 
California” (ACA 1968 23).  In New York, student strikes led to open admissions.  At 
Berkeley, cross-cultural alliances among the Afro-American Student Association, the 
Mexican American Students Confederation, the Asian American Political Alliance, 
and the Native American Students Union led to courses, programs, and departments 
that sought to represent and include the culturally diverse populations of the campus, 
state, and nation.
46 The United States Constitution beginswith “We the people,” thereby initiating
nation-making as an uneasy balance of pluralism, democracy, and representativeness.  
Emerson in “The American Scholar” (1849) and “The Transcendalist” (1842) 
simultaneously calls for and participates in a national literature celebrating democracy 
and diversity, even as he largely ignores existing cultural variety.  F.O. Matthiessen’s 
American Renaissance (1941) virtually defined U.S. literature as “dedicated to the 
possibilities of democracy” (ix), but managed to locate that ideal in just five white 
upper-middle clas men in the Northeast (Emerson, Hawthorne, Melville, Thoreau, 
and Whitman).  So-called “New Americanists” of the 1980s and 1990s have 
expanded national literary representationbetter to reflect the diversity of lived 
experience.  However, scholars working i  mid-nineteenth century studies have the 
luxury of Matthiessen’s periodization and canon with which to contend.  Twentieth 
century literary study is consolidated far less in terms of what writers, periods, genres, 
and media might constitute its “literature.”  This dissertation benefits from the 
elasticity produced in that uncertainty, particularly in the inclusion of multiple genres 
across a broad historical period.  However, the same lack of a consolidated canon also 
necessitates far greater substantiation of the texts selected, and therefore longer 
introductions.
47 The institutionalization of such multi-cultural approaches also is glossed easily in a 
survey of American literature titles published by the Modern Language Association 
during the time period between the Yale conference and the fourth edition of the 
Heath Anthology, from 1979 to 2002:  Afro-American Literature (1979), Teaching 
Women's Literature from a Regional Perspective (1982), Ethnic Perspectives in 
American Literature (1983), Studies in American Indian Literature (1983), Women's 
Personal Narratives (1985), Asian American Literature (1988), American Indian 
Literatures (1990), Professions of Desire:  Lesbian and Gay Studies in Literature
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(1995), as well as meta-critical and combinatory surveys, including Three American 
Literatures (1982), Redefining American Literary History (1990), Redrawing the 
Boundaries (1992), and Disability Studies (2002).
48 Yarborough delivered the paper at the University of Texas at Austin May 1, 2003, 
and again at the University of Maryland November 7, 2003.  Amistad (1997), directed 
by Steven Spielberg, and The Hurricane by Norman Jewison, were relatively 
mainstream and widely promoted films.  Rosewood (1997) is directed by John 
Singleton, one of the most prominent filmmakers of black experience in the U.S. 
49 Žižek offers an interpretation of Lacan’s pun, Unbewusste – une bévue, that casts 
such an oversight as at once symptomatic and constitutive of an unconscious 
participation in the real.  “The unconscious is not a kind of transcendent, unattainable 
thing of which we are unable to take cognizance, it is rather […] an overlooking:  we 
overlook the way our act is already part of the state of things we are looking at, the 
way our error is part of the Truth itself” (Sublime 59).  Yarborough’s analysis of 
black men in these historical films overlooks the pattern of racial control (slavery, Jim 
Crow, incarceration) that is not above or transparent in that history, but so visible as 
to not be seen.  
50 The disparity emerges in Newsweek’s inclusion of former prisoners and the lifetime 
likelihood of future imprisonment with those currently in prison and jail. 
51 John Edgar Wideman makes use of the same discursive tactic of writing back and 
forth through bars with his imprisoned brother in Brothers and Keepers (1984).  He 
turns from the image of the reflective mirror to the tension of imagination and reality 
in his keynote address to the conference “The American Dilemma Revisited:  
Psychoanalysis, Social Policy, and the Socio-Cultural Meaning of Race” (2002), 
printed in the Black Renaissance/Renaissance Noire 8.1   (2003). 
52 The poem, submitted by Allen Carter Jr., prisoner #87750, is Judy Deputy’s
(March/April 1985 101).
53 Some notable examples include Jack Henry Abbot’s In the Belly of the Beast 
(1981), introduced and guided to publication by Mailer, Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, 
Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood (1966), GeorgeJackson’s Soledad Brother (1970),
Richard Wright’s Native Son (1940), Malcolm X’s The Autobiography of Malcolm X
(1964), and the collectionof poetry Words From the House of the Dead (1974).  
Prisons also appear at the periphery of William Wells Brown’s Clotel (1853), 
Delillo’s Underworld, Theodore Dreiser’s An American Tragedy (1925), Faulkner’s 
Sanctuary, Light in August and Go Down, Moses, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s House of 
Seven Gables (1851) and Blithedale Romance (1852), Harriet Jacob’s Incidents in the 
Life of a Slave Girl (1861), Henry James’ The Princess Casamassima (1886).
54 Bruce Crowther’s Captured on Film:  The Prison Movie (1989) is a survey rather 
than a rigorous analysis of prison films.  Nicole Rafter’s Shots in the Mirror:  Crime 
Films and Society (2000) includes a provocative chapter focusing on prison films, but 
it similarly focuses on breadth rather than depth.
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55 Posner, a law professor, argues for formalist, aesthetic accounts of literature and 
leaves that category at once underdetermined and sharply differentiated from law, 
which he situates closer to history and judged by “ethical standards” (7).  However, in 
a curious footnote, Posner sharply critiques the U.S. justice system in no uncertain 
terms:  “The mistreatment by the American criminal justice system of persons 
charged but not yet convicted of crime is an international scandal […].  People 
accused of crimes of violence are generally though not always drawn from social 
strata in which a public arrest is not a conspicuous badge of shame, but neither are 
they released on bond; they are thrown into jail to languish, sometimes for many 
months and often in horrible conditions, while awaiting trial.  It is curious that the 
arrest of Joseph K. in the first chapter of The Trial is more civilized than arrests in the 
land of freedom at the threshold of the twenty-first century” (29).  While Posner’s 
gloss of “social strata” is bleak, his critique is a rich one in that it can be read to 
legitimize the politicized readings he so deplores, the historicist rather than formalist 
study that makes actual incarceration part of the study of its representation.  
56 Norval Morris and David J. Rothman make this point (viii), and such criticism is 
legion—see especially Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini, who catalogue much of 
the debate in that regard in appendices to The Prison and the Factory (1981).
57 Many critics Foucauldean analysis leads them to treat representations of 
imprisonment, criminality, and law enforcement as symptomatic of more generalized 
mechanisms of social control.  Examples of such include John B. Bender’s Imagining 
the Penitentiary:  Fiction and the Architecture of the Mind in Eighteenth-Century 
England (1987), D.A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police (1988), and Mark Seltzer’s 
“The Princess Casamassina:  Realism and the Fantasy of Surveillance” (1981).
58 A full account of the writers and texts that inform the method and purpose of my 
analysis of representations of incarceration, as well as race and masculinity, would of 
course be impossible.  However, I would like to draw attention to the historiography 
and cultural criticism that though not surveyed at length have shaped the efforts and 
approaches of my argument, including Foucault’s Di cipline and Punish, H. Bruce 
Franklin’s Prison Literature in America, Barbara Harlow’s Barred:  Women, Writing, 
and Political Detention (1992), Jameson’s The Political Unconscious and
Postmodernism:  Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), Peter Linebaugh’s 
The London Hanged:  Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (1992), 
Oshinsky’s “Worse than Slavery,” Pfeil’s  White Guys:  Studies in Postmodernism, 
Domination, and Difference, Timothy Powell’s Ruthless Democracy:  A Multicultural 
Interpretation of the American Renaissance (2000), and Eric J. Sundquist’s To Wake 
the Nations:  Race in the Making of American Literature (1993).
59 Walter B. Rideout, in his forward to Mercer Cook and Stephen E. Henderson’s The 
Militant Black Writer (1969), is slightly more circumspect, describing open 
discrimination as “the jailing of black leaders or the socio-ec nomic imprisonment of 
black people in ghettos” (vii).
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60 For example, Charlene Avallone claims that criticism needs to be “historically 
responsible,” that literary study “needs to articulate values commensurate with 
America’s hybrid culture and cross-cultural relations and with America’s promise of 
democratic ideals” (1104, 1115).  In nearly identical terms, Timothy Powell remaps 
the “geographical and cultural margins” in his multicultural interpretation to represent 
the “multicultural hybridity” of American identity (6, 23).  Powell acknowledges the 
degree to which his own study relies on Ronald Takaki’s A Different Mirror (1992), a 
gesture to the extent to which New Americanist literary scholarship relies upon the 
methods and works of historical scholarship.  Indeed, Powell points out that his 
Ruthless Democracy is as much a work of cultural historiography as literary study 
(19), a shared goal for much of this dissertation.
61 Theirs is not a tremendous leap, given the wording of the Thirteenth Amendment:  
“Section 1:  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  Legalizing slavery within the 
context of imprisonment created the basis both for Jim Crow laws inequitably 
punishing black Americans, and for prisons serving as factories and plantations of 
slave labor.  However, not all historians view prisons so critically.  Keve, Blake 
McKelvey, and Richard A. Wright all argue that the narrative of prison administration 
is, from the sub-title of McKelvey’s study, “A History of Good Intentions.”  Keve’s 
history is that as told from the inside, as he served as the Commissioner of 
Corrections in Minnesota. 
62 No reader, teacher, or critic can select this book or that book to be the “best” or 
worth reading or teaching from a vantage point outside of history; such decisions are 
made from within a history of judgment, of obscurity and revision.  The reader can 
read what he or she likes; the teacher and scholar, however, as cultural power brokers 
whose syllabi and scholarship produce and revise literary history, have a 
responsibility to situate their claims and painstakingly trace the allegiances and 
erasures of those claims.  Such an understanding of teaching and scholarship counters 
John Guillory’s critique of canon reformation.  In Cultural Capital (1993), his 
rewriting of Pierre Bourdieu, Guillory argues that debates over canon formation and 
the cultural production that is education presume too much in the equation of l terary 
study and cultural history.  It is certainly true that adding Cleaver’s Soul on Ice to the 
reading list for a course in U.S. literature does nothing to challenge the material 
circumstances of prisoners in Folsom today.  However, this dissertation emphasizes 
the historical conditions of the production and reception of the texts it surveys, in part 
to challenge the assumptions of incarceration and race in order to offer a broader and 
richer cultural history, literary and otherwise.
63 Sacvan Bercovitch is of course the critic of U.S. literature most associated with 
such dissent in The American Jeremiad (1978), “America as Canon and Context: 
Literary History in a Time of Dissensus” (1986), and Rites of Assent (1993).  David 
Howard-Pitney in The Afro-American Jeremiads (1990) points out the degree to 
346
which such dissent is insufficiently associated with African American discourse, 
arguing that black literature in the U.S. has consistently maintained that edge of 
critique and prophecy.   Sundquist demonstrates that some African American 
literature therefore results as a “strange combination of fiction and cultural analysis” 
(Hammers 6), a description that resonates most clearly with Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and 
“The Flashlight” (1969), but also with Faulkner’sGo Down, Moses, dedicated to 
Caroline O’Barr, the black woman and family caregiver whose storytelling likely in 
part shaped his. 
64 Go Down, Moses was originally published by Random House with and Other 
Stories as part of the title; for its 1949 reprint, Faulkner asked that they drop what he 
describes as an editorial addition.  Whether the book is a novel or a collection of short 
stories proved a dominant critical question.  I survey this discussion and describe it as 
a novel in “Go Down, Moses [and Other Stories]:  Bibliography as a Novel Approach 
to a Question of Genre” (2002); the emphasis on slavery to incarceration gives further 
focus to this argument.
65 The perceived rift does not acknowledge latent historicist aspects to Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory.  A passage from among Lacan’s earliest work provides a sense 
of the subject in history offered in a manner that, coincidentally, speaks directly to 
imprisonment.  In a brief and highly elusive image of the trope of the prison as a 
model of subjectivity offered in “The Mirror Stage,” likely the most fundamentally 
important essay with regard to the application of psychoanalytic approaches to 
cultural study, Lacan suggests that “the historical effort of a society to refuse to 
recognize that it has any function other than the utilitarian” produces a false liberty of 
imagined autonomy.  Such individualism denotes “a freedom that is never more 
authentic than when it is within the walls of a prison” (Écrits:  A Selection 6).  Lacan 
rejects that naïve existentialist model to acknowledge the constructive force of 
history, which is only the first suggestion of the degree to which he regards 
psychoanalysis and history as paired disciplines, “both sciences of the particular” 
(51).  He continues,  “What we teach the subject to realize as his unconscious is his 
history—that is to say, we help him to perfect the present historization of the facts 
that have already determined a certain number of the historical ‘turning-po ts’ in his 
existence” (52).  The equation of unconscious and history, the “historicization of the 
facts” and the focus on formative “turning-points” recognized after the fact makes 
this analysis of the subject something of a blueprint for historicist approaches
developed and refined more than a quarter century later. A turn to a printing in the 
original French demonstrates that the historical turn of the late seventies is not 
retroactively overwriting Lacan in this instance.  After all, the English translation of 
Écrits was published in 1977 and translated by Alan Sheridan, who the same year 
translated Foucault’s urveillir et punir (1975).  However, each of the instances cited 
does not use a term for the more individual past (passé, antecedent), but histoire, 
which develops both the sense of larger history as well as story or narrative (Écrits I
96, 139).
347
66 Prominent examples of such connections located at least in part in U.S. cultural 
study include Female Subjects in Black and White:  Race, Psychoanalysis, Feminism
(1997), The Psychoanalysis of Race (1998), a special issue of Black 
Renaissance/Renaissance Noire, “The American Dilemma Revisited:  
Psychoanalysis, Social Policy, and the Socio-Cultural Meaning of Race” (2003), and 
Peter Coviello’s “Intimacy and Affliction:  DuBois, Race, and Psychoanalysis” fr om 
the Modern Language Quarterly (2003).  This influx emerges more than four decades 
after Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952), a landmark psychoanalytic 
study of race framed in terms of postcolonialism.  However, Fanon’s work, while 
influential for U.S. revolutionary writers such as Cleaver, did not gain ground in U.S. 
academic study until the broader coalescing of postcolonial studies in the 1980s, and 
has seen only recent expansion in U.S. studies, such as in The Fact of Blackness
(1996), Fanon:  A Critical Reader (1996), and Frantz Fanon:  Critical Perspectives
(1999).  Homi Bhabha, whose introduction to the 1986 edition of Black Skin, White 
Masks in part produced the resurgence of Fanon’s work, cautions against such 
(mis)use.  Fanon offers his own warning that the book speaks only to black 
experience in the Antilles and not that of Africa—“at least concerning the black man 
at home” (14).  Understanding imprisonment as an interior colonization provides a 
referential context for future postcolonial applications to a critical discourse of 
carceral culture.  
67 Slavoj Žižek’s work is roughly split between philosophical critique of the limits of 
historicism (arguing for the necessity of historicizing historicism) and specifically 
Lacanian criticism (which remains largely ahistorical).  Joan Copjec argues in Read
My Desire:  Lacan Against the Historicists (1994) that historicism in the vein of 
Foucault makes marginal or lacks entirely the power of desire that psychoanalytic 
approaches make central.  Lane’s work is divided between arguing for the relevance 
of psychoanalytic criticism in various historical periods and polemicizing against 
historicism.  One way to gloss the disciplinary turf war is to read the reviews of his 
book The Burdens of Intimacy: Psychoanalysis and Victorian Masculinity (1999) and 
his edited collection The Psychoanalysis of Race in the Journal for the 
Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society, which would presumably be sympathetic to 
such approaches.  However, both reviewers—Kathy Alexis Psomiades and Ellis 
Hanson, respectively—note the lack of historicist rigor in each work (154-157; 173-
175).  Part of the problem is that Lane less bridges the fields than argues for the 
legitimacy of specifically Lacanian psychoanalysis, and with regard to ace, seeks to 
write race into Lacan in its very absence—which is fine as a gambit, but it is not a 
terribly successful tactic in arguing for a psychoanalytic historicism.  For example, 
Lane points out that Lacan’s Other does not denote skin color.  According to Lane, 
that very lack means that Lacanian alterity “fosters a more precise and historically 
subtle account of group identification and racial fantasy than we find in Hegelian 
accounts of whites and blacks” (297).  Such “reading in”works to a certain extent, 
though Lane downplays the degree to which the Lacan Other “fosters,” allows for 
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historicity rather than actually conducting it.  The Lacanian Other is only “more 
precise and historically subtle” in interrogating race to the extent that critics use it so, 
which most of the contributors to Psychoanalysis and Race do not.  Lane continues, 
“For important reasons, then, Lacan does not simply or timelessly represent the black 
man as the Other; ironically, it is post-colonial theory, taking its notion from Hegel, 
Sartre, and Fanon, that produces this ahistorical and occidental account of racial 
difference” (297).  I appreciate what Lane is trying so hard to do in suturing 
psychoanalytic reading with cultural study in particular historical contexts.  I 
therefore groan more deeply at his dip to polemic and deconstructive reversals, 
pulling the rug out from under post-colonialism’s straw critics (Hegelians all, to 
Lane’s read) to upend the interpretive strategies that many critics of the collection he 
edits find useful.
68 Gwen Bergner frames her study with the admission that “classic psychoanalysis 
emphasizes gender and sexuality as the determining factors of social organization and 
subjectivity, neglecting racial difference altogether.  Furthermore, psychoanalytic 
theory has tended to describe psychology in terms of universal frameworks that 
ignore cultural and historical specificity” (222).  Ricardo Ainslie and Kalina Brabeck 
open their own study with a similar acknowledgement (44).
69 Certeau extends this representation in the “A Walk in the City” chapter (97-110) of 
The Practice of Everyday Life (1984).  “The act of walking is to the urban system 
what the speech act is to language or to the statements uttered” (97).  If we missed the 
Lacanian gesture of the unconscious being structured like a language, Certeau returns 
in what is effectively a linguistic montage of citations that in their aggregate are an 
effort to suture Freudian psychoanalysis to poststructuralist discourse.  The signs of 
the city “characterize both a ‘symbolic order of the unconscious’ and ‘certain typical 
processes of subjectivity manifested in discourse’” (102).  A passage prefaced with 
Derrida and haunted by the spectre of Deleuze and Guattari–the “wandering of the 
semantic”—races immediately through a rewriting of Freud to collapse city, 
language, and dreams to one landscape.  The chapter ends by rewriting the Freudian 
fort-da and the Lacanian jouissance of misrecognition not in terms of possession or 
sight but in terms of space.  “To practice space is thus to repeat the joyful and silent 
experience of childhood; it is, in a place, to be other and to move toward the other” 
(110).  This fort-da of self becomes then a spatial rather than a visual relationship 
constituting subjectivity.
70 The manner in which I employ psychoanalytic terms itself gravitates to historical 
context, as I generally employ a particular psychoanalytic vocabulary in the analysis 
of texts coincident with the development of that framework itself.  For example, I 
apply largely Freudian descriptions of the unconscious and the primal scene to 
Faulkner’s Sanctuary and Light in August, novels first published contemporary to 
popular discussion of Freud and when models of psychological development proved 
pervasive in prison officials’ discussions of the origins of criminality.  Furthermore, 
Cleaver and Mailer were employing “schizophrenia” as a socio-hist rical term just a 
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few years before Deleuze and Guattari made it a primary focus of Anti-Oedipus:  
Capitalism and Schizophrenia.  I am not claiming that psychoanalytic readings are 
only useful in this manner of historical parallelism, but I am implying that their 
application in a less coincident and more transhistorical fashion requires very 
rigorous substantiation of the use-value and relevancy.
71 This 11-year period is also one of unprecedented representation of prisoners in 
popular periodicals, according to Sloop’s survey of such in The Cultural Prison (203 
Appendix 2 Table 2).  
72 Such teaching strategies have their own genealogy, with antecedents in the critical 
pedagogy of both Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux, who has his own debt to Raymond 
Williams and the Birmingham School.
73 In another context, Antonin Artaud argues, “Our present social state is iniquitous 
and should be destroyed.  If this is a fact for the theater to be preoccupied with, it is 
even more a matter for machine guns” (41-42).  Artaud distinguishes between the 
stage and staging social struggle, but from Kenneth Burke’s dramatism to Judith 
Butler’s theorization of performativity, theatrical language has proven useful in 
describing the practice of human experience.  Unlike the trope of the prison, which 
too often linguistically substitutes an existential for a material condition, the trope of 
the stage provides a more nuanced means by which Burke describes a grammar of 
motives and Butler, the performance of identity.  Protesting the social state of 
imprisonment in the instance of raced incarceration is indeed a matter for the 
rhetorical equivalent of machine guns, resistance in which I hope this dissertation 
might play a small but still significant role.
74 Faulkner described his fictional county in those terms in a 1955 interview (L on in 
the Garden 255).  The description exactly matchesthat of seven years earlier, in 
Intruder in the Dust and Lucas’ ownership of “the house and the ten acres of land it 
sat in—an oblong of earth set forever in the middle of the two-thousand-acre 
plantation like a postage stamp in the center of an envelope” (289).  The likeness 
between Faulker’s right to ownership and that of Lucas is suggestive in its cross-
racial identification.  There are many ways to describe the proprietorship of some 
small thing that is at once the sum of and the field for all one’s labor, after all, and 
Faulkner chooses the same for himself and Lucas, a black male character among the 
writer’s most powerfully rendered. 
75 The first edition of Absalom, Absalom! opens with Faulkner’s hand drawn map of 
his fictional county, a map which identifies the topography and the population:  
“Whites, 6298; Negroes, 9313.”  Robert W. Kirk identifies 1,200 characters in 19 
novels, as well as 94 shorter works, and 175 of these characters appear in multiple 
texts (vii).  Thomas E. Dasher offers a more detailed index that does not substantively 
alter the prior accounts.  
76 In 1963, Cleanth Brooks could write of Faulkner’s “masterpieces” and “greatest 
works” as bracketed in this period (viii, ix).  As Chapter One demonstrates, history 
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and subjectivity supersede conventional aesthetic des riptions in more recent literary 
criticism.  
77 Execution is the extreme extent of punishment, and the matters of the harsh 
economic climate and incarceration practices have a more than juxtapositional 
relationship.  In a comprehensive study covering 1979-1997, Gould, Weinberg, and 
Mustard (2002) found that economic downturns defined by unemployment and low 
wages offer the clearest—and arguably, the only—correlation for crime rates, and 
therefore incarceration.  More statistical research is necessary to compare their 
findings to earlier periods in U.S. history, but their work is certainly suggestive.
78 Between 1930 and 1942, 1002 of those executed were white, with 959 for murder, 
20 for rape, and 23 for other offenses.  1034 of the executed were black, with 852 for 
murder, 165 for rape, and 34 for other offenses, according to the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s “Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.”  
79 John Irwin makes a similar point of The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, 
Absalom! in Doubling and Incest, Repetition and Revenge:  A Speculative Reading of 
Faulkner (1975).  Joseph Blotner does point out that there are “many links of tone 
and phrase [in Light in August] with Sanctuary,” but does not press further (300).
80 A sheriff’s deputy narrates Rider’s death in an entirely unsympathetic manner; he 
does not comprehend that Rider, a black man, could feel overwhelming grief at the 
death of his wife and thereby seek his own death.  
81 Wright also makes this point in Native Son.  It became a matter of wider discussion 
in the late 1960s, and black revolutionary writers, some writing from inside prisons, 
make this argument.  Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and Jackson’s Soledad Brother are two 
prominent examples.
82 That introduction, one of the few Faulkner wrote, was included with the Modern 
Library edition of Sanctuary in 1932, though he thereafter recommended against its 
use.  The 1993 Vintage edition describes that introduction as “misleading, but often 
quoted” (321) to preface its reprinting (321- 4).  Criticism that would place the novel 
among the writer’s finest are André Bleikasten’s The Ink of Melancholy (1990) and 
Philip Cohen’s “‘A Cheap Idea... Deliberately Conceived to Make Money’: The 
Biographical Context of William Faulkner's Introduction to Sanctuary” (1988).
83 The second time, “I gave you your chance” becomes “I give you your chance.”  
The phrase appears in the same context in Light in August too, as Hines declares the 
contest was one between he and God:  “God give old Doc Hines his chance and so 
old Doc Hines give God His chance too” (371).
84 As Christmas is hounded, it is the “sound and fury of the hunt” he hears (emphasis 
added—331), though this referentiality seems more an authorial wink than a 
reworking of material.
85 Michael Oriard offers a rich account of Faulkner, game, and sport in Sporting with 
the Gods (1991), and Thadious M. Davis addresses games of chance in Games of 
Property:  Law, Race, Gender, and Faulkner's Go Down, Moses (2003).  Warwick 
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Wadlington is the foremost among Faulkner’s critics who emphasize the role of the 
reader.
86 Wright offers a similar description of “Bigger” Thomas in Native Son, as “Bigger” 
proceeds from repeatedly saying, “Sometimes I feel like something awful is going to 
happen to me,” to, “It’s like I was going to do something I can’t help” (23, 24).  
87 Such accounts are offered in Dianne Luce Cox’s “A Measure of Innocence:  
Sanctuary’s Temple Drake,” (1986), Linda Dunleavy’s “Sanctuary, Sexual 
Difference, and the Problem of Rape,” (1996), and Elisabeth Muhlenfield’s 
“Bewildered Witness:  Temple Drake in Sanctuary,” (1983).  In “The Dark Lady:  
Temple Drake as Femme Fatale” (1999), Scott Yarbrough offers a compelling 
suggestion of Temple’s capability to act, intimating that her perjury is “one last blow 
as an empowered femme fatale at the system that has so spurned her” (62).
88 Faulkner’s introduction suggests hat he anticipated popular beliefs and “current 
trends,” which echoes eight years later in Wright’s description of his process of 
writing Native Son.  Wright offers that he used “terms known and acceptable to a 
common body of readers, terms which would, in the course of the story, manipulate 
the deepest held notions and convictions of their lives.  That came easy” (“Bigger” 
xxvii).
89 Others have addressed Christmas’ complicity with his threatening universe.  
Warwick Wadlington suggests that “in resisting his world, [he] collaborates with it to 
compose his version of tragic drama” (135); David Minter identifies “Joe’s secret 
affiliation with the world that pursues and mutilates him” (132). 
90 Wadlington points out this winning and losing of points as well, but likens it to 
“child’s play” rather than sport (147).  
91 It is worth noting that state forces also employ such terms, though rules such as 
California’s “three strikes and you’re out” law, passed in 1994, which mandates life 
sentences for those convicted three times, even for minor felonies.  That seems a glib 
reproduction of game rather than sport, an unequal contest where the state sets the 
rules.  It is also a truncated version of New York’s “Four Felony Law” of the Baumes 
Commission (APA 1929 135-137).
92 Goodwin, Popeye, Christmas, Rider, and Butch all at least to some extent seek out 
their deaths.  Faulkner is writing tragedy, of course, and characters’ actions laying the 
basis for their ends is fundamental to the genre.  Nevertheless, in Light in August and 
Go Down, Moses, black or mixed race characters so often seeking their own deaths as 
Christmas, Rider, and Butch seem to resembles a tacit racism similar to the 
conclusion of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, an abolitionist text where 
all of the black characters are either dead or headed to Africa.
93 Noel Polk edits Sanctuary:  The Original Text (1981), though the author’s revision 
moves the scene of the jail to the center of the book, beginning instead with Horace 
Benbow and Popeye at the pond.  And as a side note, G  Down, Moses ends where it 
begins as well—Faulkner typed the first two paragraphs of the final episode of Go 
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Down, Moses on the reverse side of a discarded  typescript of a story called “Almost,” 
which in revision became “Was,” the opening of Go Down, Moses (Blotner 421).
94 I am grateful to Wadlington for bringing this military strategy to my attention.
95 Some theorists identify individuation as a primary purpose of imprisonment.  
Drawing heavily from Discipline and Punish, Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini
describe the prison as a factory for the manufacture of a particular person, the 
transformation of the criminal “real subject” into a prisoner, an “ideal subject” 
disciplined to the designs of the state (144- 5).  Such a manufacture is viewed 
negatively here, though it is less a by-product of a critique of punishment practices 
than of an analysis of the political economy of capitalism.  
96 More than either a Freudian or Lacanian subject, Gavin Stevens at the end 
resembles Deleuze and Guattari’s model of socially constituted selfhood, wherein a 
“schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s 
couch” (Anti-Oedipus  2).  Certeau offers a related account in the “A Walk in the 
City” chapter (97-110) of The Practice of Everyday Life (1984).
97 That Faulkner has Butch Beauchamp buried just outside the limit of the town may 
seem ominous to some and just a consequence of the placement of the cemetery to 
others.  Incidentally, Faulkner sometimes spells the grandmother’s name as “Molly,” 
sometimes as “Mollie.”
98 The conceit of Jefferson as of one mind, as a singular body, reaches its apex in 
Absalom, Absalom!, where the town is repeatedly described in bodily terms, 
particularly surrounding Sutpen’s marriage to Ellen Coldfield:  
[T]hat public opinion which at some moment during the five preceding years 
had swallowed him even though he never had quite ever lain quiet on its 
stomach, had performed one of mankind’s natural and violent and 
inexplicable volte faces and regurgitated him.  And it did not help him any 
that at least two of the citizens who should have made two of the teeth in the 
outraged jaw served instead as props to hold the jaw open and impotent while 
he walked out of it unharmed. (40)
99 The story of Butch Beauchamp is told in the titular episode of the novel was first 
published in Collier’s Magazine January 25, 1941.  Readers first encountered the 
story on a page largely  taken up by George Howe’s illustration of Molly Beauchamp 
sitting in a rocking chair, leaning slightly forward, holding a pipe and staring wide-
eyed and still above a caption quoting her lament for her grandson.  However, while 
the story describes Molly as “little,” with a “shrunken” face and “not as big as a ten-
year-old child” (19, 46), the illustration is that of a heavy-set woman.  Given the 
degree to which the “Mammy” figure, given widespread representation just two years 
before in Gone with the Wind (1939), served as the exemplar of mature black 
femininity in the 1940s, Howe’s picture demonstrates how the cultural imagination 
shapes interpretation coincident with production.  
100 Early criticism of Requiem for a Nun reads the character of Temple Drake in 
negative terms and her housekeeper Nancy as a saintly figure, which Noel Polk 
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challenges sharply, casting Temple as tragic heroine and Nancy—and Gavin 
Stevens—as unremittingly villainous (Faulkner’s 188-212).  Less polarizing accounts 
are offered in more recent criticism, such as Judith Bryant Wittenberg’s “Temple 
Drake and ‘La parole pleine’” (1995) and Barbara Ladd’s “‘Philosophers and Other 
Gynecologists’:  Women and the Polity in Requiem for a Nun”  However, these 
analyses do not focus on the matter of criminality, its causes and punishments, and 
the responsibility for them.
101 In the first 70 years of the Association’s history, two presidents represented the 
South; between WWII and 1979, there were eight.  In Dixie Rising:  How the South is 
Shaping American Values, Politics, and Culture (1996), Peter Applebome describes 
the expansion of Southern policies and practice, particularly how divides over civil 
rights split the Democratic party, sending many conservative Democrats to the right 
and making Southern states largely Republican.  Incidentally, in his April 3, 1964 
speech “The Ballot or the Bullet,” Malcolm X predicted that exact split for those very 
reasons, even foretelling the expansion of violent riots that summer (23-44).
102 The 1964 Civil Rights Act proved a turning point in the federal government’s 
“hands off” policy for the oversight of state prisons.  The Arkansas ruling in Holt v. 
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (1970) was the broadest of several states’ similar findings.  
Earlier rulings focused particularly on the First Amendment rights of black prisoners.  
The ACA tried to bar the religious practices of Black Muslims in the early 1960s, but 
the Federal Courts upheld the latter’s religious freedom in Pierce v. LaVallee, 21 F. 
Supp. 865 (1962); Sewell v. Pegelow, 304 F. 2d 670 (1962); and Pierce v. LaVallee 
293 F. 2d 233 (1963).
103 In 1972, Furman v. Georgia reversed the death sentences of two men convicted in 
Georgia, one for murder and one for rape, and another man in Texas convicted of 
rape (408 U.S. 238; 92 S. Ct. 2726; 33 L. Ed. 2d 346).  Such sentences for black men 
convicted of rape echo the similar circumstances addressed in Chapter Two.  The 5-4 
decision was contestedbitterly, resulting in nine separate opinions. 
104 Nor does this chapter conduct a Foucauldian reading of Soul on Ice and The 
Executioner’s Song, though like Discipline and Punish, published in English the same 
year as the latter, all focus on individuation in imprisonment.  Mailer’s Gilmore 
suggests that reformative efforts in part produced him as a convict, a claim identical 
to Foucault’s in Discipline and Punish.  Furthermore, Cleaver can be read as 
identifying with as much imagination, if with less rigor, the methods and purposes of 
imprisonment in terms very similar to Foucault’s.  Soul on Ice sometimes reads as if 
Foucault had one hand in it as he wrote Discipline and Punish, particularly with 
regard to individuation, surveillance as a force of order, and systemic and thus diffuse 
authority.  Foucault’s list of disciplinary architectures that replicate prison’s systems 
of control—“prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all 
resemble prisons” (202, 228)—sees its preview in Cleaver’s similar list of “prison, 
the Army, a monastery, hospital, spaceship, submarine” (23).  In his short story “The 
Flashlight,” those in the “Army,” “jails,” and “factories” share a sense of 
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indoctrination (288).  The function of the police in Cleaver’s account of domestic law 
is observation, surveillance, division, and making visible:  “The police patrol the city, 
cordon off communities, blockade neighborhoods, invade homes, search for that 
which is hidden” (Soul on Ice 129).  He traces that use of force on a national and 
international level not to a clear sovereign, but to systems of power not clearly 
visible.  “Behind police brutality there is social brutality, economic brutality, and 
political brutality,” lines of authority leading to offices “shrouded in mystery” (133).  
Cleaver’s sketch of control and force offers a blueprint for Foucault’s use of 
Benthamite architecture to chart a physics of power, particularly in the “Panopticism” 
chapter (195-228), though Soul on Ice is less a meticulous examination of economic, 
political, and historical formations of culture than a point from which such analysis 
might begin.
105 A participant in the ACA’s 1971 conference refers to cover articles in Time and
Newsweek addressing how “prisons have failed” (11)—and prisons would return to 
the covers of those news magazines in 2000 and 2001, thought the perceived failure 
of the system chronicled in those pages is quite different.  The earlier cover articles 
emphasize how existing imprisonment practices have failed to stop rising crime rates.  
The later articles address how the radic l increase in the number of prisons and 
prisoners does not meaningfully correlate to crime rates and dramatically over-
represents black and Hispanic men.
106 The next few years would see the same points raised in nearly identical terms.  A 
1970 participant begins, “It is difficult to speak about corrections today—indeed 
about any part of the administration of criminal justice—without reference to the 
massive social changes which are occurring in this country.  Tensions in the black 
community, a discordant youth culture, an unpopular war which is producing an 
increasing number of young men convicted of offenses essentially political in nature, 
raise profound questions about the limits, methods and aims of correctional activities” 
(ACA 1970 131).  The presidential address the subsequent year notes that “society is 
experiencing a period of cultural and social revolution” (1971 3).  Such recognitions 
fall off sharply thereafter, though they do not disappear entirely.  In 1973, ACA 
President Martha Wheeler, the first woman to head the organization, speaks of crime 
as socially and historically determined.  She asks, “Are there some kinds of behavior 
defined as illegal which the community is now willing to tolerate?  On the other hand, 
are there some kinds of behavior which were formerly tolerable but are no longer?” 
(3-4). Such liberal views are more prevalent among the plenary addresses than the 
rest of the papers.
107 Like any large group—in 1968, the ACA had a membership of nearly 10,000 
(ACA 1968 326), and it would grow ten-fold by the turn of the century—the 
organization was by no means entirely homogenous, and reactionary voices 
occasionally appear.  In 1969, for example, a warden cites university riots not as 
symptomatic of social change but as a pernicious direct cause of unrest in prison 
(ACA 1969 62).  At one point, he offers a list of trouble-makers:  “resistors, draft 
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dodgers, professional agitators, communists, hippies and revolutionaries [… and] 
former prisoners, militants, far-out liberals, subversives, and even a few clergymen, 
educators and social workers,” whose “delight in fomenting unrest” he parallels with 
“drunken Mexicans” rioting in prison (62-63).  Presidential addresses remain 
significantly more progressive through this 12-year period. 
108 The Goldman Panel supervised the prisoners directly after the riot.  The McKay 
Commission held public hearings in April 1972 in a broader examination of the 
state’s practices and concluded by criticizing the violent response and Rockefeller’s 
failure to visit the prison in person.  The “Rights of People” panel at the 1972 ACA 
conference focuses largely on the rights of corrections officers and administrators 
(ACA 1972 136-151).  The shift between the 1968 meeting in San Francisco and four 
years later in Pittsburgh is significant, and the violence of Attica likely set the tone for 
the 1972 opening address.  The Governor of Pennsylvania Milton J. Shapp, rather 
than begin with the customary congratulatory remarks saluting the ACA, begins with 
a vignette of a furloughed youth raping and murdering a young girl (1).
109 The federal government implemented the strongest anti-drug laws in 1986 and 
1988, and in 1989, William J. Bennett became President George H. W. Bush’s “drug 
czar.”  Bennett’s deputy John P. Walters served that role for the subsequent President 
Bush’s administration in 2001.  
110 The 1976 ACA congress includes a panel of five papers on “The Overcrowding 
Crisis,” and the schedules thereafter do not feature a similar panel because the issue 
saturates panel presentations.  Housing the increasing number of inmates has 
presented tremendous fiscal problems for counties, states, and the federal 
government.  For example, by the early 1980s, New York’s prison population was 
over twice what it had been before the Rockefell r drug laws.  Voters who had 
supported “tough on crime” legislation failed to support bond measures to pay for 
new facilities, so Governor Mario Cuomo ended up diverting funds designated for 
low-income housing to build the prisons (Schlosser 56-57).  
111 Martinson offered some of the 1969 research findings in his 1974 ACA 
presentation, “The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment” (105-111), and he 
clarifies that the suppression does not necessarily seem a deliberate effort, as the 
findings could have been—and eventually were—spun to support Rockefeller’s more 
extreme sentencing platform. Two years later, a prison director comments on a 
forthcoming study by Martinson that claims parole programs reduce recidivism, and 
another suggests that his article argues that most prisoners should not in fact be 
incarcerated (1977 64, 179).  His research is among the most frequently cited in ACA 
presentations of the late 1970s.  Closing down contentious inquiry was nothing new 
to Saxbe, an Ohio Senator and National Guard colonel before becoming Attorney 
General under Nixon.  He had just emerged from his appointment hearings, where 
petitioners in 1973 had demanded his disqualification due to conflicts of interest 
regarding the federal government’s involvement in the commission determining 
National Guard responsibility for the 1970 Kent State shootings.  Saxbe had promised 
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to end the investigation if appointed, according to William A. Gordon’s Four Dead in 
Ohio:  Was There a Conspiracy at Kent State? (1995).
112 Chapter Four in The Cultural Prison charts the divide between “Rehabilitation and 
Immorality, 1960-1968,” which becomes more focused with regard to race in the next 
chapter, “Rehabilitation, Revolution, and Irrationality, 1969-1974.”  The three types 
differentiate betwen the redeemable white from the black male inmate, who either 
views his imprisonment as a consequence of social injustice or has proven 
uncontrollable and irrational.  That characterization of white convicts remains in 
place in 1979, according to Sloop, though general patterns in the representation of 
incarceration in popular periodicals in general focus on “just deserts,” wherein the 
punishment matches the crime, regardless of mitigating circumstances such as socio-
economic factors (132-133).  
113 Cleaver’s short story “The Flashlight” offers a different account, where the black 
and Latino underclass cross over from their greater Los Angeles barrio of Crescent 
Heights to the white and affluent El Serrano to commit their petty thievery and 
burglary.
114 In “Lockdown at Angola:  The Case of the Angola 3” (2001), Scott Fleming 
chronicles the three decades of imprisonment at the Louisiana State Prison endured 
by Herman Wallace, Robert King Wilkerson, and Albert Woodfox, whose 
incarceration he describes as a part of the longstanding persecution of the Black 
Panther Party.  Regarding the associate warden’s comment regarding communism, it 
is at odds with Cleaver’s observations that black revolutionary radicalism conflicted
with the Communist Party—a charge disputed in U.S. Senate hearings (Heath 79-80; 
Jones 1).
115 He begins his talk with a bit of historical juxtaposition:  “While on July 4, 1970, 
Bob Hope, Billy Graham, and 350,000 persons were celebrating “Honor America 
Day,” in Washington D.C., a prison riot was starting at Holmesburg Prison, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania” (1970 19).  In a subsequent footnote, the judge 
acknowledges that during the riot, participants tried to contact him, presumably 
because he is a prominent liberal black judge.  Higginbotham applauds the Crime 
Commission Report and former U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach in 
supporting efforts to increase employment, housing, education, and health care as 
means to decrease crime, as “every effort to improve life in America’s inner cities is 
an efort against crime.”  Higginbotham places the initial bill of funding the services 
in the order of $20 billion and suggests it  immediate initiation, pointing out that 
commissions have been tracing crime to the same causes and recommending the same 
solutions every decade of the century (1970 32-3 ).  An acting commissioner of the 
New York corrections system makes the same recommendation nine years later in 
“Social Justice through Resource Allocations” (ACA 1979 191-98).
116 The same point offered by these three appears again in the 1990 ACA presidential
address (112).  Of course, at one level, they are correct, in that correctional officials 
lack any direct recourse in the management of prisons to change the complex matters 
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of the social and economic causes of imprisonment.  At the organizational level of the 
ACA, however, they very much did have such an opportunity to raise those issues, 
and the group would do so in the 1990s.  Incidentally, the chaplain in 1972 
represented the Elmira Correctional Facility in New York, which in the late 
nineteenth century was the site of the most fully developed educational programs of 
reform in corrections under Zebulon Brockway.  In a telling quotation attesting to the 
degree to which prison officials responded to black organization as a national threat 
and a declaration of war, the chaplain concludes his speech with a gesture to “never 
surrender to the militant purveyor of hate and disorder, to quote Winston Churchill, 
‘NEVER, NEVER, NEVER’” (196).  However, prisoners themselves situated 
themselves in an identical manner.  One of the Attica prisoners cited Claude McKay’s 
poem “If We Must Die” in an interview, a quotation attributed to the prisoner himself 
in a 1971 Time article.  H. Bruce Franklin points out that Churchill himself had 
quoted the poem in another urge n ver to surrender (Prison Literature 235).  Like the 
“Rights of People” panel (n. 110), prison officials sometimes appropriated the 
rhetoric of resistance to achieve a sort of moral high ground.  Incidentally, the Attica 
prisoner is not the only one to whom a national weekly misattributes a poem.  The 
Executioner’s Song recounts how Newsweek attributes to Gilmore what is in fact his 
quoting from Shelley’s “The Sensitive Plant” (668).
117 Fox argues, “The majority of persons arrested for crimes are white, but the 
majority of persons sent to prisons in many jurisdictions are black.  The social 
distance and the cultural differentiations have contributed to a new ideology of 
revolution and social change among many blacks, an ideology intensely resisted by 
the white power structure” (1972 178). 
118 Fox traces the politicizing of black prisoners to Malcolm X’s Autobiography, then 
Soul on Ice, then Soledad Brothers [sic] (ACA 1972 179-180).  Another paper offers 
a similar reading list, citing Soul on Ice twice, along with Killers of a Dream (1949),
Dark Ghetto (1965), Black Like Me (1961),and Rap on Race (1971).  The presenter 
identifies the sociological concept of “status degradation,” whereby an identity 
becomes a denigrated type—specifically, how blackness becomes identified with 
criminality in the uncritical diagnosis that is part of the sociology of corrections 
(ACA 1972 185-87).  Culturally sensitive education can address that matter, 
according to E. Eugene Miller’s “Necssary Preconditions to Achieving Cultural 
Awareness.”  He opens by mocking his very invitation to speak on that topic because 
he had worked with blacks and Native Americans and thus was presumed able to 
speak knowledgably, giving a 15 minute synopsis of the culture of each (1972 170-
71).  He interprets this very invitation as symptomatic of the white racist 
“paternalism” he argues against (172).  He also mentions an Association of State 
Correctional Administrators position paper published earlier that year acknowledging 
“that racism has and does exist in corrections” (172).  He argues for knowledge of 
and respect for cultural difference and ends with a call for an identification of an “us” 
between corrections administrators and a “them” of prisoners “without regard to race, 
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color, or creed” (174).  The call for such specific identification between prisoners and 
those who imprison is virtually unprecedented—though over 40 years earlier, a 
participant says of non-prisoners and prisoners alike, “All are brothers under the skin” 
(APA 1929 349).  Miller’s encouragement for culturally sensitive history 
paradoxically echoes the more reactionary Army Major’s support of black history 
classes—presumably, the Major does not envision them being taught by Cleaver, who 
led such classes in prison, according to Robert Sheer in his introduction to Cleaver’s 
Post-Prison Writings and Speeches (ix).
119 One lengthy presentation in 1974, by far the longest of that year’s conference, by a 
West Virginia warden titled “Prisons and the Revolutionary” manages to at one 
moment decry McCarthyism, then lay the blame for grassroots and inmate-led prison 
reform movements at the feet of the Communist Party (1974 109-1 7, 132).  It cites 
position papers by the House Committee on Internal Security and the opinions of J. 
Edgar Hoover on various intra- nd extra-prison groups as threats to national security, 
including the Black Panthers, the Nation of Islam, and the National Lawyers Guild.  
The warden clarifies that the involvement of the Communist Party is “not a giant 
Communist conspiracy,” but merely a matter of 25,000 revolutionaries, and claims 
that “sworn statements, affidavits, and committee reports” support his pos tion (132).  
He concludes by quoting an extended passage from Mein Kampf, much of which is 
indistinguishable from his own speech, and thereafter collapses Hitler’s words and 
views with those of Che Guevarra, Ho Chi Minh, and U.S. anti-war protestors, 
claiming derisively that “Venceremos” and “Viet Cong” translate to English as “We 
shall overcome” (1974 134).  It is unfortunate that the Association ceased the practice 
of recording and publishing question and answer sessions following the papers, as it 
would be interesting to know how the warden’s audience responded.  The next year, a 
participant dismisses the term “political prisoner” in an aside as a wholly pejorative 
bogeyman, designating a black man who is “loud and demanding, half articulate, 
aware of his rights and blind to the rights of others” (1975 31).  What had been a 
seriously debated topic in 1972 had three years later faded to derision and obscurity.
120 The legislation of that model can be seen in Senate Bills 1437 and 2699, among 
others introduced there and in the House between 1976 and 1984, which provided for 
standardized rather than indeterminate sentencing and de-emphasized parole.  These 
efforts culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  Those “just deserts” 
reforms were the consequence of on the one hand, liberals who were critical of what 
they perceived as harsher sentences for minority criminals, and on the other hand, 
conservatives adopting a “tough on crime” posture (King 592- 3).
121 As early as 1978, Wilbert Rideau describes the causes of the expanding prison 
system as “a spiraling crime rate, the violence of revolutionary groups, the senseless 
violence of the young, and the growing perception that prisons do not rehabilitate” 
(Life Sentences 65).  He had a unique perspective of the situation as a prisoner serving 
a life sentence at Angola, n editor of its award-winning periodical The Angolite, and 
an investigative journalist.  Toward the close of the 1970s, when some officials were 
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anticipating that the rising costs of increasing imprisonment might demand changes in 
the system, Rideau suggests that as it grows larger, “the more resistant it will prove to 
change because of the vested interests involved” (69).  His assessment proved far 
more accurate.  Twenty years later, he acted as co-director of The Farm.  A few years 
prior to Rideau, ACA member and prison historian Norval Morris offered his own 
view that the prison population would climb until the mid-1980s and then level off or 
even decline.  However, he hedges his claim by suggesting that if “punitive attitudes 
by legislators and judges harden, as there are signs they will, the prison will further 
grow” (ACA 1975 2).
122 As part of an ongoing critique—in the pejorative sense—of “liberals in the 1960s,” 
Roger Kimball so describes Cleaver in the N w Criterion (5).  This is just one of 
many articles in 1998 using the occasion of Cleaver’s death to bury or praise him.  
The New York Times and Jet followed Cleaver’s transformations most closely through 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  
123 For example, in his account of the Democratic convention in Chicago, Mailer does 
not stay to see how it all ends, excusing himself by failing to say to Eugene 
McCarthy’s daughter that “we will be fighting for forty years” on his way to drinks at 
the Playboy mansion.  His full investment is not necessary; the outcome is uncertain 
and a toss-up either way—“We may yet win, the others are so stupid.  Heaven help us 
when we do” (222, 223).  
124 Cleaver’s Soul on Fire (1978) chronicles his turn to Christianity, and by 1980 he 
was supporting Ronald Reagan for president, a stark contrast to their heated debates 
of the 1968.  Kathleen Rout titles the section of her biography and commentary 
Eldridge Cleaver (1991) “Advertisements for Himself,” a gesture to Mailer’s 
Advertisements for Myself (1959).
125 Critics such as Chevigny, Davies, and Franklin link self-representation in the form 
of autobiography with much prison writing (xiii; 120; “Literature” 120).  Soul on Ice 
and The Executioner’s Song offer important if problematic articulations of identity 
fashioned behind bars, though the latter is not prison writing per se, in that aside from 
his letters, Gary Gilmore is the subject rather than the author behind bars.  The 
tendency to autobiography is not surprising given the degree to which the very 
methods of incarceration such narratives speak against include silence and 
concealment.  
126 These include the legitimacy of writ lawyers in Johnson v. Avery (1969), 
communication with the press in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick (1971)—though Pell v. 
Procunier (1974) would limit that right—and prisoners’ rights to receive both mail 
and visitors in Procunier v. Martinez (1974).
127 The most dismissive read Cleaver’s description, “Rape was an insurrectionary act” 
(33) as a rationalization and seem to stop there, never getting as far as his admission 
that he was wrong, sick, and evil (34-35).  
128 According to H. Bruce Franklin, carceral practices in the U.S. have so 
disproportionately imprisoned black men that the African American literature written 
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on the margins of dominant culture has, paradoxically, proven the dominant discourse 
within prison literature (“Literature” 51-52).  Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of a 
minor literature offered in Kafka:  Toward a Minor Literature (1975) illuminates the 
rhetorical position of prison writers such as Cleaver—and in a more mediated 
fashion, the prisoners who represent themselves in The Farm and “Live from Death 
Row” in Chapters Four and Five.  Deleuze and Guattari identify three characteristics 
of minor literature:  the articulations of the oppressed in the language of the 
oppressor, which they relate specifically to “blacks in America today”; the political 
nature of writing and its implication in social conflicts and asymmetrical power 
relations; the collective value and political expression of writing, as “literature is the 
people’s concern”  (Kafka 16-17).  Alternatively, as they summarize minor literature 
themselves, it is “the deterritorializiation of language, the connection of the individual 
to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation” (18).  These 
are precisely the terms M. Karenga uses to define black art in The Norton Anthology 
of African American Literature (1997 1973-1977).  Jameson similarly privileges 
resistant discourse which he also explicitly associates with “black language,” one of 
the “still vital sources of language production” (Political 87), prior to its assimilation 
by dominant language use.
129 The 1999 Random House edition features an excerpt from the review in The 
Progressive describing it as a “spiritual autobiography,” and the publisher describes it 
as a “classic biography.”  Sundquist points out that James Weldon Johnson’s 
Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man (1912) embodies a “strange combination of 
fiction and cultural analysis” (6).  His analysis similarly suits Cleaver’s own writing, 
suggesting that black literature in the U.S. shares common genre combinations and 
likely for comparable historical conditions, constraints, and resistances to being black 
in America.  With regard to conventional covers, Mumia Abu-Jamal’s Live From 
Death Row (1996) similarly deploys his image on the cover.  The jacket of Soul on 
Ice is such an icon of revolutionary prison writing that it is cited in an animated film 
distributed on the Internet for the on-li e music service Napster, which returned as a 
pay service after a 2001 court decision famously ceased its free file sharing network.  
The short film “Jailbreak” has the Napster mascot escape from prison and shows his 
cell with a copy of “Bad as Ice” on a shelf, the cover featuring the face of a man with 
an Afro.  
130 Kasia Boddy gestures toward the self-absorbed character of Armies in “Shards of 
God:  An Epinician to the Heroes of the Peace-swarm” (1999), pointing out that while 
Mailer casts himself as an Emersonian Representative Man, others played far greater 
roles but downplayed them, as Ed Sanders does in Shards of God.
131 Didion’s description from her New York Times Review of the novel appears on 
the cover of numerous editions of Mailer’s book.  The veracity of that assessment is 
Robert Merrill’s line of inquiry and conclusion in “Mailer’s Sad Comedy:  The 
Executioner’s Song” (1992) one of the few essays to disregard the “true life novel” 
aspects of the text and emphasize instead its overall aesthetic structure.
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132 Gilmore reiterates this point in an interview with his lawyer Ron Stanger that 
features one of his poems.  He describes writing the poem because “I get irritable at 
the noise I have to listen to, toilets flushing, water pipes jarring, stupid conversations, 
screened conversation.”  The poem begins, “Dark thots of mayhem on a cold steel 
nite,/ when the little noises won’t let you sleep.”  He says, “I would love an absence 
of sound so profound I could hear my blood.”  Gilmore’s part in this interview ends, 
“On the seventeenth of January I hope to hear my last harsh noise” (773-74).  The 
scene not only reinforces that it is the “noise” Gilmore seeks to escape, but that it 
saturates his own prison writing as well.  Also, it is noteworthy that it is not complete 
silence he desires but an absence of all noise except his own, a sociopathic 
characteristic.  Stanger offers only, “Hum, it’s a good poem.”  Schiller complains that 
the “lawyers were hopeless as journalists” (835)—they are apparently similarly 
inadequate as reviewers of poetry.  Schiller himself does no better, admitting upon 
receiving a different Gilmore poem that he “wasn’t sure what to make of it” (737).
133 The epistolary convention sees fuller development in the book-length collections 
of George Jackson’s Soledad Brother (1970) and Jack Henry Abbott’s In the Belly of 
the Beast (1981), the latter edited by Mailer.  That editing and Abbott’s subsequent 
release made Mailer a hero to some prisoners—if less so in the popular media 
(Franklin Prison Literature xiii), given that Abbott subsequently killed a man in a 
fight.  Prisoner and writer Paul St. John in “Behind the Mirror’s Face” (1994) claims, 
“With Mailer for an editor I’d write my way out of hell” (119).  However, St. John’s 
claim of Mailer’s editorial power here also calls into question the degree to which 
Gilmore’s—or Abbott’s, for that matter—words are really Mailer’s, though Mailer in 
both instances downplays his redaction of character and text (Executioner’s 1052; 
Abbott ix-xv).  In this analysis, the authenticity of the carceral experience is less the 
stake, else it might be more relevant that Mailer spends a day in jail as chronicled in 
Armies of the Night—and nearly does so at the Democratic National Convention, as 
described in Miami and the Siege of Chicago, both published the same year as Soul 
on Ice.  Instead, this chapter is guided by the trafficking back and forth between 
imagination and history as these two texts offer a deployment of carceral identity and 
the resistance to it.
134 John Hersey famously denounced Mailer (as well as Capote) for mixing fiction 
and non-fiction in “The Legend on the License” (1980).  Jonathan Dee offers a more 
nuanced critique of that method in “The Reanimators:  On the Art of Literary 
Graverobbing” (1999).  On the other hand, Robert Merrill largely takes the “tru ” 
aspect of the novel at face value in “Mailer’s Sad Comedy:  The Executioner’s Song,” 
and Mark Edmundson in “romantic Self-Creations:  Mailer and Gilmore in The 
Executioner’s Song” (1990) calls attention to its lies of omission while accepting the 
truth of what it does say (442-443).
135 Anti-Oedipus was of course initially released and subsequently translated to 
English contemporary to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, and Foucault wrote a 
preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s book.  In the introduction to his wn text, Foucault 
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emphasizes that his “history of the present” is invested deeply with illustrating a 
“political anatomy” productive of autonomy, in which “the soul is the prison of the 
body” (30-31).  He echoes this claim in the preface to Anti-Oedipus (xiii), as well he 
should, given that resisting what all three perceive as the fascism of autonomy is 
Deleuze and Guattari’s very project.  The rigorous critique of atomistic subjectivity, 
part and parcel with much French critical theory of the 1960s and 1970s, met a 
formidable obstacle in the rhetoric of individual autonomy so prevalent in U.S. 
culture.  Cleaver and Mailer use “schizophrenia” as a pejorative, but Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theorization of schizophrenia invites more positive associations with the 
lived contradictions of plural selfhood and identification across boundaries of 
difference, matters upon which social change likely depends.  The question then 
becomes not whether the U.S. is schizophrenic, but is it schizophrenic enough?
136 Alan Sheridan translates Lacan’s manque as “lack”—with the exception of “the 
expression, created by Lacan, ‘manque-à-être,’ for which Lacan himself proposed the 
English neologism ‘want-to-be’” (xi).  In his translation, Bruce Fink similarly 
clarifies “want in being or want to be” as distinct from “lack of being” (103).  
Without the dashes, the phrase emphasizes lack more than the impossible desire to fill 
the lack; with the dashes, then, manque-à-être emphasizes the want rather than the 
lack in Lacanian subject formation.  Given the degree to which Gilmore defines 
himself in his want to not be, his character might be best understood to be mobilized 
by a manque-à-n’être-pas.  This is distinct from the Freudian death drive in the 
degree to which it is the “noise” of other voices Gilmore seeks to leave, escaping into 
an imaginary unity of spirit where he is whole, the only voice, his.  Gilmore’s death is 
secondary to the degree to which he wants to opt out of history and its language of 
others.  
137 It is of some small interest that the psychoanalytic emphasis on the family does 
complicate the multiple available identities of the invoked characters of Go Down, 
Moses, particularly Carothers McCaslin, Eunice, and Tomasina.  In the incest he 
commits, McCaslin is not his own father or son, but he is his daughter’s father and his 
daughter’s rapist, his daughter’s father and grandfather, becoming retroactively the 
All -Father.
138 A passage in Anti-Oedipus opening with “the goal of schizoanalysis” ends with a 
quote from Arthur Rimbaud’s Season in Hell (1873):  “I am of a race inferior for all 
eternity. . . .  I am a beast, a Negro,” and Deleuze and Guattari repeat that quote of 
cross-race identification and self-abnegation three times in Anti-Oedipus (85-86, 105, 
277).  Given their theorizing of minor literature, with its collective enunciation and de 
facto politicization, and their association of such writing with “blacks in America 
today” (Kafka 16), it is not surprising that they turn to a citation of blackness as a 
primary illustration of the sort of cultural investments that lead to social repression 
and its internalization, for which schizoanalysis offers the best practice.  Nor is it 
surprising that they turn to Rimbaud for such an example, who “admired the hardened 
convict on whom the prison door will always close,” (Season 51), who declares in 
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Lettre du Voyant (1871), “Je est un autre” (135) and spent a week in prison a year 
prior.  Deleuze and Guattari find in Rimbaud a “white negro” preceding Mailer’s by 
three quarters of a century.
139 The pledge of allegiance encapsulates this sense nicely, in which individuals 
affirm their commitment to a unified belief in “one nation, under God”—a unity, 
singularity, and deification largely at odds with the subsequent and final line, “with 
liberty and justice for all.”  These connotations of paranoia are identified largely in 
the explication of Deleuze and Guattari’s work.  Eugene W. Holland describes 
Deleuzo-Guattarian paranoia as implicated in semiotics that are “permanently fixed 
and exhaustively defined by a supreme authority, figure-h ad, or god” (3).  Žižek 
traces this sense to Lacan, in whose mirror stage “identity and alienation are thus 
strictly correlative” (Sublime 24).  
140 As determined in Coffin v. Reichard (1944), “A prisoner retains all the rights of an 
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him 
by law.”  However, that affirmation of rights must be read in conjunction with Price 
v. Johnston (1948):  “Lawful incarceration brings about the ncessary withdrawal or 
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system.”  Prisoners’ rights as citizens are both retained and 
withdrawn.
141 Cleaver further claims that the “ghost of John Brown is creeping through 
suburbia” (Soul on Ice 110), an image he returns to in his Post-Prison Writings:  “a 
second Civil War, wit thousands of white John Browns fighting on the side of the 
blacks, plunging America into the depths of its most desperate nightmare on the way 
to realizing the American Dream” (165).  Rubin Carter in his biography, T e 
Sixteenth Round (1974), quotes at length from a statement John Brown made the 
morning of his execution (233).  In an echo of both, Deleuze and Guattari draw 
relationships between if not equate outright the political radical with the black 
prisoner.  In calling to “become black like John Brown.  George Jackson” (270), 
blackness marks not abjectness or complex inferiority but revolutionary 
consciousness, even as it overwrites skin with politics.  The tactic of cross-racial 
identification founded on political action was a political imperative for Deleuze and 
Guattari, according Philip Goodchild.  He writes that through the 1960s and 1970s, 
they directed their philosophical work “with hopes of liberating minorities, the 
mentally ill, and prisoners” (45).  However, the limits of such alliances as claimed by 
philosophers and their critics are drawn in an example Goodchild poses, where in 
beginning with court verdicts, he reads through Deleuze’s critique et clinique (1993) 
and Difference and Repetition (1994) to perform a deconstruction of judgment and 
justice whereby he concludes, “Injustice itself becomes just” (37).  What liberatory 
impulse is enacted here is unclear.  The difficulties of equating philosophical 
discourse with a particular social project have proven legion, and Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, and Žižek are among the most visible critics arguing for the political 
efficacy of richly theorized radical democracy.
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142 His biographer and critic Kathleen Rout proves less prepared to disown the 
psychoanalytic imperative of tracing contemporary problems to childhood.  Her 
Eldridge Cleaver claims an effort to interpret its subject not only as “one man, but 
also to gain a hint of the compound influences of childhood and family, 
socioeconomic status, current events, and peer personalities that condition all our 
decisions and beliefs” (ix).  However, in her reading of the passage from Soul on Ice
condemning this Freudian inquiry, Rout describes Cleaver’s critique in 
psychoanalytic terms, as “evasive,” a matter of “defenses and rationalizations” (13, 
14).  
143 This section of “The Flashlight,” with its vanishing wild spaces, hunters, Indian 
burial ground, and rumors of hidden gold, echoes Faulkner’s fiction, especially Go 
Down, Moses.  Thomas W. Benson’s review of Mailer the same year in the Quarterly 
Journal of Speech describes Mailer in terms that strongly recall Faulkner as well:  
“America has discovered the man to read this spoor—a bourbon-breathed 
backwoodsman who can tell the tale of a leaf, a footprint, a week-old pile of ashes.  
He has a tendency to ramble, and he is full of tall tales, but he alone knows the 
mystery.  Norman Mailer” (330).  Benson reads Mailer as writing history as a novel 
like Ike McCaslin tracking the bear.  How Cleaver writes at times and how Mailer is 
written about suggest thatFaulkner presents such a definitive U.S. literary figure that 
later writers mimic him or are cast in his shadow by critics.
144 The analysis has a clear debt to Fanon.  Cleaver refers to The Wretched of the 
Earth as the “Black Bible,” and the relationship between black and white men in 
Cleaver’s model here demonstrates how “historical and economic realities come into 
the picture” when Fanon adds race to Lacanian identification (Black Skin 161).  The 
anxiety of white masculinity produces its own fulfillment:  “Projecting his own 
desires onto the Negro, the white man behaves ‘as if’ the Negro really had them” 
(165).
145 Cleaver’s paean to black women in the final chapter reads as something of an 
apology both to this general matter and to Cleaver’s own involvement with Beverly 
Axelrod, his white lawyer.  His painfully derisive descriptions of homosexuality are 
both numerous and have received comment elsewhere, as in Amy AbugoOngiri’s 
“We Are Family:  Miscegenation, Black Nationalism, Black Masculinity, and Black 
Gay Cultural Imagination” (1998) and Shelton Waldrep’s “‘Being Bridges’:  
Cleaver/Baldwin/Lorde and African-American Sexism and Sexuality” (1993).  What 
has not received much attention is how the predatory homosexuality endemic among 
men in prison might form Cleaver’s perceptions of homosexuality. 
146 William Cosgrove in “Modern Black Writers: The Divided Self” (1973) and E.S. 
Mill er in “Cleaver and Juminer: Black Man and White Woman” (1977) similarly 
suggest the use-value of the model of divided identity.  The heuristic provides further 
illumination for Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses.  Cleaver argues that white masculinity 
must seek to test its power, its “potency through a confrontation with other strength,” 
and thereby becomes “addicted to a masculine-imaged sport, become[s] a big-game 
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hunter, outdoorsman, mountain climber” in an attempt to blind itself to its impotence 
(183).  This formulation critically informs the character of the woodsmen Ike 
McCaslin in Go Down, Moses and, in its entirety, the whole set of relationships 
among the McCaslins, Beauchamp and Edmonds both.
147 The bodily convulsions brought on by the tension of history also have a parallel in 
The Executioner’s Song.  Larry Schiller debates whether or not to agree to sell his 
firsthand exclusive account of the execution for $125,000, and his deliberations focus 
on “true history” versus “journalistic crap,” a tension that he int rnalizes.  He finally 
rejects the monetary reward, quite literally rejecting such crap in a wild episode of 
diarrhea before he turns down the deal (857-59).
148 Cleaver’s analysis of racial struggle in the 1960s leads him to an extended quote 
from Frederick Douglass’ Fourth of July speech juxtaposed with a gloss of Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin.  That turn to Stowe anticipates her critical re-evaluation in the 1980s, 
though his reading of the popular response to Uncle Tom’s Cabin remains flat-out 
inaccurate:  the “most alienated view of America was preached by the Abolitionists, 
and by Harriet Beecher Stowe in her Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  But such a view of 
America was too distasteful to receive wide attention” (76).  Stowe’s novel of course 
received very wide attention in terms both sales and popular comment upon its 
publication.
149 Cleaver and Mailer specifically relate a national schizophrenia to international 
wars and domestic race relations, to a schism in the American dream.  Explicit in 
Deleuze and Guattari, and implicit in aspects of Cleaver’s and Mailer’s discursive 
techniques, is a sense of schizophrenia as the recognition of the division of the One, 
be it self or nation.  Another way to frame the contemporary use-value of 
schizophrenia as variously offered by Cleaver, Mailer, and Deleuze and Guattari is to 
think of imprisonment as the means by which a nation wages war on its own people.  
The necessity of framing the interrogation of such historical practices in a 
psychoanalytic manner is perhaps most clear when that view shifts to international 
warfare as it has been conducted thus far by the U.S. in the twenty-first century.  In 
March 2003, President Bush declared war on an Iraqi nation metonymically produced 
through the hailing of its dictator Saddam Hussein, a proxy for Osama bin Laden, and 
a return to the goal of Hussein’s execution that Bush’s own father, President George 
H. W. Bush, failed to accomplish in the prior Gulf War.  The “war on terror” has been 
cast in terms of violence directed toward individuals—bin Laden, Hussein—even as a 
far broader group of people in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere have actually faced 
the bullets and bombs of U.S. violence.  Bush further sought to imagine a unified 
U.S.,rhetorically transforming diversity and dissent into a singular national identity, 
the U.S. as “us,” the eye of the nation-as-President sternly fixed on redeeming his 
father’s unfulfilled desire.  We can then understand the nation’s contemporary 
paranoia as oedipalization, the fictional unity and factual violent expression of 
imperialist hegemonic U.S. domestic and foreign policies, a war waged on black men 
and women at home and Arabs abroad.
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150 Of course, if critics and historians were to discount the writing of all who have 
committed crimes or reprehensible acts, we would presumably not read anything from 
Louis Althusser, who strangled his wife, Martin Heidigger, whose Nazi affiliations 
are a matter of record, or from any slave owners, such as the framers of the 
Constitution—or, for that matter, watch Roman Polanski films or listen to Led 
Zeppelin or R. Kelly albums, all of whom faced statutory rape accusations.
151 In An American Dreamer:  A Psychoanalytic Study of the Fiction of Norman 
Mailer (1980), Andrew Gordon touches on Mailer’s loose use of “schizophrenia,” 
and he associates it with the tension between author and nation, between liberty and 
despotism (187).  However, lacking a Deleuzo-Guattarian sense of the term, the 
cultural and historical ramifications remain hazy.
152 Mailer clarifies his response as “a miserable recognition, and on many a count, for 
if he felt even a hint this way, then what immeasurable tides of rage must be loose in 
America itself?” (51).  He reiterates the point later even as he defends its basis:  “Of 
course that was why he was getting tired of hearing of Negro rights and Black 
Power—every Black riot was washing him loose with the rest, pushing him to that 
point where he would have to throw his vote in with revolution—what a tedious 
perspective of prisons and law courts and worse; or stand by and watch as the best 
Americans white and Black would be picked off, expended, busted, burned and 
finally lost” (187).  Mailer wants to cover his bases, defend even a borderline racist 
refusal to identify himself with blackness in terms of hesitant sympathy for 
revolution.  “And all the Left-wing Blacks would be his polemical associates—the 
Lord protect him!” (214).  Cleaver’s presidential campaign with the Peace and 
Freedom party demonstrated an alliance between its mostly white membership and 
the Black Panthers.  Unlike Cleaver, and unlike Deleuze and Guattari, Mailer is less 
prepared to allow a tenuously shared radical project supersede race in identification.  
There is no ghost of John Brown circulating in Mailer’s writing.
153 Merrill reads this episode as “perhaps the most powerful in all of Mailer’s writing” 
(141), which may or may not be the case.  He also identifies the scene as “perceived 
in much the same way by everyone present,” which is not accurate.  On a side note, 
the assessment of the literary execution of the scene may be pertinent to the 
resemblance between the writer of the book and its subject. Two of Gilmore’s writers, 
Barry Farrell and Larry Schiller, agree that when Gilmore describes the murders he 
commits, he adopts the “same narrative style every hustler and psychopath would 
give you of the most boring, or the most extraordinary evening […]  Episodic and 
unstressed” (798).  It is a rhetorical gambit on Mailer’s part in that if his own highly 
episodic narrative is similarly unstressd and flat in its account of both the boring and 
extraordinary, then the narrator of the novel is as psychopathic as Gilmore.  Mailer’s 
biographer Mary V. Dearborn misses this point when she lauds the “equal emphasis” 
of “each detail of the story,” particularly surrounding Jensen’s murder (348).  
Regardless, “psychopath” is not a term from which Mailer—a rested once for 
stabbing his wife—necessarily withholds in describing himself.
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154 Mailer’s use of news excerpts works slightly differently than that of John Dos 
Passos in U.S.A. (1937).  The accounts in the earlier novel provide a texture of the 
historical real, commenting on coincident events as a gesture between history and 
fiction and a testament to the “truth” of the latter.  The Executioner’s Song, with its 
emphasis on the narrativization of history, attests not only to the narrative 
equivalency between the novel’s events and the news excerpts, but mutual causality.  
By including more complete excerpts and the process of narrativization, Mailer’s 
gambit is that of realer-than-thou, which, in a different context, Phil Barrish suggests 
is a transhistorical phenomenon in U.S. letters in American Literary Realism, Critical 
Theory, and Intellectual Prestige, 1880-1995 (2001).
155 That Vintage International imprint, also borne on 1990s editions of Faulkner 
novels, effectively has become Random House’s latest incarnation of the Modern 
Library series, which became a contributing force in consolidating mid-twentieth 
century U.S. literature, as I suggest in “Go Down, Moses [and Other Stories]:  
Bibliography as a Novel Approach to a Question of Genre.”
156 The Armies of the Night offers similar challenges of genre.  Its own categorization 
is “History/Writing” and its jacket praise includes that of The New York Times Book 
Review, “Only a born novelist could have written a piece of history so intelligent, 
mischievous, penetrating, and alive.” Time offers that the book is “worthy to be 
judged as literature.”
157 Gregg Easterbrook makes the same point in the exact same terms in “It’s Unreal:  
How Phony Realism in Film and Literature is Corrupting and Confusing the 
American Mind.”  Easterbrook castigates another “true story” account of multiple 
murder in terms he might apply to Mailer as well, suggesting that In Cold Blood
muddies “the lines of realism and the invented not so much in the pursuit of an 
otherwise unobtainable truth (as Truman Capote initially claimed about In Cold 
Blood) but in pursuit of an improved story that would call attention to the writer (as 
Capote later admitted was his real goal)” (42).  
158 Mark Edmundson views the bond between writer and written as that of “Romantic 
Self-Creations:  Mailer and Gilmore in The Executioner’s Song,” an account Merrill 
also suggests.  Guest goes the furthest in reading author and object alike as in the 
romantic outlaw’s double-bind of resistance.  If Gilmore disavows his own self-
determination and agency, he might receive a life sentence; if he declares himself the 
sum of his actions, he pits himself against the state in a contest that at once asserts his 
importance (he is so dangerous that the state must kill him) and condemns him (he is 
so dangerous that the state must kill him).  Guest in his critique conflates character 
and author:  “The more Gilmore and Mailer advertise their outlaw status, the more 
they participate in the work of the police” (168).  However, it hardly seems necessary 
to read author and subject in the same double-bind, particularly as it is Gilmore who 
actually is killed by the authorities.
159 Later, Gilmore again describes his soul as more “evil” than most, that he is 
“further from God,” and “would like to come closer” (833), a description that 
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resonates with the words of another prisoner from the documentary The Farm
examined in the next chapter.  The inmate John Brown admits that he would like to 
live like Christ, but he does not know “if I got that far yet.”  
160 Gordon makes that confluence of personal and collective unconscious the starting 
point of An American Dreamer (15).
161 When the policeman Nielsen questions Gary as to why he shot the two men, Gary 
can never offer any satisfying answer as to why them, why there.  “I don’t know.  I 
don’t have a reason,” “I don’t know,” “It was there” (288).
162 According to the on-line magazine Crime, Gilmore’s case set a precedent for 
voluntary executions, which accounted for approximately one-eighth of executions in 
the late 1990s (Phillips).  Rideau offers a rich analysis of the social poverty of life 
imprisonment in “Conversations with the Dead,” an essay that closes with an 
exchange between two prisoners serving life sentences at Angola:  “‘You know,’ 
Billy said, ‘I’m convinced that Gary Gilmore was trying to tell us something.’” 
Rideau responds with a simple, “Yep” (Life Sentences 71).  That 1978 Angolite article 
won the American Bar Association’s Silver Gavel Award, given to the 
“communications media that have been exemplary in helping to foster the American 
public’s understanding of the law and the legal system” (ABA).  This was the first 
time a prisoner had ever received it.
163 The role of the mirror in self-identification resonates not only with Lacan’s “The 
Mirror Stage” and its own deployment of the trope of the prison of individuality, but 
with a case study of a prisoner’s treatment described in a 1970 ACA presentation.  
The prisoner resembles Gilmore—he is 34 years old, has had numerous arrests, and is 
a “hardened criminal, arrogant, egotistical and occasionally assaultive” (89).  He 
regularly manipulates and outwits his therapist until the latter holds their sessions on 
opposite sides of a one-way mirror, communicating by intercom, the therapist 
observing the prisoner, the prisoner watching his reflection (92-93).  
164 The image also appears in a poem by Angola prisoner James E. Sutton Jr., #96250:  
“There’s a prison inside my body,/ That has a cell with no key” (The Angolite
Nov/Dec 1983 116).
165 In 1977, a Pennsylvania Pardon Board member first correlates economic trends 
and incarceration rates, then blithely suggests that all prisoners are murderers (ACA 
58). 
166 Given Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song and its thousands and thousands of 
narrative shots drawn from “fifteen thousand pages” (1051), the degree to which its 
structure owes much to the rhetoric of film deserves more exploration.  Also, it is 
worth noting that the material of Gary Gilmore’s story is divided among three of the 
largest media conglomerates.  Mailer’s novel is published by Random House, and 
Doubleday, a division of Random House, offers Mikal Gilmore’s account.  However, 
the German media giant Bertlsmann is the parent company of Random House.  
HBO, a division of Time Warner, produced and distributed the television movie 
adaptation of Shot in the Heart, while the television movie version of The 
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Executioner’s Song is an NBC Universal (General Electri) property.  With Viacom, 
Disney, Sony, and News Corp. (Fox), thes ven companies control the vast majority 
of media communications in the U.S. and internationally, their collective holdings 
including film, television, music, and book publishing—both the intellectual 
properties and the means of distribution, from theaters, to video rentals, to the video 
stores, to cable companies, to the cable itself.  
167 The raw numbers of crimes committed by categories are f om the U.S. Department 
of Justice.  In 1980, 173,300 people were in state prisons for violent crimes, 89,300 
for property crimes, 19,000 for drug crimes, and 12,400 for public order crimes.  In 
1999, there were 570,000 people imprisoned for violent crimes, 245,000 for property 
crimes, 251,200 for drug crimes, and 120,600 for public order crimes (“Number of 
Persons in Custody”).  The overall population of the U.S. increased by almost 25%
over those two decades, and I have adjusted the proportional increases in the 
categories to account for that population growth.
168 In 1968, the president of the American Correctional Association addressed how 
“the halfway house movement” had shifted from supervised by religious 
organizations to state-run facilities (ACA 1968 19).  The proceedings of the annual 
conferences of the American Correctional Association from 1968 to 1979 
demonstrate a number of panels discussing community-based alternatives to 
imprisonment, though by 1977 more discussions focused on prison overcrowding due 
to the increasing number of offenders sentenced. 
169 Then U.S. Attorney, former U.S. Associate Attorney General, and later New York 
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani’s opening remarks at the height of the Reagan era prove 
a rare exception, as he points to the increasing prison population as the cause for 
decreasing crime.  He describes criminality as a matter of the “soul” and of 
individuals rather than social groups (ACA 1985 1-3).  Indeed, the only general 
addresses that maintain such a conservative tone during this time are those of federal 
officials from the Reagan and Bush administrations.
170 The meeting that year staged “The Great Debate” concerning sentencing practices,
positioning law professor Michael Tonry against Bruce Fein of the radical 
conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation, with Norval Morris moderating.
Tonry cites the raced results of dramatically expanded incarceration and senses a “sea 
change,” as even Republican lawmakers such as Orrin Hatch question the legitimacy 
of increased sanctions.  Fein knocks down a few straw men, such a twice citing a 
lack of polls “clamoring for the release of inmates” and pointing to Adolf Eichmann 
as an example of a prisoner—which Tonry (rightly) derides as a “bizarre, Willie 
Horton-type comparison” (95-106).
171 He returns to this point in his keynote address the subsequent year, when he offers 
an anecdote of two women, one released from jail and the other leaving gang life.  
Each responds to mentorship and joins a larger community, a “we.”  Wilkinson 
claims that we “recognize ourselves in these stories,” though the identification is with 
the mentoring organization, not the women themselves (ACA 1998 11).  This differs 
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from the more radical suggestion to identify with prisoners, which he makes in his 
speech the previous year, itself an echo of the call for prison administration and staff 
to identify with prisoners offered in 1972 ACA presentation (cf. n. 118).  
172 Such corporate integration and the formation of media conglomerates can lend 
itself to conspiracy theory regarding cultural production in the vein of Adorno and 
Horkheimer.  Certainly, the mergers have a clear economic downside in terms of 
inflated CEO salaries coupled with the layoffs that occur in corporate mergers.  The 
degree to which vertical and horizontal monopolies limit artistic freedom is a far 
more complex matter.  For example, Garbus offers accolades of the Time Warner 
cable company HBO in interview:  “HBO is a very special place.  They really support 
the filmmaker’s vision.  They give you the support you need, and if your film wants a 
longer schedule because it’s gonna be a better film with a longer schedule, they’ll 
give that to you.  They’ll give you another year.  And their notes are always so 
helpful and great.  It was like heaven making a film with them” (Stubbs 122). On the 
other hand, Rupert Murdoch’s Fox News has tilted television news to conservative 
punditry.
173 American History X and The Hurricane also draw attention to cameras and screens 
to represent their own mediation.  Seth (Ethan Suplee), one of Derek’s white 
supremacist soldiers, has a small video camera with which he records their gang’s 
destruction of a convenience store, and the shooting of that scene is conducted with 
rapid pans and hand-held cameras.  Several scenes in The Hurricane feature Carter 
watching black and white television.  Calling attention to the mediation of the camera 
and the screen is a double gambit:  either everything is a projection, and the film is as 
real as the news, or the presence of the camera in some scenes means that its absence 
means the action is really real.  Both alternatives underscore their own reality.
174 Though under-utilized as such, Certeau’s rich description of urban subjectivity 
seems a particularly apt model for cultural analysis.  In The Practice of Everyday Life, 
he describes in the chapter “A Walk in the City” a model of selfhood that fuses city 
culture with the Lacanian unconscious structured as a language.  Certeau’s model can 
be illustrated as a Bil Keane Family Circus single panel cartoons depicting in a dotted 
line the wanderings of the ever grade school-aged Billy.  Some presumably 
straightforward errand precipitates a path that crosses and recrosses itself repeatedly, 
an exploration that maps the environment, with his position at the end of the path 
concluding with some pithy saying.  For example, if directed to find his brother in the 
next room, Billy might search all over the neighborhood, jumping fences and 
climbing trees outside to return indoors and say, “I couldn’t find him!”  However, the 
closing enunciation depends entirely on the wandering trail visible in the single panel 
even as Billy responds to his mother.  In effect, the path mobilizes Billy.  This panel 
of the dotted path in The Family Circus as an exemplar “walk in the city” at once 
draws attention to the Freudian associations—Certeau describes the spacial location 
as fort-da—and dismisses the Oedipal frame of son and mother as irrelevant.  It is the 
son’s path, not the son’s relationship with the mother, that is important in the mise- n-
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scene.  According to Certeau, various meanings proliferate in the to and fro of the 
paths of city pedestrians, the walk itself, the crimes, graffiti, and other semantic acts 
that resist textualization (102).  That basis for subjectivity shares a family 
resemblance with Deleuze and Guattari’s “schizophrenic out for a walk.”  Space 
supersedes language and movement trumps stasis in such cultural critique.
175 Reviews in Time, The Chicago Sun-Times, and Arena Magazine draw attention to 
the film’s racial ambiguities or offer an outright negative response (Corliss 100, 
Ebert, Lentini 52).  Lentini proposes that the film features a retrograde American 
history of racism, though some other reviewers offer acclaim.
176 Lentini cites a Beat Magazine review as describing the Amnesty International 
plans (52).  An on-line forum of predominantly young adult film viewers mentions 
that the film both has been and should be screened in high schools as an educational 
tool.  The discussion among seven members began when one post raised the question 
of whether or not the film is based on a true story (For the Ravers).  Sean O’Sullivan 
points out that American History X is “widely used as a basis for discussion across a 
variety of courses in American universities and in other educational settings” (322).
177 American History X proved the divergent point for the careers of its director and 
writer.  The delay and lawsuit labeled Kaye a problem director in the industry, and his 
subsequent film was the highly marginal independent Snowblind (2002), the “true” 
account of the expansion of the U.S. cocaine market in the 1970s.  David McKenna, 
author of the screenplay, saw greater career success in work that neatly divides 
between would-be blockbuster “high concept” films such as S.W.A.T. (2003) and 
edgy films in the vein of American History X such as Blow (2001).  In a curious twist, 
the latter is also a “based on a true story” account of the development of the U.S. 
cocaine market in the 1970s, though its marquee cast (Johnny Depp, Penélope Cruz, 
Ray Liotta) and moderate budget ($30 million) make it the high concept version—
easily summarized, and therefore easily pitched—of the same story.  For more on 
“high concept,” see Justin Wyatt’s High Concept:  Movies and Marketing in 
Hollywood (1994).
178 Rideau, serving a life sentence for murder at the Louisiana State Prison, rose to 
national prominence as the editor of the highly acclaimed prison magazine The 
Angolite.  His journalism there merited him several awards, including the American 
Bar Association’s Silver Gavel Award, and he co-authors with fellow Angolite editor 
Ron Wikberg Life Sentences:  Rage and Survival Behind Bars (1992).  That 
prominence has exacerbated the difficulty of his position.  His fame may preclude his 
release, as several boards have recommended his pardon, but no governor has signed 
it.  According to former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards, “In my judgment, I 
think he has effectively forever barred any possibility for clemency because of his 
self-generated press.  That’s unfortunate, because that should n t be a consideration” 
(The Angolite July/August 1990 34).
179 It received the Grand Jury Prize at the Sundance Film Festival and two Emmy 
Awards, and it was named Best Documentary by The National Society of Film 
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Critics, The New York Film Critics Circle, and The Los Angeles Film Critics 
Association.
180 O’Sullivan offers a related argument of American History X in “Representations of 
Prison in Nineties Hollywood Cinema: From Con Air to The Shawshank Redemption” 
(2001), though his account of the film is both brief and highly derivative of one of his 
sources, an on-line review of the film posted to www.prisonflicks.com.  
181 The representation of Norton’s (white) character in the film resembles the public 
defender Athay’s description of his (black) client, Piere, in The Executioner’s Song.  
Derek is a difficult man, a complex man, but a beautiful man, as the narrative 
chronicles his self-reflection on his racism and the camera lovingly records his body 
in slow motion.
182 Part of the equation of the brothers is conducted through the familiar pairing of 
school and prison.  If Danny does not write the paper, Dr. Sweeney says, “You are a 
ghost at Venice Beach High.”  When Derek describes his imprisonment and the 
principal’s visits, he says, “I read the stuff that Sween y sent me and kept to myself.  
The last six months in that place I was like a ghost.”  Writing and reading, school and 
prison, Danny and Derek—all reflect one another.
183 Such substitution, coupled with the visual power of powerful naked skin captured 
in slow motion on film, is one of the ways in which American History X’s black and 
white sequences owe a debt to Riefenstahl’s work, particularly her account of the 
1936 Olympics in Berlin, a link that is underscored when the camera’s gaze on 
Derek’s body always features his swastika tattoo. 
184 Brooks has fulfilled this role before, as he played Uncle Tom in the television 
adaptation of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel in 1987.
185 The MPAA claims that representations of sex and violence merit similar treatment 
in their ratings decisions, but casual viewing suggest otherwise, as does a 2002 study 
by Ron Leone of 210 sequences from 13 films (2002).
186 The scene is evocative of John Edgar Wideman’s description of how 
imprisonment functions in something very like what I term as the cultural 
imagination.  In a wide-ranging talk that covers much ground in a variety of registers, 
including psychoanalytic, sociological, political, and fictive, Wideman offers the 
following:  
Consider how prisons might function in this dream world.  Think about the 
fact that prison walls serve society, symbolically to segregate good from evil, 
pure from impure, innocent from guilty.  Think about the fact that blacks are 
over-represented in prisons and that prisons are one gender.  Men must go to 
other men for sex, and given this necessity, prisons reify behind their locked 
doors the unspoken drama of homo-er tic interpenetration and exchange—the 
white fantasy of assault by the black males and assaulting black males.  In the 
collective imaginary, prisons become a site of conflicted sado-masochistic 
desire (41).
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Race as a free-floating signifier in its deployment in the film suggests the degree to 
which this rape scene, like the earlier murder that is its pair, capitulates to the fear 
fantasy of being assaulted by black males and the desire fantasy of retaliating in kind.
187 I am grateful to Daniel Richards, a former student of mine, for making this 
observation in a 2003 essay.
188 These ratings are as of the end of 2003.  The list is compiled from user ratings 
based on a minimum of 1250 votes by regularly contributing users and given a 
ranking based on a “Bayesian estimate” that includes factors of the movie’s mean 
rating, the number of votes, the minimum number of votes, and the mean vote among 
all films on the Internet Movie Database (“Top 250 Movies”).
189 That first description is of course the oft-ci ed Hobbesian description, though he 
also includes the terms “isolation” and “poor” to describe living in time of war.  
Given the poverty that contributes to the nasty and brutish condition of isolation in 
imprisonment, prisons in Hobbes’ terms are the places where nation states wage war 
on their own citizens.
190 Mark Golub takes issue with the historical reconstruction in Glory in “History 
Died for our Sins:  Guilt and Responsibility in Hollywood Redemption Histories” 
(1998). In “Legitimation Crisis and Containment:  The ‘Anti-Racist-White-Hero’ 
Film” (1999), Kelly J. Madison points out how “white anti-racist heroes” such as 
Kevin Kline’s portrayal of Donald Woods in Cry Freedom whitewash racial conflict.
191 The journal History and Theory for much of the 1990s grappled with how to “tell” 
history responsibly after the challenges to narration, history, and authoring posed by 
critical theory in a postmodern vein of the 1970s and 1980s.  In a special issue 
devoted specifically to film, Marita Sturken argues in “Reenactment, Fantasy, and the 
Paranoia of History:  Oliver Stone’s Docudramas” (1997) that Oliver Stone’s 
docudramas do not tell the difference b tween imagination and reality.  In an 
interview from the same issue, documentary filmmaker Jill Godmilow sides with 
Paula Rabinowitiz, that the “real” of documentary often follows the conventions of 
fictional narrative film.  Even Liz Stubbs when championing documentary describes 
them in terms quite similar to Rabinowitz’s negative assessment of the truth-val e of 
documentary (xi).    
192 The success of Pulp Fiction (1994) popularized such indebted narrative strategies, 
and from 1996 to 2002, four of the eight Academy Award Best Picture winners have 
departed from conventional (i.e., continuous and chronological) narrative, including 
The English Patient (1996), American Beauty (1999), A Beautiful Mind (2001), and 
Chicago (2002), and the first of these and Shakespeare in Love (1998) are styled 
deliberately as literary packages, based on Michael Ondaatje’s Booker Prize-winning 
novel and Shakespeare, the big gun of the canon, respectively.  The other three Best 
Picture winners are Titanic (1997), Gladiator (2000), and Lord of the Rings:  The 
Return of the King (2003), historical or fantastical epic dramas in the vein of many 
Best Picture winners since 1971.  However, I am not suggesting that any of these are 
art-house films.  All are glossy pictures with marquee actors, big budgets and 
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accompanying production values, soundtrack tie- ns; all can be represented 
sufficiently easily to pitch to two powerful audiences, studio executives and popular 
viewers.  They are, in a term, “high concept” pictures.
193 All of Jewison’s comments on the film are from director’s commentary available 
on the DVD release of The Hurricane.  Such special features are a valuable tool for 
film criticism and theory, though they are far from serving as any authoritative last 
word.  That is, accounting for them presents no return to auteur theory, and it would 
be a mistake to read them as a record of directorial intent; such voiceovers are, after 
all, recorded after the film is complete and included to boost DVD sales.
194 In sorting those various actualities, I draw from Hirsch’s biography of Carter, 
especially Chapters 13 and 14, “Final Judgment” and “The Eagle Rises,” as well as 
Jewison’s directorial comment on the DVD release of the film.  
195 Carter’s argument is more in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that lack is 
not an a priori condition but is instead “created, planned, and organized in and 
through social production […]  It is never primary” (29).  In effect, Carter’s self-
sustaining strategy relies on an anti-Oedipal formulation of desire to maintain his 
Oedipal autonomy, which short circuits itself.  His reintroduction to history occurs 
with his reintegration to social participation outside the prison through freeing the 
blocks to the circulation of desire, which Deleuze and Guattari characterize as the 
first order of schizoanalysis.
196 The cast and crew first tried shooting the second episode with two Washingtons in 
the cell, like the first, but the director felt that it did not work.  Instead, Jewison 
himself stood off-camera in the cell and read the other Carter’s lines, and Washington 
responded to them.  The other Hurricane’s dialogue was looped lat r in post-
production.  Whether historical accident or an unconscious endorsement of 
consciousness made manifest in the social rather than singular, Jewison so 
participating in Washington’s performance of Carter’s mind seems far more Deleuzo-
Guattarian than Lacanian.
197 From 1962 to 1999, three actors have won Academy Awards in Jewison’s films:  
Rod Steiger for In the Heat of the Night (1967), and Cher and Olympia Dukakis for 
Moonstruck (1987).  However, for Washington’s portrayal in this “most original and 
powerful” of scenes, Jewison then ascribes its excellence to the camera and the 
editing.
198 One might differentiate between the intersubjective moment of recognizing the 
self in the other (either a Hegelian or Lacanian recognition), and the transubjective 
moment, where the distinction between “I” and “we” disappears, where “one” is no 
longer separable from “many.”  Lesra’s recognition of himself in Carter is therefore 
an intersubjective awareness, Carter’s identification of participating in a social world 
beyond the self a matter of transubjectivity.  It resembles the point in The 
Executioner’s Song where the writer Farrell in reading and writing Gilmore feels “out 
of himself” (831), meeting the other in a discursive middle ground.
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199 In another connection, Spike Lee, who directed Malcolm X, directed Norton in 25th
Hour (2002), chronicling his character’s last 24 hours before going to prison—a tight 
parallel of Norton’s character in American History X and its chronicle of his 
character’s first 24 hours after prison.
200 Presumably, these are the sort of depictions the American Correctional 
Association seeks to challenge.  The organization’s mission statement as of 2002 
includes eight goals, the sixth of which is to “enhance positive public perception of 
the corrections field” (“Vision Statement”).
201 Understanding the film in these terms challenges O’Sullivan’s claim of a 
subversive subtext inhabiting the rehabilitation narrative of The Shawshank 
Redemption (326-327).  
202 The statement is inscribed above the New York Supreme Court Building, and 
although generally attributed to George Washington, John C. Fitzpatrick’s edition of 
Washington’s September 28, 1789 letter to Edmund Randolph actually reads, “the 
due administration of justice” (emphasis added).  Incidentally, the closing shot of the 
New York Supreme Court motto is a recapitulation of the opening shot of Sidney 
Lumet’s 12 Angry Men (1957), where Henry Fonda leads the jury from a 11-  straw 
vote to convict to a 12-0 verdict of innocence.  Where Lumet’s film opens with the 
quote and reproduces in nearly real time the jury’s deliberations, Jewison closes with 
it and has the film drastically telescope almost two decades of imprisonment.  
203 Carol Clover makes a related argument, though organized around gender in horror 
films, in Men, Women, and Chain Saws (1992).  She argues that two films 
characterize mainstream and marginal representations of the rape-revenge fantasy, 
where a raped woman seeks justice.  In The Accused (1988), Sarah Tobias (Jodie 
Foster) is raped; her attacker gets a light sentence, and she and a female prosecutor 
pursue judicially the men who cheered on the public attack.  A lengthy and dramatic 
legal battle upholds the legitimacy of the legal system, and the closing shot, a long, 
high view of the courtroom, is nearly identical to the closing shot of The Hurricane.  
Clover contrasts this perception of justice with the far more marginal horror film I 
Spit on Your Grave (1978), where the rape victim mutilates and kills her attackers one 
by one.  Her argument seems to apply as well to The Hurricane, that mainstream 
films will uphold rather than challenge social norms.
204 Almost no feature films are shot in the sequence of their final exhibition.  For 
example, in The Hurricane, the looped voiceover provides continuity for the jump 
cuts between the location shots of Carter in prison and the Canadians sending and 
receiving his letters.  The shots for any of the scenes taking place in the prison would 
be filmed together, and the shots of the home in Canada would be shot together as 
well.  Editing would assemble the continuity ofthe footage in post-production.
205 A review in the industry trade Variety claims that the scene “will have viewers 
shaking their fists at the screen” (Lovell).  The Film Journal describes the scene as 
“startling” (Garcia), and Anne S. Lewis addresses it at length in her introductory 
comment preceding an interview with Garbus.
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206 Rideau offers a description of a far more knowledgeable and professional parole 
board at Angola in Life Sentences (124-128).
207 The masculine homosociality of Cool Hand Luke occurs strictly among white 
men, while The Shawshank Redemption initiates the shift to cross-racial 
identification.  As in Soul on Ice (and Anti-Oedipus), the shared carceral identity 
trumps racial difference, though there is the significant lack of the revolutionary 
imperative to social change in Darabont’s film.  Incidentally, the charater of Red
(Freeman)originally was written as a white man, which fosters the unremarked 
nature of racial difference in the film.  With regard to the homosocial affection of the 
scene in The Farm, it is possible that this scene is more about the relationship among 
the men rather than about the men themselves, emphasizing the social investment in 
the connections among the people rather than the individuals.  This would distance its 
representation from the romance of Shawshank and also suggest a social subjectivity 
in line with that of Deleuze and Guattari.
208 The tone here and elsewhere in the narration is reminiscent of Rideau’s writing in 
The Angolite and Wikberg’s in Life Sentences, where each several times recalls 
earlier floods in the history of Angola, in 1912, 1922, 1973, and 1982 (Nov/Dec 1982 
63; 17).
209 Treating prison as a setting and thus one of several formative components in 
narrative representation differs from the arguments of Crowther, Mason, and Rafter 
that the “prison film” is a coherent genre.  Instead, prison is a setting “with strings 
attached,” which shapes but does not wholly determine the sort of stories told in films 
set there.
210 Oliver Stone’s films, particularly Natural Born Killers (1994), are a lightning rod 
for such criticism, as are ambiguously anti-war war films such as Saving Private Ryan
(1999).  
211 Brockway was the president of the National Prison Association in 1898 and 
frequently cited in its annual conferences through the twentieth century as one of its 
most important early leaders.
212 Žižek cites Jacques-Alain Miller’s unpublished seminar differentiating between 
imaginary and symbolic identification (Sublime 105; Looking 135).  
213 Garbus says of her and Stack’s directorial intentions in the film, it was an effort 
“to get a view from the inside—which of course we never can, because we're not 
locked up” (Kaufman).  Rideau is a life prisoner at Angola, and the extent to which 
the direction is his therefore locates the film as prisoner discourse.  However, as he 
was far less a part of the editing, and this was a film Garbus acknowledges as “made 
in the editing room” (Stubbs 120), the film’s position in and out of prisoner discourse 
is ambiguous.
214 This litany of theorized interpretations runs a double risk, on the one hand that of 
specious appropriation, and on the other, a pretense of mastery over a broad array of 
challenging discourses.  Their incorporation here is focused in the confluence of 
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imagined and actual prisonsand the deployment of the carceral identity.   I leave the 
reader to judge the use here less on the breadth of reach than the merit in application.
215 Ethnographic research provides one point of entry to the difficulty of audience, 
and textual study could expand efforts in this vein.  However, understanding books, 
films, performances, and other works as the visible manifestation of a cultural 
imagination, symptomatic of a social unconscious, complicates the use of 
ethnography.  Case studies combined with more empirical work could provide a 
richer texture to cultural fears and desires, what is remembered and believed to be 
true.  Still, the unconscious, whether personal or social, is secret knowledge, 
unknowingly known, and thereby emphasizes the interpretive work of the analyst.
216 The October 9, 1999 performance benefited the Diversity Institute, a division of 
the School of Social Work at the University of Texas at Austin.  It was offered more 
conventionally in September 1999 and then again in January 2004.
217 The field of performance studies emerged in the 1980s as a combination of 
strategies from theater studies and cultural anthropology to describe both social 
events in terms of dramatic convention and drama in terms of cultural work.  The 
conventional origin narrative of the field traces performance studies to Victor 
Turner’s From Ritual to Theatre (1982) and Richard Schechner’s Between Theater 
and Anthropology (1985), radically expanding in the late 1980s and early 1990s with 
the work of Judith Butler, Jill Dolan, Peggy Phelan, Joseph Roach, and others at the 
intersections of critical theory, drama, and gender and cultural studies.
218 Indeed, Kenneth Burke’s contribution in A Grammar of Motives has received 
insufficient notice in this regard.  His model of dramatism, of understanding literary 
and cultural narrative in terms of act, actor, agency, purpose, and scene, anticipates 
critical characteristics of what would become performance studies in the 1980s.
219 Still, this chapter in part describes some of the processes by which staged activism 
works, and doing so may well contribute to analyses of how engaging audiences as 
social bodies can contribute to historical change.  
220 The New Abolitionist, a newsletter sponsored by the same organization that 
sponsors “Live from Death Row,” was among the first to chronicle failures of public
defenders in the 1990s, including a court-appointed lawyer repeatedly falling asleep 
while defending a man facing a murder charge (Roth).  President Bush as Governor 
of Texas in the late 1990s vetoed the “Texas Fair Defense Act,” which would have 
included minimum standards for defense lawyers.  Such cases made broader national 
news in 2001 and 2002, and that publicity helped prompt Bush’s successor Governor 
Rick Perry to sign such a measure.
221 Some of the rhetorical moves made by Thigpen are components of what Jurgen 
Habermas identifies as the “bourgeois public sphere,” “based on the fictitious identity 
of the two roles assumed by the privatized individuals who came together to form a 
public:  the role of property owners and the role of human beings pure and simple” 
(56).  Thigpen moves beyond that fictional unity in describing a social body uniting 
speaker and audience, even as she implies differences of agency between them.
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222 Artaud’s conception of a “Theatre of Cruelty” sought to unite audience and stage 
in a communion initiated by trauma, where the depiction and the tactics of the 
depiction of cruelty preclude disassociative spectatorship.  Elaine Scarry’s magi terial 
The Body in Pain (1985) is a richly theorized investigation of the limits and the 
necessities of textualizing human suffering, and she touches upon ways in which 
actual torture practices have been engaged theatrically.  Anthony Kubiak repeatedly 
conflates and distinguishes torture and theater, demonstrating how understanding 
ritual and spectacle as performance complicates public violence in Stages of Terror:  
Terrorism, Ideology, and Coercion as Theatre History (1991) andAgitated States:  
Performance in the American Theater of Cruelty (2002).
223 Descriptions of forced sex are a regular means of conducting a sort of theater of 
cruelty to confront an audience with pain.  Rideau’s chronicle of rape in men’s 
prisons in “The Sexual Jungle,” originally printed in The Angolite (December 1979) 
and reprinted in Life Sentences, includes the most graphic horror of the collection.  
American History X draws on the social cachet of representing such violence in 
Derek’s prison rape scene.
224 Such an account is in accord with Habermas’ theorization of public spheres as 
enabling rather than precluding social action (240).  He points out that such spheres 
are constructed:  “Today occasions for identification have to be created—th  public 
sphere has to be ‘made,’ it is not ‘there’ any more” (201).  One might contest “any 
more,” the possibility that at some earlier point in history such homogenous publics 
could be engaged in media res; still, public spheres offer a corollary enlargement of 
the social subject.  In a related context—and in yet another example of the 
metaphorical prison over-writing actuality—Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge frame 
such potential spaces of discourse in terms of the prison visiting room.  Such a public 
sphere is constructed wholly by institutional constraints, written with power, 
simultaneously bringing together and keeping apart the inside an  out. In “On Negt 
and Kluge,” Jameson describes the boundaries that distinguish each within that space:  
visitors from outside, prisoners from inside, are constrained within a system of rules 
regulating contact (72).  “Live from Death Row” in its actuality evacuates some of 
the rhetorical force of Negt and Klug’s metaphorical prison.
225 That claim is largely implicit in The Body in Pain.  The interpretation offered here 
clarifies the function of the lengthy discussion of material culture and enlarged and 
material sentience, particularly in Chapter Four, subtitled “Body and Voice in the 
Judeo-Christian Scriptures and the Writings of Marx.”  In referring to Karl Marx’s 
writing, Scarry points out his repeated use of terms of bodily process such as 
production, consumption, reproduction, and circulation to describe social systems of 
economy (245).  The social body in its aggregate becomes a corporate singular 
between “I” and “we.”
226 I do not mean to reduce the value of these two performances to the theoretical 
model of identity as a social body that can be drawn from them.  Performances in 
their production and reception may benefit from terms by which to describe them 
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more richly, but they are more than that vocabulary.  This is especially true for staged 
activism and activist performance, whose effect is offered always with strings 
attached to a particular social project.  While staged activism and activist 
performance differ in the degree to which they imbue their representation with truth-
value and maintain dramatic convention in their performance, both cast their 
audiences as communities, hail them through and unify them by the common identity 
in the social project in which these performances situate themselves.  In the case of 
“Live From Death Row,” that commonality is the opposition to the death penalty held 
by those attending the protest; in Jury Duty, the audience attends the fundraiser in 
support of a social work program.  What works such as these two do most 
successfully is remind their audiences that they are a “we”—plural in number and 
singular in commitment.  Those audiences are reminded of their position and that 
others share it, and in being so reminded, maintain it.
227 Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1935) is 
ostensibly an examination of how the camera in general and the cinema in particular 
fundamentally transform art in terms of originality, authorship, ownership, and 
identification.  The epilogue serves as an indictment of fascism’s deployment of 
politics as art and a call for those who would combat fascism to answer “by 
politicizing art” (242).  That epilogue includes a lengthy excerpt from Filippo 
Marinetti’s Futurist manifesto claiming, “War is beautiful.”  One way to reframe 
Benjamin’s critique to carceral practice is to follow the implications of Chapters Two 
and Three of this dissertation, which suggest that imprisonment is one way in which a 
nation wages war on its own people.  Paraphrasing Marinetti as a way of laying bare 
the unspoken values of fascism then reads as, imprisonment is beautiful for its 
domination over technology, its surveillance cameras, electronically monitored gates, 
lethal injections, and electric chairs.  Prisons are beautiful because they create new 
architecture, geometrical formations ofcells of steel and concrete.  Benjamin’s 
counterattack against fetishizing war reads as, “Imperialistic war is a rebellion of 
technology which collects, in the form of ‘human material,’ the claims of which 
society has denied its natural material.  Instead of raining rivers, society directs a 
human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it 
drops incendiary bombs over cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a 
new way” (242).  Humanity as a sort of raw materi l echoes Cleaver and 
demonstrates Benjamin’s similar use of Marx.  More to the point, the degree of 
relevancy is telling when one replaces war with imprisonment, whereby society 
drains its human resources into prisons; instead of homes, cells; instead of vaccines, 
lethal injections.  
228 The Farm similarly features prison officials rehearsing John Brown’s lethal 
injection, joking among themselves as they do so.
229 However, it is not impossible for such recognition to take place.  Cleaver’s 
rhetorical flourishes and ingenuous loops and dips in prose, as well as his invitations 
to cross-racial identification, invite non-prisoners to recognize themselves in Soul on 
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Ice.  The Farm’s sympathetic portrayal of inmates encourages viewers not only to 
look to them, but in the cases of Tannehill and Witherspoon, look up to them.  
230 The violent police suppression of civil rights activists in particular and black 
neighborhoods in general in the early 1960s merits Rubin Carter’s widely publicized 
comments—taken out of context—regarding killing policemen (The Sixteenth Round 
226), a scene that also appears in the film The Hurricane.  The violence he imagines 
for rhetorical effect became actual shoot- u s between some of the Black Panthers 
and the Oakland police from 1967 to1973, the responsibility for which remains 
bitterly contested, but which contributed to the fear of black militancy exhibited in the 
ACA transcripts in the early 1970s.  The social tensions producing such violence as a 
recurrent phenomenon see their reitera ion in the similarly contested shooting that led 
to Abu-Jamal’s imprisonment. 
231 While the Department of Justice acknowledges these declines (“Property Crime,” 
Serious Violent Crime”), they nevertheless attribute increasing prison and jail 
populations to violent crime:  “Over half of the increase in State prison population 
since 1995 is due to an increase in the prisoners convicted of violent offenses” (“Over 
Half”). However, elsewhere, that increase is described in more specific terms that 
clarify the alleged increase.  “At the end of 2000, 49% of State prisoners were serving 
time for violent offenses, up from 47% in 1995” (“Prisoners in 2002”).  Furthermore, 
other Department of Justice figures demonstrate that the rate of offenses has declined 
steadily, reaching its lowest level ever in 2002 (“Violent Crime”).  In addition, by 
shifting the focus strictly to state prisoners rather than a combination of federal 
prisoners, these particular figures ignore the fact that over 40% of people accused of a 
federal crime are charged with a drug offense (Walters 3)—and other accounts from 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy place this proportion at 60% (Policy
Chapter III).  Some anecdotal evidence suggests that the harsher federal penalties for 
drug offenses encourage zealous or politically aspiring prosecutors to shift trials to 
the federal courts. 
232 Such high visibility users include the death by overdose of college basketball 
player Len Bias in 1986 and the arrest of Washington D.C. Mayor Marion Barry in 
1990.  Incidentally, Bias was later determined most likely to have used powder 
cocaine.  
233 Property crime has declined steadily since prior to the expansion of imprisonment.  
No correlation has been demonstrated between rates of imprisonment and the 
commission of crimes of theft or violence.  Ruth Wilson Gilmore traces the expansion 
of California’s prison system in “Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth” (1998), 
identifying the economic factors and cultural costs of the 22 prisons the state built at 
roughly $300 million a piece in the 1980s and 1990s (171- 2).  Abu-Jamal and 
Morris in the 1990s both point out that the U.S. imprisons its citizens at a rate far 
higher than comparable nations.  There is not only the matter of rates of incarceration 
and length of sentences, but also the variable definitions of crime itself.  As cited in 
Chapter Three, in 1973, the ACA president poses the questions, “Are there some 
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kinds of behavior defined as illegal which the community is now willing to tolerate?  
On the other hand, are there some kinds of behavior which were formerly tolerable 
but are no longer?” (3-4).  While the term “socially constructed” has become passé, 
the president’s view suggests the degree to which prison leadership itself realizes 
crime to be a set of acts historically fluctuating in their definition.  Looking backward 
through the over three decades since her questions, what has become intolerable is 
wholesale and long-term imprisonment demarcating lines of race and class.  In a 
similar vein, an ACA member and Washington D.C. director of corrections in 1976 
claims, “The last decade in this country has been marked by an unprecedented moral 
decadence” (88).  However, he is not referring to drug use, communes, or draft 
dodgers, but to the Vietnam War, Watergate, and corporate and government graft.  He 
observes, “We have too long couched the public discussion of crime either in terms of 
fuzzy abstractions or melodramatic examples of a street mugging” (90).  He argues
instead to shift the emphasis to corporate nd white collar crime. 
234 Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard conclude that rather than incarceration rates 
matching crime rates, unemployment provides the clearest correlation to 
imprisonment patterns.  Western and Petit point out the perceived narrowing of the 
employment gap between white and black men is skewed by the number of black men 
in prison.  
235 Bullins’ life and work provide something of a crucible for some of the historical 
tensions of the late 1960s and 1970s, as well as matters of identity and identification 
raised in Chapters Three and Four.  Richard G. Scharine opens a 1979 essay in which 
he argues for the autobiographical qualities of much of the playwright’s work with a 
description of Bullins as an “ex-Philadelphia street-gang member, ex-Navy boxing 
champ, ex-L.A. college student, ex-San Francisco Black Panther Minister of 
Information” (103)—a description that reads as an amalgam of Eldridge Cleaver and 
Rubin Carter as well, though Scharine mistakenly lists Bullins as Minister of 
Information rather than Culture.  Cleaver was actually Minister of Information.  
Scharine further describes the main character of The Reluctant Rapist as “Bullins’ 
best metaphor yet for the revolutionary artist” (108), another blurring of writer, 
character, and Cleaver.  Bullins replies to Scharine’s observations in terms that echo 
the focus on schizophrenia in Chapter Three—“I believe my characters sometimes 
have multiple identities, as parts of a whole, an ever-changing, interchangeable 
universe, as the points in a vision which expands—dreamlike” (109).  
236 I had the opportunity to teach just such a course in the English Department at The 
University of Texas at Austin in 2001 and 2002.  The course, English 314L:  Literary 
Contexts and Contests, was designed for sophomore English majors; however, 
because it fulfills a university writing requirement, non-majors comprised about half 
of the students.  For the class, I first assigned Franz Kafka’s Penal Colony and the 
“Introduction” and “Panopticism” chapters of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish to 
establish imprisonment as our theme, initiate close reading practices, and provide a 
theoretical framework.  Then, the primary works for the course included William 
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Shakespeare’s The Tempest, Harriet Jacobs’ Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, 
Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses, and Cleaver’s Soul on Ice, all accompanied by surveys 
of their contemporary history and current criticism.  Each reading also was paired in 
the class with a section T.S. Eliot’s Waste Land:  The Tempest with “What the 
Thunder Said,” Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl with “The Fire Sermon,” Go 
Down, Moses with “Burial of the Dead,” and Soul on Ice with “A Game of Chess.”  I 
included The Tempest to introduce the idea of “America” and its literature as a trans-
Atlantic colonial practice; in addition, Shakespeare’s play features numerous images 
of punishment, particularly banishment and confinement.  Then, slavery and 
imprisonment work nearly interchangeably in Jacobs’ narrative.  Class discussions 
those two semesters helped shape my understandings of Faulkner’s and Cleaver’s 
work as offered here in Chapters Two and Three.    
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